[2017] FWC 5617

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739 - Application to deal with a dispute

David Wedgwood
v
Charles Sturt University T/A Charles Sturt University
(C2016/7602)

COMMISSIONER JOHNS

SYDNEY, 27 OCTOBER 2017

Application to deal with a dispute – conversion to continuing or fixed term employment

Background to the application
[1] On 23 December 2016 David Wedgwood (applicant) made an application under section 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act) about an alleged failure to convert his employment to continuing or fixed term.

[2] The Respondent is Charles Sturt University (University/respondent).

[3] The parties are covered by the Charles Sturt University Enterprise Agreement 2013-2016 (Agreement). 1 The Agreement was approved by the Commission, on 17 October 2013. The Agreement passed its nominal expiry date on 31 December 2016.

[4] The dispute arises out of the operation of clause 21.18 of the Agreement. Clause 21.18 is a part of the Agreement entitled: “Professional/General Staff Casual Employment – Conversion Arrangements for Certain Employees”. That part of the Agreement is as follows:

“21.18 A member of the casual professional/general staff is eligible to apply for conversion to continuing or fixed term employment, as appropriate, in the following circumstances:

(i) if the employee has been employed by the University on a regular and systematic basis in the same or a similar and identically classified position in the same workplace/work unit; and either

a. the period of employment referred to in (i) was during the immediately preceding period of at least twelve (12) months and the average weekly hours worked during the period referred to in equalled at least 70% of the ordinary weekly hours that would have been worked by an equivalent full-time employee; or
b. the period of employment referred to in (i) was during the immediately preceding period of at least twenty-four (24) months;

(ii) and the performance of the employee has been satisfactory.

21.19 For the purposes of sub-clause 21.18 casual work performed by the employee in another classification, job or workplace/work unit shall not:

(i) affect the employee's eligibility for conversion; nor
(ii) be included in determining whether the employee meets eligibility requirements.

21.20 Conversion to non-casual employment will not occur in the following circumstances:

(i) the employee is a genuine retiree;
(ii) the employee is performing work which will either cease to be required or will be performed by a non-casual employee, within twenty-six (26) weeks from the date on which the application of conversion is made;
(iii) the employee has a primary occupation with the University or elsewhere, either as a staff member or as a self-employed person;
(iv) the employee does not meet the essential requirements for the position; or
(v) the work subject to the application for conversion is ad hoc, intermittent, unpredictable or involves hours that are irregular.

21.21 The University will determine whether the employee's employment will be converted to continuing or fixed term.”

(Casual Conversion Clause)

[5] A clause similar to the Casual Conversion Clause (referring to when a casual general staff member “is eligible to apply for conversion to continuing or fixed-term employment”) appeared in predecessor enterprise agreements, namely:

a) the Charles Sturt University Enterprise Agreement 2010-2012 (clause 21.18) 2, and before it,
b) the Charles Sturt University Enterprise Agreement 2005-2008, (clause 23.15). 3

[6] Both the predecessor agreements (2005-2008 in clause 23.18 and 2010-2012 in clause 21.21) also contained the clause that,

“The University will determine whether the employee's employment will be converted to continuing or fixed term.”

[7] In his application to the Commission the applicant described the dispute in the following terms,

“What is the dispute about?

Answer: The failure [in December 2015] of CSU to convert my employment to continuing in accordance with the requirements of 21.18 of the Agreement.”

[8] In his Final Submissions the applicant proposed the following Orders:

“55. The resolution sought by the Applicant is one of two options that the Applicant claims the Respondent has available to them. In operationalising the successful application for casual conversion, the Applicant respectfully requests that the Commission make Orders to the effect of either of the following options.
Option 1:
a. Orders to the effect of requiring the Respondent to offer the Applicant equivalent employment Employee Relations Officer, Level 8 Step 5, on a continuing basis.
Option 2;
b. Orders to the effect of requiring the Respondent to offer the Applicant equivalent employment Employee Relations Officer, Level 8 Step 5, on a fixed term basis under sub-clause 21.6(v) Pre-retirement contract with an end date nominated by the Applicant to be no later than 31 December 2020.”

[9] In response the University raised two objections to the Commission arbitrating the dispute on jurisdictional grounds. Those objections are as follows:

….

20. The Applicant has failed to comply with the requirements of the mandatory dispute settling procedure in Clause 52 of the Agreement, which operate as a condition precedent to the Commission being able to deal with this dispute under subsection 739(4) of the Act.”

Jurisdiction

[10] Section 739 of the FW Act empowers the Commission to deal with certain disputes under enterprise agreement dispute settlement terms. The Agreement contains such a term at clause 52. Having regard to the information in the Form F10 application and submissions of the parties, subject to resolving the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection about the Applicant not complying the mandatory requirements of the dispute settling procedure, the Commission has jurisdiction to deal with the dispute, including by arbitration, under clause 52.8 of the Agreement.

Hearing and proceedings

[11] On 19 April 2017 the matter was listed for arbitration. At the hearing:

a) the Applicant was represented by Mr Blake Stephens, Industrial Manager, Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU).
b) Mr Stephens called the Applicant to give evidence on his own behalf. The Applicant was made available for cross examination.
c) the Respondent was represented by Mr Stuart Andrews, Executive Director, Australian Higher Education Industrial Association (AHEIA).

d) Mr Andrews called:

i. Mr Malcolm Wilson, the Respondent’s Director, Workplace Relations and Policy. Mr Wilson was made available for cross-examination.
ii. Mr Andrew Crowl, the Respondent’s Manager, Workplace Relations and Policy. Ms Crowl was made available for cross-examination.

[12] During the hearing the following Exhibits were received. The Commission, as presently constituted, has had regard to the Exhibits as well as the evidence received during the hearing in coming to this decision.

