Davidson and Comcare
[2004] AATA 262
•15 March 2004
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2004] AATA 262
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2002/233, Q2002/1018
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re ALLAN DAVIDSON Applicant
And
COMCARE
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Ms J Cowdroy, Member Date15 March 2004
PlaceBrisbane
Decision Q2002/233:
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes its decision that the applicant’s request for reconsideration was lodged within time and it remits the matter to the respondent for reconsideration;
Q2002/1018
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review....................(Sgd).......................
J Cowdroy
Member
CATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION – Application to review decisions of Comcare – service related disease – aggravation regarding asthma accepted - request for reconsideration of asthma claim made in time – request for reconsideration of psychological disorder not made in time with no grounds for extension – asthma claim to be reconsidered.
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 s 61, 62, 63, 124, 129
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986
Commonwealth Employees’ Compensation Act 1930 s 10, 16(1)
Freedom of information Act 1982
Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1988 s 62Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Re Hewson v The Australian Postal Corporation (1988) 50 ALD 994REASONS FOR DECISION
15 March 2004 Ms J Cowdroy, Member 1. This decision relates to a hearing on 14 and 28 April 2003. It concerns the review of a decision of Comcare in relation to the applicant's claims for asthma and a psychological condition.
Hearing
2. Mr A C Harding of counsel appeared for the applicant and Mr C J Clark appeared for the respondent. The T-documents were admitted into evidence and were marked as Exhibit 1 (Q2002/233) and Exhibit 2 (Q2002/1018) pursuant to Section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, as well as the following documents:
· Exhibit 3 (a) Statement of the applicant undated
· Exhibit 3(b) Statement of the applicant dated 27 November 2002
· Exhibit 3(c) Statement of the applicant dated 18 February 2003
· Exhibit 3(d) Statement of the applicant dated 7 April 2003
· Exhibit 4 Bundle of medical records
· Exhibit 5 MCRS file for applicant
· Exhibit 6 Report of Dr Gary P Larder dated 20 December 2002
Background
· Asthma
3. The following is not in dispute. The applicant, who was born on 8 January 1944, enlisted in the Australian Regular Army on 28 March 1961 and was discharged in May of 1974 as being medically unfit.
4. In about July of 1975, the applicant lodged a claim for compensation and rehabilitation for asthma on the grounds it was caused by his service in the Army. On 2 July 1976 liability was accepted for aggravation of that condition on the basis that he had a pre-existing condition of allergic rhinitis. Liability was determined to have ceased on 12 February 1976, on the basis of an opinion of Dr M Murphy, dated 12 February 1976.
5. On 19 October 2001 the respondent received a written request from the applicant that his claim for asthma be reconsidered and in support of his claim, he provided a report of Dr C M Evans dated 22 August 2001.
6. On 11 February 2002 a delegate decided not to reconsider the decision of 2 July 1976 on the basis that the applicant had not requested reconsideration of the decision within the period specified in the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988. Further, the delegate determined that it was not appropriate to extend the time in which to allow the request.
· Psychological Condition
7. The applicant lodged an application for compensation and rehabilitation on 27 June 2001 for an injury affecting his mind. Dr G Larder, psychiatrist had provided reports dated 18 October 1999, 25 June 1001 and 29 January 2002. The first two reports had been provided in relation to a claim by the applicant under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 for acceptance of major depressive as war caused.
8. On 31 January 2002, the primary delegate disallowed the applicant's claim for conditions described by Dr Larder as personality disorder and major depressive disorder, the latter being in partial in remission, on the basis that the available medical evidence did not support his claim that the problems were attributable to his service. On 21 October 2002, a Manager Reconsideration affirmed that decision, stating that the claim was out of time. Further the manager reconsideration considered that even assessing the claim on its merits, there was no evidence to indicate that his condition was service related.
The Issues
9. Q2002/233
(a)whether the applicant had requested reconsideration of the decision to cease liability in respect to his asthma within the period specified in the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, and, if not,
(b)whether there are grounds for granting an extension of time in respect to the request for reconsideration.
