David Kelso and Telstra Corporation Limited

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[2015] AATA 403

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number

 2013/3631

Re

David Kelso

APPLICANT

And

Telstra Corporation Limited

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Senior Member A C Cotter
Dr M Sullivan, Member

Date 5 June 2015
Place Brisbane

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision that the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant in respect of the Applicant’s Adjustment Disorder.

................................SGD.....................................

Senior Member A C Cotter

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – Liability accepted for workplace injury to back – whether liability to be accepted for associated psychological injury – Adjustment Disorder – Depression – whether “injury” or “disease” under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)- decision under review set aside

LEGISLATION

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 14, 5A, 5B and 67(8)

CASES

Comcare v Canute (2005) 148 FCR 232

Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535

Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286

Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522

ReRosenzweig and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2012) 130 ALD 284.

Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439

March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506

Commonwealth of Australia v (K C) Smith (1989) 18 ALD 224, 227

Re Havnen and Comcare [2010] AATA 535

REASONS FOR DECISION

5 June 2015

INTRODUCTION

  1. David Kelso was working as a technician for Telstra Corporation Limited when he suffered a muscular strain to his lower back in February 2012. He subsequently lodged a workers’ compensation claim with Telstra, which accepted liability to pay compensation in respect of that injury.

  2. Some five weeks after the first incident, he suffered another injury to his lower back, also while at work.

  3. During the course of the next few months, Mr Kelso consulted his general practitioner on several occasions about his ongoing back pain. She prescribed anti-inflammatory drugs and referred him for physiotherapy and ultimately, to an orthopaedic surgeon. She also issued a number of medical certificates, certifying that he was either unfit for work at all, or fit only for suitable duties.

  4. Regrettably for Mr Kelso, his back pain continued. Neither a CT scan nor a MTI disclosed any major abnormality. The orthopaedic surgeon to whom he was referred was likewise unable to find any particular physical abnormality. In a letter to the referring general practitioner in late July 2012, he noted that Mr Kelso was starting to feel depressed with the lack of improvement in his symptoms. He therefore suggested that she see Mr Kelso with respect to his depression and to potentially prescribe him an antidepressant.[1] 

    [1] Exhibit 15: Letter Dr John Albietz to Dr Lalitha Gunasena dated 25 July 2012.

  5. By September 2012, Telstra wanted Mr Kelso examined by an orthopaedic surgeon of its choosing. That doctor thought that it was difficult to justify the ongoing complaint severity at a physical level, given the lack of supportive features to account for it, and having regard to the duration of the ongoing symptoms. Noting that Mr…

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Details
Case
[2015] AATA 403
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of David Kelso and Telstra Corporation Limited, the dispute involves the acceptance of liability for a workplace injury that resulted in both physical and psychological harm to Mr. Kelso. The matter was brought before the court to determine whether Telstra Corporation Limited was liable for compensation regarding the psychological injury, specifically an Adjustment Disorder, which Mr. Kelso developed due to his back injury. The Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) was the statutory framework under which the liability and compensation were assessed.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether Mr. Kelso's psychological condition could be classified as an "injury" or a "disease" under the Act, and subsequently, whether Telstra was liable for compensation for this condition. The court considered the definitions and criteria provided by the Act to determine if the psychological condition met the threshold for being compensable. This involved evaluating the medical evidence provided by Drs. De Leacy and Duke, who diagnosed Mr. Kelso with an Adjustment Disorder, which later progressed to Major Depressive Episode. The court also had to consider the nature and origin of the psychological condition in relation to the workplace injury, assessing whether it could be considered a sudden, ascertainable physiological change, which is typically required for an injury under the Act.