EXHIBIT NO.	DESCRIPTION
A1	Submissions on behalf of the Applicant
A2	Submissions in Reply on behalf of the Applicant
A3	Witness Statement of David Wedgwood
A4	Letter dated 8 July 2013
R1	Bundle of emails dated 20 September 2017
R2	Outline of Argument for the Respondent
R3	Email dated 18 April from Mr Andrews
R4	Statement of Malcolm Joseph Wilson
R5	Statement of Andrew John Crowl

[13] On 13 July 2017 the Commission issued a Statement and Further Directions. The parties were provided with an opportunity to address additional matters, which, as a matter of procedural fairness, the Commission was required to put to them. The matters were described as follows:

“[21] Neither at the hearing nor in their final submissions did the parties address the fact that the Casual Conversion Clause existed, in some form, in previous enterprise agreements. This may or may not be of some import in the matter. However, as a matter of procedural fairness to the parties, they ought to be provided with an opportunity to address the same.
[22] Further, at the hearing the parties were not provided with an opportunity to propose or comment upon the question/s to be determined by the Commission. In relation to the first jurisdictional objection, the Commission, as presently constituted, has formulated a question in paragraph [10] above. As a matter of procedural fairness to the parties, they ought to be provided with an opportunity to address the same.
[23] The use of different language as between clause 21.1 of the Agreement and clause 12.3(c) of the Modern Award has also not been the subject of fulsome submissions by the parties. Nothing may turn on the different language used. However, as a matter of procedural fairness to the parties, they ought to be provided with an opportunity to address the same.
[24] Since the hearing of the matter and the filing of submissions a Full Bench of the Commission has handed down a decision as a part of the 4 yearly review of modern awards about part-time employment and casual employment (including the history of casual conversion clauses). The decision of the Full Bench 4 (in particular their observations about the operation of casual conversion clauses), may have no bearing on the present dispute. However, as a matter of procedural fairness to the parties, they ought to be provided with an opportunity to address the same.

[25] Finally, the Commission, as presently constituted, has prepared a statement above (para [9]) about matters that appear to be either common ground between the parties or not otherwise contested. As a matter of procedural fairness to the parties, they ought to be provided with an opportunity to comment on the same and to the extent that they disagree that any matter is common ground, provide the evidentiary basis for an alternate finding.”

[14] In response to the Statement and Further Directions on 27 July 2017 the parties filed Additional Submissions.

[15] On 28 July 2017 the Commission was advised that parties had agreed not file a reply to the Additional Submissions of the other party.

[16] In coming to this decision the Commission, as presently constituted, has also had regard to the Additional Submissions filed by the parties.

Background to the dispute

[17] The following matters are either common ground between the parties or not otherwise contested:

a) Mr Wedgwood first commenced working for the University in March 2012. He was engaged to provide advice on individual industrial relations matters. He was also engaged to develop the first Enterprise Agreement Charles Sturt Campus Services (CSCS). CSCS is a private company. It is a separate legal entity to the University.

b) Initial discussions proposed that Mr Wedgwood be engaged on a consultancy basis. However, in March 2012 Mr Wedgwood proposed that he be engaged as a casual employee. The University agreed. Mr Wedgwood submitted a 12 week plan for the completion of the new enterprise agreement.

c) Mr Wedgwood did some work in March and April 2012. He then became ill and did not work on the project as originally planned. He re-established contact with the University in October 2012.

d) Between November 2012 and around July 2013 Mr Wedgwood was engaged on a 100% basis under 2 separate employment arrangements (60% employed by the University on a fixed term contract and 40% as a casual employee to complete the original project to develop the CSCS Enterprise Agreement).

e) The CSCS Enterprise Agreement was approved on 23 August 2013. 5

f) Because the CSCS Enterprise Agreement was completed Mr Wedgwood requested that his appointment with the University be increased from 60% to 100%. The University agreed. On 8 July 2013 the University wrote to Mr Wedgwood proposing an extension of his appointment to the position of Employee Relations Officer in the Division of Human Resources for a period through until 27 December 2013. 6 Mr Wedgwood accepted the extension on the basis that it would be full-time employment.

g) In December 2013 Mr Wedgwood approached the University about work opportunities in 2014. However, Mr Wedgwood wanted to have his employment terminated when his fixed term contract expired on 27 December 2013, as this would establish a condition of release for UniSuper. 7

h) The University offered Mr Wedgwood fixed term contract for the period 13 January 2014 to 11 July 2014 (although it was subsequently extended to 24 December 2014).

i) In December 2014 Mr Wedgwood approached the University about work opportunities in 2015.

j) Between 7 January 2015 and 23 December 2015 Mr Wedgwood was engaged on a casual basis. The University says he worked a 70% workload. Mr Wedgwood says he worked a 100% workload.

k) On 9 December 2015 Mr Wedgwood made an application to the University for conversion to continuing employment with the University under clause 21.18 of the Agreement. Mr Wedgwood wrote,

“I hereby apply for conversion to continuing employment … in accordance with sub-clause 21.18…

I meet the requirement for conversion as I have “been employed by the University on a regular and systematic basis in the same or a similar and identically classified position in the same workplace/work unit” for “at least 12 months”, and “the average weekly hours worked during the period referred to equal to at least 70% of the ordinary weekly hours that would have been worked by an equivalent full-time employee”.

Indeed, I have “been employed by the University on a regular and systematic basis the same or a similar and identical classified position in the same workplace/work unit” for a “period of the lease 24 months”.

My employment on a number of consecutive “rolling contracts” clearly demonstrates that my performance “has been satisfactory”

None of the exclusions detailed in sub clause 21.20 of the Agreement apply in my case.

I look forward to an affirmative response to this application, so that I can continue to contribute positively to the University.” 8

l) The University declined to convert Mr Wedgwood from a casual employee to a continuing employee.

m) On 21 December 2015 Mr Wedgwood again wrote to the University. He wrote,

“I hereby apply for conversion from full-time to part-time employment… In accordance with sub clause 21.24 of the… Agreement.

I request that my employment be reduced to a 0.4 appointment, i.e. 2 days per week from July 2016. The actual days worked be determined by mutual agreement, depending on the University’s needs.

I propose this conversion be for a period of 5 years. However, I also requested that we meet in December 2016 to review whether this arrangement then continues to meet the University’s needs.

