Dare v Tasmania
[2015] TASCCA 12
•5 June 2015
[2015] TASCCA 12
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)
CITATION: Dare v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 12
PARTIES: DARE, Jason Charles
v
STATE OF TASMANIA
FILE NO: CCA 973/2014
DELIVERED ON: 5 June 2015
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 2 June 2015
JUDGMENT OF: Blow CJ, Estcourt and Pearce JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Appeal and new trial – Appeal against sentence – Grounds for interference – Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate – Two burglaries of commercial premises and related crimes – Global sentence of two years six months' imprisonment with non-parole period of 20 months – Whether non-parole period manifestly excessive.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3521]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: K Baumeler
Respondent: Y Prenc
Solicitors:
Appellant: No solicitor
Respondent: Acting Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2015] TASCCA 12
Number of paragraphs: 29
Serial No 12/2015
File No CCA 973/2014
JASON CHARLES DARE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
BLOW CJ
ESTCOURT J
PEARCE J
5 June 2015
Order of the Court (1 June 2015)
Appeal dismissed.
Serial No 12/2015
File No CCA 973/2014
JASON CHARLES DARE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
BLOW CJ
5 June 2015
This is a sentencing appeal. The appellant participated in two burglaries of commercial premises. In relation to the first, he was charged with burglary and stealing. In relation to the second, he was charged with burglary, stealing, unlawfully injuring property, and trafficking in fish. He pleaded guilty to all those charges. Tennent J sentenced him to two years six months' imprisonment, and ordered that he not be eligible for parole until he had served 20 months of that sentence. He appealed, contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive. His counsel did not argue that the head sentence was manifestly excessive, but argued that his non-parole period should have been half the head sentence, namely 15 months. After hearing her submissions, this Court dismissed the appeal, indicating that full written reasons for its dismissal would be published at a later date. The Court is now sitting to publish its reasons.
I agree with the reasons of Estcourt J. The only appropriate course was for this Court to dismiss the appeal, for the reasons stated by him.
File No CCA 973/2014
JASON CHARLES DARE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
ESTCOURT J
5 June 2015
The appeal
The appellant, Jason Charles Dare, has appealed against a sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months imposed by Tennent J on 7 November 2014. The sentence was imposed by her Honour in respect of two counts of burglary, two counts of stealing, one count of unlawfully injuring property, and one count of trafficking in fish.
The sole ground of appeal is that her Honour erred in exercising her discretion by imposing a non-parole period greater than half of the total sentence.
The factual background
In her comments made upon passing sentence the learned sentencing judge summarised the facts surrounding the appellant's offending as follows:
"You have pleaded guilty to one count of burglary and one count of stealing on indictment number 329/2014 and one count of burglary, one count of stealing, one count of unlawfully injuring property and one count of trafficking in fish on a separate indictment number 333/2014.
At around 12.12am on 23 September 2013, you and two other males arrived in New Norfolk in a stolen car. You parked near the building where the New Norfolk Newsagency was. Two minutes later, you and the other two men smashed the front glass sliding door of the newsagency and entered the premises. An alarm was activated. The roller door of the cigarette cabinet was smashed using an axe and other implements. You and one of the men loaded most of the cigarettes from the cabinet into a large white trash pack bag, brought with you for the purpose. All three of you left the property at 12.17am, knocking over various stands in the newsagency as you left. Individual packets and cartons of cigarettes were stolen, with a total value of $26,900.20 wholesale (ie excluding GST).
Nearby neighbours were woken by the sound of breaking glass and the newsagency alarm. They contacted police. When police arrived, they found a number of tools and a torch. The torch later returned a positive DNA match to you.
On 2 December 2013, in the early hours of the morning, you and another male entered the premises of the South Australian Lobster Company (SALCO) at Cambridge. The main business conducted by SALCO is the export of live lobster to Asia. It also provides live and cooked lobster locally.
The business operates out of a large industrial shed which is clad with iron sheeting fixed by screws to the walls. At around 2.39am on that morning you and the other male drove in your car to a bush track near the SALCO premises. You entered the track by removing a shackle from a post and removing the chain fence. You walked about 150 metres before coming to a 1.8 metre high chain mesh fence. That fence secured a compound used by hire car companies to park vehicles and was adjacent to the rear of the SALCO premises. The fence was cut and rolled back enabling you to enter the SALCO premises.
