New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal
CITATION: David EID v R [2008] NSWCCA 255
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.HEARING DATE(S): 27 October 2008
JUDGMENT DATE:
5 November 2008JUDGMENT OF: McClellan CJ at CL at 1; Simpson J at 2; McCallum J at 43 DECISION: (1) Leave granted to appeal;
(2) Appeal dismissed;
(3) In respect of first count, the applicant is sentenced to imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months, commencing on 8 August 2006 and expiring on 7 February 2013, and a balance of term of 3 years and 10 months, expiring on 7 December 2016.CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - appeal against severity of sentence - pleas of guilty - armed robbery - knowingly deal in proceeds of crime - conduct dealings to avoid reporting requirements - whether presence of firearm treated as aggravating factor - whether failure to sentence in accordance with s 44(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 - whether manifestly excessive - failure to comply with s 44(1) directive a technical error - sentence re-formulated - appeal dismissed LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999
Crimes Act 1900
Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)CATEGORY: Principal judgment CASES CITED: R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346
Huynh v R [2006] NSWCCA 224
Bain v R [2006] NSWCCA 79; 161 A Crim R 36
R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; 60 NSWLR 168PARTIES: David EID (Applicant)
REGINA (Respondent)FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 2007/5637 COUNSEL: P Lange (Applicant)
G Rowling (Respondent)SOLICITORS: Adam Houda (Applicant)
S Kavanagh (Solicitor for Public Prosecutions)LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 07/11/0014 LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Williams DCJ LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 30 November 2007
2007/5637
5 November 2008McCLELLAN CJ at CL
SIMPSON J
McCALLUM J
1 McCLELLAN CJ at CL: I agree with Simpson J.
2 SIMPSON J: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the severity of sentences imposed upon him on 30 November 2007 in the District Court by Williams DCJ following his pleas of guilty to an indictment containing three counts. The counts were:
1. Robbery whilst armed with a dangerous weapon;
2. Knowingly deal in proceeds of crime;
He asked, pursuant to Pt 3 Div 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (“the Sentencing Procedure Act ”) that a further 2 offences on a Form 1 be taken into account.3. Conduct dealings to avoid reporting requirements.
3 The first offence on the indictment is an offence against s 97(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years; the second is an offence against s 193(B)(1) of the same Act, and carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 20 years. The third is an offence against s 31 of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) and carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment…
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- AGLC
- David EID v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 255
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- [2008] NSWCCA 255
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the presence of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery warranted an increased severity in the sentence, and if the Supreme Court's failure to comply with the statutory sentencing directive was a material error. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and whether any error in the application of section 44(1) constituted a technical error that warranted a re-formulation of the sentence. The appellant argued that the Supreme Court's sentence was excessive and that the failure to comply with the statutory directive was a significant error.
The court found that the presence of a firearm was indeed an aggravating factor that justified an increased severity in the sentence. However, it determined that the Supreme Court's failure to comply with section 44(1) of the Act was a technical error rather than a material one. The court noted that the overall sentence imposed by the Supreme Court was not manifestly excessive when considering the totality of the appellant's criminal conduct. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the original sentence, with the understanding that any technical error in the application of section 44(1) did not necessitate a re-formulation of the sentence.
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