[2015] AATA 403
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number
2013/3631
Re
David Kelso
APPLICANT
And
Telstra Corporation Limited
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member A C Cotter
Dr M Sullivan, MemberDate 5 June 2015 Place Brisbane The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision that the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant in respect of the Applicant’s Adjustment Disorder.
................................SGD.....................................
Senior Member A C Cotter
CATCHWORDS
COMPENSATION – Liability accepted for workplace injury to back – whether liability to be accepted for associated psychological injury – Adjustment Disorder – Depression – whether “injury” or “disease” under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)- decision under review set aside
LEGISLATION
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 14, 5A, 5B and 67(8)
CASES
Comcare v Canute (2005) 148 FCR 232
Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535
Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286
Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522
ReRosenzweig and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2012) 130 ALD 284.
Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506
Commonwealth of Australia v (K C) Smith (1989) 18 ALD 224, 227
Re Havnen and Comcare [2010] AATA 535
REASONS FOR DECISION
5 June 2015
INTRODUCTION
David Kelso was working as a technician for Telstra Corporation Limited when he suffered a muscular strain to his lower back in February 2012. He subsequently lodged a workers’ compensation claim with Telstra, which accepted liability to pay compensation in respect of that injury.
Some five weeks after the first incident, he suffered another injury to his lower back, also while at work.
During the course of the next few months, Mr Kelso consulted his general practitioner on several occasions about his ongoing back pain. She prescribed anti-inflammatory drugs and referred him for physiotherapy and ultimately, to an orthopaedic surgeon. She also issued a number of medical certificates, certifying that he was either unfit for work at all, or fit only for suitable duties.
Regrettably for Mr Kelso, his back pain continued. Neither a CT scan nor a MTI disclosed any major abnormality. The orthopaedic surgeon to whom he was referred was likewise unable to find any particular physical abnormality. In a letter to the referring general practitioner in late July 2012, he noted that Mr Kelso was starting to feel depressed with the lack of improvement in his symptoms. He therefore suggested that she see Mr Kelso with respect to his depression and to potentially prescribe him an antidepressant.[1]
[1] Exhibit 15: Letter Dr John Albietz to Dr Lalitha Gunasena dated 25 July 2012.
By September 2012, Telstra wanted Mr Kelso examined by an orthopaedic surgeon of its choosing. That doctor thought that it was difficult to justify the ongoing complaint severity at a physical level, given the lack of supportive features to account for it, and having regard to the duration of the ongoing symptoms. Noting that Mr…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether Mr. Kelso's psychological condition could be classified as an "injury" or a "disease" under the Act, and subsequently, whether Telstra was liable for compensation for this condition. The court considered the definitions and criteria provided by the Act to determine if the psychological condition met the threshold for being compensable. This involved evaluating the medical evidence provided by Drs. De Leacy and Duke, who diagnosed Mr. Kelso with an Adjustment Disorder, which later progressed to Major Depressive Episode. The court also had to consider the nature and origin of the psychological condition in relation to the workplace injury, assessing whether it could be considered a sudden, ascertainable physiological change, which is typically required for an injury under the Act.
In its reasoning, the court found that Mr. Kelso's condition did not meet the typical definition of an "injury" as it lacked the sudden and ascertainable physiological change usually associated with such a classification. However, the court did not consider Mr. Kelso's condition as an ailment that would classify it as a "disease." Instead, the court concluded that the psychological condition was compensable under the Act as an "injury" because it resulted in impairment. Consequently, Telstra Corporation Limited was found liable to pay compensation for Mr. Kelso's Adjustment Disorder. The court set aside the previous decision and substituted it with a decision to compensate Mr. Kelso, while also proposing to adjourn the proceeding to allow for submissions on costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
We deal with each of these issues below.CONSIDERATIONHow is Mr Kelso’s condition to be described? How Mr Kelso’s condition is described is important because the Act differentiates between a “disease” and an “injury (other than a disease)” and prescribes different contribution tests for each. While an “injury” is compensable if it “arises out of, or in the course of”, employment, “disease” is compensable only if an ailment or its aggravation was “contributed to, to a significant degree” by the employment. The former therefore imports a wider test which recognises either a causal or temporal relationship with the employment, whereas the latter requires a narrower, causal relationship with the employment to be established. Equally, it is important to determine whether Mr Kelso’s condition amounts to an ailment, as that is central to the determination of whether he is suffering from a “disease” within the meaning in s 5B of the Act. Is Mr Kelso’s condition an “injury”? Counsel for Mr Kelso referred us to the remarks of Gyles J in Comcare v Canute[21] which were affirmed on appeal by the High Court,[22] to the effect that the definitions of “injury” and “disease” were wide enough to permit the conclusion in that case that the psychological condition might be regarded either as a mental injury or as an ailment.[21] (2005) 148 FCR 232 at [83].[22] Canute v Comcare (2006) 226 CLR 535. While that general observation is not disputed, the question of whether it is possible to describe a psychological condition as a mental “injury” depends on the circumstances of the particular case. That in turn involves a consideration of the plain meaning of “injury”, as that word is used in the definition in the Act. It is well established that the word “injury” in that context involves a sudden, ascertainable physiological change.[23] [23] See Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286 at [39] (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J); Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; and Re Rosenzweig and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2012) 130 ALD 284. The difficulty for Mr Kelso in the present case is that there is no evidence of the requisite sudden and ascertainable or dramatic physiological change necessary to constitute an “injury” as that word is normally understood. While the assessments of Drs De Leacy and Duke confirm Mr Kelso as suffering from diagnosed psychological conditions, they fall short of describing what one would normally understand as an “injury”; to so describe his condition would, in our view, be straining the normal meaning of the word. We therefore do not consider that Mr Kelso’s condition can be described as an “injury”. That then leads us to the next question, whether Mr Kelso’s condition is an “ailment” as that term is understood in the Act.Is Mr Kelso’s condition an “ailment”? It is long accepted that, for the purposes of the Act, it is not necessary to identify the employee’s psychological condition by reference to some diagnostic label. Rather, the threshold test is whether the employee’s psychological condition goes beyond a normal human reaction, such that it falls “outside the boundaries of normal mental functioning and behaviour.”[24] [24] See Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439, [444] (Drummond J).Competing Opinions