You used a cordless drill to gain entry to the building by removing screws from an iron sheet, which was approximately 1.5 metres from ground level. You then climbed onto a BBQ to unscrew further screws approximately 2.4 metres from ground level. A sheet of iron was peeled back which allowed you to gain access to the main work area. The alarm was then disabled. A safe containing approximately $7,000 in cash was taken, as was $500 from a cash register.
While you were inside, you removed a quantity of live lobster from a holding tank and put them in a wheelie bin. You then took the wheelie bin to your car and unloaded the fish. After leaving the area, you took the fish to a houseboat located at Goodwood and concealed them in the underfloor area of the houseboat. You returned the following morning and retrieved the lobster. You later sold them for $2,000.
The loss to SALCO caused by the burglary and stealing was extensive. This included losses in relation to, not only the lobster that was stolen, but also other lobster that died and had to be disposed of, the money taken from the safe and the costs associated with repairs to holding tanks, refilling them with water, the cooking of the viable lobster left after the events and disposal costs. The company had to cancel all exports for seven days until the quality of their product and water in holding tanks could be guaranteed so as to ensure its reputation was not damaged. The company was able to mitigate some of the loss through cooking, freezing and tailing lobsters found unsuitable for the export market. Those savings amounted to $77,876 which is a lower price per kilogram than whole price. SALCO also received a payment of $174,158.49 to cover part of the loss from their insurers.
On 4 December 2013, police executed a search warrant at the houseboat. They located a green wheelie bin and a piece of seafood in the hull of the boat, as well as some gloves. You were subsequently arrested and interviewed. You told police you used to work at the SALCO factory. You made admissions as to the events of the night of 2 December. You said you had used your share of the money from the burglary and the sale of the fish to pay off a drug debt. You denied causing any damage to tanks at the factory. You were charged and bailed.
On 17 December you returned to speak to police and were interviewed in relation to the events in September. You made admissions but refused to name your co-offenders. You claimed to be under the influence of morphine and speed. You admitted using a disguise on that occasion and said you got a bit over $1000 from the sale of the cigarettes. You told police you committed the crimes to support a drug habit."
The head sentence
With reference to the head sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment the learned sentencing judge commented as follows:
"It is clear from the crimes in September that they were well planned. While you admit knowing what was to happen you deny being part of the planning process. However a car was stolen, implements were taken to effect the break in, you wore a disguise and the crimes were carried out very quickly. There was extensive damage to the premises.
You are 35 years old. On 13 May 2013, you were convicted of a number of dishonesty matters and sentenced to a period of nine months' imprisonment to commence from 24 May 2012. Three months of that term were suspended on condition you not commit any offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of two years. That sentence was backdated to 24 May 2012 because you had been taken into custody on that date and remained there until 9 December 2012. You were then bailed and did not go back into custody as a result of the sentence in May 2013. The offending the subject of the present proceedings occurred in September and December 2013, only a few months after you were sentenced in May. The crimes committed in September and December 2013 are therefore new offences by reference to the Sentencing Act, s27, and as a consequence you are in breach of the suspended sentence imposed in May 2013. The State has applied for you to be dealt with for that breach and seeks that that part of the sentence imposed on 13 May 2013 that was held in suspense be activated.
You have, apart from the matters dealt with on 13 May 2013, an extensive history for offences of dishonesty and you have served terms of imprisonment before. You have now been in custody now in respect of the current matters since 21 October 2014.
A forensic mental health report was sought at the request of your counsel. It does not suggest you have any significant mental illness. It does, however, recognize a long standing drug problem and repeated failures to deal with that. I am told that at least one effort, that is participation in the court mandated drug program, was successful for its duration but you relapsed after. You recognize the significant impact your involvement in drugs and crime has had on your long term partner and your children. That impact has been made worse in this case because your partner was a friend of the wife of the person who managed SALCO and her daughter and one of yours were the same age and friends. Those relationships have now ended because of your actions. I am told in relation to the SALCO crimes that you were horrified to be told of the nature and consequences of your actions in stealing and selling fish. What had, in your mind, been effectively a straightforward burglary and stealing, became significantly more than that when you stole the fish.
