Danny-Glen Raiz and Versa-Tile Pty Limited v Peter Gregory Vickers and Chandra Patel and M.O.F.S Pty Limited

The Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory heard an application by the plaintiffs, Danny-Glen Raiz and Versa-Tile Pty Limited, for leave to amend their statement of claim. The plaintiffs sought to amend their pleadings to address issues of clarity and to clarify their legal position against the defendants, Peter Gregory Vickers, Chandra Patel, and M.O.F.S. Pty Limited. The primary legal issues focused on whether the proposed amendments would introduce new causes of action outside the limitation period and whether the causes of action in question were assignable.

The court considered the rules governing amendments to pleadings and noted that while amendments introducing new causes of action outside the limitation period were generally impermissible, the court had discretion to allow such amendments if it deemed it just. The plaintiffs argued that their proposed amendments did not introduce new causes of action but rather clarified the existing ones, relying on precedents that distinguished between the concept of a cause of action and the broader scope of a matter before the court. The court acknowledged that if the amendment merely elaborated on the matter already before it, it would not be considered as introducing a new cause of action.

A significant issue addressed was whether the causes of action asserted, particularly those under the Fair Trading Act 1992, were assignable. The court cited authorities that suggested such causes of action were generally not assignable, except in specific circumstances such as death, bankruptcy, or corporate mergers. Given this, the court tentatively concluded that the causes of action in question were not assignable, and therefore, the second plaintiff’s claims, if they depended on such an assignment, would likely fail.

The court decided to adjourn the application to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to address these issues further. It emphasized that it was inappropriate to make any orders until the parties had fully considered the court's provisional conclusions.