The reason for the request is to enable to transition to retirement…”

n) On or around 23 December 2015 the University sent an email to Mr Wedgwood. It proposed to confirm,

i. Full time employment on a fixed term basis for a period of 6 months commencing on 4 January 2016, and

ii. Fractional employment at 40%, thereafter, on a fixed term basis, under the category of a pre-retirement contract. The University wrote “The duration of this [post July 2016] contract is yet to be determined, although it is agreed that we will meet in December 2016 to review this arrangement.” 9

o) On 4 January 2016 the Applicant wrote to the University and provided it with a proposed Memorandum that (he proposed) Mr Wilson send to him. In the covering letter he wrote,

“I have enclosed a Memo which I hope will enable to resolve the issue of my employment with CSU. …
I hope that this will enable
• Conversion to full-time employment as a result of my request of 9 December 2015, but to a fixed term contract in accordance with this Memo, as provided for in sub-clause 21.6(v);
• Reduction to part-time in July 2016, either on the basis of my request which you already have or other agreed arrangements, and
• Arrangements beyond December 2016 as agreed between now and then (hopefully to our mutual benefit)…..”

The reference to sub-clause 21.6(v) was a reference to the intention to retire clause. In the Memo, the Applicant proposed December 2020. 10

p) On 7 January 2016 the University made a formal offer of fixed term employment to Mr Wedgwood in the following terms, 11

Employment status	Full Time, until 30 June 2016. Part Time, 40% of full time equivalent from 1 July 2016 to 23 December 2016, to be worked as determined by your supervisor
Commencement date	4 January 2016
Cessation date	23 December 2016
Appointment category	This offer of fixed term employment is made pursuant to sub clause 21.6 (i) - Specific Task or Project - of the… Agreement. You will be expected to perform specific tasks and activities associated with assisting the Workplace Relations Policy team with workload while Enterprise Agreement negotiations take place and other projects as directed.
Salary	$101,435 per annum until 30 June 2016 $40,581 per annum from 1 July 2016 until 23 December 2016
Hours per week	35 until 30 June 2016 14 from 1 July 2016 until 23 December 2016

q) Also on 7 January 2016 Mr Wedgwood accepted the offer of employment (2016 Agreement). He signed an acceptance in the following terms,

“I accept the above-mentioned position, salary offered and conditions as set out in this letter schedule 1. 12

r) The University treated the 2016 Agreement as resolving the application for conversion. Mr Wedgwood did not. In Mr Crowl’s words the parties “agreed to disagree”. 13

s) Between 4 January 2016 – July 2016 Mr Wedgwood worked under the terms of the 2016 Agreement.

t) On 21 July 2016 Mr Wedgwood notified a dispute under sub-clause 52.4 of the Agreement about the alleged,

“failure to convert Mr David Wedgwood’s employment to full-time continuing in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause 21.18 of the Agreement.” 14

u) On 4 August 2016 the parties met to discuss the dispute.

v) On 22 August 2016 the University responded to the dispute notification. In short the University objected to the validity of the dispute notification. It asserted that the conversion issue was resolved in December 2015 and that, in any case, clause 21.18 does not create a right to conversion. 15

w) On 2 September 2016 Mr Wedgwood was advised that there would be no continuing employment beyond December 2016. 16

x) On 8 November 2016 Mr Wedgwood again notified a dispute and demanded that his employment be converted “to fulltime from 23 December 2016…” 17

y) The University did not accede to the demand and the present application was lodged on 23 December 2016.

Issue in dispute

[18] Having regard to how Mr Wedgwood described the dispute in his application, in short, the question for the Commission to answer is:

Did the University fail to convert Mr Wedgwood’s employment to continuing in accordance with the requirements of clause 21.18 of the Agreement?

[19] There is a presumption in the question (and inherent in Mr Wedgwood’s application) that clause 21.18 of the Agreement contains a “requirement” to convert.

[20] Consequently, the starting point for the analysis is to initially consider and determine the first jurisdictional objection raised by the University, namely that,

“The application is falsely based on the premise that the… Agreement contains a right conversion from casual employment to continuing employment if the applicant is eligible for conversion. No such right exists.”

[21] The Applicant said the question should be framed as follows,

“What obligations and options does the casual conversion clause provide for and allows the Respondent to do, considering the language of clauses in the context of the enterprise agreement as a whole.”

[22] The University submits that clause 21.18 of the Agreement provides a relevant employee with nothing more than an eligibility to apply for conversion.
[23] It says that the obligations under the Agreement are to be contrasted with clause 12.5 18 of the Higher Education Industry – General Staff Award 2010 (Modern Award).

[24] There are some similarities and some differences between the Agreement and the Modern Award. For example, both refer to an eligibility to apply:

Clause 21.21 of the Agreement	Clause 12.3(a)(iv) of the Modern Award
A member of the casual professional/general staff is eligible to apply for conversion to continuing or fixed term employment, as appropriate, in the following circumstances…	An eligible casual employee may apply in writing for conversion to non-casual employment in accordance with the conversion provisions of this award.

[25] However, there appears to be a difference in how the employer (in this case the University) is to respond to an application:

Clause 21.21 of the Agreement	Clause 12.3(c) of the Modern Award
The University will determine whether the employee's employment will be converted to continuing or fixed term.	The employer will not unreasonably refuse an application for conversion. However, it may refuse an application on reasonable grounds. Reasonable grounds include…

[26] When the application for the Agreement to be approved was made it was accompanied by the standard employer declaration. The University declared that the Agreement did not “contain any terms or conditions of employment less beneficial than equivalent terms and conditions in the” Modern Award. The declaration was signed by Mr Wilson, it having been prepared for him by Mr Wedgwood on or about 20 September 2013. However, that declaration did not (and could not) alter the terms of the Agreement. Even if the declaration is wrong, that does not mean the terms of the Agreement are not less beneficial than the Modern Award. The construction of the Agreement is to be had having regard to the usual principles, not by having regard to the content of the declaration. The declaration cannot change the plain and ordinary words in the Agreement.

Submissions - Does the Agreement create a requirement to convert?

[27] In the present matter there is a dispute between the parties as to the operation of clauses 21.18 – 21.21. This is the basis of the first jurisdictional objection.

