[2005] HCATrans 890
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P13 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
DAVID WILLIAM SIDNEY DAVIES
Applicant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Perth No P14 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
FLORENCE GLADYS DAVIES
Applicant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 26 OCTOBER 2005, AT 10.37 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR D. GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR L.M. LEVY on behalf of both applicants. (instructed by Laurie Levy & Associates)
MR D. DEMPSTER: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondents in both matters. (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia)
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Grace.
MR GRACE: Your Honours, could I take you at once to page 51 of the application book in the judgment of the learned President at paragraph 10 at the bottom of that page where his Honour says this:
Consequently, their possession of the drug was exercised with intent to supply it to their son for the purposes of s 6(1)(a): see Urbano v The Queen (1983) 9 A Crim R 170 at 184 and R v Buckley (1979) 69 Cr App Rep 371. This was so notwithstanding that, for the purposes of that section, Tyssul Davies already had a form of possession of the cannabis. The form of possession which he had was different to that proposed to be given to him, being possession as a result of the physical transfer of the drug to him.
It is respectfully submitted that that statement is in error and that the form of possession of the cannabis on the part of Tyssul Davies ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: We have to look at the two statutory definitions, do we not, one to possess and one to supply?
MR GRACE: Yes, we do.
GUMMOW J: It is a mistake to approach this case with some common law notions, if I can put it that way, and what possession in the law is.
MR GRACE: The definition of the word “supply” is set out at paragraph 28 on page 54 of the application book and it is also set out, I might say, at paragraph 9, page 51. That definition, as your Honours would be aware from the judgments, was expanded as a result of a series of decisions in Western Australia, Manisco and Pelham, which followed a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Carey.
Could I refer to that case of Carey (1990) 20 NSWLR 292 at the outset. It is an additional case that I have provided to your Honours this morning. Could I take your Honours to the judgment of Justice Hunt at page 295 at paragraph A. There…
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 890
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the notice of termination was invalid because it was issued for an improper purpose, namely to circumvent the need for a formal disciplinary process that would otherwise have been required under the Act. The court had to determine if the power to terminate employment under section 13(1) could be exercised for reasons other than those contemplated by the general provisions of the Act, or if such an exercise would constitute an abuse of power.
Gummow and Heydon JJ found that the power to terminate employment under section 13(1) of the Act was not unfettered and was subject to the implied limitation that it must not be exercised for an improper purpose. Their Honours reasoned that the State had sought to use the broad power of termination to avoid the procedural protections afforded to public sector employees under other provisions of the Act, which constituted an improper purpose. This reasoning was based on the principle that statutory powers must be exercised in accordance with the purpose for which they were conferred. The court concluded that the notice of termination was therefore invalid.
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