Dansey & Dansey (No 3) - [2023] FedCFamC1F 592

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Dansey & Dansey (No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 592

File number(s): SYC 3614 of 2012

Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J

Date of judgment: 19 July 2023

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Interim – Where the matter is part-heard – Oral application for interim parenting orders made on the last day of trial – Where the parties and the single joint experts have been cross examined – Where the single expert psychiatrist diagnoses the mother with PTSD and delusional disorder – Where the single expert psychologist says the mother is fabricating allegations – Where the mother’s treating psychiatrist diagnoses the mother with complex PTSD as a result of her experiences of family violence – Serious allegations of sexual abuse and family violence alleged by the mother – Where the father seeks the children spend no time with the mother until the resumption of final hearing – Where the Independent Children’s Lawyer seeks a weekabout arrangement – It is ordered that the children live with the mother and spend five consecutive nights each alternate weekend with the father.

Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA

Cases cited:
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286; [2006] FamCA 1346

MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461; [2010] HCA 4

SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 103

Date of hearing: 17 July 2023

Place: Sydney

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Sansom SC

Solicitor for the Applicant: Pearson Emerson Family Lawyers

Solicitor for the Respondent: Burgess Family Law

Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: G & D Lawyers
ORDERS

SYC 3614 of 2012

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MR DANSEY

Applicant

AND:
MS DANSEY

Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

order made by:

ALTOBELLI J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 July 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.All previous parenting orders in respect of the children, X born 2012 and Y born 2013 (“the children”) be discharged from after school on Thursday 20 July 2023 at which time these orders become operative.
2.The parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children.
3.The children live with the Respondent mother (“the Mother”) at all times they are not living with the Applicant father (“the Father’) pursuant to these orders.

Spend time with arrangements with the Father
4.The children live with the Father during the school term from the conclusion of school on Friday 28 July 2023 until commencement of school on Wednesday 2 August 2023 and each alternate weekend thereafter.
5.The children live with the Father during school holidays for the first half of the Term 3 2023 school holidays by collecting the children from school on the last day of the school term.
6.The Father shall ensure that the children sleep overnight at the same premises as at least one of his parents when the children are living with him.
7.The Paternal Grandparents be released from all previous Undertakings to this Court and the Father do all things necessary to cause the Paternal Grandparents to undertake as follows:
(a)They will ensure that either of them remains with the Father overnight, consistent with these orders; and
(b)They will contact the Mother immediately on her mobile phone and return the children to her, in the event they observe conduct on behalf of the Father which exposes the children to harm including physical, emotional or psychological harm or conduct on the part of the Father.

Spend time with arrangements with the Mother
8.When the children are living with the Mother, she shall be supervised by the Supervisor at all times that either or both of the children are in her care.
9.The Supervisor shall be Ms EE until 31 October 2023.
10.A copy of the Single Expert Report of Dr U dated 16 August 2022 (“Dr U’s first report”), the Family Report of Dr V dated 12 February 2023 (“Dr V’s report”) and the Addendum Report of Dr U dated 10 June 2023 (“Dr U’s second report”) is released this day to Ms EE.
11.The Independent Children’s Lawyer is to provide a copy of Dr U’s first report, Dr V’s report and Dr U’s second report to Ms EE.
12.The Supervisor give an Undertaking to this Court in the following terms:
(a)She will be present at all times when the Mother has the children in her care and will ensure that the children (or either of them) are not left alone at any time with the Mother;
(b)If she witnesses any conduct by the Mother which she considers inappropriate or which exposes the children or either of them to harm, including emotional or psychological harm, then she will terminate the Mother’s time with the children, remove the children from her presence, contact the Father immediately on his mobile phone and arrange for the children to be delivered to the Father;
(c)She will not discuss with or in the presence or hearing of the children, these family law proceedings, including allegations and any other issue raised in the proceedings between the Father and the Mother and will likewise not denigrate the Father in the presence or hearing of the children or allow any other person to do so;
(d)She will read Dr U’s first report, Dr V’s report and Dr U’s second report; and
(e)She will meet with the Independent Children’s Lawyer to have her obligations pursuant to this Undertaking and any other matters to her supervision, explained to her.

Communication
13.The parties shall communicate with each other in relation to the children by the OurFamilyWizard App or an agreed equivalent.
14.When the children are living with the Father, on a Without Admissions basis the Mother shall:
(a)Not communicate, attempt to communicate or approach the children whilst in the care of the Father;
(b)Notify the Paternal Grandmother immediately in the event that either or both of the children contact her directly with any information regarding the children’s location (if they appear to have left the care of the Father) and any information suggestive of the children being at risk of harm, and provide copies of such communications to the Paternal Grandmother; and
(c)Block the children’s mobile phone numbers on her mobile phone so that she cannot receive calls or messages from the children and block the Mother’s mobile phone number on the children’s mobile phones to prevent them receiving calls or messages from her to their mobile phones.

15.The Father shall use his best endeavours to prevent the children contacting the Mother when they are living with him.

Other
16.Until the children have both attended their time with the Father on not less than five consecutive occasions, the Mother shall remain outside a radius of 10 km of Suburb B from 2:30 pm until 8:00 pm on the day they go into the Father’s care to commence their time with him.
17.The Mother is to continue to consult her current Psychiatrist and Psychologist as recommended by them.
18.The parties facilitate X’s attendance on Ms DD as recommended by her and Y’s attendance on Ms FF as recommended by her.
19.Each of the parties be restrained by injunction from:
(a)Abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or otherwise denigrating the other party and/or the children;
(b)Using physical discipline on the children or either of them; and
(c)Discussing these proceedings or any allegations raised in such proceedings or discussing the contents of any documents filed in or intended for use in these proceedings to, with or in the presence or hearing of the children (or any of them) and from permitting any other person to do so.

20.Within 48 hours of these orders or as soon as reasonably practicable, the Independent Children’s Lawyer and Ms DD meet with the children to explain the effect of these orders.
21.The Independent Children’s Lawyer has liberty to relist this matter on short notice.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.The intention of these orders is that they will be made on Wednesday 19 July 2023 but come into effect from after the children’s school on Thursday 20 July 2023 when they should return to the care of the Mother. Their time with the Father under these orders commences from after school on Friday 28 July 2023.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dansey & Dansey has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION

These reasons for judgment explain the further interim orders made in relation to the children, X aged 11 and Y aged 9 (“the children”), pending the resumption of the final hearing in this matter on 3 October 2023.
BACKGROUND
The father is the applicant in this matter (“the father”). He is 44 years old and describes himself as a public servant. He currently lives in a suburban home in Suburb GG with his parents. The mother is the respondent in this matter (“the mother”). She is 45 years old and describes herself as a full time mother. She currently resides in the former matrimonial home in Suburb B (“the Suburb B property”). The parties commenced cohabitation in 2007, and married in 2018. They separated on a final basis on 10 May 2021 and were divorced in early 2023.
Dr U was appointed as single expert psychologist pursuant to orders made on 16 September 2021 and produced her expert report on 16 August 2022 (“Dr U’s first report”). Dr V was appointed as single expert psychiatrist on 22 June 2022 and prepared a psychiatric assessment of each of the parties on 12 February 2023 (“Dr V’s report”). Dr U then prepared an addendum to her report on 10 June 2023 (“Dr U’s second report”).
Both parties make very serious and alarming allegations of risk against each other. Among others, the mother makes allegations of sexual assault over a ten year period from the father, physical assault against her and Y, verbal abuse and denigration and financially controlling and coercive behaviour. Throughout the history of these proceedings, the mother made allegations in respect of sexual abuse and/or grooming of X but has now recanted those allegations upon “reflection”. The father relies heavily on the reports and makes allegations, among others, that the mother’s mental health is so unwell that the children are at substantial risk of psychological harm in her care.
The matter was listed for final hearing for eight days and proceeded on 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26 and 27 June 2023 (“the June hearing dates”). Unfortunately, the matter went part-heard and is listed for a further three days of final hearing on 3, 4 and 5 October 2023 (“the October hearing dates”).
Up until the June hearing dates, the parenting arrangement was governed by orders made by Curran J on 24 February 2023. They provided for the mother’s time to be supervised by Ms O and for the father’s time to be supervised by the paternal grandparents. The children were to live with the mother and spend time with the father each Wednesday after school until Thursday and each alternate weekend from Friday after school to Monday before school (five nights per fortnight). However, it is agreed that X refused to spend time with the father in accordance with the orders on 3 May 2023 and from 12 May 2023 until 30 June 2023.
On the last day of the June hearing dates, counsel for the mother indicated that Ms O would no longer be able to supervise the children’s time with the mother as she needed to return to Perth, and made an oral application for further interim hearing pending the October hearing dates. In that context, the parties submitted consent orders to chambers on 30 June 2023 containing an interim-interim arrangement for the two week holiday period until the date of interim hearing. They provide for the paternal grandparents to be released from their undertaking for supervision but that the father ensure the children sleep overnight at the home of at least one of the paternal grandparents. The orders further provide for the father to facilitate a phone call between the mother and the children each Wednesday and Sunday between the hours of 6.00 pm and 6.30 pm and place restraints on the mother from otherwise communicating or contacting the children. The orders are silent on the live with arrangements but Order 7 of the orders made by Curran J on 24 February 2023 became enlivened as a result of the mother losing her supervisor:
7.By consent, in the event [Ms O] becomes unavailable to supervise the mother’s time with the children, the children are to reside with the father pending the further hearing of this matter.
The matter was listed for interim hearing on 12 July 2023 but as a result of counsel for the mother falling ill, the matter was adjourned to 17 July 2023 and the consent orders made on 30 June 2023 were varied to extend to 17 July 2023. As counsel for the mother was still ill on 17 July 2023, the interim hearing proceeded and the mother’s solicitor appeared on her behalf.
Throughout the June hearing dates, the Court had the benefit of observing the cross‑examination of the following witnesses:
(1)The father;
(2)The mother;
(3)The mother’s treating psychiatrist, Dr T;
(4)Dr V;
(5)Very briefly from Mr Q (the paternal grandfather); and
(6)Dr U, although her cross examination remains incomplete.
APPLICABLE LAW
The applicable law is found in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Act the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s 60CA.
The objects and principles of Part VII are set out at s 60B:
60B Objects of Part and principles underlying it
(1)The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:
(a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
(c)ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d)ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
(2)The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):
(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
(e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).
(3)For the purposes of subparagraph (2)(e), an Aboriginal child’s or Torres Strait Islander child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture includes the right:
(a)to maintain a connection with that culture; and
(b)to have the support, opportunity and encouragement necessary:
(i)to explore the full extent of that culture, consistent with the child’s age and developmental level and the child’s views; and
(ii)to develop a positive appreciation of that culture.
At the very core of Part VII of the Act is the creation of a presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s 61DA. Section 61DA provides:
61DA Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility when making parenting orders
(1)When making a parenting order in relation to a child, the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
(2)The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child (or a person who lives with a parent of the child) has engaged in:
(a)abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family); or
(b)family violence.
(3)When the court is making an interim order, the presumption applies unless the court considers that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied when making that order.
(4)The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
If the presumption applies, the Court is required to consider certain things:
65DAA Court to consider child spending equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent in certain circumstances
Equal time
(1)Subject to subsection (6), if a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:
(a)consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(b)consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(c)if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents.
Substantial and significant time
(2)      Subject to subsection (6), if:
(a)a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child; and
(b)the court does not make an order (or include a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents;
the court must:
(c)consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(d)consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(e)if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents.
(3)For the purposes of subsection (2), a child will be taken to spend substantial and significant time with a parent only if:
(a)       the time the child spends with the parent includes both:
(i)        days that fall on weekends and holidays; and
(ii)       days that do not fall on weekends or holidays; and
(b)the time the child spends with the parent allows the parent to be involved in:
(i)the child’s daily routine; and
(ii)occasions and events that are of particular significance to the child; and
(c)the time the child spends with the parent allows the child to be involved in occasions and events that are of special significance to the parent.
(4)Subsection (3) does not limit the other matters to which a court can have regard in determining whether the time a child spends with a parent would be substantial and significant.
Reasonable practicality
(5)In determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child’s parents, the court must have regard to:
(a)how far apart the parents live from each other; and
(b)the parents’ current and future capacity to implement an arrangement for the child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the parents; and
(c)the parents’ current and future capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties that might arise in implementing an arrangement of that kind; and
(d)the impact that an arrangement of that kind would have on the child; and
(e)such other matters as the court considers relevant.