[28] The Applicant submitted that:

1. “The next point in contention is the interpretation of the casual conversion clause and how this was applied by the Respondent.
2. The Applicant claims that the Respondent has the option to convert a casual employee who eligibly applies for conversion under clause 21 to either fixed term or continuing and that it is up to the Respondent to determine which it will be. 19 The Applicant does not wholly oppose this argument however there are further issues in the Agreement that impact on the Respondents ability to make this determination.
3. The Agreement provides for three main types of employment being continuing, 20 fixed term21 or casual.22 Continuing and fixed term employment may be full time23 or part time.24 The use of fixed term employment is strongly limited by sub-clause 21.6 which provides that fixed term employment shall only be for;

i. Specific task or project
…
v. Pre-retirement contract

4. Sub-clause 21.21 does not create a new criterion for fixed term employment. This sub-clause recognises that there are situations where the Respondent may employ someone as continuing or as fixed term, however the employment must only in accordance with the enterprise agreement.
5. The Applicant claims that the only valid form of fixed term employment open to the Respondent is found in sub-clause 21.6(v), Pre-retirement Contract. This was open to the Respondent on the grounds that, in accordance with the sub-clause, the Applicant could determine their own retirement date. This option was ultimately not accepted by the Respondent.
6. The Respondent claims that the fixed term contract under sub-clause 21.6(i), Specific Task or Project, is a valid option available to the Respondent in response to the application to be converted from casual employment. 25
7. Sub-clause 21.6(i) provides that

a. “Specific task or project” shall mean a definable work activity which has a starting time and which is expected to be completed within an anticipated timeframe. Without limiting the generality of that circumstance, it shall also include a period of employment provided for from identifiable funding external to the University, not being funding that is part of an operating grant from government or funding compromised of payments of fees made by or on behalf of students.” (emphasis added)

8. The Applicant asserts that this form of fixed term employment is only available when the funding for that period of employment is “from identifiable funding external to the University, not being funding that is part of an operating grant from government of funding compromised of payments of fees made by or on behalf of students”.

9. At the time the contract was offered, the Applicant made clear that this was not an acceptable response to the casual conversion application. 26 The Applicant claims that the only two valid responses the Respondent had available was to convert to continuing employment or a pre-retirement contract where the end date was specified by the Respondent.
10. During cross examination Mr Wilson, a witness for the Respondent, confirmed that the funding for the fixed term employment was internal funding that “it would certainly be associated with our… ongoing revenue from our student admissions”. 27
11. The interpretation of this exact clause in other enterprise agreements has been in relation to the nature of “specific task or project” in that “the work activity of performing for a fixed period of time duties of a kind ordinarily undertaken on an ongoing basis by continuing employees is not intended to constitute a “specific task for project” within the meaning of (the clause)”. 28
12. While there is some doubt as to whether the actual nature of the work required for the 2016 fixed term contract was ongoing or project related, the point in contention is the funding for the position was internal funding and not external.
13. The ninth Golden Cockeral Principle provides that “[a] common intention is identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement”. 29 The second Principle requires that “it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or contains an ambiguity”.30
14. In this case the Applicant asserts that there is no ambiguity in relation to this sub-clause and that the it is open to the Commission to find that for a fixed term position under sub-clause 21.6(i) the ‘specific task or project’ must “include a period of employment provided” by external funding. The Applicant claims this is what a reasonable person would take from reading this clause.
15. The casual conversion arrangements provide a requirement for the Respondent to convert a casual employee to continuing employment where;

a. the casual employee meets certain conditions precedent; 31 and
b. the exemptions to the requirement to convert to continuing employment are not applicable; 32 and
c. where the position does not meet one of the limitations on the use of fixed term contracts available to the Respondent in sub-clause 21.6

16. The Applicant sought to be converted to continuing employment. 33 The Respondent and the Applicant foreshadowed a valid alternative to continuing employment in the form of a fixed term contract under sub-clause 21.6(v) being a pre-retirement contract.34 Another form of fixed term employment was offered and accepted35 on the condition that it was not a valid or accepted response to the application for conversion from casual employment to continuing.36 This was communicated to the Respondent by the Applicant at the time the fixed term contract was signed.37”

[29] The Respondent submitted that.

“4. The Application is falsely based on the premise that the [Agreement] contains a right to conversion from casual employment to continuing employment if the applicant is eligible for conversion. No such right exists.
5. Unlike Clause 12.5 of the Higher Education Industry - General Staff Award 2010 (“the Modern Award”), neither Clause 21.18 of the Agreement, nor any other provision of the Agreement, places any requirement on the Respondent to approve an application for conversion from an eligible casual employee.
6. Clause 12.5 of the Modern Award provides that: “The employer will not unreasonably refuse an application for conversion.”
7. In stark contrast to the Modern Award, the Agreement provides only for a right to apply for conversion. Eligibility to apply is detailed in Clause 21.18 and specific disqualifications from eligibility are detailed in Clause 21.20.
8. The disqualifications from eligibility to apply for conversion set out in Clause 21.20 of the Agreement are simply that. They are not specified as being the only grounds upon which an application may be rejected by the Respondent.

9. The Respondent relies on the principles enunciated in the Commission Full Bench decision in [Golden Cockerel]…”

10. The usual situation when considering the Golden Cockerel principles occurs where one party is asserting that particular wording used in an Agreement is unclear or ambiguous, either on its face or by reference to surrounding circumstances, and that resort should be had to extraneous material or other evidence to ascertain the true meaning of the wording in question.

11. In this case, the Applicant has not directed the Commission’s attention to any particular wording in the Agreement that should be interpreted other than in accordance with its plain meaning, and has not suggested that any particular word or phrase in the Agreement is unclear or ambiguous. It follows that the Agreement must, in accordance with the Golden Cockerel principles, be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, in this case as summarised in paragraphs 7 and 8 above.

12. Quite contrary to the Golden Cockerel principles, and without regard to whether the words of the Agreement have a plain meaning or not, the Applicant is in fact asserting that the conversion rights contained in Clause 12.5 of the Modern Award must be deemed to be incorporated into the Agreement because of a statement made in a statutory declaration filed by the Respondent with its application to the Commission for approval of the Agreement in October 2013.

13. That assertion is set out in paragraphs 2-4 of the Applicant’s Submission in Reply to the Respondent’s Outline of Argument (Exhibit A2), and was confirmed in the witness box by the Applicant (transcript PN 141- 175).

14. The Applicant’s assertion is that a non-specification of a less beneficial Agreement provision in answer to Questions 3.6 and 3.7 of a Form F17 statutory declaration renders operative the more beneficial provision in the relevant modern award. That proposition has no proper basis. Read literally, the Applicant’s assertion as expressed in paragraph 4 of his Submission in Reply also contradicts section 57 of the Act.