In its reasoning, the court found that Mr. Kelso's condition did not meet the typical definition of an "injury" as it lacked the sudden and ascertainable physiological change usually associated with such a classification. However, the court did not consider Mr. Kelso's condition as an ailment that would classify it as a "disease." Instead, the court concluded that the psychological condition was compensable under the Act as an "injury" because it resulted in impairment. Consequently, Telstra Corporation Limited was found liable to pay compensation for Mr. Kelso's Adjustment Disorder. The court set aside the previous decision and substituted it with a decision to compensate Mr. Kelso, while also proposing to adjourn the proceeding to allow for submissions on costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In a supplementary report[8] and again at the hearing,[9] Dr De Leacy reiterated that he stood by his view that Mr Kelso “has developed an Adjustment Disorder in relation to the work-related injury that ultimately led to chronic back pain and disability”.[8] Exhibit 12: Supplementary report of Dr Eric De Leacy dated 12 January 2015.[9] Transcript of hearing, page 27, lines [1]-[6].Dr Duke’s evidence Dr Duke saw Mr Kelso almost a year later, on 19 November 2014. He diagnosed Mr Kelso as having initially developed an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depression. However, over time and with ongoing symptoms of pain and functional impairment as a result of his back injury, he thought Mr Kelso’s condition had progressed to the point where he was, at the time of the consultation, suffering from a Major Depressive Episode. Dr Duke considered that the Adjustment Disorder first developed in the middle of 2012 and that Mr Kelso’s back pain and his limited response to treatment had been the major significant factors contributing to its onset. He stated that had Mr Kelso not suffered the back injury in 2012, he would not have presented with symptoms of major depression. Dr Duke expressed the opinion that if there was no further improvement in his back pain, Mr Kelso’s depressive symptoms would likely be permanent.[10] [10] Exhibit 14: Report of Dr Benjamin Duke dated 26 November 2014. In oral evidence at the hearing, Dr Duke elaborated further:….(Q)uite often when people experience an acute physical injury that is associated with pain and that pain doesn’t improve, they will begin to develop depressive symptoms that would initially be perceived to be part of what we call an adjustment disorder with depressed mood. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding their pain and whether it’s impacting upon their finances, their financial security, their job security, they often will also develop anxiety symptoms, and so occasionally people will have what’s called an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression. If people, for whatever reason, be it continuation of the pain, lack of response to treatment, other difficulties that have arisen as a result of pain such as in Mr Kelso’s case, impaired work performance with resulting extended time away from the workplace, the depressive symptoms can worsen and intensify, and according to DSM-IV, if somebody’s depressive symptoms and range of depressive symptoms have increased in their breadth and severity to the point where they then meet the criteria for a major depression, then the diagnosis transfers across. In Mr Kelso’s case, given that he was…reportedly stood down from the workplace because of depression and then was unable to obtain viable alternative employment with Telstra, and because of continued unemployment and the financial difficulties that have arisen as a result of that, that progression of his depressive symptoms occurred, to the point where I felt they did also progress to a major depressive illness.[11] [11] Transcript of hearing, pages 51 to 52, lines [29]-[47] and [1] to [4].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Based on the opinions of Drs De Leacy and Duke, we consider that that “injury” resulted in impairment and is therefore compensable. Telstra is therefore liable to pay compensation in respect of that injury under s 14 of the Act. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, we consider that under s 14 of the Act, Telstra is liable to pay compensation in respect of Mr Kelso’s Adjustment Disorder. We therefore set aside the Reviewable Decision the subject of the application and substitute for it a decision to this effect. We note that in his submissions, counsel for Mr Kelso sought an additional order that Telstra pay Mr Kelso’s costs pursuant to s 67(8) of the Act. Telstra made no submissions on that matter. We therefore propose to adjourn the proceeding for 14 days to enable both parties to make written submissions on costs, to be provided to the Tribunal and the other party within that period. After the expiration of that time and after considering the parties’ submissions (if any), we intend to make a further order on the question of costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

We deal with each of these issues below.CONSIDERATIONHow is Mr Kelso’s condition to be described? How Mr Kelso’s condition is described is important because the Act differentiates between a “disease” and an “injury (other than a disease)” and prescribes different contribution tests for each. While an “injury” is compensable if it “arises out of, or in the course of”, employment, “disease” is compensable only if an ailment or its aggravation was “contributed to, to a significant degree” by the employment. The former therefore imports a wider test which recognises either a causal or temporal relationship with the employment, whereas the latter requires a narrower, causal relationship with the employment to be established. Equally, it is important to determine whether Mr Kelso’s condition amounts to an ailment, as that is central to the determination of whether he is suffering from a “disease” within the meaning in s 5B of the Act. Is Mr Kelso’s condition an “injury”? Counsel for Mr Kelso referred us to the remarks of Gyles J in Comcare v Canute[21] which were affirmed on appeal by the High Court,[22] to the effect that the definitions of “injury” and “disease” were wide enough to permit the conclusion in that case that the psychological condition might be regarded either as a mental injury or as an ailment.[21] (2005) 148 FCR 232 at [83].[22] Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535. While that general observation is not disputed, the question of whether it is possible to describe a psychological condition as a mental “injury” depends on the circumstances of the particular case. That in turn involves a consideration of the plain meaning of “injury”, as that word is used in the definition in the Act. It is well established that the word “injury” in that context involves a sudden, ascertainable physiological change.[23] [23] See Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286 at [39] (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J); Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; and Re Rosenzweig and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2012) 130 ALD 284. The difficulty for Mr Kelso in the present case is that there is no evidence of the requisite sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change necessary to constitute an “injury” as that word is normally understood. While the assessments of Drs De Leacy and Duke confirm Mr Kelso as suffering from diagnosed psychological conditions, they fall short of describing what one would normally understand as an “injury”; to so describe his condition would, in our view, be straining the normal meaning of the word. We therefore do not consider that Mr Kelso’s condition can be described as an “injury”. That then leads us to the next question, whether Mr Kelso’s condition is an “ailment” as that term is understood in the Act.Is Mr Kelso’s condition an “ailment”? It is long accepted that, for the purposes of the Act, it is not necessary to identify the employee’s psychological condition by reference to some diagnostic label. Rather, the threshold test is whether the employee’s psychological condition goes beyond a normal human reaction, such that it falls “outside the boundaries of normal mental functioning and behaviour.”[24] [24] See Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439, [444] (Drummond J).Competing Opinions