SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
| S APCI 2014 0103 | |
| BRONWYN DAVIDSON | Applicant |
| v | |
| TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMMISSION | Respondent |
---
JUDGES: | ASHLEY, WHELAN and BEACH JJA | |
WHERE HELD: | BENDIGO | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 9 February 2015 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 13 February 2015 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2015] VSCA 12 | |
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2014] VCC 1130 (Judge Macnamara) | |
---
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION – Transport accident – Serious injury application – Fractured wrist – Consequences of impairment – Application for leave to appeal from order dismissing serious injury application – Application granted – Appeal allowed – Transport Accident Act 1986, s 93.
---
| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicant | Ms J M Forbes SC with Mr M J Hooper | Riordan Legal Pty Ltd |
| For the Respondent | Mr J Ruskin QC with Mr S E Gladman | Wisewould Mahony |
ASHLEY JA
WHELAN JA
BEACH JA:
Introduction
On 24 January 2009, Ms Bronwyn Davidson, the applicant, was involved in a transport accident when a motor vehicle in which she was travelling as a front seat passenger left the roadway and collided with a tree. Immediately before impact, the applicant, in an attempt to protect her face from hitting the dashboard, braced herself by placing her left hand on the dashboard. As a result of the accident, the applicant suffered a fracture of the distal radius and a fracture of the ulnar styloid process of her left wrist.
By an originating motion filed in the County Court on 21 June 2013, the applicant sought leave, pursuant to s 93(4)(d) of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (‘the Act’), to bring proceedings at common law claiming damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident. The application was heard in the County Court at Shepparton on 9 and 10 July 2014. At the hearing of the application, the applicant relied upon paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘serious injury’ in s 93(17) of the Act — namely, ‘serious long-term impairment or loss of a body function’. The body function relied upon by the applicant was the function of the left wrist.
On the hearing of the application, the applicant relied upon two affidavits sworn by herself; an affidavit sworn by the applicant’s mother, Marita Davidson; an affidavit sworn by the applicant’s former secondary school teacher, Julie Wikman; an affidavit sworn by the applicant’s former secondary school career advisor, Kerrie Raglus; and an affidavit sworn by a chef working in Shepparton, Timothy Guppy. The applicant also relied upon various medical and radiological reports. In addition to medical reports prepared by the applicant’s treating doctors and medico-legal specialists retained by the applicant’s solicitors, some of the medical reports tendered by the applicant were medical reports prepared by medico-legal specialists retained by the respondent. The applicant also tendered colour photographs of a surgical scar on her left wrist. The respondent did not tender any evidence. The only witness to give viva voce evidence at the hearing of the application was the applicant.
On 22 July 2014, the judge dismissed the applicant’s…
Continue reading Davidson v Transport Accident Commission
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Davidson v Transport Accident Commission [2015] VSCA 12
- Case
- [2015] VSCA 12
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether Davidson had established that the fractured wrist amounted to a serious injury as defined by the Transport Accident Act 1986. The court needed to determine whether the consequences of the impairment, including the impact on Davidson's physical and psychological well-being, were sufficient to warrant a serious injury declaration. The court also had to consider whether the primary judge correctly exercised their discretion in dismissing the application and whether there were any errors in the application of the law or the assessment of evidence.
The court found that the primary judge had misapplied the relevant statutory provisions in dismissing the application. The court held that the primary judge had failed to adequately consider the totality of the consequences of the impairment and had placed undue weight on certain factors. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision was unreasonable and that the application for leave to appeal should be granted. The appeal was subsequently allowed, and the matter was remitted to the primary judge for reconsideration in light of the court's findings. The court ordered that the primary judge reassess the application for a serious injury declaration, taking into account the correct legal principles and the full extent of the consequences of the impairment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.