Dang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Dang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1101

File number(s): ADG123/2019
Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV
Date of judgment: 16 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Partner visa – whether applicants given access to written material before the Tribunal – application of Australian Privacy Principle 6 – whether Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied provision concerning family violence exception to Partner visa criteria – where Tribunal did not wish to go behind the findings of the Magistrate – whether reasonable apprehension of bias – whether jurisdictional error – writs issued
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 5, ss 5F, 140, 352, 359, 359A 362A, 375A, 476,

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 6, 14, Sch 1

Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No 1) Rules 2024 (Cth) rr 11, 12

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A, 1.23, Sch 2, cl 100.211, 100.221

Migration Amendment Regulations 2009 (No. 12) Select Legislative Instrument 2009 No. 273 (Cth) Explanatory Statement

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630

Carlos v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301; (2001) 183 ALR 719

Carlos v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1087; (2001) 113 FCR 456

Chao vMinister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 858

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289; (2021) 95 ALJR 824; (2021) 393 ALR 389; (2021) 64 Fam LR 94

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; (2006) 229 CLR 577; (2006) 81 ALJR 352; (2006) 231 ALR 663; (2006) 70 IPR 468

Dang v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1299

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337; (2000) 75 ALJR 277; (2000) 176 ALR 644; (2000) 63 ALD 577

EGU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 153

Hanna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 282; (2016) 150 ALD 299

He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 206; (2017) 255 FCR 41; (2017) 161 ALD 17

Lee v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321; (2024) 98 ALJR 610; (2024) 418 ALR 152

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Dhillon [2014] FCAFC 157; (2014) 227 FCR 525

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421; (2019) 93 ALJR 252; (2019) 75 AAR 75; (2019) 363 ALR 599; (2019) 163 ALD 38

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Applicant, Dang, a citizen of Vietnam, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Tribunal concerning her application for a Permanent Partner Visa. The Tribunal had affirmed the Minister’s decision not to grant the visa, a decision which was previously subject to unsuccessful judicial review. Dang sought access to documents before the Tribunal under section 362A of the Migration Act 1958, however the Tribunal only provided partial access to the material. The Tribunal reasoned that disclosure was not permitted under Australian Privacy Principle 6 as set out in Schedule 1 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal materially failed to comply with s 362A of the Migration Act, whether the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the family violence exception to Partner visa criteria, and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court found that the Tribunal had materially failed to comply with s 362A of the Migration Act. The Court found that the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that material containing personal information about another person was exempt from disclosure due to Australian Privacy Principle 6. The Court found that the Tribunal’s approach was erroneous. The Court found that the Tribunal’s failure to disclose the Sponsor’s movement details report was material because it contained adverse information that the Tribunal may have taken into account and supporting evidence to which the Tribunal may not have had regard. The Court found that the Tribunal had not misconstrued or misapplied the family violence exception to Partner visa criteria. The Court found that the Tribunal had not been required to go behind the findings of the Magistrate’s Court concerning Dang’s family violence claim. The Court found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court issued writs of mandamus requiring the Minister to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and to make a decision on Dang’s application for a Permanent Partner Visa, having regard to the full evidence before the Tribunal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In addition to the Amended Judicial Review Application the materials before the Court include the following:(a)the Court Book (“CB”) filed by the Minister’s solicitors on 21 June 2019, and marked as Exhibit 1 at hearing; (b)the affidavit of Susanne Gloria Jacobs affirmed 21 August 2023 (“Jacobs’ Affidavit”), verifying transcripts of Ms Dang’s hearings before the Tribunal on 24 October 2018 and 8 January 2019;(c)the affidavit of Michael Cai affirmed 24 August 2023 (“Cai Affidavit”), annexing documents produced by the Tribunal in response to a request made under s 362A;(d)Ms Dang’s submissions filed on 25 August 2023 (“Ms Dang’s Submissions”); (e)the Supplementary Court Book (“SCB”) filed by Ms Dang and accepted for filing on 29 August 2023 (“SCB”), and marked as Exhibit 2 at hearing;(f)the Minister’s submissions filed on 22 September 2023 (“Minister’s Submissions”);(g)the transcript of the hearing before the Court on 22 April 2024 (“Court Hearing Transcript”); (h)the Minister’s further submissions (relating to privacy principles and an independent expert’s opinion) filed 27 May 2024 (“Minister’s Further Submissions”); and(i)Ms Dang’s further submissions (relating to privacy principles and an independent expert’s opinion) filed 7 June 2024 (“Ms Dang’s Further Submissions”).BACKGROUND The background to the Amended Judicial Review Application is as follows:(a)Ms Dang is a female citizen of Vietnam born on 1 January 1960;(b)on 20 December 2011 Ms Dang simultaneously applied for a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) (subclass 309) visa (“Provisional Partner Visa”) and a Permanent Partner Visa (collectively “Partner Visas”), sponsored by her Australian citizen husband, Ba Van Nguyen (“Sponsor”): CB 12-35. Ms Dang’s three children from a previous relationship also applied for the Partner Visas as members of her family unit;(c)Ms Dang’s visa application states that she met the Sponsor in Vietnam in April 2009 and they began their spousal relationship on 7 October 2010: CB 24 and 36;(d)Ms Dang was granted the Provisional Partner Visa on 5 July 2012 and arrived in Australia on 9 November 2012: CB 197; Cai Affidavit, Annexure MC-1 at p 770;(e)on 28 December 2012 the Minister’s department (“Department”) received an undated letter from the Sponsor, advising that he had moved out of the marital home on 19 December 2012 and that he wished to withdraw his sponsorship of Ms Dang: CB 227;(f)on 8 January 2013 the Department notified Ms Dang of the Sponsor’s withdrawal of sponsorship and advised her as to her options: CB 229(g)in February 2013 Ms Dang emailed the Department claiming that she had suffered family violence and provided an interim intervention order (“Interim Intervention Order”) of the Magistrate’s Court of South Australia (“Magistrates Court”) dated 30 January 2013, requiring the Sponsor not to assault, threaten, harass or intimidate Ms Dang: CB 241, 245, 249 and 343; (h)on 8 April 2013 Ms Dang presented evidence in relation to the making of a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence” for the purposes of reg 1.23: CB 