You realize you will face a prison sentence. You hope on release, whether at the end of the sentence or on parole, to be able to enter a residential drug program such as Missiondale immediately so that you are not faced with release into the community and perhaps the inevitable reconnection with other offenders and drugs. Your father lives in the north of the State in a rural area and your ultimate plan is to return to live on his property and get work in the area. You appreciate that is dependent on your successfully dealing with your drug problems and the co-operation of your partner.
While you have pleaded guilty and been largely co-operative with police by making admissions, you have refused in respect of each lot of offending to name your co-offenders. By that approach you are leaving other criminals unpunished and free to continue with other offending. As I have indicated, the inevitable outcome of your crimes given their nature and your history is a prison term. There must be a deterrent to you and others, perhaps more particularly to you because you are a repeat offender. I note that the offending I am dealing with involves similar elements to crimes you have committed before."
The non-parole period
In respect of her order that the appellant was not to be eligible for parole until he had served 20 months of his sentence of two years and six months, the learned sentencing judge did not expressly state reasons as referable to the requirement of s 17(7) of the Sentencing Act 1997. Her Honour's reasons for making the order she did are however, in my view, clearly discernible from her sentencing comments read as a whole.
In particular her Honour referred to the appellant's "extensive history for offences of dishonesty", that he had "served terms of imprisonment before", and that his offending, the subject of the present proceedings, occurred in September and December 2013, only a few months after he was sentenced in May.
Her Honour also noted that a forensic mental health report "recognised a long standing drug problem and repeated failures to deal with that", although she was informed that at least one effort, that is participation in the court mandated drug program, was successful for its duration, but that the appellant thereafter relapsed. (Emphasis added.)
Importantly, I observe, relevant to the tension between punishment and rehabilitation through conditional release after a period specified by the sentencing judge, her Honour said:
"While you have pleaded guilty and been largely co-operative with police by making admissions, you have refused in respect of each lot of offending to name your co-offenders. By that approach you are leaving other criminals unpunished and free to continue with other offending. As I have indicated, the inevitable outcome of your crimes given their nature and your history is a prison term. There must be a deterrent to you and others, perhaps more particularly to you because you are a repeat offender. I note that the offending I am dealing with involves similar elements to crimes you have committed before."
The appellant's submissions
In her written submissions, counsel for the appellant, Ms Baumeler, emphasised the appellant's personal circumstances. She set out the following matters:
"Appellant's personal circumstances
7) The Appellant at the time of sentence was 34 years of age.
8) He had co-operated with the Police and made admissions relevant to his involvement in the matters.
9) He had entered pleas of guilty to the charges.
10) He was in a long term relationship which had been under considerable strain since the commission of the offences.
11) His partner had been suffering from mental health issues and had only recently been placed on anti-depressant medication which had taken some time to stabilise.
12) The Appellant at the time of committing the offences suffered from a drug addiction, and the offending was motivated to pay for his drug addiction.
13) The Appellant did have insight into his addiction and for a number of years had attempted to address his addiction.
14) The Appellant had in the past successfully completed the Court Mandated Drug Diversion Programme, and but for the indictable nature of the subject matters, would have again been considered eligible and suitable to be a participant.
15) The Appellant had made provision for his release to a residential drug rehabilitation facility on completion of his sentence, and to move away from the Hobart area. AB 32 lines 10-13.
16) The Appellant had, while on bail, successfully completed the Bridge Programme.
17) He had also undertaken drug and alcohol counselling and sought the assistance of his general practitioner and a psychologist to assist him in addressing his drug addiction."
Citing Richman v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 18 at [47]; Power v The Queen (1974) CLR 623 at 629 and Carr v The Queen (2002) 11 Tas R 362 [96], Ms Baumeler submitted that it is well established that the fixing of a non-parole period allows for mitigating a penalty of imprisonment in favour of rehabilitation through conditional release after the minimum period of imprisonment justice requires to be served in all of the circumstances of the case. On that basis she contended that in the present case a non-parole period of 15 months should be substituted for the learned sentencing judge's order of 20 months' parole ineligibility.
