DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN v THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY [2013] ACTSC 184 (28 August 2013)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application of apprehended bias of Minister – application for release on licence – Minister as decision-maker – whether given the history of Minister’s approach to prior applications, objective observer might think Minister’s participation in Executive’s final decision would be unfavourable to applicant – where previous decisions made by Minister on erroneous construction of section conferring discretion – where delay by Minister in seeking information and decision after Court order in nature of a writ of mandamus
Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT)
Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act2005 (ACT) ss 6, 7, 290, 293, 295
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 475
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) ss 10(1)(b), 19(1), 40B(1)
Eastman v ACT Executive Australian Capital Territory [2013] ACTSC 53 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 22 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 applied Eastman v Marshall (2012) 7 ACTLR 37 referred to
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425 applied
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
No. SC 136 of 2013
Judge: Rares J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 28 August 2013
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 136 of 2013
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN: DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN
Plaintiff
AND:AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Defendant
ORDER
Judge: Rares J
Date: 28 August 2013
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application be dismissed.
On 25 February 2013, I made an order in the nature of a writ of mandamus requiring the Australian Capital Territory to consider the application of the plaintiff, David Eastman, to release him on licence under s 295 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act2005 (ACT) in accordance with law: see Eastman v ACT Executive Australian Capital Territory [2013] ACTSC 53. In those reasons, I set out the then relevant portions of the statutory schemes and the facts relating to Mr Eastman’s three applications for consideration of his being released on license that he had made, the first two to the Attorney‑General on each of 29 June 2009 and 2010, and the third to the Chief Minister on 29 June 2012.
Following that order, Mr Eastman made inquiries of senior officers of ACT Corrective Services as to whether the Executive had enquired of them for any update as to his suitability for release on license. On 18 April 2013, Mr Eastman filed an originating application seeking that the matter be listed so as to seek an order prescribing a time by which the Executive should decide his application. The application was heard on 13 May 2013 and it was accepted by senior counsel appearing for the Executive that no such inquiries had been initiated up to then. The evidence then suggested that the Executive anticipated that a decision would be made in relation to his request for release on license by Sunday, 30 June 2013.
In his application in the…
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- Case
- [2013] ACTSC 184
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to address included whether the Minister's previous decisions, which were based on an erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, and the delay in complying with the Court's order, created a reasonable apprehension of bias in the Minister's mind. The appellant also argued that the Minister's history of denying parole applications without providing detailed reasons contributed to the apprehension of bias. Furthermore, the court had to consider the extent to which the Minister's prior conduct could be taken into account when assessing the apprehension of bias.
The court found that the Minister's prior decisions, based on an erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, did not necessarily indicate a bias. The court also held that the Minister's delay in seeking information and making a decision after the Court's order did not contribute to the apprehension of bias. The court found that the Minister's conduct in relation to prior parole applications, which lacked detailed reasons, did not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias in the Minister's mind. The court concluded that the Minister's conduct did not give rise to a real likelihood of bias, and therefore dismissed the application. The court also noted that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Minister's conduct had any impact on the final decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi