Danielsen-Jensen; Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services

[2004] AATA 1319

Administrative

Appeals

Tribunal

 

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2004] AATA 1319

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION            N2004/923

Re: SECRETARY,    DEPARTMENT of FAMILY   and COMMUNITY SERVICES

Applicant

And:NATALIE DANIELSEN-JENSEN

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal:       P.J. Lindsay, Senior Member

Date:             10 December 2004

Place:           Sydney

Decision: The decision under review is set aside and in substitution the Tribunal decided that pursuant to s.1184K(1) of the Social Security Act 1991, it is appropriate in the special circumstances of the case to treat payment of $12,379.76 of the respondent’s compensation payment as not having been made.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P. J. Lindsay, Senior Member

©        Commonwealth of Australia          (2004)

Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL    )                N2004/923
  )  
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION     )

Re:         SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Applicant

And:        NATALIE DANIELSEN-JENSEN

Respondent

ORDER TO AMEND WRITTEN DECISION [2004] AATA 1319

TribunalP.J. Lindsay, Senior Member

Date18 January 2005

PlaceSydney

WHEREAS:

1.   The Tribunal released a written decision in this matter, which was dated 10 December 2004.

2.   It has come to the Tribunal’s attention that there is a typographical error in relation to the statement of the decision and paragraph 30 in the statement of reasons.  

3. The Tribunal wishes to amend the written decision so as to rectify this error and wishing to do so with the least cost and inconvenience to the parties, applies section 43AA of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975.

THE TRIBUNAL THEREFORE ORDERS that the statement of the decision and paragraph 30 in the statement of reasons read as follows:

Decision:The decision under review is set aside and in substitution the Tribunal decides that pursuant to s.1184K(1) of the Social Security Act 1991, it is appropriate in the special circumstances of the case to treat payment of $47,529.07 of the respondent’s compensation payment as not having been made.

[30] The decision under review found special circumstances under s.1237AAD of the Act to waive a debt payable by the respondent. However, I have found that there are special circumstances under s.1184K and that s.1237AAD is not relevant. Consequently, the decision under review is set aside and in substitution I decide that pursuant to s.1184K(1), it is appropriate in the special circumstances of the case to treat payment of $47,529.07 of the respondent’s compensation payment as not having been made.

[SGD] P.J. Lindsay
  Senior Member  

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SECURITY –– compensation payment – lump sum – preclusion period – no causal relation between injuries and payment denied – preclusion period during time of no award for economic loss - special circumstances – discretion exercised in respondent’s favour -  decision under review set aside

Social Security Act 1991 ss.1184K, 1237AAD

Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (New South Wales)

Re Secretary, Department of Social Security and Duzevich (1996) 41 ALD 461

Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 57 ALD 600

Re Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1

Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541

Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 13 AAR 454

Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Edwards (2000) 32 AAR 370

REASONS FOR DECISION

P.J. Lindsay, Senior Member

1. The Secretary to the Department of Family and Community Services has applied for review of the decision by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) dated 5 July 2004. The SSAT set aside a decision by Centrelink’s authorised review officer to raise and recover a debt of $12,379.76 arising from overpayment of parenting payment during 11 June 2001 to 17 November 2002. The SSAT also decided that the debt of $12,379.76 should be waived under s.1237AAD of the Social Security Act 1991.  The Secretary seeks an order that the SSAT’s decision be set aside and the authorised review officer’s decision be substituted therefor.

2. At the hearing Mr G Richardson from Centrelink represented the Secretary and Ms D Anagnos from the Welfare Rights Centre appeared for Ms Natalie Danielsen-Jensen, the respondent. The tribunal had before it the documents lodged under s.37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 and the exhibits tendered at the hearing.

background

3.      Ms Danielsen-Jensen is 33 and lives with her husband and five children in a three bedroom house in Blacktown. Her eldest child is 11 and in grade 6 at primary school. The youngest child is 3.

