SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 3700 of 2003
| ROBERT ANDREW DAVIES | |
| Appellant | |
| v. | |
| BARLOW PYKE | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | CALLAWAY, BUCHANAN and NETTLE, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 23-24 June 2004 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 22 July 2004 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2004] VSCA 124 | 1st Revision: 26 July 2004 |
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Negligence – Motor vehicles – Defence conducted by counsel briefed for Transport Accident Commission – Whether counsel could announce appearance for Commission – Whether counsel obliged to conduct defence in accordance with defendant’s version of events – Defendant said to be in league with plaintiff – Defendant not called by either side to give evidence – Rule in Jones v. Dunkel (1959) 101 C.L.R. 298 – Whether open to draw inference against plaintiff – Verdict of no negligence on part of defendant not unreasonable.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr R.P. Gorton, Q.C. | Burt & Davies |
| For the Respondent | Mr M.R. Titshall, Q.C. Mr D. Masel | Deacons |
CALLAWAY, J.A.:
I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Buchanan, J.A. I also agree with Nettle, J.A. that the learned trial judge erred in permitting counsel to announce that he appeared for the Transport Accident Commission, as opposed to explaining to the jury that he was briefed on behalf of the Commission to conduct the defence and that the interests of the defendant did not necessarily coincide with those of the Commission. Like the other members of the Court, I would reserve for another day the question whether the absence of the defendant from the witness box in a case like this is something from which it is, or may be, open to draw an inference adverse to the plaintiff.
BUCHANAN, J.A.:
On 16 December 1997, a motor cycle carrying the appellant, whom I shall call “the plaintiff” and the respondent, whom I shall call “the defendant”, crashed on the road between Kinglake and St. Andrews. The plaintiff sustained a fracture dislocation of his right shoulder.
The plaintiff brought proceedings against the defendant for damages. He alleged that he was the pillion passenger on the motor cycle and the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence in controlling the motor cycle. As the motor cycle was registered, the Transport Accident Commission (“the Commission”) was bound to indemnify “the owner or driver” of the motor cycle against any liability in respect of an injury caused by or arising out of the use of the motor cycle[1] and was entitled to defend the proceeding in the name of the defendant.[2] The Commission instructed lawyers who filed a defence on behalf of the defendant admitting that he was the rider of the motor cycle but denying that he was guilty of any negligence.
[1]Section 94(1)(a) of the Transport Accident Act 1986.
[2]Section 94(10)(c) of the Act.
TAC Law Pty. Ltd., the legal representatives appointed by the Commission to act for the defendant, applied for and were granted leave to cease to…
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- AGLC
- Davies v Pyke [2004] VSCA 124
- Case
- [2004] VSCA 124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the counsel's announcement of appearance for the Commission was permissible and whether such counsel was bound to advocate strictly in accordance with Pyke's account of the events. This raised the question of whether Pyke's claim of collusion with Davies could be used to draw adverse inferences against the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court needed to determine whether, given that Pyke did not testify, it was permissible to infer any unfavourable implications for Davies. The court also considered the application of the rule in Jones v Dunkel, which pertains to the drawing of inferences when a party fails to call a witness who could provide favourable evidence.
The court concluded that the counsel's appearance for the Commission was valid, and that the counsel was not obliged to strictly adhere to Pyke's version of events. The court ruled that Pyke's claim of collusion with Davies did not permit an inference against the plaintiff, especially since Pyke did not testify. The court held that the verdict of no negligence on Pyke's part was not unreasonable given the evidence presented. The court found that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and the inferences drawn from it was within a reasonable scope. The court upheld the verdict in favour of Pyke, affirming that there was no negligence on his part in the incident.
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