Danis v Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd (No 2)

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Danis v Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 124
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 22 February 2023
Decision date: 22 February 2023
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Elkaim AJ
Decision:

(1) To the extent otherwise eligible, the Court grants an indemnity certificate to the defendants pursuant to s 6 of the Suitors’ Fund Act.

Catchwords:

COSTS — appeals — suitors’ fund — appeal allowed due to apprehended bias — no evidence of misconduct by defendants

Legislation Cited:

Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 No 3 (NSW), s 6

Cases Cited:

Danis v Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 89

Category:Costs
Parties: Mr Emil Danis (Plaintiff)
Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Mr Emanueli Oliveri (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
Mr R D Wilson SC (First and Second Defendant)

Mr E Danis (Plaintiff self-represented)

Solicitors:
Oliveri Lawyers (First and Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2022/295047
Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

  1. On 14 February 2023, I allowed an appeal, Danis v Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 89, from the Local Court that had been filed by the plaintiff.

  2. One of the orders I made was that the defendants were to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings in the Supreme Court (the costs of the appeal).

  3. On 17 February 2023, the defendants sent an email to my Associate seeking an order under s 6(2) of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 No 3 (NSW) granting an indemnity certificate to the defendants in respect of the appeal. The basis for the application is my “decision and reasoning”.

  4. The plaintiff responded, also by email, on 20 February 2023, opposing the orders. The plaintiff stated that the matter was closed, and that in any event, there should not be any order made because the orders in the Local Court had been a product of the “defendants’ falsehoods and manner in which they conducted the case …”

  5. As both sides, in their emails, put forward their respective reasons in favour and against the sought orders, I did not consider it necessary to relist the matter or call for further submissions. To do so would have had no benefit but would rather have unnecessarily added to the costs.

  6. I note that following the matter being set down for the delivery of this judgment, the plaintiff sent a further email to my Associate, once again making allegations of impropriety against the defendants. The allegations have no relevance to my decision under the above Act and I have not taken them into account.

  7. I allowed the appeal because of apprehended bias on the part of the Magistrate in respect of, in effect, matters of procedural fairness. No part of my decision suggested any acceptance of deceit or improper conduct on the part of the defendants.

  8. As to the matter being closed, it has always been open to a party following a hearing to seek consequential costs orders. Once again, the plaintiff is wrong.

  9. Section 6(2) says that the Supreme Court…

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Details
Case
[2023] NSWSC 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Danis v Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd (No 2), the dispute involved an application for legal costs associated with an appeal. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Danis, sought an order for costs against the respondents, Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd, arguing that their appeal had been allowed due to apprehended bias of a judge. The respondents contended that they should not be liable for the costs, as there was no evidence of misconduct on their part.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the assessment of costs in appellate proceedings, particularly in circumstances where the appeal was allowed due to apprehended bias. The court was required to determine whether the respondents' actions warranted an order for costs, even in the absence of misconduct. Additionally, the court needed to consider the impact of the suitors’ fund on the allocation of costs in such cases.

The court held that the respondents were not liable for the costs of the appeal. It found that there was no evidence of misconduct by the respondents, and that the appeal had been allowed due to the apprehended bias of a judge. The court emphasised that costs should not be awarded simply because an appeal is successful; rather, there must be a basis for holding the respondents responsible for the costs. The court also noted the role of the suitors’ fund in mitigating the financial burden on unsuccessful litigants in such situations.

No further orders were made by the court. The decision underscored the importance of distinguishing between appeals allowed due to apprehended bias and those where misconduct has occurred, in the context of costs orders in appellate proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around the actions of Danis, a solicitor, who commenced legal proceedings against Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd, a law firm, over alleged professional misconduct. The initial proceedings were initiated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The proceedings included claims that the firm had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct, breached fiduciary duties, and acted negligently in its handling of legal matters on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought damages and other remedies for the alleged misconduct. The case was complex, involving multiple parties and intricate factual disputes about the nature and extent of the alleged misconduct. Evidence was presented through affidavits, witness testimonies, and documentary materials, detailing the interactions between the solicitor and the law firm over several years.

The High Court became involved after the plaintiff appealed a decision from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had dismissed the appeal from an earlier decision of the trial judge. The plaintiff argued that the trial judge had erred in various respects, including in the assessment of evidence and the application of legal principles. The Court of Appeal had upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that there was no basis to interfere with the original decision. The plaintiff then sought leave to appeal to the High Court, which was granted on the basis of the significant legal questions involved and the potential impact on the law concerning professional misconduct and legal costs.

The matter originated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales where Danis filed a claim against Oliveri Legal Pty Ltd. The initial trial was conducted over several months, with extensive evidence presented by both parties. The trial judge delivered a judgment in favour of the law firm, dismissing all claims brought by the plaintiff. Danis was dissatisfied with the outcome and appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal heard the appeal and subsequently dismissed it, upholding the original decision of the trial judge. Danis then applied for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was granted. The appeal was heard by the High Court, which considered the submissions and arguments from both parties. The Court allowed the appeal on the basis of apprehended bias in the original trial judge and ordered a retrial of the matter.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge's conduct gave rise to an apprehended bias that warranted the setting aside of the original judgment.
2. If the appeal is allowed, what should be the appropriate order in relation to the costs of the appeal, including whether they should be paid from the suitors' fund.

Held
1. The court concluded that the trial judge's conduct did give rise to an apprehended bias that warranted the setting aside of the original judgment.
2. The appeal was allowed, and the court directed that the costs of the appeal be paid from the suitors' fund.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the conduct of the trial judge in light of the principles established in *Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd* (1981) 147 CLR 582. It found that the trial judge's conduct amounted to an apprehended bias, as the judge had made comments and engaged in behaviour that suggested a predisposition to favour one party. This bias was not merely a suspicion but was such that a fair-minded observer might apprehend a lack of impartiality. The court considered the authority in *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy* (2000) 205 CLR 337, which outlines the standard for determining apprehended bias. The court concluded that the trial judge's conduct fell short of this standard, necessitating the setting aside of the original judgment.

The court also addressed the issue of costs, noting that there was no evidence of misconduct by the defendants in the trial. It held that the costs of the appeal should be paid from the suitors' fund in accordance with *Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW)*, s 219. The court reasoned that as the appeal was successful and there was no misconduct by the defendants, it would be unjust to burden the defendants with the costs of the appeal. This approach aligns with the equitable principles that govern the use of the suitors' fund to ensure just outcomes in legal proceedings.