FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Dang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1101
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Dang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultur... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1101
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the Tribunal had materially failed to comply with s 362A of the Migration Act. The Court found that the Tribunal had proceeded on the basis that material containing personal information about another person was exempt from disclosure due to Australian Privacy Principle 6. The Court found that the Tribunal’s approach was erroneous. The Court found that the Tribunal’s failure to disclose the Sponsor’s movement details report was material because it contained adverse information that the Tribunal may have taken into account and supporting evidence to which the Tribunal may not have had regard. The Court found that the Tribunal had not misconstrued or misapplied the family violence exception to Partner visa criteria. The Court found that the Tribunal had not been required to go behind the findings of the Magistrate’s Court concerning Dang’s family violence claim. The Court found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Court issued writs of mandamus requiring the Minister to set aside the Tribunal’s decision and to make a decision on Dang’s application for a Permanent Partner Visa, having regard to the full evidence before the Tribunal.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Amended Judicial Review Application accepted for filing on 28 August 2023 has three grounds set out below at [11] (ground 1), [38] (ground 2), and [50] (ground 3):CONSIDERATION Ground 1 Ground 1 is as follows:1.The second respondent (Tribunal) materially failed to comply with section 362A of the Migration Act 1958.ParticularsCourt Book at page 585Ms Dang’s submissions In relation to ground 1, and having referred to s 362A and the judgments in Carlos v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301; (2001) 183 ALR 719 (“Carlos”) and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Dhillon [2014] FCAFC 157; (2014) 227 FCR 525 (“Dhillon”), Ms Dang submitted as follows:(a)Ms Dang requested access to written material before the Tribunal on 16 August 2018 and the Tribunal provided only partial access to the material before it on 24 August 2018. The documents produced by the Tribunal on 24 August 2018 are reproduced in full in the Cai Affidavit at Annexure MC-1. Like the Migration Review Tribunal (“MR Tribunal”) in Dhillon the Tribunal here proceeded on the erroneous basis that material containing personal information about another person was exempt from disclosure due to APP 6. And, though some of the documents redacted or withheld by the Tribunal had been the subject of the certificates and notifications under s 375A, both certificates under s 375A had been revoked prior to the Tribunal providing the Section 362A Response on 24 August 2018; (b)some of the documents provided to Ms Dang in redacted form on 24 August 2018 have been included in the CB in unredacted form. They include adverse statements from named third parties which were disclosed to Ms Dang with addresses and other personal identifiers redacted: CB 346-361; Cai Affidavit at Annexure MC-1 at pp 599-614 (Department file CLF2014/143138 at folios 10-25). In her Invitation to Comment Response Ms Dang said that she was not familiar with the names of all but one of these witnesses and was therefore unable to specifically recall meeting them or the occasions they said they came to her home: CB 697 at [6]. In Ms Dang’s submission, as a matter of “reasonable conjecture”, it is possible that Ms Dang would have been able to identify and recall these witnesses, and therefore provide a meaningful response to the allegations contained in the statements if she knew the street or suburb, or had the benefit of other personal identifiers redacted by the Tribunal;(c)a document which was not provided to Ms Dang on 24 August 2018 was the Sponsor’s movement details report (“Sponsor’s Movement Details Report”). Dated 2 July 2015 the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report records detail of the Sponsor’s arrivals in and departures from Australia, amongst other things. The Tribunal’s failure to disclose the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report was material because it contained adverse information that the Tribunal may have taken into account and supporting evidence to which the Tribunal may not have had regard. For instance, Ms Dang claimed she married the Sponsor on 7 October 2010 whereas the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report states the Sponsor flew out of Australia that day and the Tribunal proceeded on the basis of a marriage registration date of 24 May 2011: CB 746 at [78]. The Sponsor’s Movement Details Report also contradicts the Tribunal’s finding at CB 746 at [84], based on the dates the Sponsor was registered as living with Ms Dang in Vietnam CB 743 at [57]-[58], that Ms Dang and the Sponsor had only lived together in Vietnam for a year; and(d)in further submissions in relation to APP 6 Ms Dang submitted as follows: (i)in the Australian Privacy Principles guidelines (“APP Guidelines”), the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (“OAIC”) explains “primary purpose” under APP 6 in the following terms:B.101The purpose for which an APP entity collects personal information is known as the ‘primary purpose’ of collection. This is the specific function or activity for which the entity collects the personal information. If an APP entity uses or discloses the personal information for another purpose this is known as a ‘secondary purpose’ …B.102Where an APP entity collects personal information directly from an individual, the context will help in identifying the primary purpose of collection. For example, the individual may provide the personal information for a particular purpose, such as buying a particular