Darren Vieira v Procter & Gamble Australia Pty. Limited

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[2025] FWCFB 213

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.604—Appeal of decision

Darren Vieira
v

Procter & Gamble Australia Pty. Limited

(C2025/7023)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT FAROUQUE
COMMISSIONER TRAN
COMMISSIONER FOX

MELBOURNE, 18 SEPTEMBER 2025

Appeal against decision [2025] FWC 2175 of Deputy President Colman at Melbourne on 25 July 2025 in matter C2025/5727 – permission to appeal refused

Introduction

  1. Mr Darren Vieira has lodged an appeal and applies for permission to appeal under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) against a decision of Deputy President Colman dated 25 July 2025 (the Decision).[1] The Decision dealt with whether Mr Vieira should be granted an extension of time under s 366(1)(b) and s 366(2) to make a general protections dismissal application to the Commission under s 365.

  1. Mr Vieira’s application for permission to appeal was listed for hearing before the Full Bench in person in Melbourne at 10:00am on 17 September 2025.  A few minutes before the hearing was to commence, Mr Vieira emailed the Commission and indicated that he was unwell and unable to attend and requested that the hearing be re-listed or, alternatively, for his application for permission to be determined on the papers. The hearing commenced as listed but only for the purpose of ascertaining whether Proctor & Gamble Australia Pty Limited (the Respondent) consented to the application for permission to appeal being determined on the papers. The Respondent consented to permission being determined on the papers. We note that both parties filed written submissions in respect of Mr Vieira’s application for permission to appeal. Mr Vieira has also filed an appeal book containing relevant documents. We are satisfied that the parties have consented to the application for permission to be appeal being determined without the making of oral submissions. We are further satisfied that the matter can be adequately determined on the papers.

  1. Mr Vieira was dismissed by the Respondent effective 10 December 2024. The 21-day period under s 366(1)(a) expired on 31 December 2024. Mr Vieira lodged his general protections application in the Commission on 16 June 2025.

  1. In the Decision, the Deputy President concluded that taking into account the matters in s 366(2), he was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to extend time.   Consequently, the Deputy President dismissed Mr Vieira’s general protections application.

  1. In relation to the Deputy President’s assessment of the considerations in s 366(2), the Decision discloses the following reasoning:

a)In relation to s 366(1)(a), Deputy President addressed Mr Vieira’s reason for the delay.   The Deputy President referred to a contention identified in the Decision as made by Mr Vieira to the following effect: that at time of his dismissal, Mr Vieira understood, based on the respondent’s advice, that issues related to the dismissal were to be addressed in Workcover channels, and that he was not told about the option of making a general protections claim, of which he became aware in mid-2025. The Deputy President also referred to Mr Vieira’s explanation about the…

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Details
Case
[2025] FWCFB 213
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Darren Vieira v Procter & Gamble Australia Pty. Limited involves an appeal by Mr Vieira against a decision of Deputy President Colman, who dismissed Mr Vieira's application for an extension of time to lodge a general protections dismissal application under the Fair Work Act 2009. The primary issue for the Full Bench to decide was whether to grant Mr Vieira permission to appeal the Decision of the Deputy President.

The Full Bench considered the statutory framework governing permission to appeal under the Fair Work Act, which requires the Commission to grant permission if it is in the public interest, or on general discretionary grounds if the public interest is not engaged. The Full Bench noted that an arguable case of appealable error is necessary for permission to be granted, but the presence of an error at first instance is not sufficient on its own. The Full Bench also highlighted that the application for permission is not a preliminary hearing of the appeal, and detailed examination of the grounds is not appropriate at this stage. The Full Bench concluded that the matter could be adequately determined on the papers, as both parties had consented to the application for permission being determined without oral submissions.

The Full Bench found that the Deputy President's assessment of the considerations under s 366(2) of the Fair Work Act was reasonable and that there were no exceptional circumstances to extend time for Mr Vieira's application. The Full Bench dismissed Mr Vieira's application for permission to appeal, holding that the grounds of appeal did not raise an arguable case of appealable error. Consequently, the Full Bench upheld the Decision of the Deputy President.

In light of the Full Bench's decision, it was ordered that Mr Vieira's application for permission to appeal be dismissed, and no further appeal would lie from the Decision of the Deputy President. The Full Bench further directed that the costs of the appeal be borne by Mr Vieira.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Darren Vieira has lodged an appeal and applies for permission to appeal under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) against a decision of Deputy President Colman dated 25 July 2025 (the Decision).[1] The Decision dealt with whether Mr Vieira should be granted an extension of time under s 366(1)(b) and s 366(2) to make a general protections dismissal application to the Commission under s 365. Mr Vieira’s application for permission to appeal was listed for hearing before the Full Bench in person in Melbourne at 10:00am on 17 September 2025. A few minutes before the hearing was to commence, Mr Vieira emailed the Commission and indicated that he was unwell and unable to attend and requested that the hearing be re-listed or, alternatively, for his application for permission to be determined on the papers. The hearing commenced as listed but only for the purpose of ascertaining whether Proctor & Gamble Australia Pty Limited (the Respondent) consented to the application for permission to appeal being determined on the papers. The Respondent consented to permission being determined on the papers. We note that both parties filed written submissions in respect of Mr Vieira’s application for permission to appeal. Mr Vieira has also filed an appeal book containing relevant documents. We are satisfied that the parties have consented to the application for permission to be appeal being determined without the making of oral submissions. We are further satisfied that the matter can be adequately determined on the papers. Mr Vieira was dismissed by the Respondent effective 10 December 2024. The 21-day period under s 366(1)(a) expired on 31 December 2024. Mr Vieira lodged his general protections application in the Commission on 16 June 2025. In the Decision, the Deputy President concluded that taking into account the matters in s 366(2), he was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to extend time. Consequently, the Deputy President dismissed Mr Vieira’s general protections application. In relation to the Deputy President’s assessment of the considerations in s 366(2), the Decision discloses the following reasoning: There is no right to appeal from a decision of the Commission as s 604(1) requires that an appellant must first obtain permission to appeal. Section 604(2) provides that the Commission must grant permission if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. The task of assessing whether a “public interest” test is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value judgment. Considerations that may attract the public interest have been identified by a Full Bench of the Commission in GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin[2] in the following terms: If the public interest is not engaged, the Commission may still grant permission to appeal on general discretionary grounds. It will be rare for permission to appeal to be granted unless an arguable case of appealable error is demonstrated. However, the fact of an error at first instance, is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal. Furthermore, an application for permission to appeal is not a de facto or preliminary hearing of the appeal and it is not appropriate for the Full Bench to conduct a detailed examination of the grounds of the appeal. However, the Full Bench will engage with the grounds of appeal to consider whether they raise an arguable case of appealable error (see generally Qantas Ground Services Pty Ltd t/a QGS v Rogers [2019] FWCFB 2759 at [11] – [12]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established