| [2023] FWC 375 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
David Jones
v
Woolworths Ltd T/A Woolworths Ltd
(U2022/11912)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAKE | BRISBANE, 15 FEBRUARY 2023 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – application made outside of statutory timeframe – application for extension of time dismissed.
Mr David Jones (the Applicant) lodged an application with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) in relation to the termination of his employment by Woolworths Ltd (the Respondent).
The Applicant began his employment on 15 September 2007. It is uncontentious that the Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment on 3 November 2022. The application was lodged with the Commission on 15 December 2022.
Directions were set for the filing and service of material. The Applicant filed and served their material at 3:14am on Wednesday, 1 February 2023. The Respondent filed and served their material at 1:18pm on Wednesday, 8 February 2023. The jurisdictional matter was heard at 10:00am on Monday, 13 February 2023.
Was the application lodged within time?
Section 394(2) of the Act requires that an application for unfair dismissal remedy be made within 21 days after a dismissal took effect, or in such further time as the Commission may allow pursuant to s.394(3) of the Act.
The Applicant lodged his application on 15 December 2022. He accepts that his application was made some 21 days outside of the 21 days required under s.394(2) of the Act.
The Respondent opposes the granting of an extension of time. It is therefore necessary to determine whether a further period should be allowed under s.394(3) of the Act for the application to be made.
Consideration of whether a further period should be granted
Section 394(3) of the Act sets out the circumstances in which the Commission may allow a further period for a general protections application involving dismissal be made:
“(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b)whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.”
The test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ establishes a high barrier for an applicant.[1] In Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (later cited with approval by the Full Bench of the Commission in Tamu v Australia for UNHCR),[2] the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia stated that:
“[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or…
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- Case
- [2023] FWC 375
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Deputy President found that the explanation for the delay was not exceptional. While Mr Jones had experienced significant mental health issues, there was no evidence that these issues rendered him incapable of filing the application within the required timeframe. The Deputy President also found that Mrs Jones's role in filing the application did not constitute exceptional circumstances as she was acting in a voluntary capacity. The further delay caused by the post was also not considered exceptional, as Mrs Jones should have taken steps to mitigate this risk. The Applicant's failure to dispute the dismissal and present evidence of prejudice to the employer further weighed against an extension of time. The Deputy President considered the merits of the application to be neutral, as it was difficult to assess them without a proper hearing and assessment of all the evidence. The Deputy President found that fairness as between the Applicant and others in a like position was also a neutral factor in this case.
The Deputy President concluded that the application was made outside the statutory timeframe and there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant an extension of time. The Deputy President dismissed the application for an unfair dismissal remedy. This decision highlights the importance of meeting statutory timeframes for unfair dismissal applications and the high threshold for demonstrating exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time. The Deputy President found that the Applicant's explanation for the delay, reliance on his wife to file the application, and failure to mitigate the risk of the post delay did not meet this threshold.
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