DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN v THE HONOURABLE JEFFREY ALLAN MILES [2006] ACTSC 57 (25 May 2006)
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for Judge to disqualify himself on grounds of actual and/or apprehended bias – no actual bias – no apprehended bias – application dismissed.
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
No. SC 853 of 2005
Judge: Lander J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 25 May 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 853 of 2005
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN
Applicant
AND:THE HONOURABLE JEFFREY ALLAN MILES
Respondent
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Intervenor
ORDER
Judge: Lander J
Date: 25 May 2006
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The oral application be dismissed.
This is an application by the applicant that I disqualify myself on the grounds of actual bias or, in the alternative, apprehended bias. The test for disqualification for apprehended bias is well known. In Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 498, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ formulated the test for apprehended bias:
It has been established by a series of decisions of this court that the test to be applied in Australia in determining whether a judge is disqualified by reason of the appearance of bias (which, in the present case, was said to take the form of pre-judgment) is whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.
That statement of principle was repeated in Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337. At [6], Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said:
Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.
In this application, Mr Eastman has relied on, as I have said, both grounds, actual bias and apprehended bias. Of course, if he can make out apprehended bias then that would be enough. That test is significantly less difficult to satisfy than establishing to the satisfaction of the judicial officer that the judicial officer is actually biased. I…
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- Case
- [2006] ACTSC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court meticulously examined the applicant's arguments, which centred on several incidents during the proceedings. These included the judge's allowance of a barrister to appear despite potential conflicts of interest, the judge's comments on the relevance of certain affidavit evidence, and the judge's refusal to grant interim relief regarding the applicant's transfer from prison. Each of these points was assessed against the legal standards for bias, particularly the apprehension of bias principle established in Johnson v Johnson and reiterated in Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy. The court concluded that none of the actions or comments by the judge warranted a finding of actual or apprehended bias. The judge's conduct was found to be within the bounds of judicial discretion and did not indicate any predisposition to partiality or lack of impartiality.
The court dismissed the application for disqualification, affirming that the judge's actions did not suggest any form of bias that would undermine the integrity of the judicial process. The decision was grounded in the principle that justice must be perceived to be done, and the court found no basis for the apprehension that the judge might not be impartial.
The final orders of the court were that the oral application be dismissed, with no disqualification of the judge on grounds of actual or apprehended bias.
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