10. Q2002/1018
(a)whether the applicant's claim for compensation in respect to a psychological illness was lodged with the time limits set out in section 16(1) of the Commonwealth Employees' Compensation Act 1930; and, if not;
(b)whether there are grounds for granting an extension of time for lodgment of a claim.
Evidence
11. Mr Allan Davidson lodged a claim for acceptance of asthma in 1975 on the basis it was related to service. At that time, he was missing one or two days per week from work because of the symptoms of asthma. He was treated for asthma and bronchitis-type symptoms during his service.
12. He consulted Dr M Darwin on 1 July 1974. Dr Darwin recorded a history of taking Ventolin when necessary and Intal for the previous six months. He had consulted Dr Darwin's surgery on six occasions from July 1974 and 31 July 1975 for the purposes of obtaining prescriptions for Ventolin.
13. He could not recall when he changed his address from Stafford Road, Stafford to Coulter Crescent, Northgate East, however it was within 12 months of his discharge. The respondent had notice of his changed address. Although he acknowledged that he consulted Dr J Seymour on 6 January 1976 and Dr M Murphy on 11 February 1976 in connection with his claim, he put the claim out of his mind after attending those appointments. He did not attach any great significance to the fact that the doctors he consulted were specialists who were asked to provide opinions on the status of his asthma and its connection with service.
14. He was not aware of the contents of the report of Dr Murphy who, in effect, had opined that Army conditions did not permanently aggravate his asthma. Although he had no response to his claim he gradually he found other matters took precedence, including marital difficulties and Family Court proceedings. He continued to have symptoms of asthma, which he self-treated by the use of Ventolin, which he could then buy as an "over the counter" product.
15. He had spoken with an officer from MCRS on 18 June 2001 and was told that liability for asthma had been accepted but it had ceased. He gained this information after he had initiated enquiries regarding a claim with the Veterans' Affairs Department and was subsequently provided with documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.. He could not recall when he first received a copy of the determination advising that the condition had been accepted, however he consulted Dr Evans shortly after receiving it with a view to having the matter re-opened, whose report was subsequently provided to the respondent.
16. In respect to the claim for “an injury of the mind”, Mr Davidson acknowledged that he was diagnosed with a mild personality disorder in 1974, relatively close to his discharge from the Army. He acknowledged that there was no mention in any of his service documents about a psychiatric response as a result of viewing coffins, however he had such events "closed it" out of his mind. In Exhibit 4, page 8, he stated:
“I feel my personality disorder was caused by the way I was treated in the Army at recruit trg. It made me very aggressive [sic]. Also I haved [sic] developed loss of memory in my service.
The worst part was I had been medically downgrade and to be posted out of Watsonia back to Qld but this wasn't done and was sent out to Diggers Rest/Rockbank to serve. Contrie [sic] to my medical documents recommendations this made me very upset and frustrated with the system bringing on more asthma attacks.”
17. He was employed as a bus driver for eight years following discharge and then he held a position with Grace Bros as a courier for two years. He then spent about 3-4 years on single parents benefit, followed by 10 years in the Public Service, from which he has retired. He thought that he had problems with his mind in the 1980s. He consulted a doctor, whose name he could not recall, at the Mary Street Clinic in the 1980s. He had a breakdown, which caused his admission to Prince Charles Hospital in 1998, which was precipitated by a confrontation with a female colleague. He acknowledged that he had difficulties in his working relationships with women.
18. There are some days when his short and long term memory is intact, however in general his memory is erratic, and there are days when he is unable to retain any information.
19. Dr Larder, who gave evidence by telephone, first examined the applicant on 26 May 1988, following referral from his then general practitioner. He also examined the applicant in connection with a claim for psychiatric impairment in connection with a claim through the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986.. Apart from his reports in the T-documents, he provided a report dated 20 December 2002 (Exhibit 6 refers). Following mental state examination on 31 May 1999 he could find no evidence of cognitive abnormalities and he considered that the applicant's short and long term memory function were normal.
20. Dr Larder agreed that the 10 years spent in the Public Service, the applicant’s previous work history as a Council bus driver, and his personal history, which includes an acrimonious matrimonial dispute, were important factors bearing upon his psychiatric make-up at the time of the 18 October 1999 report. He opined that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder, and that the major issue contributing to Mr Davidson's presentation was "the accumulation of various work related stressors".