Because s 65DAA refers to the best interests of the child the Court must then go back to consider s 60CC which specifies how the Court must determine what is in a child’s best interests.
Determining child's best interests
(1)Subject to subsection (5), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3).
Primary considerations
(2) The primary considerations are:
(a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and
(b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
Note:        Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).
(2A)In applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).
Additional considerations
(3)      Additional considerations are:
(a)any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child's maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's views;
(b)       the nature of the relationship of the child with:
(i)each of the child's parents; and
(ii)other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);
(c)the extent to which each of the child's parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity:
(i)to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and
(ii)to spend time with the child; and
(iii)to communicate with the child;
(ca)the extent to which each of the child's parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent's obligations to maintain the child;
(d)the likely effect of any changes in the child's circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:
(i)either of his or her parents; or
(ii)any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living;
(e)the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child's right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;
(f)the capacity of:
(i)each of the child's parents; and
(ii)any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);
to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs;
(g)the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child's parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant;
(h)if the child is an Aboriginal child or a Torres Strait Islander child:
(i)the child's right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture); and
(ii)the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right;
(i)the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child's parents;
(j)any family violence involving the child or a member of the child's family;
(k)if a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child's family--any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order, taking into account the following:
(i)the nature of the order;
(ii)the circumstances in which the order was made;
(iii)any evidence admitted in proceedings for the order;
(iv)any findings made by the court in, or in proceedings for, the order;
(v)any other relevant matter;
(l)whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;
(m)any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.
The case law
In MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461, the High Court referred to s 65DAA(1) and said:
9.Each of sub-ss (1)(b) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA require the Court to consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents. It is clearly intended that the Court determine that question. Sub-section (5) provides in that respect that the Court "must have regard" to certain matters, such as how far apart the parents live from each other and their capacity to implement the arrangement in question, and "such other matters as the court considers relevant", "[i]n determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child's parents".
A little later in the judgment the High Court said:
13.Section 65DAA(1) is expressed in imperative terms. It obliges the Court to consider both the question whether it is in the best interests of the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (par (a)) and the question whether it is reasonably practicable that the child spend equal time with each of them (par (b)). It is only where both questions are answered in the affirmative that consideration may be given, under par (c), to the making of an order.
At [15] the High Court emphasised the need for a practical approach:
15.Section 65DAA(1) is concerned with the reality of the situation of the parents and the child, not whether it is desirable that there be equal time spent by the child with each parent. The presumption in s 61DA(1) is not determinative of the questions arising under s 65DAA(1). Section 65DAA(1)(b) requires a practical assessment of whether equal time parenting is feasible.
The Full Court’s decision in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 provides some guidance about the interpretation of Part VII and the way to proceed in interim hearings.
68.In our view some of the comments of the Full Court in paragraph 18 are still apposite. For example, the procedure for making interim parenting orders will continue to be an abridged process where the scope of the enquiry is “significantly curtailed”. Where the Court cannot make findings of fact it should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute and would have regard to the care arrangements prior to separation, the current circumstances of the parties and their children, and the parties’ respective proposals for the future.
…
72.In our view, it can be fairly said there is a legislative intent evinced in favour of substantial involvement of both parents in their children’s lives, both as to parental responsibility and as to time spent with children, subject to the need to protect children from harm, from abuse and family violence and provided it is in their best interests and reasonably practicable. This means where there is a status quo or well settled environment, instead of simply preserving it, unless there are protective or other significant best interests concerns for the child, the Court must follow the structure of the Act and consider accepting, where applicable, equal or significant involvement by both parents in the care arrangements for the child.
…
82. In an interim case that would involve the following:
(a)identifying the competing proposals of the parties;
(b)identifying the issues in dispute in the interim hearing;
(c)identifying any agreed or uncontested relevant facts;
(d)considering the matters in s 60CC that are relevant and, if possible, making findings about them (in interim proceedings there may be little uncontested evidence to enable more than a limited consideration of these matters to take place);
(e)deciding whether the presumption in s 61DA that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child applies or does not apply because there are reasonable grounds to believe there has been abuse of the child or family violence or, in an interim matter, the Court does not consider it appropriate to apply the presumption;
(f)if the presumption does apply, deciding whether it is rebutted because application of it would not be in the child’s best interests;
(g)if the presumption applies and is not rebutted, considering making an order that the child spend equal time with the parents unless it is contrary to the child’s best interests as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC, or impracticable;
(h)if equal time is found not to be in the child’s best interests, considering making an order that the child spend substantial and significant time as defined in s 65DAA(3) with the parents, unless contrary to the child’s best interests as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC, or impracticable;
(i)if neither equal time nor substantial and significant time is considered to be in the best interests of the child, then making such orders in the discretion of the Court that are in the best interests of the child, as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC;
(j)if the presumption is not applied or is rebutted, then making such order as is in the best interests of the child, as a result of consideration of one or more of the matters in s 60CC; and
(k)even then the Court may need to consider equal time or substantial and significant time, especially if one of the parties has sought it or, even if neither has sought it, if the Court considers after affording procedural fairness to the parties it to be in the best interests of the child.
This matter is part-heard before me. It was submitted that it was an unusual case where the Court was asked to make interim orders after hearing eight days of evidence, and at least three days of hearing remained. On behalf of the father it was submitted that clear findings were possible from the evidence heard to date, and should in fact be made. On behalf of the mother, and to a certain extent the Independent Children’s Lawyer, caution was urged in circumstances where, for example, the cross-examination of one of the single joint experts had not concluded, and where the evidence of a significant witness in the mother’s case, her treating psychologist, had not been heard. Indeed, it was the submission of the Independent Children’s Lawyer that it was not, in fact, necessary to make findings in order to determine the interim issues. For its own part the Court observes that the relationship between the father and X is in a state of flux which contra-indicates making any findings relevant to this issue.
There is high probability that both parents will be allowed to be subjected to further limited cross-examination on events post-dating the evidence they have already given to date. The Court would be assisted by this. Particularly in these circumstances, it would be unwise to make any observations about the credibility of the parties.
In SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, the majority of the Full Court (Boland and Thackray JJ) said:
100.… Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
Having regard to this decision of the Full Court the focus of the present decision must be on considering the likely impact on the children of acting upon, or rejecting, the competing claims, as well as focusing on the immediate welfare of the children. This is a complex and fluid matter and the Court considers that it would be most unwise to make findings about central issues until all of the evidence is before the Court and appropriately tested. That is not to say that the evidence that has been presented to date should be ignored, but rather that the weight that it should be given in the circumstances takes into account the absence of final findings.
THE EVIDENCE
In support of his case, the father relied upon the following documents:
(a)Written submissions filed 11 July 2023;
(b)His affidavit filed 10 July 2023;
(c)Amended Initiating Application filed 22 April 2022;
(d)His affidavit filed 22 May 2023;
(e)Affidavit of Mr Q filed 22 May 2023;
(f)Affidavit of Ms R filed 22 May 2023;
(g)Oral evidence given in the proceedings during the June hearings dates; and
(h)Various documents tendered during the June hearing dates, marked as exhibits A1‑A11.
In support of her case, the mother relied upon the following documents:
(a)Further Amended Minute of Interim Orders and Chronology dated 17 July 2023;
(b)Her affidavit filed 10 July 2023;
(c)Affidavit of Ms EE filed 14 July 2023
(d)List of documents relied on filed 12 July 2023;
(e)Her affidavit filed 26 May 2023;
(f)Affidavit of Dr T filed 22 May 2023;
(g)Affidavit of Ms S filed 22 May 2023;
(h)Affidavit of Ms GG filed 22 May 2023;
(i)Affidavit of Ms O filed 22 May 2023;
(j)Affidavit of Dr HH filed 22 May 2023;
(k)Affidavit of Ms JJ filed 22 May 2023;
(l)Affidavit of Ms J filed 22 May 2023;
(m)Affidavit of Ms KK filed 22 May 2023;
(n)Affidavit of Dr CC filed 22 May 2023;
(o)Affidavit of Mr D filed 22 May 2023;
(p)Affidavit of Dr LL filed 22 May 2023;
(q)Oral evidence of the Mother and her witnesses (during the June hearing dates);
(r)Various documents tendered during the June hearing dates, marked exhibits R1–R5; and
(s)Various documents tendered during the interim hearing, marked as exhibits R1–R18.
In support of their case, the Independent Children’s Lawyer relied upon the following documents:
(a)Proposed Minute of Interim Orders dated 12 July 2023;
(b)Single Expert Report of Dr U dated 16 August 2022;
(c)Addendum Report of Dr U dated 10 June 2023;
(d)Single Expert Report of Dr V dated 12 February 2023;
(e)Child Inclusive Memorandum dated 28 June 2021; and
(f)Subpoena material produced by Ms DD, marked as exhibit ICL1.
THE COMPETING PROPOSALS
The interim orders sought by the father are located at schedule one of these reasons for judgment. In general terms, the father seeks that the children live with him and spend no time and have no communication with the mother until the recommencement of the final hearing. He further seeks that the mother vacate the Suburb B property but receive $50,000 as a partial property settlement to meet the costs of her rehousing herself. During the course of the interim hearing, counsel for the father was asked what orders would be sought if the Court was to make orders that the children spend time with the mother. Counsel for the father, on instructions, confirmed the father seeks that the mother’s time be supervised.
The mother’s interim orders sought are attached to these reasons at schedule two. She seeks orders that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility; the children live with her at all times they are not living with the father; and the children live with the father for one night each alternate week and four consecutive nights in the alternating weekend; and half of the school holidays. She seeks a continuation of orders that the father remain living with the paternal grandparents but that the paternal grandparents are released from their undertaking as a supervisor. She proposes that her time will continue to be supervised by a new proposed supervisor, she will not contact the children when they are in the father’s care and that she will vacate the Suburb B property until 8.00 pm on changeover days. The mother further proposes that the parties communicate via the OurFamilyWizard Application and that the children be placed on the Family Law Watchlist.
The interim orders sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer are attached to these reasons as the third schedule. The Independent Children’s Lawyer seeks orders that the children live in a week-about arrangement with the parents unless X does not spend time with the father in accordance with the orders in which case the matter would be relisted on two days’ notice or the father’s interim orders sought would self-execute. The Independent Children’s Lawyer further seeks orders as proposed by the mother in relation to the paternal grandparents, the mother’s supervision, communication by OurFamilyWizard Application, the mother vacating the Suburb B property on changeover days, therapy and mutual restraints.
At the conclusion of the interim hearing, the mother proposed that should the Court prefer to minimise the number of changeovers of the children, she would accede to an order for block time of five nights.
SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
There is an unusual fluidity in this case. For example, whilst many serious allegations have been made by one parent and denied by the other, the alleging parent then withdrew some of those allegations. The resistance of the oldest child, X, to spending time with the father appears to have waxed and waned. Eight months ago X appeared to be enjoying a good relationship with the father. Eight weeks ago X appears to have completely rejected him as a parent and was spending no time with him. As recently as two weeks ago, however, a thaw in the hitherto frozen relationship between father and daughter had commenced. Green shoots were appearing with the fragile promise of a restoration to normality of that relationship in the fullness of time, and with some sensitivity, persistence and professional assistance.
The parents were ordered to file and serve “updating” affidavits and, to the extent that they have done so, the evidence they present is both promising and disconcerting. It is promising because it depicts an incremental improvement in the relationship between X and the father, even though those increments could sometimes best be described as one step forward, and two steps back. Cumulatively, however, the relationship presents as better than it has been for many months. The evidence is disconcerting, however because both affidavits manifest deep parental mistrust no doubt exacerbated by serious allegations made and denied, and woefully inadequate communication. One possible impression that can be formed is that the litigation juggernaut has such momentum that the parents simply cannot see that there is a problem to be solved rather than a battle to be continued. The Court also acknowledges that certain factual matters raised in the affidavits may need to be tested in further cross-examination.
The fluidity of this case has an impact on the expert evidence. This evidence will be discussed below insofar as it is relevant to the interim applications. The fluidity of the case means that some of the facts upon which assumptions were made in the expert evidence have changed, thus possibly having an impact on the recommendations made. The expert evidence thus needs to be critically and closely examined.
THE UPDATING AFFIDAVITS
Both parents filed what purports to be “updating” affidavits on 10 July 2023.