249;(i)on 8 November 2013 the Magistrate’s Court refused to make a permanent intervention order and revoked the Interim Intervention Order finding that Ms Dang had made false allegations against the Sponsor to enable her and her children to remain in Australia: CB 363-379 (“Magistrates Court Judgment”);(j)on 14 August 2014 the Department referred Ms Dang’s family violence claim to an independent expert appointed under reg 1.23: CB 380, and on 9 October 2014 the independent expert provided the Department with an opinion that Ms Dang had not suffered family violence: CB 298-309 (“Independent Expert” and “Independent Expert’s Opinion” respectively);(k)on 27 November 2014 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant Ms Dang a Permanent Partner Visa: CB 322-325;(l)on 9 December 2014 Ms Dang applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the Delegate’s Decision: CB 387-397;(m)on 18 November 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant Ms Dang a Permanent Partner Visa: CB 528-536 (“2015 Tribunal Decision”). The 2015 Tribunal Decision concluded that Ms Dang and the Sponsor had not been in a genuine spousal relationship and therefore did not satisfy Sch 2, cl 100.221(4)(b), and the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make findings on Ms Dang’s family violence claim;(n)Ms Dang applied unsuccessfully to this Court for judicial review of the 2015 Tribunal Decision: CB 547; see also Dang v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1299. On appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, the 2015 Tribunal Decision was set aside by consent and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration: CB 553. The Minister accepted that in making the 2015 Tribunal Decision the Tribunal had denied Ms Dang procedural fairness by failing to advise her of the existence of a notification under s 375A: CB 555; (o)on 10 August 2018 and 23 August 2018 the Department revoked the certificates and notifications previously issued under s 375A: CB 239 and 386;(p)on 16 August 2018 Ms Dang requested access to the material before the Tribunal under s 362A: CB 576 (“Section 362A Request”);(q)on 24 August 2018 the Tribunal responded to the Section 362A Request: CB 585. As part of its decision, some documents were partially redacted and some were redacted in full: CB 585-586. The redactions related to personal information relating to persons other than the applicants. The Tribunal reasoned that the documents contained personal information about another person and it was not satisfied that disclosure was permitted under Australian Privacy Principle 6 (“APP 6”) as set out in Sch 1 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (“Privacy Act”). Documents produced by the Tribunal in response to the Section 362A Request appear at Annexure MC-1 to the Cai Affidavit; (r)on 13 September 2018, and notwithstanding that it already had access to a copy of the Magistrates Court Judgment, the Tribunal requested, amongst other things, that Ms Dang provide a copy of the Magistrates Court Judgment to the Tribunal: CB 593. The Magistrates Court Judgment had been placed on the Department’s file and was the subject of a s 375A certificate dated 24 December 2014;(s)on 24 October 2018 the reconstituted Tribunal conducted a hearing in relation to Ms Dang’s review: CB 596;(t)on 1 November 2018 under s 359A the Tribunal invited Ms Dang to comment on and respond to the Magistrates Court Judgment and adverse information from the Sponsor and other persons: CB 685 (“Invitation to Comment”); (u)on 15 November 2018 Ms Dang provided a response to the Invitation to Comment: CB 691 (“Invitation to Comment Response”);(v)on 8 January 2019 the Tribunal conducted a further hearing: CB 701; and(w)on 7 March 2019 the Tribunal Decision again affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant Ms Dang a Permanent Partner Visa: CB 747 at [89]. The Tribunal noted: (i)at CB 736 at [14] that the s 375A certificates, the existence of which had not been disclosed by the previously constituted Tribunal, had subsequently been revoked by the Department; and (ii)at CB 737 at [20] that it had invited Ms Dang to comment on and respond to adverse information from the Magistrates Court Judgment and statutory declarations provided by the Sponsor and others.TRIBUNAL DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The background to the Amended Judicial Review Application is as follows:(a)Ms Dang is a female citizen of Vietnam born on 1 January 1960;(b)on 20 December 2011 Ms Dang simultaneously applied for a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) (subclass 309) visa (“Provisional Partner Visa”) and a Permanent Partner Visa (collectively “Partner Visas”), sponsored by her Australian citizen husband, Ba Van Nguyen (“Sponsor”): CB 12-35. Ms Dang’s three children from a previous relationship also applied for the Partner Visas as members of her family unit;(c)Ms Dang’s visa application states that she met the Sponsor in Vietnam in April 2009 and they began their spousal relationship on 7 October 2010: CB 24 and 36;(d)Ms Dang was granted the Provisional Partner Visa on 5 July 2012 and arrived in Australia on 9 November 2012: CB 197; Cai Affidavit, Annexure MC-1 at p 770;(e)on 28 December 2012 the