21. In his most recent report dated 20 December 2002, Dr Larder referred to the applicant's memory problems being a direct result of his depression and anxiety. He notes that the applicant had been referred to Dr Porter in 1968 for vagueness, disorganisation and memory issues. Although Dr Porter could not find any evidence of memory defect, immediate recent or remote and no impairment of concentration or attention, Dr Larder made the point that the applicant has a history of psychiatric symptoms, which were not explained by the presence of memory problems.
22. Dr Larder opines that Mr Davidson has developed a serious depressive illness, a major depressive episode. He goes on to state that the essential feature of this condition "is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to accumulative traumatic stressors involving direct personal conflict with work colleagues and management, and the repeated experience of failing to achieve a sense of satisfaction and support for the work that has been performed".
23. He goes on to state:
“In my opinion the clinical onset of Mr Davidson's Major Depressive Disorder resulted, in part, as a result of his underlying personality disorder as he did experience events which were identifiable occurrences that evoked feelings of substantial distress in him....severe illness, loss of employment, major financial problems and occupational problems.”
24. He confirms an opinion expressed in earlier reports that the applicant's employment with the Commonwealth (1961-1974) was probably the principal cause of the employee's psychiatric condition.
Submissions
25. For the applicant, it was submitted that the determination made to cease liability for asthma is taken to be a determination made under the Military Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 1988, pursuant to the provisions of Section 127(2) of that Act.
26. The applicant first became aware of the determination on the day he received a copy of it, namely on or after 18 October 2001. His undated letter at T22-53 constitutes a request for reconsideration and accordingly no extension of time is required.
27. In the alternative, if the Tribunal takes the view that the phrase “first came to the notice” in section 62(3)(b) of the Act is referrable to when the applicant first became aware of the existence of the determination, then this occurred on about 18 June 2001, when the applicant was informed orally that liability had been accepted for asthma but that it had been ceased.
28. If the Tribunal was to take this view, then it should extend the time to request reconsideration, given that a period of about three months is involved in the delay, and the applicant did not know of the precise terms of the determination until such time as he received a copy of it. Further, the applicant had on three occasions informed MCRS of his intention to pursue the asthma claim - in April 2001, 30 May 2001 and 18 June 2001.
29. In respect to the claim for a psychiatric condition, the amnesiac effect of this condition had denied Mr Davidson sufficient clarity of thought to submit a claim. He did not recognise that he had a psychiatric condition which dated back to his service and which had some part to play in his discharge. However, he lodged a claim once he realised that that was the case.
30. On that basis the applicant’s failure to give notice to his employer and submit a claim was by reason of ignorance or other reasonable cause. The applicant’s psychiatric condition arose from the nature of his service in that he was required to attend the funerals of soldiers who were killed in Vietnam and he also was involved in the delivery and return of coffins to Amberley.
31. For the respondent, Mr Clark submitted that regardless of the fact that the notice advising the applicant of cessation of liability was sent to the incorrect address, the applicant had taken some 25 years to ask for the matter to be re-opened. This indicated an absence of interest in pursuing the claim. He had made no effort to ascertain the progress of the claim, despite the fact he had attended a medical appointment with Dr Murphy in connection with that claim.
32. An extension of time should not be granted in that the applicant had failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay, and most significantly there is considerable prejudice to the Commonwealth in that many years have elapsed, and that no contemporaneous information was available as to the status of the applicant’s asthma from 1976. The report of Dr Murphy dated 12 February 1976 supported the decision to cease liability and there is no specialist evidence contradicting that opinion.
33. The Tribunal could construe the term “notice” as simply an awareness of a particular state of affairs, in which case the applicant had awareness that his claim had, in effect, been rejected. The medical practitioners who have examined him have not detected any short term or long term memory deficits and the applicant’s evidence is that he has good days and bad days. There is insufficient material to satisfy the Tribunal that the applicant suffered from memory problems, which would cause him to forget about the claim. He functioned as a bus driver and carried out other occupations, throughout which he was aware of ongoing asthma symptoms, which required treatment.