The mother’s affidavit, of course, can give no evidence about the children’s time with the father during the current school holidays pursuant to the interim orders made on 30 June 2023. She was not there. When, together with the agreed assistance of X’s treating psychologist Ms DD, X was told that she would be living with the father during the school holidays, the mother deposes to what the Court would describe as X’s dramatic reaction and visceral opposition. Nonetheless, on Friday 30 June 2023, the mother dropped the children to school as usual and then left for G Town later that morning. She blocked her mobile phone number on the children’s phones and blocked their numbers on her phone, in accordance with the interim order. In accordance with the orders she telephoned the children on Sunday 2 July 2023, Wednesday 6 July 2023 and Sunday 9 July 2023.
There is much evidence in the mother’s affidavit that was not “updating” evidence and was objected to and mostly not read, or struck out. The Court accepts that this material was included in the affidavit from the mother’s instructions.
The mother does explain in her affidavit that her proposed further interim order would be that the father and the children spend time together for four consecutive nights in alternate weeks and one overnight in the other week. This reduces the number of changeovers and thus, she hopes, facilitates the children settling in sooner. She proposes that she remain away from the home that she and the children occupy each day that the children go into the care of the father, until 8.00 pm, to reduce the opportunities of X simply walking home. She proposes to maintain the existing arrangement in relation to mobile phones, such that the children cannot contact her. She outlines a regime of punishment should X refuse to spend time with the father in accordance with the orders the mother proposes.
The father’s affidavit graphically depicts: X’s resistance to spending time with him; his loving patience and perseverance with her notwithstanding what can only be described as abuse from X; the gradual erosion of her resistance; periods of a seemingly close relationship between himself and X; and regression immediately following telephone calls between X and her mother. At paragraph 89 of his affidavit the father states: “… at times I have seen a glimpse of the way [X] interacted with me prior to December 2022”.
The father explains in his affidavit why he believes that the children should not return into the mother’s care, and that he and the children should return to the family home, thus meaning that the mother would need to relocate. He proposed a $50,000 interim distribution of funds held in trust to enable her to do so. By relocating away from the children, the option of X running away becomes more difficult.
THE FATHER’S CASE
The father’s case for the purposes of the interim hearing emphasised the following matters:
·The mother’s unexplained refusal to be treated for delusional disorder – absent any negative side effects and there being evidence of the positive benefits (even for PTSD treatment);
·The mother’s credit was undermined by the manner in which she gave her evidence;
·Dr T’s evidence was inconsistent. He insufficiently addressed the evidence that the mother maintained “delusional” allegations for at least one month thus satisfying the relevant criteria. He did not address whether the mother’s change in allegations is “genuine” or “as [Dr V] refers to it enduring”;
·The mother’s views either have not really changed, or there is no enduring change;
·The mother has not really accepted that X has not been abused and it is of significant concern that X now believes she has been abused;
·The mother unnecessarily involves the children in the proceedings and has no understanding of their needs;
·The mother’s evidence about the alleged abuse from the father is inconsistent and inherently unbelievable, especially the evidence of the mother given to her GP Dr MM and to the police;
·The mother still maintains at trial the risks to X are “huge” despite a lack of evidence;
·The father seeks a positive finding that X was not sexually abused by the father;
·The mother was unable (during cross-examination) to explain how X’s refusal to see the father could be handled;
·The consistency of the evidence of the experts Dr U and Dr V to the effect that the children were at risk of harm in the mother’s care;
·The undesirability of experimenting with arrangements for the children to spend time with both parents;
·The obvious lack of any acknowledgement by the mother that anything she had said or done had contributed to the problems in the relationship between X and the father; and
·Putting aside issues about whether the mother suffered from delusional disorder, or had deliberately fabricated claims against the father, the evidence of the enmeshed relationship between the mother and X, and her parentification of X, were independent grounds to be concerned about the risk of harm to the children in her care.
A number of tentative observations may be made about the father’s case. It is an ambitious proposal given the status of this matter is part-heard and the very nature of an interim application. It is premature to make any findings about credit. It is unfair to criticise the mother for refusing treatment as if she suffered from delusional disorder when her own treating psychiatrist did not make that diagnosis. It may well be the case that it is not just the evidence of Dr T that presents with inconsistencies, but also Dr U and Dr V. Until all the evidence is before the Court, it is difficult to assess whether inconsistencies in fact exist, or may be explained by reference to other evidence. Nonetheless, the Court accepts that some of the father’s concerns about the mother’s interactions with the children may be problematic to the nature of their relationship. The criticism of any interim order that, in effect, experiments with the children pending the final hearing lacks cogency in circumstances where the current arrangement for the children was, in effect, an experiment agreed to by the father, and the father’s own proposal is, on one view, the greatest experiment on the children.
THE MOTHER’S CASE
For the purposes of the interim hearing the mother's case emphasised the following matters:
·The present application was an interim application in circumstances where there was more important evidence to be presented to the Court;
·The inconsistencies in the expert evidence of Dr U and Dr V particularly in relation to the diagnosis of delusional disorder;
·The evidence of Ms S, the mother’s treating psychologist, was critical to the mother’s case and had not been presented or tested;
·The significance of the evidence of Dr T, the mother’s treating psychiatrist, particularly as he was the most persuasive of the experts to give evidence in the case;
·Important inconsistencies in the father’s case about when he first started to experience difficulties in his time with the children, but particularly X;
·The evidence before the Court which explained that there was a reasonable basis for the mother’s concerns that X had been sexually abused, even in circumstances where she no longer held the view that this was perpetrated by the father;
·The evidence before the Court, including that of Dr LL who was not required for cross‑examination, to the effect that the mother’s behaviour and demeanour changed significantly during the marriage to the father;
·The independent corroboration of the mother’s evidence that her relationship with the father was marred by coercive, controlling and abusive behaviour;
·The factual basis of the mother’s contended delusions was questionable;
·The objective evidence clearly signifying that the mother had not only changed her views about the risks presented by the father, but acted on them by proposing and then agreeing to increase time with him;
·The evidence before the Court suggestive of there being other causes not attributable to the mother of X’s resistance to spending time with the father including her lived experiences with the father, and her developmental stage;
·Concerns the Court would have over the manner in which the father presented his own evidence at during cross-examination;
·An acceptance that whilst the Court might be concerned about the mother’s proposed new supervisor when the children are spending time with her, the qualifications and experience of the supervisor are appropriate; and
·The father’s proposed orders would have a detrimental impact on the children and irreparably damage X’s relationship with the father.
A number of tentative observations may be made about the mother’s case. It emphasises the need to proceed cautiously in an interim hearing in the context of a part-heard and very complex matter. It is a measured proposal in relation to the children. The mother’s acceptance of the need for her own time to continue to be supervised signals a measure of insight in relation to the concerns about the nature of her relationship with the children, and ongoing issues associated with previous claims against the father. The Court accepts that there are inconsistencies in the expert evidence, and repeats its observations in relation to this issue set out above. Many of the submissions were, perhaps, more apt at the conclusion of all of the evidence, rather than in the context of an interim hearing. Consistent with the mother’s own submissions, no findings of fact could, or should be made at this juncture and thus making submissions about corroboration of evidence does not assist. The mother, through her solicitor in submissions, agreed that the father’s time with the children could be five nights in one block.
THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER’S CASE
The Independent Children’s Lawyer made submissions to the following effect:
·The very nature of the case before the Court has changed, as the children are now spending time with the father;
·The emergent issue was whether the mother’s acceptance, and support, of the father’s time with the children is genuine;
·The benefits to the children and to the Court of allowing time with the mother to continue;
·The evidence suggesting that Y was not influenced by his sister, X’s behaviour;
·X wants to have time with the mother, a view which needed to be given weight to, particularly in circumstances where she would probably struggle to accept an order that provided no time with the mother in terms proposed by the father;
·Nonetheless, there were residual concerns about the mother’s ability to facilitate and encourage X’s relationship with the father;
·The benefits to the children, and to the Court, of continuing an arrangement for them to spend time with both parents until the final hearing, especially in circumstances where the mother could clearly see the benefit to her of making such an arrangement work;
·No provision for telephone time with the parents should be made as the evidence suggests this contact is intrusive; and
·As unconventional as a proposal for equal time might seem in a case like this, it provided the minimum number of changeovers, thus minimising transition periods and creating a predictable schedule for the children.
A number of observations may be made about the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s case. The case has, in fact, changed and the significance of the children now spending time with the father is not lost on the Court. Questions of the mother’s attitude, and persistence with supporting the father’s time with the children, have become important issues and the passage of time between now and the date of the resumption of the final hearing provides the Court with more time to assess this. There are benefits to the children spending time with both parents. There would be concerns about how X would cope with not spending time with the mother for several months. An equal time arrangement would minimise the number of changeovers, mitigate transition difficulties, and create a predictable schedule for the children. However, the Court notes, so would a lesser arrangement.
FURTHER DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY MS DD
The material produced on subpoena by Ms DD on 12 July 2023 provides some further insight into the interim issues. Her notes from June 2023 describe X’s reaction to when she was told of the interim-interim arrangement for her to live with the father:
[X] became very upset and was screaming and crying very loudly. She made many statements including she would rather die than go with her Dad; that she hated her Dad; that she refused to go, that she wished he was dead. [X] was dysregulated for some time and was loudly screaming and crying. [X] was distraught at this time.
When Ms DD spoke to X in July 2023, it is clear she had settled from her initial reaction but was still experiencing reservations about living with the father:
I asked [X] how things had gone on the Friday with going to Dad’s and she said fine. I said to [X] that one of the things I remembered her talking about at the last appointment was her option that she could act like it was ok and whether she had been doing this. She said she hadn’t, she said she was eating only enough food to survive. Then we talked about what she could do - she said she could talk more; she could eat more and she could act like she was a bit happy.
THE EXPERT EVIDENCE
Dr U’s first report
Dr U presented three different hypotheses which are set out on page 55 of her first report:
1 - The children have been exposed to chronic and severe family violence perpetrated by [Mr Dansey] over many years, [Y] has been physically assaulted by his father and [X] has been sexually abused by her father. In this scenario, [Ms Dansey] is acting as a protectively.
2 - The children have not been exposed or subjected to family violence perpetrated by [Mr Dansey] and [Ms Dansey] is ether hyper-vigilant, anxious, or has fixed ideas that border on delusional but is acting genuinely out of good faith to protect the children.
3 - The children have not been exposed or subjected to family violence perpetrated by [Mr Dansey] and [Ms Dansey] is making false allegations to manipulate the court system to gain advantage in the legal proceedings.
When assessing these competing hypotheses, Dr U was of the view that the mother’s account cannot be relied on as the mother’s allegations against the father have been inconsistent across time and to various services. On page 58 she says:
To my mind, the inconsistencies in her account, the escalating allegations over time, and the seemingly outlandish claims raise concern about paranoid delusions and/or her capacity to reality test, and/or the possibility of fabrication for secondary gain. If [Ms Dansey] genuinely believes these allegations to be true despite there being no corroborating evidence, then she may be experiencing delusions.
In relation to the mother’s mental health, Dr U furthers on page 58:
She [Ms Dansey] endorsed symptoms on the PAI that suggest a broad range of severe symptoms across multiple domains, giving rise to several possible clinical diagnoses […]. The amount and severity of the psychopathology reported by [Ms Dansey] on the self‑report inventory would be debilitating and would seriously compromise her physical, cognitive and social functioning.
The mother indicated to Dr U that she is able to compartmentalise her symptoms and trauma when she is caring for the children despite reporting severe symptoms as above, and therefore her mental illness does not affect her parenting capacity. With respect to this, Dr U reports (on page 58):
It is a curiosity, therefore, that [Ms Dansey] (and her health practitioners) claim that her daily functioning is impaired to such a degree that she cannot work in any capacity for two years, and yet simultaneously claim that there is no impact on her parenting capacity. The assertion that [Ms Dansey] can compartmentalize such severe symptoms appears highly unusual and most unlikely, in my opinion. If she cannot switch off symptoms to manage employment or day to day activities, it seems very odd that she can switch off symptoms when she is with the children. Indeed, the symptoms of PTSD include intrusive thoughts, nightmares, hypervigilance, hyperarousal, and re‑experiencing phenomena (flashbacks). These are unwanted and symptoms that persists beyond the experienced trauma. While people who suffer PTSD frequently try and avoid the memories of the trauma, and may be aware of some triggers, the experience of the symptoms are largely unpredictable. It is therefore most unusual and unlikely that [Ms Dansey] has the ability to turn off her symptoms when parenting as she claims.
(Emphasis added)
Dr U also places weight on the fact that the children speak positively about the father to police, case workers, counsellors and treating psychologists and that the allegations have been investigated by the police and were unsubstantiated.
As a result, Dr U concludes that “there is little support for hypothesis 1 and considerable support for hypothesis 2 or 3”. However, regardless of whether the mother is fabricating her allegations or is delusional, the expert’s view is that the “net effect” is that her parenting capacity is severely compromised and she is not stable enough to be the primary parent or make any decisions that are in the best interests of the children.
Dr U held concerns that should the children continue to live with the mother, there was a strong likelihood that the mother will expose the children to her views about the father being the perpetrator of family violence and sexual abuse and that the mother will become enmeshed with the children.
In Dr U’s first report, she ultimately recommends that there be an immediate change of residence to live primarily with the father, for the father to have sole parental responsibility and spend time with the mother under formal supervision once a week. She further recommends that the children continue to engage upon their treating professionals and the mother undergo intensive treatment, including the possibility of an inpatient stay.
Dr V’s report
In relation to the father, Dr V concludes with “reasonable medical certainty” that he has no psychiatric diagnosis and there is no evidence of any paraphilic or sexually deviant disorder.
Regarding the mother, Dr V diagnoses the mother with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and delusional disorder (line 1680 of his report). He found that the mother presented with symptoms consistent with PTSD related to her childhood experiences of sexual abuse. The diagnosis of delusional disorder stems from Dr V’s opinion that the mother holds fixed false beliefs where there is clear evidence that would ordinarily assuage the false belief. Among other things, Dr V says at page 53 of his report that a persistent fixed false belief held by the mother is the alleged sexual abuse on X:
The mother evinced a persistent fixed false belief that the father had sexually abused [X] and continued to pose risk of sexual harm to the child. This persistent false belief crystalised from 2018 onwards (line 293) and was not adequately explained or accounted for by her PTSD diagnosis.
Despite Dr V being made aware that the mother no longer holds this belief since his report, he maintains his diagnosis on the basis that the way in which this belief came about is consistent with a delusional disorder.
Other likely false beliefs supporting his diagnosis of a delusional disorder were listed at line 1710:
a)the mother’s belief that the father was kicking and hitting her when he was asleep, or pretending to be asleep (line 1000);
b)the mother believed that the father would kill her (lines 465, 781);
c)the mother had an overwhelming feeling that she was not safe or that something very wrong was about to happen (this was consistent with delusional mood; lines 504, 849);
d)the mother believed the father would take [X], harm [X] and harm the mother (line 740);
e)the mother believed the father was tracking and monitoring her (lines 774, 778, 891, 1013);
f)the mother believed the father would arrange to have her murdered (lines 830, 844, 1004); and
g)in the present assessment the mother said she was “still terrified” of the father (line 954).