Ms Baumeler made the following points in support of that submission:
• The appellant had struggled to address his addiction; however, he had a plan in place to continue the steps he had made towards rehabilitation by completing the Bridge Programme and engaging in counselling by entering into residential rehabilitation on release.
• A minimum non-parole period of half of the head sentence would have ensured the maximum amount of supervision in the community after release to ensure the desire to rehabilitate could be fulfilled.
• The sentence imposed rejected, without explanation, the submissions requesting a half non-parole period.
• The circumstances of this matter did not warrant such a rejection and called for such a sentence to ensure assistance in the rehabilitation that had already been undertaken.
• By not doing so, her Honour fell into error in the exercise of her discretion.
The legislation
Section 17 of the Sentencing Act provides as follows:
"17 Court may bar or limit eligibility for parole
(1) This section does not apply to a sentence of imprisonment for the term of an offender's natural life.
(2) A court that imposes a sentence of imprisonment on an offender, either on the conviction of the offender or on the determination of an appeal, or, on appeal, confirms the imposition of such a sentence, may order –
(a) that the offender is not eligible for parole in respect of that sentence; or
(b) that the offender is not eligible for parole in respect of that sentence before the expiration of such period as is specified in the order.
(3) The period specified in an order under subsection (2)(b) is not to be less than one-half of the period of that sentence.
(3A) Where a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment and does not make an order under subsection (2), the offender is not eligible for parole in respect of that sentence.
(4) In exercising its discretion under subsection (2), a court may have regard to such matters as it considers necessary or appropriate and, without limiting the generality of this, may have regard to all or any of the following:
(a) the nature and circumstances of the offence;
(b) the offender's antecedents or character;
(c) any other sentence to which the offender is subject.
(5) An order under subsection (2) forms, for all purposes, part of the sentence to which it relates.
(6) An offender in respect of whom –
(a) an order has been made under subsection (2)(a); or
(b) subsection (3A) applies –
is not eligible to be released on parole in respect of his or her sentence.
(7) A court must give reasons for making an order under subsection (2).
(8) If the whole or part of a sentence of imprisonment is suspended, only the operative sentence is to be taken into account for the purposes of this section.
(9) In subsection (8), operative sentence means that part of a sentence of imprisonment which has not been suspended."
The principles relevant to the Sentencing Act, s 17
In Adams v The Queen [1998] TASSC 41 Cox CJ, with whom Underwood J (as he then was) agreed, said at 2-3 in relation to the former s 12B of the Parole Act 1975, which, for present purposes, has relevant similarities to s 17 of the Sentencing Act:
" … In Gill v R 34/1990, Green CJ said (at 1 - 2):
'… The provisions of s12B(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Parole Act 1975 do not on their face limit the factors to which a judge may have regard when he is exercising the discretion conferred by that section but in my view nothing in the Act would suggest that Parliament was intending that a judge should take into account considerations which are not relevant to what are generally accepted as the principles and purposes of sentencing. In my view therefore in exercising his discretion under s12B a judge should have regard to the factors specified in s12(B)(1)(a), (b) and (c), read in the light of the established principles and objectives of sentencing.
Those conclusions are reinforced by the conclusion reached by the High Court that the intention of similar legislation was "to provide for mitigation of the punishment of the prisoner in favour of his rehabilitation through conditional freedom, when appropriate, once the prisoner has served the minimum time that a judge determines justice requires that he must serve having regard to all the circumstances of his offence". Per Barwick CJ, Menzies J Stephen J & Mason J in Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623 at 629 and re-affirmed in Deakin v The Queen (1984) 58 ALJR 367. Notwithstanding that in that passage their Honours referred only to the "circumstances of his offence" it is clear from other passages at pp 628 and 629 of their reasons that they also regarded "deterring either the prisoner himself or others from crime" and the weight the judge gives "to his estimate of the capacity of the prisoner for reformation" as relevant considerations which a judge was entitled to take into account in fixing a non parole period.'