15. Having regard to the Golden Cockerel principles, it is irrelevant that Mr Wilson’s statutory declaration contains the answer “No” to the question as to whether the Agreement contains no terms or conditions of employment which were less beneficial to employees than the Modern Award. The Applicant has advanced no proper argument for the Agreement to be interpreted other than in accordance with its plain meaning.

16. The wording of Clause 12.5 of the Modern Award regarding rights of conversion is clearly different to the wording of the Agreement, which provides no such right. Under cross-examination the Applicant repeatedly contended, however, that the wording of the two instruments provide exactly the same entitlement, but simply used different wording in doing so (transcript PN 149, 167, 174, 175). That is a contention made under oath which has absolutely no credibility, and is clearly wrong.

17. The irony of the Applicant’s attempted reliance on the answer “No” to Question 3.6 in the Form F17 statutory declaration is that Mr Wilson did so in reliance on advice from the Applicant, and did so on the basis of the Applicant possessing significant industrial relations experience and expertise. That advice was provided by the Applicant in his email to Ms Tuineau of 20 September 2013 (contained in Exhibit R1). The Applicant conceded in cross-examination (transcript PN 171), when being shown Exhibit R1, that he had indeed given that advice, notwithstanding previously being adamant under cross-examination that he had given no advice whatsoever regarding the information to be provided in Mr Wilson’s statutory declaration (transcript PN 137).

18. As the Agreement, unlike the Modern Award, provides no conversion rights to casual employees (other than eligibility to apply for conversion), this dispute concerning the decision by the Respondent to not convert the Applicant’s employment status from casual to continuing (and which is not a dispute about eligibility to apply for conversion) is not capable of constituting a dispute for the purposes of Clause 52.1 of the Agreement. Clause 21.18 of the Agreement, in accordance with its plain meaning, deals only with eligibility to apply for conversion. Subsection 739(4) of the Act thus precludes the Commission from dealing with this dispute.

19. For completeness, the Respondent also relies on the fact that in response to the Applicant’s request for conversion, the Respondent did in fact provide the Applicant with a fixed-term appointment…. This is also a full answer to any dispute about a refusal to provide conversion to continuing employment; as Clause 21.21 of the Agreement gives full and complete discretion to the Respondent as to whether any conversion granted is to continuing employment or, in the alternative, to fixed-term employment.”

Consideration – Does the Agreement create a requirement to convert?

[30] In The Australian Meat Industry Employees Union v Golden Cockerel Pty Limited, 38 a Full Bench of this Commission set out the relevant principles to be applied in the construction of agreements. These principles were revised in Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union’ known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU) v Berri Pty Limited.39

[31] In Berri the Full Bench wrote:

“[114] The principles relevant to the task of construing a single enterprise agreement may be summarised as follows:

1. The construction of an enterprise agreement, like that of a statute or contract, begins with a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the relevant words. The resolution of a disputed construction of an agreement will turn on the language of the agreement having regard to its context and purpose. Context might appear from:

(i) the text of the agreement viewed as a whole;
(ii) the disputed provision’s place and arrangement in the agreement;
(iii) the legislative context under which the agreement was made and in which it operates.

2. The task of interpreting an agreement does not involve rewriting the agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome. The task is always one of interpreting the agreement produced by parties.
3. The common intention of the parties is sought to be identified objectively, that is by reference to that which a reasonable person would understand by the language the parties have used to express their agreement, without regard to the subjective intentions or expectations of the parties.
4. The fact that the instrument being construed is an enterprise agreement made pursuant to Part 2-4 of the FW Act is itself an important contextual consideration. It may be inferred that such agreements are intended to establish binding obligations.
5. The FW Act does not speak in terms of the ‘parties’ to enterprise agreements made pursuant to Part 2-4 agreements, rather it refers to the persons and organisations who are ‘covered by’ such agreements. Relevantly s.172(2)(a) provides that an employer may make an enterprise agreement ‘with the employees who are employed at the time the agreement is made and who will be covered by the agreement’. Section 182(1) provides that an agreement is ‘made’ if the employees to be covered by the agreement ‘have been asked to approve the agreement and a majority of those employees who cast a valid vote approve the agreement’. This is so because an enterprise agreement is ‘made’ when a majority of the employees asked to approve the agreement cast a valid vote to approve the agreement.
6. Enterprise agreements are not instruments to which the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) applies, however the modes of textual analysis developed in the general law may assist in the interpretation of enterprise agreements. An overly technical approach to interpretation should be avoided and consequently some general principles of statutory construction may have less force in the context of construing an enterprise agreement.
7. In construing an enterprise agreement it is first necessary to determine whether an agreement has a plain meaning or it is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning.
8. Regard may be had to evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist in determining whether an ambiguity exists.
9. If the agreement has a plain meaning, evidence of the surrounding circumstances will not be admitted to contradict the plain language of the agreement.
10. If the language of the agreement is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning then evidence of the surrounding circumstance will be admissible to aide the interpretation of the agreement.
11. The admissibility of evidence of the surrounding circumstances is limited to evidence tending to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties which inform and the subject matter of the agreement. Evidence of such objective facts is to be distinguished from evidence of the subjective intentions of the parties, such as statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations.
12. Evidence of objective background facts will include:

(i) evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;
(ii) notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed; and
(iii) evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption.

13. The diversity of interests involved in the negotiation and making of enterprise agreements (see point 4 above) warrants the adoption of a cautious approach to the admission and reliance upon the evidence of prior negotiations and the positions advanced during the negotiation process. Evidence as to what the employees covered by the agreement were told (either during the course of the negotiations or pursuant to s.180(5) of the FW Act) may be of more assistance than evidence of the bargaining positions taken by the employer or a bargaining representative during the negotiation of the agreement.
14. Admissible extrinsic material may be used to aid the interpretation of a provision in an enterprise agreement with a disputed meaning, but it cannot be used to disregard or rewrite the provision in order to give effect to an externally derived conception of what the parties’ intention or purpose was.
15. In the industrial context it has been accepted that, in some circumstances, subsequent conduct may be relevant to the interpretation of an industrial instrument. But such post-agreement conduct must be such as to show that there has been a meeting of minds, a consensus. Post-agreement conduct which amounts to little more than the absence of a complaint or common inadvertence is insufficient to establish a common understanding.”