4. On 11 June 2001 the applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident. She sustained injuries to her neck, back and hip. On 24 February 2004 a Claims Assessment and Resolution Services (CARS) assessor acting pursuant to section 94 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) awarded her damages of $56,254.22 in respect of her injuries. The largest component of her damages was the sum of $47,529.07 awarded for future economic loss.

5.      On 5 March 2004 Centrelink informed the compulsory third party insurance company that a charge had been raised under Part 3.14 of the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act) in the sum of $12,379.76 covering the period 11 June 2001 to 17 November 2002. Also on 5 March 2004, the respondent was informed that Centrelink was aware of her entitlement to receive a lump sum compensation payment and that she was required to repay $12,379.76 since she had been receiving parenting payment during the preclusion period.

6.      On receipt of Centrelink’s notice that a charge for $12,379.76 had been raised, Ms Danielsen-Jensen phoned Centrelink to inform them that the solicitors acting for her in her compensation claim had not advised her that she may have to repay an amount to Centrelink. In the event, her solicitors wrote to Centrelink on 10 March 2004 to request that the matter be reviewed. As well as pointing out that the award of damages of $56,254.22 was subject to a deduction for medical expenses and legal fees, the solicitors noted that the award did not include a component for past economic loss, only an award for future economic loss of $47,529.07. The letter went on to say “… the day on which the loss of earnings, or loss of earning capacity (following the injury began), has simply not started. The assessor quite plainly states our client will not return or seek work until her youngest child Caleb has started in kindergarten in 2006. We submit that it is unfair to base a loss of earning capacity which has been assessed as a periodic payment of $75 per week discounted until age 65 years … which is totally dependent upon the perceived happening of a future event, ie. a return to work in 2006. In short, it cannot be based on something that has not begun.” (T18).

7.      On 18 March 2004 Centrelink informed Ms Danielsen-Jensen that no error had been made in calculating the preclusion period or the charge amount. Ms Danielsen-Jensen requested review of that decision. An authorised review officer looked into the matter again, but on 19 May 2004 advised that it was the correct decision to preclude her from receiving compensation affected payments from 11 June 2001 to 17 November 2002 and to recover the charge of $12,379.76 representing parenting payment received within that period.

8.      This led to her appeal to the SSAT and ultimately to the current application.

issues

9.      The parties agreed that the only issues are:

·Whether by reason of her receipt of compensation, a lump sum preclusion period applied to Ms Danielsen-Jensen from 11 June 2001 to 17 November 2002;

·If so, whether the amount of $12,379.76 was recoverable by the Secretary under the compensation recovery provisions of the Act as a debt due to the Commonwealth;

·Whether there are special circumstances that make it appropriate to disregard the receipt of part or all of the compensation under s. 1184K(1) of the Act and

·Whether there are special circumstances that make it desirable to waive recovery of any debt under s. 1237AAD of the Act.

evidence

10.     Ms Danielsen-Jensen said that her employment experience includes data entry and secretarial duties. Her last period of paid employment was in June 2000. She left when she found out that she was pregnant with her youngest child Caleb, who was born on 1 February 2001. She had been receiving parenting payment from 20 March 1998.

11.     Ms Danielsen-Jensen briefly outlined her action in recovering compensation for the injury she suffered in the accident on 11 June 2001. She said that she had daily physiotherapy for a period and then treatment from a chiropractor. An initial settlement offer of $600.00 was made which she rejected. This led her to instruct solicitors in February 2003. Legal advice was that she would not be entitled to any damages for pain and suffering but she did have a claim for future economic loss which the solicitor estimated could amount to $10,000.00. Ultimately, from the award of damages of $56,254.22, she received a net amount of $27,919.09 after deducting medical expenses, legal fees and the charge. She said that she learnt about the preclusion period a week after being notified that she had been awarded the damages. Following her discussion with Centrelink, she then spoke with her solicitor and was told that he had forgotten to tell her about the preclusion period.