Dr V highlighted in his report the instances that he says are psychiatrically indicative of a psychotic process. Some examples include the mother feeling “foggy” in her thinking and mental state examination evidence of latency and thought blocking.
In relation to the mother’s parenting capacity, Dr V discusses from line 1766:
If the children are repeatedly exposed to comments from the mother alleging that the father was/is abusive, that in itself represents emotional abuse and is highly damaging to the children. If the children were to continue living with the mother, the children will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of emotional abuse given the mother’s mental state and fixed false belief(s).
Whilst the mother’s PTSD has received extensive psychological and some psychiatric treatment, her delusional disorder has not. The cornerstone of treatment for delusional disorder is antipsychotic medication, which has never been prescribed. This may explain why the mother has appeared to not significantly improve in her clinical presentation despite several psychological sessions and antidepressant treatment.
…
When delusional disorder is untreated, salience for fixed false belief(s) and thought confusion will dominate. These psychiatric aspects create significant drains upon the parent’s cognitive, emotional physical resources, resulting in impaired capacity to provide for the children’s emotional, psychological, developmental and physical needs.
Dr V concludes that in the mother’s current mental health condition, she will be unable to encourage the children to have a meaningful relationship with the father and the children will be at risk of emotional abuse in her care. Therefore, he recommends that the children live with the father and have professional supervised visits with the mother once per week or less.
Dr V states that he agrees with the reasoning and findings of Dr U’s first report but that in his opinion, the mother’s clinical picture is more consistent with a delusional disorder (hypothesis 2) than with deliberate fabrication to gain advantage in proceedings (hypothesis 3).
Dr U’s second report
For the purposes of her addendum report, Dr U was instructed to interview X and review updating material to provide an opinion in relation to X’s resistance to spending time with the father. At this stage, the mother’s position was that X had started making complaints about spending time with the father since September 2022 and refused to go since April 2023 and the mother has no understanding of why. The father’s position was that the children were engaged and affectionate until December 2022 when there was a marked deterioration in their behaviour, and since May 2023 X had refused to spend time with him until the current school holidays.
With respect to the mother’s clinical presentation, Dr U reports at paragraph 49:
On the one hand, they suggest that [Ms Dansey’s] PTSD is so complex and severe that over 100 treatment sessions and medication will be needed, but they also claim she functioning quite well and her parenting capacity is not impaired. They also suggest that [Ms Dansey] no longer believes that [Mr Dansey] may harm or kill her (previously identified as delusional beliefs) but there is no indication of how or when her beliefs changed. There is also seemingly no exploration or explanation about how or why she came to hold such beliefs in the beginning. It seems curious that the change seems to have occurred after [Ms Dansey] read [Dr V’s] report and the recommendations made therein.
At paragraph 71, Dr U set out a timeline of X’s relationship with the father. In 2022, X described a positive relationship with the father during therapy with Ms NN, in April 2023, she rated a closeness of 6/10 and by May 2023, X refused to spend time with the father. The expert assesses X’s current views as vague and confusing at paragraph 74:
…Specifically, she made vague assertions that he had physically and mentally abused [Ms Dansey] and her in the past but was unable to give any clear or detailed examples of either. She claimed to have just realized she is unsafe with him…She also claimed to feel highly anxious but was also unable to identify any triggers, or patterns. She spoke wholly negatively about [Mr Dansey] and his family and wholly positive about [Ms Dansey], suggesting a complete polarization in her views…Further, she indicated that she worries a lot about her mother, and feels depressed when she is away from her, raising serious concern about an inverted care-giving relationship and /or enmeshment…
Dr U ultimately concludes that her concerns about enmeshment in her first report have actualised and “[X] now appears to believe she has been abused by her father and that she should fear him”. She further concludes at paragraph 76:
After reading the reports of the independent psychiatrist, and the treating clinicians, I am even more concerned about the risk of psychological harm to both children in [Ms Dansey’s] care…The most likely explanation, in my opinion, is that [Ms Dansey] fabricated those claims to suit a narrative that she and the children were unsafe, and to justify her proposal that the children should not spend time with him. My view is that [X’s] recent shift to resistance and rejection of her father is best understood in this context.
(Emphasis added)
At the end of her second report, Dr U recommends that the children live with the father and spend no time with the mother for six months in order to address X’s “false belief that she has been abused by her father”.
Therefore, whilst Dr U’s first report and Dr V’s report seem to agree that the mother holds delusional beliefs or suffers from a delusional disorder, Dr U no longer holds that view. It is clear Dr U now believes that the mother is intentionally fabricating allegations to further her legal proceedings.
The mother’s treating team
The mother’s treating psychiatrist, Dr T, provides a very different opinion. His affidavit filed on 22 May 2023 annexes several letters and reports he prepared to members of the mother’s treating team and legal representatives. Annexure DT2 appears to be a report prepared by him in April 2022 to the mother’s treating general practitioner. In it, he opines:
I agree with the opinion of [Ms S] that [Ms Dansey] presents with features of complex post-traumatic stress disorder. She has suffered sustained and repetitive trauma through the course of her marriage. This is significant in a woman who prior to the marriage was functioning at an exceptionally high level evident by her work [and education]. There has been a profound loss for [Ms Dansey] though the course of the marriage.
Fortunately, for [Ms Dansey] she has two children that she is deeply devoted to. At the assessment I conducted today I could not find any evidence that her mental illness is having an impact upon her role as a mother. To the contrary it would appear that [Ms Dansey’s] role as a mother is deeply associated with her sense of identity. In my opinion, it is crucial for her children to have some stability despite the adversity of their past.
Annexure DT6 is a letter from Dr T to the mother’s solicitor providing an updated treating doctor’s report in November 2022. Dr T states:
In my opinion, [Ms Dansey] has a favourable prognosis. She has engaged in psychiatric and psychological treatment. She is addressing the traumas of her past both in her marriage and from her early childhood. She is doing the difficult work of receiving professional assistance in resolving very distressing traumas from her past. She has also complied with antidepressant medication to optimise her mental health. In my opinion, through continued engagement in treatment, and resolution of the family Court matters, I suspect that [Ms Dansey’s] mental health will continue to improve.
Annexure DT8 is an updated treating doctor’s report dated May 2023 from Dr T. He opines:
In the context of the recurrent clinical assessments of [Ms Dansey] and having spoken with a family member and her Clinical Psychologist, having reviewed the material provided in relation to her Family Court matter, I remain of the view that [Ms Dansey] suffers from a complex posttraumatic stress disorder with a comorbid depressive illness. She has responded to treatment indicated for these diagnosed conditions. In my opinion, [Ms Dansey] does not suffer from a delusional disorder…
(Emphasis added)
Dr T responds to Dr V’s opinion that the mother suffers from a delusional disorder as follows:
In treatment under my care, [Ms Dansey] has not presented with a persistent fixed false belief in this regard. She has not held a belief system in relation to the allegations she has made that her ex-husband sexually abused her daughter. [Ms Dansey] has been open to understanding that she may have misinterpreted her daughter's behaviour. With regards to the other "likely false beliefs'' that [Dr V] raises at point 1710 of his report, [Ms Dansey] no longer holds a belief that her ex-husband may harm her. [Ms Dansey] no longer suffers from an overwhelming feeling that she is not safe or that something very wrong is about to happen . [Ms Dansey] no longer believes that her ex-husband will take [X], harm her and harm herself. [Ms Dansey] no longer believes that her ex‑husband is tracking and monitoring her. [Ms Dansey] no longer believes that her ex‑husband will arrange to have her murdered.
Dr T responds to Dr U’s scepticism of the mother’s ability to compartmentalise her trauma as follows:
I agree that [Ms Dansey] has the capacity to compartmentalise. I agree that [Ms Dansey] is able to repress memories of her trauma and focus on her role as a mother when she is with her children. When not around her children, particularly in a therapeutic space, processing her trauma has been challenging for [Ms Dansey]. She is now able to sit in session and discuss traumatic experiences that she alleges have occurred without acutely deteriorating. I have confirmed with [Ms Dansey’s] cousin, who is currently supervising [Ms Dansey] that she is able to meet her responsibilities as a mother. [Ms Dansey’s] cousin did not express any concerns regarding [Ms Dansey’s] capacity to parent. This is consistent with my own observations of [Ms Dansey] and that reported by her Clinical Psychologist, [Ms S].
Dr T concludes his report in May 2023 by stating that the mother has a favourable prognosis as she remains engaged in treatment and displays a strong motivation to improve her mental health.
Cross examination of the experts
Dr T, Dr V and Dr U were all called to give evidence. Despite some changes in circumstances and evidence that had come to light during the hearing being put to them, all three experts did not change their opinion on their diagnoses from their last reports.
It is important to note the different roles of Dr T as a treating psychiatrist and Dr V and Dr U as single joint experts in this matter. When asked why Dr T specified at the end of his report that he is not an independent medical expert in the matter, he responded:
Because I am the treating doctor of [Ms Dansey] and, therefore, I have a duty of care to her and that duty of care is something that an independent psychiatrist appointed by the court does not have, and so it’s an important distinction to make in my role as being different to that of a single expert.
(Transcript 23 June 2023 page 57 lines 6–10)
When Dr V was cross-examined, it was this distinction in their roles that he relied on to argue why Dr T has an incorrect view on the mother’s diagnosis and treatment. He stated:
He’s a treating psychiatrist, and treating psychiatrists by their nature…we’re aligned with our patients. We’ve got to be on their side. Otherwise, they don’t talk to us. So you know, he’s in a very different position,…he may not have access to the same diversity of information
(transcript 26 June 2023 page 30 lines 14–23)
Dr U similarly states at paragraph 29 of her addendum report:
Lastly, I note that [Dr T] states that a limitation of his report is that he is a treating doctor in this matter and not an independent expert. This is an important distinction. The treating clinician generally only has the benefit of hearing from one side and needs to maintain a therapeutic alliance to work effectively with the client.
Dr T was cross-examined about this limitation and how that might affect his ability to challenge his clients and make further investigations as to what he is being told. He responded:
---I disagree with that in the sense that, again, I come back to my duty and that it is my duty of care to the patient… So that involves me investigating their thought patterns, their beliefs. That involves me questioning them, because I have a duty of care to them.
(Transcript 23 June 2023 page 61 lines 13–19)
A concern Dr T raised in relation to Dr V’s report was as follows:
My only concern with the methodology of [Dr V] is that he forms a view of [Ms Dansey] that is clearly different to that of the treating team, both [Dr MM], [Ms S] and myself, and because he forms a view that it’s quite strikingly different to the treating team, in my view that would have warranted some further investigation.
And what investigation do you say that would have warranted, in your view?---So I’m both a general adult and forensic psychiatrist, so I’ve sat in the shoes of [Dr V]. If I was in that position and I formed an opinion of a patient that I was assessing that was at odds with what the treating team was seeing, I would seek further clarification and perhaps arrange a formal phone interview with the treating team to get some further information.
(Transcript 23 June 2023 page 60 lines 31–42)
Dr T was an impressive witness who earnestly answered all questions posed to him by counsel. When asked about Dr U’s conclusions in her second report that the mother is fabricating allegations for secondary gain based on corroborative material that Dr T would not have had access to, he responded:
Now, in my role as a treating psychiatrist I am absolutely aware that patients won’t always tell me the truth, but part of my role is to also assess their background and to pick up elements of their personality style, because that influences treatment and the management of their condition. Now, in [Ms Dansey’s] case there’s not a clear history there of longitudinal maladaptive behaviours that have caused problems in her function over a long passage of time. Her history is, you know, to the contrary of that. Rather, she is highly functional and in the affidavits that have been provided that support that, she’s, you know, living a normal rich and fulfilled life. So there’s not evidence that she has an enduring pattern of personality dysfunction that’s impairing for her that has been alluded to in the report of [Dr U].
(Transcript 23 June 2023 pager 62 lines 8–19)
He maintained that the mother has a positive prognosis on the basis she is currently engaging in extensive psychiatric and psychological treatment and she is receiving evidence-based treatment and improving accordingly. He explained that PTSD does not necessarily lead to a diminution of parental capacity and conceded that if the Court were to find that her parenting capacity was impaired, there may be another diagnosis or reason as to why.
Dr V said the most “striking” fixed false belief held by the mother is the belief that the father had sexually abused X and continued to pose a significant risk of sexual harm to the child. Now that the mother has recanted that belief, Dr V maintains his diagnosis on the way in which the mother’s belief came about.
What I’m getting at, though, is somewhat different, and I will ask it again. So you formed a view that she had a delusional disorder based on a fixed, false belief that [X] was sexually abused. We’ve established that?---Yes.
Now, what I’m putting to you is given that that is a founding fact that you relied upon, if his Honour was to form the view that the mother had a reasonable basis for her concerns, then that would have to cause you to revisit your opinion, would it not?---It certainly would give pause. However, the genesis of her belief is one that’s not consistent with – well, the genesis of her belief and forming that belief, that it was all crystallised in that moment, is more consistent with a delusional process.
(Transcript 26 June 2023 page 61 lines 5–14)
However, in cross-examination it was put to him that the evidence suggests throughout 2020 and 2021, X was presenting with a sore vagina and if the mother was a victim of sexual abuse by the father and childhood sexual abuse, it was not unreasonable that the mother would have been concerned about that. Dr V agreed with the proposition put forward by mother’s counsel.
INTERIM ORDERS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
Having regard to the totality of the evidence before the Court and the submissions made, the Court makes the following tentative findings in the context of this interim hearing.
Both children have a meaningful relationship with the mother. In a prospective sense they would both benefit from this continuing.
Y has a meaningful relationship with the father. In a prospective sense he would benefit from this continuing.
X once had a meaningful relationship with the father but it would be difficult to so characterise it at the present time. There is no doubt that in a prospective sense X would benefit from a meaningful relationship with the father.
There are as yet no definitive findings that can be made about the risks of harm to the children that emanate from either or both of their parents. Even though some tentative findings have been made about the expert medical evidence, the evidence before the Court has not closed. The competing claims of risk to the children are neither completely accepted nor rejected, but the risks inherent in the claims being accepted are managed through the orders that are contemplated. The impression formed is that such risk as exists in the context of the children spending time with each parent is best managed by a level of vigilance in the case of the father, and supervision in the case of the mother. To a certain extent, and to varying degrees, this is reflected in the interim proposals that they each make, as well as the interim orders to date. Thus, pending the final hearing, and recognising the possibility that the children are subjected to different types of risk in the homes of each parent, the mother’s time with the children does need to be continually supervised, and the father’s time with the children does need to continue to be in what is for the children the protective and familiar environment of the home of the paternal grandparents.
The mother’s proposed new supervisor is adequate under the circumstances, but she will be asked to enter into a written undertaking in the form suggested by the mother which includes a requirement for her to read some of the expert evidence in this case.
The views of the children is not a matter on which the Court places significant weight. Dr U expressed reservations about the views expressed by X and the extent to which they are influenced by the mother (paragraph 75 of Dr U’s second report). It is noticeable, the Court observes, that in terms of the children’s views, Y’s is starkly different to that of his sister X. The risk, of course, is that this may change over time.
The nature of the children’s relationships with their parents and grandparents is an important issue. Y appears to enjoy good relationships all around. X’s relationship with the mother appears, on the evidence before the Court to date, to be an intense and often emotional one. The mother and X are clearly close to each other. Indeed, the closeness of the relationship is a concern to, for example, Dr U who described it as an enmeshed relationship (paragraph 77 of Dr U’s second report). X’s relationship with the father has waxed and waned, sometimes dramatically and over a short period of time. On the material before the Court it does present as being the best it has been for some time.