[32] I respectfully adopt and apply these principles in this decision. That is to say:

a) I begin my analysis with a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words of clause 21.21 of the Agreement,

b) I must determine whether the Agreement has a plain meaning,
c) I must review the text of the Agreement as a whole,
d) I must not rewrite the Agreement to achieve what might be regarded as a fair or just outcome,
e) in determining the objective intention of the parties I must do so by reference to what a reasonable person would understand by the language used in the Agreement,
f) I should not adopt an overly technical approach to the interpretation of the Agreement, and
g) I must not contradict the plain language of the Agreement.

Long standing provisions

[33] As has been observed (above), at least since 22 November 2005, the applicable enterprise agreement has provided that,

a) a member of the casual professional/general staff is eligible to apply for conversion to continuing or fixed term employment, and
b) the University will determine whether the employee's employment will be converted to continuing or fixed term.

[34] In the present matter no evidence was lead establishing the objective background facts which were known when the Agreement was/agreements were made nor was there evidence about prior negotiations.

[35] In its Additional Submissions the Applicant submitted that,

“4. Clause 21.18 of … (the Agreement) provides that a casual employee is eligible to apply for conversion in certain circumstances. Inherent is this entitlement is an implied term that the University must respond to an application that is made.
5. Sub-clauses 21.18 (i) and (ii) sets out the circumstances that an employee becomes eligible to apply for conversion and clauses 21.20 and 21.21 sets out the options for how the University is to respond to such an application.
6. The Respondent submitted that “neither clause 21.18 of the agreement, nor any other provision of the agreement, places any requirement on the Respondent to approve an application for conversion for an eligible employee”.
7. The Applicant submits that this is a narrow reading of the Agreement and is an incorrect approach to understanding the relevant clauses and the agreement as a whole.
8. Principles 7 and 8 of the Golden Cockeral decision are relevant here in understanding the obligations and options provided to the University by clause 21.18 to 21.21.
9. The purpose of clauses 21.18 to 21.21 is to provide for the conversion of casual employees to a more secure form employment if they make the application.
10. Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 come under Part 4, Employment Arrangements, in the Agreement. This part sets out the comprehensive regulation of the forms of employment available and limitations or restrictions on both casual and fixed term forms of employment and the management of how employees can acquire more secure employment if they are casual or fixed term.
11. The relevant section for clauses 21.18 to 21.21 comes under the sub-heading of “Professional/General Staff Casual Employment - Conversion Arrangements for Certain Employees”. The placement of these clauses in this section under this heading supports the interpretation that conversion is an obligation if the facts meet the required circumstances.
12. Clause 21.18 provides to casual employees the opportunity to seek more secure employment if they meet the eligibility criteria. Clause 21.19 compliments clause 21.18 in relation to an employee’s eligibility to apply. Clause 21.20 provides the Respondent with a comprehensive list of circumstances that conversion to a more secure form of employment can be refused. Clause 21.21 then obliges the Respondent to make a determination (if 21.20 options are not exercised) on whether the employee will be converted to continuing or fixed term.
13. The language used in this clause is relevant. Clause 21.21 says the Respondent “will determine” the form of employment that is either “continuing or fixed term”. It does not include the option for the Respondent to determine that the form of employment “will be” casual employment.
14. Other language in the casual conversion clauses also provides for a strong implication for action required by the Respondent to an application for conversion. In clause 21.18 it says that “An employee … is eligible to apply for conversion”. However, clause 21.20 says that “Conversion to non-casual employment will not occur in the following circumstances” [emphasis added]. Following this clause 21.21. says “The University will determine whether the employee’s employment will be converted to continuing or fixed term” [emphasis added].
15. The use of strong language in these clauses places a requirement on the Respondent to ensure in that they will make a determination. There is no optional language here. It does not say University may determine whether the employee is converted to continuing or fixed term, but will determine whether the employee is converted to continuing or fixed term.
16. There are implied terms associated with this clause that requires it to be read in context of the Agreement as a whole, in particular with regard to the whole of Part 4 of the Agreement.
17. The Respondent’s submission is that the clause be narrowly read without consideration of the broader context of the Agreement, and without consideration of the disputed provision’s place and arrangement in the agreement. Taken in this way, this would provide for serious problems in how it could be applied.
18. If Clause 21.21 is read by itself, and following the Respondent’s approach, the Respondent could arbitrarily and unilaterally convert any employee, be they continuing, fixed term or casual, to “either continuing or fixed term”. This clause can only be read in the context of the rest of Part 4 of the Agreement.
19. When read in context, in applying clause 21.21, the Respondent must also apply clause 21.6 which limits the use of fixed term employment. The Respondent must also apply clauses 21.15 and 21.16 which limits on the use of casual employment. Finally, it must be read in context of the sub-heading immediately prior to clause 21.18 which provides that this section is the process under which a casual employee can become a non-casual employee. For further context that must be considered.
20. The language used in this section, in clauses 21.18 to 21.21, also provides further context. Clauses 21.18 starts off with “A member of the casual professional/general staff” then continues for the rest of this section to refer to “the employee”. It is implicit that in the clauses following clause 21.18 in this section of the agreement that “the employee” is the “casual professional/general staff” member who applied under clause 21.18 for conversion due to becoming eligible under sub-clauses 21.18 (i) and (ii).
21. Clause 21.20 provides a comprehensive list of circumstances where conversion will not apply. There is no express or implied term in this clause or the Agreement that provides for other circumstances in which conversion will not occur.
22. The Applicant submits that where a list is provided without the terms “includes” or “such as” then the list is an exhaustive list. In this case clause 21.20 provides that “Conversion to non-casual employment will not occur in the following circumstances:”. [Emphasis added] The list in clause 21.20 also does not include a statement such as “any other genuine business need” or “any other similar situation”. The Applicant submits that this excludes the ejusdem generis rule from providing that similar circumstances to those listed may be utilised.
23. In contrast the Modern Award in clause 12.3 (c) has the same list of circumstances with the preamble “but are not limited to”. These changes are relevant when combined with the removal of the “employer will not unreasonably refuse” and the removal of the employer “may refuse an application on reasonable grounds”.
24. The construction of these clauses in the context of their place and arrangement provides for an implied requirement that the Respondent will convert an eligible employee under 21.21 who had applied under clause 21.18, and unless one of the options in clause 21.20 is validly chosen the Respondent.
25. Principle 9 of the Golden Cockeral decision supports this argument. If this section of the Agreement (clauses 21.18 to 21.21) is read by any reasonable person, the understanding taken upon reading this section can only be that the Respondent will convert an eligible casual employee to either continuing or fixed term. Further to this, a reasonable person reading Part 4 of the Agreement would also understand that conversion to fixed term would need to be in accordance with clause 21.6. Where this is not possible, the conversion would then be to continuing employment. There are no other options available in clause 21.21.”