34. In the alternative, the conversation with Mr Gill on 18 June 2001 is sufficient to constitute “notice” within the meaning of that term. The term “determination” in section 61 of the Act does not refer to the need for it to be in writing.
35. The application of the principles enunciated in Hunter Valley DevelopmentsPty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 and Re Hewson v The Australian Postal Corporation (1988) 50 ALD 994 does not justify the exercise of the discretion in the applicant’s favour.
36. In respect to the psychological claim, the evidence is that the applicant had some awareness of the presence of psychiatric symptoms on the basis that he was treated at the Mary Street Clinic in the early 1980s.
Legislation Framework
37. In respect to matter Q2002/233, this relates to a determination of 2 July 1976 which was made under the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees’) Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act"). That Act was replaced on 1 December 1988 by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act"). Section 127(2) of the 1988 Act provides that any determination made by the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation or his delegate before 1 December 1988 in relation to the 1971 Act is deemed to be a determination made under the 1988 Act. Accordingly, the decision made on 2 July 1976 is deemed to be a decision made under the 1988 Act.
38. Section 61 of the 1988 Act provides:
“Determinations to be notified in writing
61. (1)As soon as practicable after a determining authority makes a determination, it shall cause to be served on the claimant a notice in writing setting out:
(a) the terms of the determination;
(b) the reasons for the determination; and
(c) a statement to the effect that the claimant may, if dissatisfied with the determination, request a reconsideration of the determination under subsection 62 (2).
(2) This section does not apply in relation to a determination under subsection 16 (1) that compensation of an amount equal to the full amount of the cost of medical treatment obtained by an employee is payable if that amount of compensation is payable to a person other than the employee.”
39. Section 62(3) of the 1988 Act deals with a request for reconsideration of a determination. It provides:
“(3) A request for reconsideration of a determination shall:
(a) set out the reasons for the request; and
(b) be given to the determining authority within 30 days after the day on which the determination first came to the notice of the person making the request, or within such further period (if any) as the determining authority, either before or after the expiration of that period, allows.”
40. In respect to Q2002/1018, this relates to a claim for a psychological condition in respect of which the applicant first sought treatment in 1968. Section 124 of the 1988 Act is relevant to his claim, the relevant part of which states:
“124. (1) Subject to this Part, this Act applies in relation to an injury, loss or damage suffered by an employee, whether before or after the commencing day.
(1A) Subject to this Part, a person is entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of an injury, loss or damage suffered before the commencing day if compensation was, or would have been, payable to the person in respect of that injury, loss or damage under the 1912 Act, the 1930 Act or the 1971 Act.
(2) A person is not entitled to compensation under this Act in respect of an injury, loss or damage suffered before the commencing day if compensation was not payable in respect of that injury, loss or damage:
(a) where the injury, loss or damage was suffered before the commencement of the 1930 Act-under the 1912 Act;
(b) where the injury, loss or damage was suffered after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act-under the 1930 Act as in force when the injury, loss or damage was suffered; or
(c) in any other case-under the 1971 Act as in force when the injury, loss or damage was suffered.
(3) A person is not entitled to compensation under section 24 or 25 in respect of a permanent impairment, or under section 17 in respect of the death of an employee, being an impairment or death that occurred before the commencing date, if:
(a) the person received compensation of a lump sum in respect of that impairment or death under the 1912 Act, the 1930 Act or the 1971 Act; or
(b) the person was not entitled to receive compensation of a lump sum in respect of that impairment or death:
(i) where the impairment or death occurred before the commencement of the 1930 Act-under the 1912 Act;
(ii) where the impairment or death occurred after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act-under the 1930 Act as in force when the impairment or death occurred; or
(iii) in any other case-under the 1971 Act as in force when the impairment or death occurred.
(4) The amount of compensation (if any) that a person is, by virtue of this section, entitled to receive under section 24 or 25 in respect of a permanent impairment, or under section 17 in respect of the death of an employee, being an impairment or death that occurred before the commencing day, shall be the same as the amount of the compensation that would have been payable to that person, if this Act had not been enacted, under:
(a) where the impairment or death occurred before the commencement of the 1930 Act-the 1912 Act;
(b) where the impairment or death occurred after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act-the 1930 Act as in force when the impairment or death occurred; or
(c) in any other case-the 1971 Act as in force when the impairment or death occurred.