The other significant relationship is that between the children themselves. This is significant because an option for the Court is to make orders that separate the siblings from each other. The difficulty is, however, that at paragraphs 133, 135 and 148 of Dr U’s first report she reports the children saying things indicative of a very strong sibling relationship. This does give rise to concerns about separating X and Y.
The likely impact of change in the children’ circumstances, particularly in terms of separation from parents or other significant persons, is an important consideration in this present interim application.
The mother’s proposal presents a scenario of least change compared to the period immediately before the interim hearing. Indeed, the children are spending regular time with the father, not without issue so far as X is concerned, but seemingly well-managed by the father. For most of the time since the parents separated, the children have spent substantial and significant time with the father. In context, it is only for a period of months that X has not been spending time with the father.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer’s proposal of equal time presents some change for the children, but not significant in magnitude. It is a pragmatic proposal that maximises the opportunity for relationship repair between X and the father and gives the mother the opportunity to demonstrate her commitment to supporting this relationship into the future. It has the added advantage of minimising changeovers as well.
It is the father’s proposal that presents a scenario of the greatest change for the children. Whilst on the one hand they would return to live in the family home, albeit with him rather than the mother, on the other hand he proposes that the mother have no time with the children until the final hearing in October, and that she be excluded from the home on 48 hours’ notice. Neither of the children will have spent such an extended period of time away from the mother. The evidence suggests that the father has managed X’s resistance, with much difficulty, patience and love, in a context where it was understood that X would be returning home to the mother at the end of the school holidays. His proposal presents a completely different scenario. X’s reaction is really not that difficult to predict given her track record. The impact on X and on Y, but also on the father, is likely to be profound and negative. The father’s premise in moving back into the family home is that the mother must move at least 5 kilometres away, not disclose her whereabouts to the children, not communicate with them in any way, and thus create a situation where X will have nowhere to run away to. It is a coercive order from the mother’s perspective. Much to the mother’s credit, she communicated to the Court that if such an order was made, she would comply, on the basis that it minimises disruption to the children, and that she would need more than the notice that was contemplated by the father.
The impact of the father’s proposal is in fact Draconian when one remembers that it is an interim order that is open for reversal at a final hearing in a few months’ time. It would involve the Court accepting the fundamental premises in the father’s case before the evidence was complete. The greatest risk, however, from the Court’s perspective is that the fragile restoration of the relationship between X and the father is in fact put in jeopardy by making the very order that he seeks. Moreover, this Court fears that making such an order is likely to precipitate further proceedings in relation to the children between the date of any such order and the date on which judgment is delivered after the final hearing. Nonetheless, given the fluidity of this case, further litigation may well be inevitable, even before the final hearing.
Therefore, orders will be made largely in line with the mother’s proposal. The Court has accepted the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s submission to minimise changeover and therefore will order that the children live with the father for five consecutive nights each alternate weekend.
It is noted that all parties sought an order that the parties shall communicate with each other in relation to the children by the OurFamilyWizard App. It was raised during cross-examination that all communication related to the children has occurred and is currently occurring between the mother and the paternal grandmother. The Court is hopeful that this opportunity will begin mending the relationship and communication between the parties before the October hearing dates.
The Court will make general restraints on non-denigration and discussing the proceedings in the presence of the children as proposed by all of the parties.
The mother sought an order that she be permitted to take the children on a holiday to G Town when they are living with her in the school holidays. Noting that no submissions were made on behalf of the mother about this during the hearing, this order will not be made. The mother also sought an order that the children be placed on the Family Law Watchlist and no submissions were made on this issue and the necessity for such an order is not clear. The order will not be made.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer sought an order that if X does not spend time with the father in accordance with the orders, the father be at liberty to relist on two days’ notice or the orders sought by the father self-execute. The Court is of the view that the latter proposition is too restrictive and unfair. The Court will instead order that the Independent Children’s Lawyer have liberty to relist the proceedings.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli.
Associate:
Dated:       19 July 2023
SCHEDULE ONE
DEFINITIONS:
A.       "father" means Applicant, Mr Dansey.
B.       "mother" means the Respondent, Ms Dansey.
C.       "parties" means the father and the mother.
D.       "party" means the father or the mother.
E. “children” means X born 2012 and Y born 2013

