| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
S CI 2014 6632
IN THE MATTER of an application by David James Lindsay under section 54 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic).
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JUDGE: | J FORREST J |
DATE OF RULING: | 9 April 2015 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | David James Lindsay – Application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2015] VSC 129 |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Vexatious litigant – General litigation restraint order – Application for leave to commence legal proceedings – Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (Vic) – Whether proposed proceeding is a vexatious proceeding – Whether there are reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding – Whether proposed proceeding is an abuse of process.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| No appearances – application dealt with on the papers | ||
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
David James Lindsay, AKA Sjostrom Clemens-Lindsay, is a vexatious litigant with a long history of bringing claims in this Court.
During the 1980s and in 1992 Mr Lindsay sustained injuries to his leg and back in the course of his employment with Carlton and United Breweries (CUB). Over the past 25 years he has received payments of compensation under the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic). He now wants to issue a common law proceeding in the County Court against his employer.
To bring such a claim, given his status as a vexatious litigant, Mr Lindsay must obtain the leave of this Court. The central issue is not that he may at some point in time have possessed a viable substantive claim. Rather, it is whether the Court can be satisfied that Mr Lindsay’s claim is not vexatious and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding.[1] It is readily apparent that CUB may rely on a defence under the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) and/or a jury verdict (and judgment) in a previous claim brought by Mr Lindsay against CUB.
[1]Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014, s 55.
For the following reasons I think that CUB and, if he wishes, the Attorney-General, should be given the opportunity to be heard before I grant Mr Lindsay leave to proceed.
Background to Mr Lindsay’s application
Vexatious Litigant Order
In July 1998, Mr Lindsay was declared a vexatious litigant, under s 21 of the Supreme Court Act1986 (Vic) upon the application of the Attorney-General.
Kellam J found that a number of proceedings commenced by Mr Lindsay –
… were vexatious proceedings in the sense that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action or were or are oppressive, embarrassing and an abuse of process of the Court… Each of [the proceedings] contain pleadings which were or are oppressive, embarrassing and were or are so untenable as to have no prospect of being successfully established at trial.
His Honour was satisfied that each of those proceedings had been brought without any reasonable grounds and had been instituted both ‘habitually and persistently’ within the meaning of s 21(2)(a) and (b) of the Supreme…
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- Case
- [2015] VSC 129
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Mr Lindsay had previously been declared a vexatious litigant by the Supreme Court, meaning he was subject to the Vexatious Proceedings Act. The court considered whether the proposed proceeding met the definition of a vexatious proceeding, which includes a proceeding where there are no reasonable grounds for bringing it or where it is an abuse of the court's process. The court examined the affidavit and exhibits provided by Mr Lindsay and considered whether the proposed proceeding met the criteria for being classified as vexatious.
The court found that the proposed proceeding did not meet the criteria for being classified as vexatious. The court found that there were reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding and that it was not an abuse of process. The court also found that the proposed proceeding did not meet the criteria for a general litigation restraint order, which would have prevented Mr Lindsay from commencing the proceeding without the leave of the court. The court therefore granted leave for Mr Lindsay to commence the proposed proceeding.
The court ordered that CUB Insurance and the Attorney-General be given notice of the application and be provided with copies of Mr Lindsay's affidavit, the exhibits and these reasons. The court also ordered that Mr Lindsay's application be listed for hearing before a judge of the Court on 20 May 2015.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. That CUB and the Attorney-General be given notice of this application and be provided with copies of Mr Lindsay’s affidavit, the exhibits and these reasons.
2. That Mr Lindsay’s application be listed for hearing before a judge of this Court on 20 May 2015.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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