(5) A person is not entitled to compensation under section 29 in respect of any period occurring before the commencing day.
(6) A person is not entitled to compensation under subsection 17(5) in respect of the death of an employee, or under section 19, 20, 21, 22 or 31 in respect of an incapacity, where the compensation relates to a period occurring before the commencing day, if:
(a) that person received weekly payments of compensation in respect of that death or incapacity in relation to that period under the 1912 Act, the 1930 Act or the 1971 Act; or
(b) that person was not entitled to receive weekly payments of compensation in respect of that death or incapacity in relation to that period:
(i) where the death or period of incapacity occurred before the commencement of the 1930 Act-under the 1912 Act;
(ii) where the death or period of incapacity occurred after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act-under the 1930 Act as in force when the death or period of incapacity occurred; or
(iii) in any other case-under the 1971 Act as in force when the death or period of incapacity occurred.
(7) The rate of compensation (if any) that a person is, by virtue of this section, entitled to receive under subsection 17 (5) in respect of the death of an employee, or under section 19, 20, 21, 22 or 31 in respect of an incapacity, where the compensation relates to a period occurring before the commencing day, shall be the same as the rate of compensation that would have been payable to that person in relation to that period, if this Act had not been enacted, under:
(a) where the period occurred before the commencement of the 1930 Act-the 1912 Act;
(b) where the period occurred after the commencement of the 1930 Act but before the commencement of the 1971 Act-the 1930 Act as in force during the period; or
(c) in any other case-the 1971 Act as in force during the period.
41. In considering whether the applicant would have been entitled to compensation under the 1930 Act, regard must be had to Section 10 of the 1930 Act. It provides for compensation where an employee suffers from a disease that is due to the nature of the employment in which they were engaged by the Commonwealth. The term "disease" is defined in section 4 of the 1930 Act. It provides:
"disease includes any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition, whether of sudden or gradual development, and also includes the aggravation, acceleration or recurrence of a pre-existing disease.”
42. Section 16 of the 1930 Act deals with the provision of notice of claims. It states:
“(1) The Commission shall not admit a claim for compensation under this Act for an injury unless notice of the accident has been served upon him as soon as practicable after it has happened, and before the employee has voluntarily left the employment of the Commonwealth, and unless the claim for compensation has been made:
(a) within six months from the occurrence of the accident;
(b)in case of death – within six months after advice of the death has been received by the claimant;
Provided always that:
(i)the want of or any defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall not prevent consideration of the claim by the Commissioner if he finds that the Commonwealth is not prejudiced by the want, defect or inaccuracy, or that the want, defect or inaccuracy was occasioned by mistake, absence from Australia or other reasonable cause; and
(ii)the failure to make a claim within the period above specified shall not prevent consideration of the claim by the Commissioner if he finds that the failure was occasioned by mistake, absence from Australia or other reasonable cause.
(2) Notice in respect of any injury to which this Act applies shall contain the name and address of the person injured, and a statement in ordinary language of the cause of the injury and the date at which the accident happened.
(3) The notice may be served by sending it by post in a registered letter properly addressed to the Permanent Head or Chief Office of the Department or authority in or by which the employee was employed at the time of the accident, or by delivering it at the head office of the Department or authority or to the officer in charge of the work on which the employee was so employed, or in any other prescribed manner.”
Consideration and Conclusion
· Q2002/233
43. The first issue relates to the time at which the determination dated 2 July 1976 “first came to the notice of” the applicant (section 62(3)(b) of the 1988 Act).
44. It was submitted that constructive notice was sufficient to satisfy this term. In particular, Mr Davidson had notice that his claim was either not likely to have been accepted or liability would not have continued, on the basis that (i) he heard nothing from the respondent and (ii) he is likely to have received an indication from Dr Murphy that would lead him to think that he would not receive a favourable response.
45. It is common ground that the determination was sent to the applicant's former address despite the fact that he notified the respondent that he had changed address. The interpretation urged upon the Tribunal was that the applicant had constructive notice of the basis of the determination because he failed to pursue his rights.