In exercising the discretion reposed in it, a sentencing court must consider (inter alia) what minimum time justice requires that the prisoner must serve, having regard to all the circumstances of his offence. That is a factor specifically addressed in the Act, s12B with its reference to '(a) the nature and circumstances of the offence'. Time and again the courts have stressed it: Power v R (supra) at 629; Deakin v R (supra) at 367; Lowe v R (1984) 154 CLR 606 per Dawson J at 625 … ."
In Hunt v The Queen [1999] TASSC 63 at [23]–[26] Underwood J said in relation to the Sentencing Act, as it then relevantly provided:
"23 The Sentencing Act, ss17 and 18 provide that upon a determination of the question of parole, the Court 'may have regard to such matters as it considers necessary or appropriate' and, without limiting the generality of that, may have regard to:
'(a) the nature and circumstances of the offence;
(b) the offender's antecedents or character;
(c) any other sentence to which the offender is subject.'
In making an order that a prisoner shall not be eligible for parole or in ordering an extension of the statutory default non-parole period, a sentencing judge is increasing the severity of the punishment by delaying the possible time for release from prison. See Gill v R 34/1990 per Crawford J at 7.
24 As Cox CJ said in Adams (supra) at 2:
'In exercising the discretion reposed in it, a sentencing court must consider (inter alia) what minimum time justice requires that the prisoner must serve, having regard to all the circumstances of his offence. That is a factor specifically addressed in the Act s12B [Sentencing Act ss17 and 18].'
26 In Power v R (1974) 131 CLR 623, Barwick CJ, Menzie, Stephen and Mason JJ said at 628:
'In a true sense the non-parole period is a minimum period of imprisonment to be served because the sentencing judge considers that the crime committed calls for such detention.'
26 See also Deakin v The Queen (1984) 58 ALJR 367; R v Watt (1988) 165 CLR 474 at 481. The proposition set out set out above was re-affirmed in Bugmy v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 525 at 531, where Mason CJ and McHugh J went on to say, at 531:
'Accordingly, although the fixing of a minimum term confers a benefit on the prisoner, it serves the interests of the community rather than those of the prisoner: Attorney-General v Morgan and Morgan (1980) 7 A Crim R 146. In that case Jenkinson J, with whom Kaye J agreed, pointed out (at p 155) that considerations relevant to the interests of the community which the imprisonment of offenders is designed to serve, as well as circumstances which mitigate punishment, will be taken into account in determining the head sentence and, again, in fixing the minimum term. At that stage the various interests of the community "will be balanced against the advantages to the community which release on parole is thought likely in the particular circumstances to confer, and against whatever degree of mitigation mercy to the offender may claim without injustice".'
A little later in Hunt, at [29] Underwood J said:
"Accordingly, when determining the appropriate length of the term of imprisonment that must be served as a minimum term, the Parliament and the common law require the Court to have regard to the matters set out in the Sentencing Act, ss17(2) and 18(2), and Parliament has enacted that an order, either that the prisoner is ineligible for parole or is not eligible for parole until after the expiration of a specified period of time, 'forms for all purposes part of the sentence to which it relates'."
The basis of the appeal
It is clear therefore, that the learned sentencing judge was exercising a discretion. In exercising that discretion her Honour was obliged to consider, amongst other things, what minimum time justice required that the appellant must serve, having regard to all the matters that she was entitled to take into account in fixing the overall sentence, and having regard to the fact that in imposing a non-parole period she was increasing the severity of the appellant's punishment by delaying the possible time for his release from prison, and perhaps his putative rehabilitation.
To succeed on this appeal, which does not allege specific error, the appellant must show implied error in the same way that an appellant is required to do in the case of an appeal brought on the basis that a head sentence is manifestly excessive. The principles relevant to such an appeal were most recently and, with respect, most succinctly, restated by Pearce J in Hall v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 6 where his Honour said at [51]–[52]:
"51 To succeed in an appeal on the ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive the appellant must show that the sentencing discretion must have miscarried and the sentence is definitely outside the appropriate range of sentences for the crime: Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295, per McHugh J at 306. It must be established that the sentencing order is so manifestly wrong that it could only be the result of some undefinable error in the exercise of the judicial discretion: Bresnehan v The Queen [1992] TASSC 55; (1992) 1 Tas R 234 at [13]. Manifest excess must be plainly apparent: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [6]. The sentence must be 'unreasonable or plainly unjust': House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505.