product or receiving a particular service. This is the primary purpose of collection, even if the entity has additional secondary purposes in mind.B.103Where an APP entity receives unsolicited personal information or collects personal information about an individual from a third party, the context will again be relevant in identifying the primary purpose of collection. It will also be relevant to consider the function or activity which the personal information is reasonably necessary for, or to which it directly relates. …(ii)and in relation to how the primary purpose is to be described, the OAIC says:B.104How broadly a purpose can be described will depend on the circumstances and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In cases of ambiguity, and with a view to protecting individual privacy, the primary purpose for collection, use or disclosure should be construed narrowly rather than expansively.B.105The primary purpose may nevertheless be described in general terms, as long as the description is adequate to inform an individual of how the APP entity may use or disclose their personal information. A description – the information will be used ‘for the functions of the entity’ – would generally be considered too broad. Instead, the primary purpose of collection could be described as to:·provide a particular banking service·market particular goods or services , or types of goods or services, to the individual·assess an applicant’s suitability for a job·assess an applicant’s eligibility for a loan·resolve a complaint·provide further information about a particular service·enable an agency to give someone a particular benefit or service.(iii)an example of how these principles apply in the context of personal information collected by the Minister can be found in 'OJ' and Department of Home Affairs (Privacy) [2018] AICmr 35 at [31] where the Information Commissioner characterised information regarding the complainant’s immigration status as having been collected for the primary purpose of “administration of immigration laws” and found at [36] that the disclosure of that information to a television show was not consistent with that primary purpose and therefore for a secondary purpose;(iv)in relation to the adverse witness statements, Ms Dang submitted at hearing that the redacted personal information had been provided to the Department for the primary purpose of assessing Ms Dang’s Partner Visas applications and that this was the same purpose for which disclosure was sought from the Tribunal. Disclosure of material was sought by Ms Dang under s 362A so that she could comment on and respond to adverse information as part of the process of assessing Ms Dang’s Partner Visa applications. It was also submitted, in the alternative, that even if the use of the personal information by the Tribunal was for another purpose, the relevant individuals would have implicitly consented to such use (APP6 at [6.1(a)]). The witnesses who had provided statements to the Department could only have expected that their information could be used in the appeal process. In Ms Dang’s submission this characterisation of the primary purpose is consistent with the APP Guidelines set out at [12(d)(i)] above;(v)the Minister submits that the personal information in the adverse statements was collected for the purpose of “the delegate … assess[ing] the applicants’ applications for visas” and then provided to the Tribunal for the purposes of “it conducting a review of the delegate’s decision under Part 5 of the Act”. However such a characterisation is too narrow and asks the Court to focus on each person undertaking each step in fulfilling the function of assessing visa applications, rather than focusing on the function itself. If the Minister’s characterisation of “primary purpose” were to be adopted, it would mean that the Department is required under APP 5 to notify the relevant individual of everyone who would use the information at every step in the visa application process. Further, in relation to each person taking a step in the process, the Department would have to implement procedures to ensure the accuracy and relevance of the information under APP 10 and APP 13;(vi)in relation to the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report, this again was information collected by the Tribunal for the purpose of assessing Ms Dang’s Partner Visas applications and it was for this same purpose that disclosure was sought by Ms Dang under s 362A. The information was sought so that Ms Dang could make comments or submissions for consideration by the Tribunal in assessing the Permanent Partner Visa application;(vii)contrary to the Minister’s submissions the Tribunal had “collected” the information for the purposes of APP 6 because it collected the personal information “for inclusion in a record …”, namely the Tribunal file: Privacy Act, s 6(1) definitions of “collects” and “record”), and APP Guidelines at [B.29]; and(viii)further even if, as the Minister submits, the adverse witness statements and the Sponsor’s Movement Details Report were sought for the purpose of “mak[ing] submissions to the Tribunal on the application for review”, this was a secondary purpose which was “reasonably expected” and “related to the primary purpose” for which they were collected: APP 6 at [6.2](a)(ii).(e)it is not necessary for Ms Dang to adduce evidence as to what she would have said had the Tribunal provided full disclosure of the material before it: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80; (2022) 96 ALJR 737; (2022) 403 ALR 398; (2022) 178 ALD 536 (“Nathanson”) at [39] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ. It is sufficient that Ms Dang can, as an “undemanding” matter of “reasonable conjecture”, say that she was denied the possibility of a favourable outcome. It is enough that Ms Dang was denied the opportunity to make submissions based on the evidence full access to which was not given: Nathanson at [11] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ.Minister’s submissions