[36] In its Additional Submissions the University submitted that,

“14. “The Respondent relies on the principles set out in the Commission Full Bench decision in AMIEU v Golden Cockerel Pty Limited [2014] FWCFB 7447, as recently expanded upon by the Commission Full Bench decision in AMWU v Berri Pty Limited [2017] FWCFB 3005 (“Berri”). The principles referred to below are those as set out in Berri at paragraph [114] (“the Berri Principles”) and are numbered accordingly hereafter.
15. The starting point must always be a consideration of the ordinary meaning of the relevant words (Berri Principle 1). In this case, there are no words in the Agreement that require that the Respondent must convert an eligible casual employee. The Agreement specifies eligibility criteria, provides for disqualifications from eligibility, and says nothing about approval/refusal of applications. On the clear wording of the Agreement, the Agreement does not address the approval/refusal of applications for conversion.
16. The enterprise agreement conversion regime described in paragraph 15 above was carried forward from the Respondent’s two immediate antecedent enterprise agreements, being the two enterprise agreements referred to at paragraph [5] of the Commission Statement.
17. The enterprise agreement conversion regime is evidently and objectively quite different to the conversion regime provided by the Modern Award, which specifically requires at Clause 12.3(c) that an employer “not unreasonably refuse an application for conversion”. If the two antecedent agreements are at all relevant to the task of interpreting the objective meaning of Clauses 21.18-21.21 of the Agreement, they do strongly suggest that the non-existence of approval/refusal provisions in the Agreement in question was not accidental.
18. The Applicant is not contending that there are any words or phrases in Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of the Agreement which are ambiguous, and for which recourse should be had to surrounding circumstances as permitted by Berri Principle 8 (such as language which might be peculiar to the higher education industry, as might be found in the Modern Award or antecedent enterprise agreements) to properly understand the meaning of wording used in the Agreement.
19. For the reason referred to in paragraph 18 above, and with reference to Berri Principles 7, 8 and 9, the plain wording of Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of the Agreement must prevail. This wording contains no requirement for an application for conversion to be approved by the Respondent.
20. In giving consideration to surrounding circumstances for the purposes of Berri Principle 9, the fact that the Modern Award uses entirely different wording, in that it specifically deals approval/refusal of applications, is in fact evidence that no ambiguity exists with this non-existent wording as there is no wording to this effect in the Agreement. The Modern Award deals with eligibility to apply, and approval/refusal of applications; the Agreement deals only with eligibility to apply.
21. The Applicant is effectively asking the Commission to infer that the Agreement contains a compulsion to convert an eligible employee simply because this is what the Modern Award does (albeit subject to a reasonableness test). This contention amounts to a blatant re-writing of what Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of the Agreement say in plain words, contrary to Berri Principle 2.
22. As set out at paragraphs 12-17 of the Respondent’s Closing Submissions, any deficiency in the statutory declaration filed by the Respondent in support of the application for Commission approval of the Agreement cannot be used to contradict the plain meaning of the Agreement. It should also be noted, of course, that the statutory declaration did not form part of the “tripartite agreement”, as referred to in Berri, involving the employer, employee representatives and the employees.
23. Using the statutory declaration to defeat the plain meaning of Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of the Agreement would also directly contravene Berri Principle 14 (if, indeed, this material is admissible extrinsic material, which the Respondent contends it is not).
24. The recent 4 Yearly Modern Awards Review Full Bench decision regarding casual employment and part time employment [2017] FWCFB 3531 (“the MAR Decision”) dealt with applications to vary a large number of modern awards, including this Modern Award. Consistent with paragraph 18 above, there is nothing in the Full Bench consideration of the application to vary this Modern Award that assists in a proper determination of the meaning of the plain words used in Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of the Agreement.
25. It is also contended by the Respondent that the consideration at section 3.45 of the MAR Decision of the general history and operation of casual conversion provisions in industrial awards can have no bearing on the objective meaning of the plain words used in Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of this particular enterprise agreement negotiated at Charles Sturt University.
26. In summary, the wording of Clauses 21.18 to 21.21 of the Agreement contains no ambiguity. This wording has plain meaning. That plain meaning involves no requirement for the Respondent to approve applications for conversion. Eligibility to apply for conversion means eligibility to apply for conversion. Nothing more can be read into Clause 21.18 of the Agreement.”

Different words used in the Modern Award

[37] As the Full Bench observed in the Casual employment and Part-time employment 4 yearly review decision 40,

“[333] The first casual conversion provision in an award was granted by the South Australian Industrial Relations Commission (the SAIRC) (Stevens DP) in Clerks (South Australia) Award.” 41

“[334] The decision of Stevens DP was quashed on appeal by a Full Bench of the SAIRC in Clerks (South Australia) Award Casual Provisions Appeal Case.” 42
“[335] Subsequently, the Full Bench re-determined the matter in a further decision 43 and awarded a casual conversion clause which addressed the concerns it had identified in its earlier decision.”
“[336] After the initial decision of Stevens DP, but before the first appeal decision, a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commissions (Munro J, Polites SDP and Lawson C) issued its decision in Re Metal, Engineering and Associated Industries Award, 1998 - Part 1 44 in which it undertook a comprehensive review of the casual employment provisions of the Metals Award and, among other things, awarded the first casual conversion clause in the federal industrial relations jurisdiction.”
….
“[340] In the years following this decision, applications for casual conversion provisions to be placed in a number of other federal awards were made and determined. Many of those applications were granted by consent, and in a number of cases the conversion provision awarded departed from the terms of the clause the Full Bench determined for the Metal, Engineering and Associated Industries Award 1998. The most common departure was to extend the qualifying period for the exercise of the election to convert from 6 months to 12 months.”
….