12.     From the net amount of $27,919.09 she received, Ms Danielsen-Jensen repaid her mother some money. Her mother’s loan enabled her husband to undertake his Masters in Chiropractic course and for them to purchase some new furniture and computers for home. She placed $15,000 of her compensation payment on term deposit, adding that this sum should help her husband to establish himself as a chiropractor. He expects to be qualified by December 2005, by which time he will have completed his Masters course and the practical component. The money in the term deposit may also have to be spent on moving back to Queensland, where her husband has received an informal offer of employment.

13.     The respondent’s evidence was that she and her husband  have no significant assets other than the term deposit of $15,000, a twenty year old vehicle, some new furniture, TV and computers. The family of seven lives in a rented 3 bedroom house. Mr Danielsen-Jensen’s evidence was that his HECS debt will be approximately $50,000 at the completion of his degree.

14.     Mrs Danielsen-Jensen confirmed the approximate fortnightly expenses of her family as contained in Attachment B to the Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Contentions. She noted, however, that the list did not include other expected expenses associated with the children’s schooling and pre-schooling and her husband’s student fees and expenses for books, which she estimated to total in the vicinity of $2,000 per annum. In addition there was no allowance for haircuts, ordinary clothing and other basic expenses. Even according to Attachment B, before taking into account the other expected expenses, her family’s fortnightly expenses ($1,436.30) exceed the family’s fortnightly income received in the form of family payment and parenting payment (on her evidence currently $1242.00) by nearly $200.00 per fortnight.

15.     The respondent gave evidence that prior to the end of 2003, her husband was also entitled to an Austudy allowance but that it was not available to him in his Masters degree, which he began at the beginning of 2004. There is some suggestion, however, that it may be available in 2005, the final year of his Masters, although they had not made application as that entitlement had still to be determined. According to Mr Danielsen-Jensen’s evidence, the Austudy allowance that he received up to the end of 2003 was “about $310.00 per fortnight”. The respondent gave evidence that when the Austudy terminated at the end of 2003 they had to cut their losses and shave their budget. She was able to borrow $2,000.00 from her mother for costs associated with her husband’s Masters.

16.     Mr Danielsen-Jensen gave evidence that the likelihood of his being able to undertake any paid casual work between now and the completion of his Masters would depend on how intensive his study will be. The respondent’s evidence was that her husband’s university schedule including the practical component left little time for work let alone study. She could not foresee him picking up paid work before the end of next year and not even over the summer break. I accept that Mr Danielsen-Jensen is unlikely to undertake significant casual employment to help alleviate his family’s difficult financial circumstances until the end of 2005.

findings and consideration

17.     It was submitted for the Secretary that there are no special circumstances in this matter. While it was recognised that there was no relationship between the Ms Danielsen-Jensen’s injuries and her ceasing to receive parenting payment, s.1184K(2) expressly prevents this circumstance alone constituting special circumstances. The applicant disagreed with the SSAT’s finding that the family’s financial position was ‘’precarious’’, although now acknowledging that the fortnightly income from Ms Danielsen-Jensen’s parenting payment and family tax benefit is less than the family’s expenses. She had been adequately compensated for her injuries so her current medical condition was not a special circumstance. Finally, the Secretary submitted, that the SSAT should not have found that Ms Danielsen-Jensen experienced unfairness in the way that the Act applied to her. The Victorian compensation legislation that was considered in Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 57 ALD 600 to lead to unfairness, was not comparable to the New South Wales legislation that the assessor had to apply.

18.     The respondent submitted that the Act did apply unfairly to her. She was precluded from income support for almost eighteen months despite compensation for her economic loss not starting from February 2006. It was submitted that the policy assumption that the compensation replaces her income support was unfair, as her compensation for economic loss was set at a very low rate of $75.00 per week for her partial loss of earning capacity. Further, she submitted it was unfair that she was denied receipt of parenting payment through the preclusion period, in spite of entitlement to that payment being unrelated to a person’s state of health. This unfairness, in combination with her family’s precarious financial position and poor legal advice, justified a finding of special circumstances.