52 The appellate court may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because it would have exercised the sentencing discretion in a different way: Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 at [15]. A wide measure of latitude should be accorded sentencing judges: Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 per Kirby J at 336. There is no single correct sentence and a sentencing judge 'should be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime under which the sentencing is effected': Johnson v The Queen [2004] HCA 15; (2004) 78 ALJR 616 at [26], cited with approval in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [25]; Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520 at [58]."
Is error apparent?
In my view, it cannot be said in the present case that the learned sentencing judge's order that the appellant not be eligible for parole until he has served 20 months of his 30-month sentence of imprisonment is so manifestly wrong that it could only be the result of some undefinable error in the exercise of her Honour's discretion.
The appellant's offending was serious and he had wreaked havoc. He had prior convictions for dishonesty for which he had been sentenced to imprisonment. As an adult he had 50 prior convictions for stealing, ten for burglary, nine for aggravated burglary, four for receiving stolen goods, three for attempted stealing and one prior conviction for each of the crimes of attempted burglary, attempting to obtain goods by false pretences, demanding money with menaces, giving particulars likely to mislead, robbery and motor vehicle stealing. Including some suspended sentences, he had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment on no less than 16 occasions.
The crimes for which the appellant was sentenced by the learned sentencing judge were committed by him within four to six months of being sentenced to imprisonment for earlier offences that contained elements of similarity to the offences for which her Honour sentenced him. Moreover, the crimes for which her Honour sentenced the appellant were committed in breach of a suspended sentence of imprisonment.
Her Honour did not lose sight of the appellant's plea of guilty and his co-operation with police, but she was also entitled to observe, as she did, that the appellant had refused to provide police with the names of his co-offenders.
Equally her Honour did not lose sight of the appellant's stated aspirations to rid himself of his long-standing drug problems, but she was entitled to observe, as she did, that he had repeatedly failed to do so in the past and had continued to offend. In my view, this was not a case where the learned sentencing judge was required to mitigate the appellant's punishment in favour of his rehabilitation to any greater extent than she did.
To my mind it was quite open to her Honour in the exercise of her discretion to conclude, as she obviously did, that the minimum time that justice required that the appellant must serve, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, was two thirds of his sentence. It must be remembered, of course, that s 17(3) of the Sentencing Act provides that the period specified in a non-parole order under subs (2)(b) of the Sentencing Act is not to be less than one-half of the period of the sentence.
I reiterate the observations I made at [7] above as to the discerning of her Honour's reasons for imposing the non-parole period that she did. Bearing in mind, as was pointed out in Attorney-General v Morgan and Morgan (above) at 155, that considerations relevant to imprisonment, as well as circumstances which mitigate punishment, are taken into account in determining the head sentence and, again, at the stage of fixing the minimum term, I see no vitiating error in her Honour's failure to expressly assign reasons to each stage. In any event any such failure is not the subject of a ground of appeal. Had it been, and were it to have succeeded, I would be of the view that no substantial miscarriage of justice could have actually occurred as a result.
Disposition
For these reasons I decided to dismiss the appeal.
File No CCA 973/2014
JASON CHARLES DARE v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
PEARCE J
5 June 2015
I respectfully agree with Estcourt J. I joined in the order dismissing the appeal for the reasons expressed by his Honour.
The crimes committed by the appellant were serious. They were planned criminal enterprises which resulted in very substantial losses to the victims. The crimes demanded sentences of general and specific deterrence, punishment and denunciation. In light of the appellant's record and his failure to take advantage of past opportunities for rehabilitation, protection of the public was a very weighty sentencing consideration. The learned sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 30 months. I was wholly unpersuaded that she erred by ordering a parole ineligibility period of 20 months instead of the minimum period of 15 months.
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Criminal Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Sentencing
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Jurisdiction
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Remedies
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