46. Section 61 of the 1988 Act prescribes with definity the notification requirements, which are no doubt stipulated in that manner to ensure that claimants are notified not only of the basis of the decision but also that they are acquainted of their right to seek reconsideration of that decision. That information is required to be provided in writing. The reference in Section 63 of the 1988 Act provides that the right to lodge a request for reconsideration runs from the time the applicant first receives notice. It would be contradictory in the Tribunal's view to require that the determination be in writing but the notification of the contents of that determination could be conveyed orally or by some other means. Given that the legislative scheme imposes a clear obligation on the respondent to provide written reasons for its determination and to cause the determination to be served on the claimant, the concept that constructive notice is sufficient does not sit comfortably within that scheme.
47. The applicant’s evidence was that he had no knowledge of the determination until he had spoken to an officer from MCRS on 18 June 2001 and that he had been told that liability had been accepted for his asthma but that it has ceased. I accept his evidence on that aspect. Although the officer, in his written notes of that conversation made the notation “Mr Davidson appeared to accept it”, he stated that he did not accept it and his subsequent actions have borne that out.
48. I find that the determination first came to the notice of the applicant on about 18 October 2001. It follows that his request for reconsideration, received by the respondent on 19 October 2001, is within the 30 days after which such determination first came to his notice. In such case, the exercise of discretion to extend the time does not arise and the respondent should reconsider the decision.
· Q2002/1018
49. The evidence reveals that the applicant first sought treatment for emotional and behavioural symptoms in 1968. Section 16(1) of the 1930 Act requires that notice of a claim for compensation be submitted within six months of the occurrence which is said to have caused the compensable disability. The applicant lodged a claim for acceptance of a psychological condition on 27 June 2001.
50. The delay of more than 30 years in lodging the claim is said to be attributable to the amnesiac affect of the applicant’s psychiatric condition, which "denied him sufficient clarity of thought to appropriately submit a claim”.. The applicant's evidence was that although he sought psychiatric treatment in the 1980s for a brief period, it was not until he came under the care of Dr Larder that he realised that he had been suffering from a psychiatric condition for many years, which had its genesis in events which occurred during his service.
51. The application of the principles in Hunter ValleyDevelopments Pty Ltdv Cohen and Hewson to the present case presents insurmountable obstacles to the discretion being exercised in his favour. In the first place, even if the Tribunal was of the view that the failure to give notice was due to a "reasonable cause", (that cause being the lack of knowledge on the applicant's part that the psychiatric condition which had been present since at least 1968 was attributable to his service), there is overwhelming prejudice to the respondent in being able to investigate the applicant's claim, including the absence of witnesses and relevant documentation. The Tribunal was mindful of the fact that medical experts would be asked to give opinions about events which occurred over 30 years ago.
52. Additionally, whilst a report from Dr P Larder is to the effect that the applicant's employment contributed to a significant substantial and important extent to the development of major depressive disorder, the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from personality disorder during service. There is no contemporaneous medical evidence as to the applicant's psychiatric state from that time until the relatively recent consultations with Dr Larder. Consequently, it would be difficult for the respondent to obtain any relevant material at this point in time.
53. Of further relevance is the fact that the 1930 Act requires that the condition be entirely attributable to the applicant's service (as opposed to the requirement in Section 4 of the 1988 Act that a disease be “contributed to in a material degree by the employee’s employment”). Dr Larder opines that the applicant's employment with the Commonwealth was "probably the principal cause of the employee's psychiatric condition". He does not relate it specifically to the viewing of coffins or any particular event during service which is said to be causative. When considering the merits of the claim, Dr Larder’s evidence is the only evidence that expresses an opinion as to causation, and it would not appear to meet the requirements of section 10 of the 1930 Act.
54. Taking into account all of those factors, the Tribunal determined that it is not appropriate to extend the time for lodgement of a claim for compensation.
55. Accordingly the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.
I certify that the 55 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms J Cowdroy, Member
Signed: Sam Appleton
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 14 April 2003
Date of Decision 15 March 2004Counsel for the Applicant Mr A Harding
Solicitor for the Applicant Gilshenan and Luton
Counsel for the Respondent Mr C Clark
Solicitor for the Respondent Blake Dawson Waldron
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