19. There was no real dispute about the lump sum of damages being ‘compensation’ as defined under s.17(2) of the Act and that the compensation part of the lump sum payment is $47,529.07 (s.17(3)(b)). Nor was there any dispute concerning the applicant’s determination of the preclusion period and I find that it runs from 11 June 2001 to 17 November 2002. Both representatives were unsure why the SSAT’s decision considered the application of s.1237AAD of the Act. However, this did not concern them. They accepted that the breadth of the discretion there, and that in s.1184K(1) was similar, but that the latter was the more relevant discretion given it appears in Part 3.14 of the Act dealing with ‘Compensation Recovery’. I am mindful that in ReSecretary, Department of Social Security and Duzevich (1996) 41 ALD 461 the tribunal noted that ‘special circumstances’ should receive the same interpretation in both provisions. At any rate, on the evidence and materials available to me, I am unable to find that Centrelink raised a debt against the respondent for the amount of $12,379.76. That is not surprising given that Centrelink’s express policy as set out at par 6.4.6 and 6.4.9 of the Guide to Social Security Law is to send the recovery notice to the insurer and not to raise a debt on the ‘customer’ unless recovery cannot be made from the compensation payer or insurer. A debt was raised against the insurer through the notice under s.1184 of the Act given on 5 March 2004 (T14). I will therefore consider only the application of s.1184K in deciding whether to treat some of the compensation payment as not having been made. 

20.     Section 1184K reads:

Secretary may disregard some payments

1184K(1) For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:

(a)  not having been made; or

(b)  not liable to be made;

if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case.

1184K(2) If:

(a)  a person or a person's partner receives or claims a compensation       affected payment; and

(b)  the person receives compensation; and

(c)  the set of circumstances that gave rise to the claim for compensation is         not related to the set of circumstances that gave rise to the person's or the         person's partner's receipt of, or claim for, the compensation affected payment;

the fact that those 2 sets of circumstances are unrelated does not alone constitute special circumstances for the purposes of subsection (1).

21.     The object of Part 3.14 was described by Merkel J in Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 as follows (at 65):

The Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) ("the Act") provides for the Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services, to reduce and, where appropriate, recover certain social security benefits payable under the Act to a person who receives personal injury compensation which includes payment for loss of earnings or earning capacity. The statutory scheme is designed to prevent a person from being entitled to receive social security benefits in respect of a period during which the person receives, or is entitled to receive, personal injury compensation for loss of earnings or earning capacity. The relevant provisions operate to prevent "double payment" by depriving a person of an entitlement to social security benefits payable under the Act during the relevant period ("the preclusion period").

22.     As for the approach to exercising the discretion that depends on finding ‘special circumstances’, I note that the following passage from a decision of the Tribunal comprising Toohey J, Mr. I.A. Wilkins and Dr. J.G. Billings (Members) has been cited with approval in many subsequent cases:

An expression such as ‘special circumstances’ is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special. (Re Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 at 3)

Another much quoted passage is found in the judgment of Kiefel J in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541, who said of the expression ”special circumstances” that “ … it would require something to distinguish [an applicant’s] case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. … It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.” (at 545)

23.     I find on the evidence given by the respondent and her husband, which was accepted by the applicant, that their current expenditure exceeds their current income. This is not a situation that I expect will change appreciably between now and the end of 2005, when Mr Danielsen-Jensen expects to complete his Masters degree and obtains registration in his profession. I find the respondent and her family have been living under these financial conditions since the beginning of 2004. I find that they have managed only because they have been able to borrow short term from her mother when necessary and they have keenly cut their budget. They have been willing to do so to preserve their nest egg, the term deposit, which they have earmarked to fund the expected necessary setup costs of the respondent’s husband in his intended profession.  He gave evidence, which I accept, that he has prospects of work in Queensland. He would need to purchase his own bench and other chiropractic equipment, which could cost from $2,000 to $8,000. I find that the additional school fees of approximately $2,000, and her husband’s student fees and text books, that have not been included in the budget in attachment B to the respondent’s statement of facts and contentions, together with the shortfall between their usual outgoings and income, are likely to be met only by the funds held in the term deposit.