Minister’s department (“Department”) received an undated letter from the Sponsor, advising that he had moved out of the marital home on 19 December 2012 and that he wished to withdraw his sponsorship of Ms Dang: CB 227;(f)on 8 January 2013 the Department notified Ms Dang of the Sponsor’s withdrawal of sponsorship and advised her as to her options: CB 229(g)in February 2013 Ms Dang emailed the Department claiming that she had suffered family violence and provided an interim intervention order (“Interim Intervention Order”) of the Magistrate’s Court of South Australia (“Magistrates Court”) dated 30 January 2013, requiring the Sponsor not to assault, threaten, harass or intimidate Ms Dang: CB 241, 245, 249 and 343; (h)on 8 April 2013 Ms Dang presented evidence in relation to the making of a “non-judicially determined claim of family violence” for the purposes of reg 1.23: CB 249;(i)on 8 November 2013 the Magistrate’s Court refused to make a permanent intervention order and revoked the Interim Intervention Order finding that Ms Dang had made false allegations against the Sponsor to enable her and her children to remain in Australia: CB 363-379 (“Magistrates Court Judgment”);(j)on 14 August 2014 the Department referred Ms Dang’s family violence claim to an independent expert appointed under reg 1.23: CB 380, and on 9 October 2014 the independent expert provided the Department with an opinion that Ms Dang had not suffered family violence: CB 298-309 (“Independent Expert” and “Independent Expert’s Opinion” respectively);(k)on 27 November 2014 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse to grant Ms Dang a Permanent Partner Visa: CB 322-325;(l)on 9 December 2014 Ms Dang applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the Delegate’s Decision: CB 387-397;(m)on 18 November 2015 the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant Ms Dang a Permanent Partner Visa: CB 528-536 (“2015 Tribunal Decision”). The 2015 Tribunal Decision concluded that Ms Dang and the Sponsor had not been in a genuine spousal relationship and therefore did not satisfy Sch 2, cl 100.221(4)(b), and the Tribunal did not find it necessary to make findings on Ms Dang’s family violence claim;(n)Ms Dang applied unsuccessfully to this Court for judicial review of the 2015 Tribunal Decision: CB 547; see also Dang v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1299. On appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, the 2015 Tribunal Decision was set aside by consent and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration: CB 553. The Minister accepted that in making the 2015 Tribunal Decision the Tribunal had denied Ms Dang procedural fairness by failing to advise her of the existence of a notification under s 375A: CB 555; (o)on 10 August 2018 and 23 August 2018 the Department revoked the certificates and notifications previously issued under s 375A: CB 239 and 386;(p)on 16 August 2018 Ms Dang requested access to the material before the Tribunal under s 362A: CB 576 (“Section 362A Request”);(q)on 24 August 2018 the Tribunal responded to the Section 362A Request: CB 585. As part of its decision, some documents were partially redacted and some were redacted in full: CB 585-586. The redactions related to personal information relating to persons other than the applicants. The Tribunal reasoned that the documents contained personal information about another person and it was not satisfied that disclosure was permitted under Australian Privacy Principle 6 (“APP 6”) as set out in Sch 1 to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (“Privacy Act”). Documents produced by the Tribunal in response to the Section 362A Request appear at Annexure MC-1 to the Cai Affidavit; (r)on 13 September 2018, and notwithstanding that it already had access to a copy of the Magistrates Court Judgment, the Tribunal requested, amongst other things, that Ms Dang provide a copy of the Magistrates Court Judgment to the Tribunal: CB 593. The Magistrates Court Judgment had been placed on the Department’s file and was the subject of a s 375A certificate dated 24 December 2014;(s)on 24 October 2018 the reconstituted Tribunal conducted a hearing in relation to Ms Dang’s review: CB 596;(t)on 1 November 2018 under s 359A the Tribunal invited Ms Dang to comment on and respond to the Magistrates Court Judgment and adverse information from the Sponsor and other persons: CB 685 (“Invitation to Comment”); (u)on 15 November 2018 Ms Dang provided a response to the Invitation to Comment: CB 691 (“Invitation to Comment Response”);(v)on 8 January 2019 the Tribunal conducted a further hearing: CB 701; and(w)on 7 March 2019 the Tribunal Decision again affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant Ms Dang a Permanent Partner Visa: CB 747 at [89]. The Tribunal noted: (i)at CB 736 at [14] that the s 375A certificates, the existence of which had not been disclosed by the previously constituted Tribunal, had subsequently been revoked by the Department; and (ii)at CB 737 at [20] that it had invited Ms Dang to comment on and respond to adverse information from the Magistrates Court Judgment and statutory declarations provided by the Sponsor and others.TRIBUNAL DECISION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Amended Judicial