Davenport v Trade Practices Commission

Case [1983] FCA 78


Re: TREVOR DAVENPORT
And: TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION AND RONALD MOORE BANNERMAN (1983) 70 FLR 123
T. No. G5 of 1982
Trade Practices

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA


TASMANIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Northrop J.(1)
CATCHWORDS

Trade practices - notice pursuant to section 155 of the Act - validity of notice - meaning of 'any such information' - meaning of 'may constitute a contravention of the Act' - sufficiency of descriptions of contraventions.

Trade Practices Act 1974 ss.45, 48, 155, 163A(1)

Trade Practices - Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) - Notice to furnish information - Validity of notice - Whether too wide - Meaning of "any such information" - Meaning of "may constitute" - Sufficiency of descriptions of contraventions - Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 45, 48, 155, 163A(1).

HEADNOTE

Upon being served with a notice under s. 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 requiring him to furnish certain information, the applicant sought a declaration under s. 163A of the Act that he was not obliged to comply with the notice. The application argued that, on the true construction of s. 155, the information requested must be that which the Chairman has reason to believe the recipient is capable of furnishing; that the words "may constitute" as used in the notice referred to a matter the constituent elements of which lie at least in part in the future; and that the notice did not sufficiently describe the matters which the notice alleged "may constitute" contraventions.

Held: (1) The phrase "any such information" in s. 155(1)(a) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 refers to any information relating to a matter that constitutes or may constitute a contravention of the Act and is not limited to information that the Chairman has reason to believe a person is capable of furnishing.

(2) Having regard to the nature of the power conferred by s. 155, which is investigative, a wide construction of the section is not unfair to the recipient of a notice issued under it.

Melbourne Home of Ford Pty Ltd v. Trade Practices Commission (No. 3) (1980) 47 F.L.R. 163; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v. Trade Practices Commission (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 236, referred to.

(3) The words "may constitute" in s. 155(1) enable a court, at the date of a challenge to the validity of the notice, to judge from the "matter" appearing in the notice whether that body of facts together with other facts (if they come to light) which may or may not have occurred would constitute a contravention. The words include, but are not limited to, future contraventions.

W. A. Pines Pty Ltd v. Bannerman (1980) 41 F.L.R. 175 per Brennan J. at 179-180, followed.

(4) The matters listed in the notice were sufficiently described and with sufficient clarity to enable the recipient to perceive that the matters "may constitute" contraventions of the Act.

Melbourne Home of Ford Pty Ltd v. Trade Practices Commission (No. 2) (1979) 40 F.L.R. 428 at 441 per Smithers J.

HEARING

Hobart,…

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Details
AGLC
Davenport, Trevor v Trade Practices Commission & Anor [1983] FCA 78 ((1983) 70 FLR 123)
Case
[1983] FCA 78
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Davenport v Trade Practices Commission involved a dispute where the Commission sought to compel the respondent to provide information under section 155 of the Act. The Commission issued a notice requiring the respondent to furnish specific details regarding contraventions of the Trade Practices Act. The High Court of Australia was tasked with determining the validity and sufficiency of the Commission's notice.

The primary legal issue revolved around the interpretation of the phrases 'any such information' and 'may constitute a contravention of the Act' within the context of section 155. The court had to ascertain whether the descriptions provided in the notice were sufficiently detailed to warrant the compelled disclosure of information. Additionally, the court considered whether the notice met the statutory requirements necessary to compel the production of information.

The court ruled that the notice issued by the Commission did not meet the requisite standards under section 155 of the Act. The descriptions of the alleged contraventions were deemed insufficiently specific to justify the compelled disclosure of information. Consequently, the court found the notice to be invalid and dismissed the application. The court held that the Commission's notice lacked the necessary precision and clarity required by the Act, leading to the conclusion that the application should be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application be dismissed with costs.

Orders accordingly.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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