24.     This is a young family, living in rented accommodation and relying on a 20 year old vehicle that they cannot obtain a loan to replace, struggling to get by on income support.  I find that the financial circumstances of the respondent’s family, consisting of two adults and 5 young children, where the husband is undertaking full time study without the benefit of Austudy, their expenses significantly exceed their income and their debts (which are deferred but will eventually require repayment from income) significantly exceed the value of their assets, is a fact that should be considered with the other circumstances of the respondent’s position.

25.     In relation to the respondent’s submission concerning defective legal advice, I am satisfied that, while she may not have been forewarned of the likely preclusion period, that deficiency is unlikely to have had any effect on the outcome of the claim for compensation. I come to this conclusion as there was little evidence of the achievable alternatives that may have been available to her. Nor was there evidence establishing that the outcome could have been different had she known of the preclusion period and acted with this knowledge. I also accept that the effect of her injuries, while continuing, will not prevent her from returning to the workforce in a limited capacity and I find that she received an amount in her award to cover her for anticipated medical expenses for necessary treatment for her injuries. I therefore do not find her injuries to amount to a relevant circumstance.

26.     Coming now to the submission that the Act has an unfair application to the respondent, I make the following findings of fact regarding the damages awarded to her:

·the component of damages for economic loss, $47,592.07, reflected a partial loss of earning capacity and was based on compensation of $75.00 per week commencing from February 2006 for a period of 30 years when the respondent will be 65.

·the damages assessor found that there was no economic loss in the period from the accident on 11 June 2001 to February 2006 because Ms Danielsen-Jensen does not intend to resume work until her youngest child is ready for school in 2006. Consequently, she was not awarded any compensation for economic loss for the period from the date of the accident to February 2006. That is, she did not receive compensation for economic loss in respect of the preclusion period, 11 June 2001 to 17 November 2002.  

·     Ms Danielsen-Jensen had ceased paid work prior to the accident on 11 June 2001. At the time of the accident she had been receiving parenting payment partnered. Her capacity to work had no bearing on her entitlement to that payment. But for the preclusion period and all other things being equal, she could continue to receive the parenting payment. Currently she is again receiving parenting payment.       

27.     I accept that the application of the Act produces an unfair result for the respondent for these reasons:

·the assessor’s award of damages recognised that Ms Danielsen-Jensen would not suffer any economic loss between the date of the accident and February 2006 because it was her intention not to return to the workforce until then, as her youngest child would be ready to go to school. Accordingly, she was not awarded compensation for that period, but neither could she receive parenting payment for the preclusion period by reason of the compensation recovery provisions in the Act. As practical matter of fact, there could not be any double dipping during that period. I accept the submission that the respondent has been disadvantaged by the interrelationship of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (New South Wales), as applied by the assessor, and the Act. Kertland is authority for the point that such a disadvantage may be taken into account in considering the exercise of the discretion in s.1184K.  There is a parallel here to the situation in Kertland where State compensation legislation did not allow damages to be awarded for a set period following the accident. The result here was the same, although the basis for it was the assessor’s application of general principles to the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW). There is unfairness in paying back parenting payment for a period when there was no entitlement to compensation and none was awarded. The comments by Merkel J in Kertland have similar force to the respondent’s situation:

In the present case, it was open to the AAT to find no part of the     compensation the applicant received related to a period during which social       security payments were payable with the consequence that, as there has        been no “double payment”, there were “special circumstances” for the      purposes of s.1184(1). In such circumstances the exercise of the discretion         under s.1184(1) would not be inconsistent with the policy and purpose of the      statutory scheme. As was noted by von Doussa J in Smith (at 61-62) the very purpose of the ameliorating provisions of s.156 (and now s1184(1)) is to        enable the discretion to be exercised where it is appropriate to do so because         the circumstances of the particular case will give rise to an unreasonable or           unjust result under the scheme. (at 609)

In Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 13 AAR 454 von Doussa J approved the following statement that the tribunal had made “’To continue to deprive (the respondent) of that which was paid to him by virtue of his rightful entitlement to sickness benefits on the basis that he is to be taken to have been compensated for it, when in actual fact he was not, would in my view be unjust’” (at 460). There is a further, subsidiary matter of unfairness in that Ms Danielsen-Jensen did not recover approximately $10,000 in solicitor/client costs, approximately 18 per cent of the total damages ($17,642.47 per solicitors’ account less $7,697.25 received from the insurer for costs - exhibit R2). On a pro-rata basis, the economic loss component of the damages made the greatest contribution to the shortfall. This significant reduction in the monies she received ought be taken into account as another aspect of the respondent’s circumstances, to be weighed in the balance when considering whether to exercise the discretion in s.1184K.

·     Ms Danielsen-Jensen will be denied parenting payment during the preclusion period despite entitlement to that payment not being related to or affected by a recipient’s injuries or any resulting incapacity for work. I am cognisant of the aim of s.1184K(2). However, Drummond J in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Edwards (2000) 32 AAR 370 found that the lack of a causal relationship between income support and compensability can be properly taken into account under s.1184(1) (equivalent to s.1184K of the Act). His Honour noted that ss.1163(9) and 1184(2) (equivalent to s.1184K(2)) had been amended with the aim of narrowing the operation of s.1184(1) ” … by providing that the absence of such a connection was not by itself sufficient to require the secretary to apply s.1184(1) to such a case.” But the effect of the amendments was not to prohibit the Secretary from taking into account any absence of a causal relationship between a person’s social security entitlements and a payment of compensation, as a matter relevant to the exercise of the discretion in s.1184(1). Drummond J said:

Far from saying that the absence of a causal relationship between pensionability and compensability is irrelevant to the task of considering whether to apply s 1184(1), sub-section (2) acknowledges that it is a relevant consideration but by itself, is not sufficient to require the benefit of s 1184(1) to be given to the pensioner, at least when the question arises as to whether a pensioner should be left with pension unaffected despite the spouse's receipt of compensation. In Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56, von Doussa J held that it was a consideration of relevance to the exercise of the discretion under a precursor of s 1184(1) that the supervening incapacity for work that attracted pension payments was unrelated to the earlier injury that attracted compensation. (at 379)

28.     I find the applicant’s submission that there may be double dipping in the future if the respondent were to continue to receive social security payments after February 2006, to be speculation. That possibility does not outweigh the unjust result of her being denied the parenting payment during a period for which she was expressly not compensated.

29.     In summary I am satisfied that Ms Danielsen-Jensen’s circumstances overall and in combination do exhibit the character of unusualness that take her out of the ordinary and constitute special circumstances within the provisions of s.1184K of the Act. In particular I am mindful of her precarious financial position, the unfairness of the compensation recovery rules’ denying her parenting payment in a period during which she did not receive an award for economic loss, and there being no causal connection between her injuries and the payment she was denied. As I balance the interests of the respondent against the taxpaying community, I find that it is appropriate to exercise the discretion in s.1184K in her favour.

30. The decision under review found special circumstances under s.1237AAD of the Act to waive a debt payable by the respondent. However, I have found that there are special circumstances under s.1184K and that s.1237AAD is not relevant. Consequently, the decision under review is set aside and in substitution I decide that pursuant to s.1184K(1), it is appropriate in the special circumstances of the case to treat payment of $12,379.76 of the respondent’s compensation payment as not having been made.

I certify that the 30 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision of Senior Member Lindsay

Signed:         .....................................................................................
  Associate

Hearing  17 November 2004
Decision  10 December 2004
Applicant’s representative        Welfare Rights Centre
Respondent’s representative    Centrelink