Pending further order it is ordered that:
1. The children live with the father.
2. The children spend no time with the mother pending further order and the recommencement of the final hearing on 3 October 2023.
3. Within 48 hours of these Orders, or as soon as reasonably practicable, the Independent Children's Lawyer meet with the children to explain the effect of these Orders.

Communication
4. The parties shall communicate with each other in relation to the children by the OurFamilyWizard App.

Occupancy of Children's Residence
5. Pursuant to Section 68B:
5.1Within 48 hours of the making of these Orders, the mother shall do all acts and things necessary to vacate the former family home situated at F Street, Suburb B in the State of New South Wales ("the former family home") in which the children shall reside with the father;

5.2 The mother be restrained from entering or remaining at the former family home;
5.3 The mother be restrained from residing within 5km of the former family home, and the mother shall notify the father of the residential address at which she is residing within 48 hours of vacating the former family home, and shall notify the father of any further change of her residential address within 7 days of any such change.

6. The mother's compliance with Order 5.1 of these Orders is conditional upon the father doing all acts and things and signing all documents necessary to cause a sum of $50,000 to be released to the mother from the funds held in the trust account operated by Pearson Emerson in the total sum of $1,136,388.85, to meet the mother's costs of rehousing, such funds paid to the mother to be characterised as a partial payment of her property settlement entitlements.

Restraints
7. The mother be restrained by injunction from:
7.1 Approaching the children;
7.2 Disclosing any changed residential address or any work or business address of hers to the children;
7.3 Communicating with the children by telephone call, letter, text message, video call, email or any other messenger app or social media app, or gaming platform, including responding to any messages, emails or letters received by her from X and/or Y or any calls placed to her by X and/or Y, except as may be agreed between the parties in writing;

7.4 Attending the premises of any school attended by X and/or Y; and
7.5 Attending the venue or location of any extracurricular activity or social activity participated in by X and/or Y.