Review Application accepted for filing on 28 August 2023 has three grounds set out below at [11] (ground 1), [38] (ground 2), and [50] (ground 3):CONSIDERATION Ground 1 Ground 1 is as follows:1.The second respondent (Tribunal) materially failed to comply with section 362A of the Migration Act 1958.ParticularsCourt Book at page 585Ms Dang’s submissions In relation to ground 1, and having referred to s 362A and the judgments in Carlos v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301; (2001) 183 ALR 719 (“Carlos”) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Dhillon [2014] FCAFC 157; (2014) 227 FCR 525 (“Dhillon”), Ms Dang submitted as follows:(a)Ms Dang requested access to written material before the Tribunal on 16 August 2018 and the Tribunal provided only partial access to the material before it on 24 August 2018. The documents produced by the Tribunal on 24 August 2018 are reproduced in full in the Cai Affidavit at Annexure MC-1. Like the Migration Review Tribunal (“MR Tribunal”) in Dhillon the Tribunal here proceeded on the erroneous basis that material containing personal information about another person was exempt from disclosure due to APP 6. And, though some of the documents redacted or withheld by the Tribunal had been the subject of the certificates and notifications under s 375A, both certificates under s 375A had been revoked prior to the Tribunal providing the Section 362A Response on 24 August 2018; (b)some of the documents provided to Ms Dang in redacted form on 24 August 2018 have been included in the CB in unredacted form. They include adverse statements from named third parties which were disclosed to Ms Dang with addresses and other personal identifiers redacted: CB 346-361; Cai Affidavit at Annexure MC-1 at pp 599-614 (Department file CLF2014/143138 at folios 10-25). In her Invitation to Comment Response Ms Dang said that she was not familiar with the names of all but one of these witnesses and was therefore unable to specifically recall meeting them or the occasions they said they came to her home: CB 697 at [6]. In Ms Dang’s submission, as a matter of “reasonable conjecture”, it is possible that Ms Dang would have been able to identify and recall these witnesses, and therefore provide a meaningful response to the allegations contained in the statements if she knew the street or suburb, or had the benefit of other personal identifiers redacted by the Tribunal;(c)a document which was not provided to Ms Dang on 24 August 2018 was the Sponsor’s movement details report (“Sponsor’s Movement Details Report”). Dated 2 July 2015 the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report records detail of the Sponsor’s arrivals in and departures from Australia, amongst other things. The Tribunal’s failure to disclose the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report was material because it contained adverse information that the Tribunal may have taken into account and supporting evidence to which the Tribunal may not have had regard. For instance, Ms Dang claimed she married the Sponsor on 7 October 2010 whereas the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report states the Sponsor flew out of Australia that day and the Tribunal proceeded on the basis of a marriage registration date of 24 May 2011: CB 746 at [78]. The Sponsor’s Movement Details Report also contradicts the Tribunal’s finding at CB 746 at [84], based on the dates the Sponsor was registered as living with Ms Dang in Vietnam CB 743 at [57]-[58], that Ms Dang and the Sponsor had only lived together in Vietnam for a year; and(d)in further submissions in relation to APP 6 Ms Dang submitted as follows: (i)in the Australian Privacy Principles guidelines (“APP Guidelines”), the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (“OAIC”) explains “primary purpose” under APP 6 in the following terms:B.101The purpose for which an APP entity collects personal information is known as the ‘primary purpose’ of collection. This is the specific function or activity for which the entity collects the personal information. If an APP entity uses or discloses the personal information for another purpose this is known as a ‘secondary purpose’ …B.102Where an APP entity collects personal information directly from an individual, the context will help in identifying the primary purpose of collection. For example, the individual may provide the personal information for a particular purpose, such as buying a particular product or receiving a particular service. This is the primary purpose of collection, even if the entity has additional secondary purposes in mind.B.103Where an APP entity receives unsolicited personal information or collects personal information about an individual from a third party, the context will again be relevant in identifying the primary purpose of collection. It will also be relevant to consider the function or activity which the personal information is reasonably necessary for, or to which it directly relates. …(ii)and in relation to how the primary purpose is to be described, the OAIC says:B.104How broadly a purpose can be described will depend on the circumstances and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In cases of ambiguity, and with a view to protecting individual