“[342] Further consideration of casual conversion clauses by the AIRC and the State industrial relations tribunals was, shortly after the Secure Employment Test Case decision, overtaken by the commencement of the operation of the substantial part of the amendments to the WR Act effected by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (the Work Choices Act) on 27 March 2006. Section 515(1)(b) of the WR Act after that date provided “conversion from casual employment to another type of employment” was not an “allowable award matter”, that is, a matter that could be the subject of an award term, and s.525(1) provided that after that date terms of awards which were not allowable award matters ceased to have effect (subject to certain exceptions which were not applicable to casual conversion clauses). To the extent that the WR Act as amended extended the operation of the federal industrial relations system to most private sectors by use of the corporations power in s.51(xx) of the Commonwealth Constitution, State awards applicable to those employers became “notional agreements preserving State awards” (NAPSAs) under Schedule 8 of the WR Act. Casual conversion clauses in State awards carried over into NAPSAs were not invalidated by the Work Choices Act amendments.”

“[343] The issue of casual conversion clauses arose again when the Commission came to conduct the award modernisation process required by Part 10A of the WR Act (by this time amended by the Workplace Relations Amendment (Transition to Forward with Fairness) Act 2008 (Cth) in 2008–09. This issue was addressed in the Full Bench Award Modernisation Decision of 19 December 2008. 45”

“[344] As part of the award modernisation process, casual conversion clauses were, in a small number of cases, placed in modern awards the predecessor awards of which had not contained such clauses. …”

“[345] Prior to the current proceedings, no modern award has been varied to add a casual conversion clause since the modern awards took effect on 1 January 2010. Of the current total of 122 non-enterprise modern awards, the 28 awards which contain a casual conversion clause are listed in Attachment F.”

[38] The first casual provision in a federal award provided for,

“An employee … hav[ing] the right to elect to have [their] ongoing contract of employment converted to full-time employment or part-time employment.” 46

[39] As has been observed above, there are some similarities and some differences between the Agreement and the Modern Award. For example, both refer to an eligibility to apply:

Clause 21.21 of the Agreement	Clause 12.3(a)(iv) of the Modern Award
A member of the casual professional/general staff is eligible to apply for conversion to continuing or fixed term employment, as appropriate, in the following circumstances…	An eligible casual employee may apply in writing for conversion to non-casual employment in accordance with the conversion provisions of this award.

[40] However, there appears to be a difference in how the employer (in this case the University) is to respond to an application:

Clause 21.21 of the Agreement	Clause 12.3(c) of the Modern Award
The University will determine whether the employee's employment will be converted to continuing or fixed term.	The employer will not unreasonably refuse an application for conversion. However, it may refuse an application on reasonable grounds. Reasonable grounds include…

[41] In its Additional Submissions the Applicant submitted that,

“33. The Applicant notes firstly that the Decision in relation to the Higher Education - General Staff Modern Award 2010 is that there is no proposal to change the casual conversion clause. [393]-[394]. It must be noted that this clause is the result of a consent award as settlement of the ‘casuals case’ in the Higher Education sector following the Metals Casual Decision. 47
34. The broad rationale by the Full Bench is nicely summarised in paragraph [346] relevantly including that “[t]he fundamental justification for a casual conversion entitlement was that long-term regular and systematic employment on a casual basis was characterised as undermining the integrity of fundamental employment standards…” and that “the employee was in the best position to assess whether the continuation of employment on a casual basis was detrimental to the employee’s interests”.

8 Appendix H of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

9 Appendix F of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

10 Exhibit A3, attachments 5.1 and 5.2.

11 Appendix G of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

12 Ibid.

13 Transcript reference PN486.

14 Appendix H of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

15 Appendix I of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

16 Appendix J of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

17 Appendix K of AD1 (a part of Exhibit R4).

18 From 1 January 2010 clause 12.5 was renumbered 12.3(c).

19 Exhibit R2, paragraph 13;

20 Sub-clause 21.1 of the Agreement

21 Sub-clauses 21.5 to 21.13

22 Sub-clauses 21.14 to 21.25

23 Sub-clause 21.2

24 Sub-clauses 21.3, 21.4

25 Exhibit R4, AD1, Attachment to email from Mr Wilson 4 January 2017, paragraphs 12-13; C2016/7602 Transcript of Proceedings, PN418-424

26 C2016/7602 Transcript of Proceedings, PN237 and PN486

27 C2016/7602 Transcript of Proceedings, PN447-448

28 NTEIU v University of Wollongong [2002] FCA 31, [30]; in National Tertiary Education Industry Union v The University of Melbourne[2012] FWA 1202, [21].

29 245 IR 394 [41] 9

30 245 IR 394 [41] 2

31 Sub-clause 21.18

32 Sub-clause 21.20

33 Exhibit R4, Appendix E

34 Exhibit R4, Appendix F

35 Exhibit R4, Appendix G

36 Exhibit R5, paragraph 11

37 C2016/7602 Transcript of Proceedings, PN486

38 [2014] FWCFB 7447.

39 [2017] FWCFB 3005.

40 [2017] FWCFB 3541.

41 [2000] SAIRComm 41.

42 [2001] SAIRComm 7.

43 Clerks (South Australia) Award Casual Provisions Appeal Case (2) [2002] SAIRComm 39 .

44 (2000) 110 IR 247; Print T4991.

45 [2008] AIRCFB 1000.

46 Ibid 290, [114].

47 (2000) 110 IR 247

48 - see clause 10.4,

49 - see clause 11.4

50 - see clause 1.54

51 Charles Sturt University (General Staff) Enterprise Agreement 2000-2003. AG805050

54 – 2005-2008, clause 23.15

55 – 2010-2012, clause 21.18

56 - 2013-2016, clause 21.18

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

David Wedgwood v Charles Sturt University T/A Charles Sturt University

[2017] FWC 5617

27 OCTOBER 2017

DECISION