8. Each of the parties be restrained by injunction from:
8.1 Abusing, insulting, belittling, rebuking, or otherwise denigrating the other party and/or the children;

8.2 Using physical discipline on the children or either of them; and
8.3 Discussing these proceedings or any allegations raised in such proceedings or discussing the contents of any documents filed in or intended for use in these proceedings to, with or in the presence or hearing of the children (or any of them) and from permitting any other person to do so.

9. The mother be and is hereby required to attend or continue attending such practitioners or therapists as may be recommended by Dr U.

SCHEDULE TWO
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975
IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY
File No. SYC3614/2021
BETWEEN
MR DANSEY
(Applicant)
AND
MS DANSEY
(Respondent)
and
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
MINUTE OF INTERIM ORDERS SOUGHT BY THE RESPONDENT MOTHER
1.That all previous parenting Orders in respect of the children X born 2012 and Y born 2013 (collectively referred to as “Children”) be discharged.
2.That the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the Children.
3.That the Children live with the Mother at all times that they are not living with the Father pursuant to these Orders.
4.That the Children live with the Father during their school terms as follows:
4.1from conclusion of school Wednesday 19 July 2023 until commencement of school Thursday each alternate week;
4.2from conclusion of school Friday 28 July 2023 until commencement of school Tuesday 1 August 2023 and on each alternate weekend;

5.That the Children live with the Father during school holidays as follows:
5.1Until 3pm 17 July 2023;
5.2for the first half of the Term 3 2023 school holidays by collection of the Children from school on the last day of the school term;
5.3In relation to the end of year 2023 school holidays that the Children live with the Father from 3pm 3 January 2024 until 3pm 17 January 2024 and from 3pm 24 January 2024 until the Children return to school.

6.The Father shall ensure that the Children sleep overnight at the same premises as at least one of his parents when the Children are living with him.
7.That the Father remain living at the home of the Paternal Grandparents.
8.That the Paternal Grandparents be released from all previous Undertakings to this Court and Undertake as follows:
(a)that they will ensure that either of them remains with the Father overnight, consistent with these Orders;
(b)that they will contact the Mother immediately on her mobile phone and return the Children to her, in the event they observe conduct on behalf of the Father which exposes the Children to harm including physical, emotional or psychological harm or conduct which is inconsistent with paragraph 19 of these Orders on the part of the Father.

9.That the Mother facilitate a Zoom call between the Children and the Father on Christmas Day 2023 and New Years Day 2024 between 9:00am-9:30am.
10.That when the Children are living with the Mother, she shall be supervised by the Supervisor at all times that either or both of the Children are in her care.
11.That the Supervisor be Ms EE until 31 October 2023.
12.That the Supervisor give an Undertaking to this Court in the following terms:
12.1That she will be present at all times when the Mother has the Children in her care and will ensure that the Children (or either of them) are not left alone at any time with the Mother;
12.2that if she witnesses any conduct by the Mother which she considers inappropriate or which breaches paragraph 19 of these Orders or which exposes the Children or either of them to harm, including emotional or psychological harm, then she will terminate the Mother’s time with the Children, remove the Children from her presence, contact the Father immediately on his mobile phone and arrange for the Children to be delivered to the Father;
12.3that she will not discuss with or in the presence or hearing of the Children, these family law proceedings, including allegations and any other issue raised in the proceedings between the Father and the Mother and will likewise not denigrate the Father in the presence or hearing of the Children or allow any other person to do so;
12.4that she will meet with the Independent Children’s Lawyer to have her obligations pursuant to this Undertaking and any other matters to her supervision, explained to her.

13.The parties shall communicate with each other in relation to the Children by the OurFamilyWizard App.
14.That when the Children are living with the Father, on a Without Admission basis the Mother shall:
14.1not communicate, attempt to communicate or approach the Children whilst in the care of the Father;
14.2notify the paternal grandmother immediately in the event that either or both of the children contact her directly with any information regarding the Children’s location (if they appear to have left the care of the Father) and any information suggestive of the Children being at risk of harm, and provide copies of such communications to the paternal grandmother;
14.3block the Children’s mobile phone numbers on her mobile phone so that she cannot receive calls or messages from the Children and block the Mother’s mobile phone number on the Children’s mobile phones to prevent them receiving calls or messages from her to their mobile phones.

15.That the Father shall use his best endeavours to prevent the Children contacting the Mother when they are living with him.
16.Until the Children have both attended their time with the Father on not less than 5 consecutive occasions, the Mother shall remain outside a radius of 10km of Suburb B from 2:30pm until 8:00pm on the day they go into the Father’s care to commence their time with him.
17.That the Respondent Mother continue to consult her current Psychiatrist and Psychologist as recommended by them.
18.That the parties facilitate X’s attendance on Ms DD as recommended by her and Y’s attendance on Ms FF as recommended by her.
19.That the Mother be permitted to take the Children on holiday to G Town when they are living with her during school holidays provided that the Children stay at the home of the Maternal Grandfather or the Maternal Uncle and she shall give to the Father not less than 28 days notice in writing in advance of the Children’s departure to G Town.
20.Each of the parties be restrained by injunction from:
20.1speaking of the other party in a derogatory manner or allowing a third party to do so, in the presence or hearing of the Children;
20.2using physical discipline on either of the Children;
20.3discussing these proceedings or any allegations raised in these proceedings or discussing the contents of any documents filed in these proceedings with or in the presence or hearing of the Children (or either of them) and from permitting any other person to do so.

21.The parties, Mr Dansey, born 1979, and Ms Dansey, born 1978, and their agents are hereby restrained from removing or attempting to remove the Children, X born 2012 and Y born 2013, from the Commonwealth of Australia without first receiving the written consent of the other party, AND IT IS REQUESTED the Australia Federal Police give effect to this Order by placing the child on the Family Law Watchlist in force at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia and maintain the child’s name on the Family Law Watchlist until the Court orders its removal or the parties agree in writing.

Date: 14 July 2023
___________________________
Belinda Burgess
Solicitor for the Mother
SCHEDULE THREE
Mr Dansey
Applicant Father
Ms Dansey
Respondent Mother
Independent Children's Lawyer
ICL proposed minute of interim orders
Pending further order
1.        The children X and Y spend week about with each parent with the time to start from the conclusion of school (or 3 pm if it is not a school day) on a day to be agreed failing which it is Wednesday to the commencement of school (or 9 am if it is not a school day) a week later.
2.        The changeover is to occur at school with the parent into whose care the children will be coming, picking them up and that parent dropping them off there at the end of their time. In the event the children are not at school the changeover will occur as agreed but failing agreement - the ICL invites the parents to put forward this alternative noting the orders are likely to apply during holiday time.
3.        Additional order to be made as set out in the amended minute sought by the respondent mother and numbered 6,7,8,9 but those Zoom calls to be made to the parent who is not spending time with the children on those days, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18and20
4.        Also Order 3 of the fathers orders is sought but slightly altered to read "Within 48 hours of these orders or as soon as reasonably practicable the ICL and [Ms DD] meet with the children to explain the effect of these orders.
5. In the event X does not spend time with the father in accordance with the orders either the father is at liberty to relist the matter on 2 days notice and seek the orders he is currently proposing and numbered 1 to 9 with the inclusion of Ms DD to be present and assist the -lCL in explaining the orders to the children as set out in 4 above.
Or the orders sought by the father are made at this time as self executing if the children do not spend time with the father in accordance with 1.

File number(s):	SYC 3614 of 2012
Judgment of:	ALTOBELLI J
Date of judgment:	19 July 2023
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Interim – Where the matter is part-heard – Oral application for interim parenting orders made on the last day of trial – Where the parties and the single joint experts have been cross examined – Where the single expert psychiatrist diagnoses the mother with PTSD and delusional disorder – Where the single expert psychologist says the mother is fabricating allegations – Where the mother’s treating psychiatrist diagnoses the mother with complex PTSD as a result of her experiences of family violence – Serious allegations of sexual abuse and family violence alleged by the mother – Where the father seeks the children spend no time with the mother until the resumption of final hearing – Where the Independent Children’s Lawyer seeks a weekabout arrangement – It is ordered that the children live with the mother and spend five consecutive nights each alternate weekend with the father.
Legislation:	Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA
Cases cited:	Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286; [2006] FamCA 1346 MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461; [2010] HCA 4 SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	103
Date of hearing:	17 July 2023
Place:	Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Sansom SC
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Pearson Emerson Family Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Burgess Family Law
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	G & D Lawyers

SYC 3614 of 2012
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MR DANSEY Applicant
AND:	MS DANSEY Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

order made by:	ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:	19 July 2023