privacy, the primary purpose for collection, use or disclosure should be construed narrowly rather than expansively.B.105The primary purpose may nevertheless be described in general terms, as long as the description is adequate to inform an individual of how the APP entity may use or disclose their personal information. A description – the information will be used ‘for the functions of the entity’ – would generally be considered too broad. Instead, the primary purpose of collection could be described as to:·provide a particular banking service·market particular goods or services , or types of goods or services, to the individual·assess an applicant’s suitability for a job·assess an applicant’s eligibility for a loan·resolve a complaint·provide further information about a particular service·enable an agency to give someone a particular benefit or service.(iii)an example of how these principles apply in the context of personal information collected by the Minister can be found in 'OJ' and Department of Home Affairs (Privacy) [2018] AICmr 35 at [31] where the Information Commissioner characterised information regarding the complainant’s immigration status as having been collected for the primary purpose of “administration of immigration laws” and found at [36] that the disclosure of that information to a television show was not consistent with that primary purpose and therefore for a secondary purpose;(iv)in relation to the adverse witness statements, Ms Dang submitted at hearing that the redacted personal information had been provided to the Department for the primary purpose of assessing Ms Dang’s Partner Visas applications and that this was the same purpose for which disclosure was sought from the Tribunal. Disclosure of material was sought by Ms Dang under s 362A so that she could comment on and respond to adverse information as part of the process of assessing Ms Dang’s Partner Visa applications. It was also submitted, in the alternative, that even if the use of the personal information by the Tribunal was for another purpose, the relevant individuals would have implicitly consented to such use (APP6 at [6.1(a)]). The witnesses who had provided statements to the Department could only have expected that their information could be used in the appeal process. In Ms Dang’s submission this characterisation of the primary purpose is consistent with the APP Guidelines set out at [12(d)(i)] above;(v)the Minister submits that the personal information in the adverse statements was collected for the purpose of “the delegate … assess[ing] the applicants’ applications for visas” and then provided to the Tribunal for the purposes of “it conducting a review of the delegate’s decision under Part 5 of the Act”. However such a characterisation is too narrow and asks the Court to focus on each person undertaking each step in fulfilling the function of assessing visa applications, rather than focusing on the function itself. If the Minister’s characterisation of “primary purpose” were to be adopted, it would mean that the Department is required under APP 5 to notify the relevant individual of everyone who would use the information at every step in the visa application process. Further, in relation to each person taking a step in the process, the Department would have to implement procedures to ensure the accuracy and relevance of the information under APP 10 and APP 13;(vi)in relation to the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report, this again was information collected by the Tribunal for the purpose of assessing Ms Dang’s Partner Visas applications and it was for this same purpose that disclosure was sought by Ms Dang under s 362A. The information was sought so that Ms Dang could make comments or submissions for consideration by the Tribunal in assessing the Permanent Partner Visa application;(vii)contrary to the Minister’s submissions the Tribunal had “collected” the information for the purposes of APP 6 because it collected the personal information “for inclusion in a record …”, namely the Tribunal file: Privacy Act, s 6(1) definitions of “collects” and “record”), and APP Guidelines at [B.29]; and(viii)further even if, as the Minister submits, the adverse witness statements and the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report were sought for the purpose of “mak[ing] submissions to the Tribunal on the application for review”, this was a secondary purpose which was “reasonably expected” and “related to the primary purpose” for which they were collected: APP 6 at [6.2](a)(ii).(e)it is not necessary for Ms Dang to adduce evidence as to what she would have said had the Tribunal provided full disclosure of the material before it: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80; (2022) 96 ALJR 737; (2022) 403 ALR 398; (2022) 178 ALD 536 (“Nathanson”) at [39] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ. It is sufficient that Ms Dang can, as an “undemanding” matter of “reasonable conjecture”, say that she was denied the possibility of a favourable outcome. It is enough that Ms Dang was denied the opportunity to make submissions based on the evidence full access to which was not given: Nathanson at [11] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ.Minister’s submissions