Daneen Mitchell v The Trustee for the Lowood Jones Unit Trust
[2025] FWC 649
•12 MARCH 2025
| [2025] FWC 649 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections
Daneen Mitchell
v
The Trustee for The Lowood Jones Unit Trust
(C2024/8854)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAKE | BRISBANE, 12 MARCH 2025 |
Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal – jurisdictional objection – out of time and no dismissal – forced resignation – application not out of time – jurisdictional objection of no dismissal upheld – application dismissed.
Ms Daneen Mitchell (the Applicant) lodged a general protections application involving dismissal with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) on 5 December 2024. The Applicant claims that adverse action was taken against her by the Trustee for The Lowood Jones Unit Trust (the Respondent) under s.352 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act).
The Respondent raised two jurisdictional objections. Firstly, that the Application was made out of time, and secondly that the Applicant was not dismissed under s.386 of the Act as the Applicant resigned from her employment. The Applicant contests the second objection on the basis that she was constructively dismissed and forced to resign under s.386(1)(b) of the Act.
I conducted a determinative conference on 4 March 2025. Both parties were self-represented. Mr Jason Butcher, Venue Manager, appeared for the Respondent.
Was the Application out of time?
The jurisdictional objection that the application was out of time will be dealt with first.
Section 366 of the Act provides:
366 Time for application
(1) An application under section 365 must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).
(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d) the merits of the application; and
(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.
There is some confusion between the parties about when the Applicant resigned. Therefore, it is necessary for me to make a finding of fact as to the effective date of the Applicant’s resignation.
On the Applicant’s Form F8, she stated that the date of her dismissal was 6 November 2024.[1] If the Applicant’s dismissal was effective from 6 November 2024, then her application would be 8 days out of time.
In the Applicant’s submissions, she states that she resigned by letter on 15 November 2024.[2]
Mr Butcher claimed during the determinative conference that he was informed of the Applicant’s resignation on the evening of 12 November 2024. However, this date is not reflected in the Respondent’s written materials. The Respondent notes that the Applicant provided a resignation letter on 15 November 2024. This letter was included in the Respondent’s evidence.[3] In the letter, the Applicant states that her resignation is effective from 14 November 2024.[4]
During the determinative conference, I asked why the Applicant said the date of her dismissal was 6 November 2024 on her Form F8, noting she elsewhere said she resigned effective from 14 November 2024. The Applicant stated that she was confused by this question on the form and believed it to be asking what the last day was that the Applicant attended a shift with the Respondent.
I accept that the Applicant made an error on this form, noting that she is unused to the Commission’s processes.
On the evidence before me, I find that the Applicant’s resignation was effective from 14 November 2024. The Application was made on 5 December 2024. Therefore, the Application was made within the 21-day timeframe for dismissal-related applications. Accordingly, the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection that the application was made out of time is dismissed.
Was the Applicant dismissed?
Background
The Applicant commenced employment with the Respondent on 26 February 2024 as a duty manager at the Respondent’s venue, Hotel Lowood.[5]
The Applicant claims she was the subject of a targeted bullying campaign by other staff of the Respondent between approximately March 2024 and November 2024 to “get me out… purely because my work values did not match theirs.”[6]
Mr Butcher commenced as Venue Manager in April 2024.[7]
Between July 2024 and August 2024, the Respondent states that the Applicant was given two written warnings relating to the Applicant’s performance and one first written warning for breach of the Respondent’s policy.[8] The Applicant states that were five meetings which the Applicant had with Mr Butcher regarding performance concerns and breach of policy in this period.[9] The Applicant contends that the warnings were all based on fabrications.[10] In a text message which the Applicant included in her evidence, Mr Butcher told the Applicant that he could not provide her with a copy of the complaint made against her, as it is private.[11]
The Applicant states that she made complaints to the previous Venue Manager in March 2024, prior Mr Butcher starting regarding being allegedly belittled by an employee who no longer works for the Respondent.[12]
The Applicant states that there was a “clique” between staff members which the Applicant was not a part of and that the other Duty Manager, Mr Reece Dearden, told her multiple times “Nobody wants to work with you. Everybody hates you, nobody likes you”.[13] The Applicant says other staff members made “smart remarks” to her.[14] Mr Dearden also allegedly left a post it note on the Applicant’s phone cover saying, “Dee loves big juicy hairy penis bushier than the amazon rainforest. xo. Don’t leave your phone around me.”[15]
Mr Butcher claims that he has a “book” of complaints about the Applicant made by customers and staff. The Applicant states that she has months’ worth of footage which she covertly recorded during her shifts between July 2024 and October 2024.[16] The Applicant states that she offered for Mr Butcher to watch the footage. Mr Butcher declined to watch the footage because he “did not want to take sides”.[17]
The Applicant submissions involve complaints regarding being belittled and berated by other staff members, especially Mr Dearden, and a lack of support from Mr Butcher. The Applicant states that she informally complained to Mr Butcher saying that staff do not respect her role as a manager and “if I don’t speak to them I’m an a**hole, and if I do speak to them, apparently I’m being rude…”[18] Mr Butcher allegedly replied, “Here, take a fucken ticket”, implying that staff do not like him either.[19]
The Applicant’s son also works for the Respondent. Mr Butcher allegedly accused the Applicant or her son of playing Keno while working a shift, based on a note found with the Applicant’s son handwriting.[20] It appears the Respondent took no further action after this regarding the Keno money.
The Applicant describes an incident in detail on 18 September 2024 which requires further consideration.
Chocolate milk incident
The Applicant has apparently, on a couple of occasions, made homemade chocolate milk while working a shift.[21] This is made by mixing chocolate syrup into a two-litre bottle of milk.
The first time the Applicant made her chocolate milk she noticed that it “smelt weird”.[22] On 18 September 2024, the Applicant made the chocolate milk again. She again said it smelt weird.[23] She drank half a glass anyway. The Applicant’s colleague tasted the syrup bottle and said it tasted like barbecue sauce.[24] It is unclear to me why the Applicant drank the milk if it “smelt weird”.
The Applicant was ill over the following four days. She immediately reached the conclusion that her colleagues had “drink spiked” her by putting barbecue sauce in the chocolate syrup, and possibly laxatives.[25] The Applicant made a police report following the incident, stating that “deliberately tampering with someone’s food or drink is illegal”.[26] The police seized a sample of the chocolate syrup.[27]
No evidence has been put before me of the outcome of the police report. According to the Respondent, the police asked Mr Butcher to put the CCTV footage on a USB, but the police have not yet collected the footage from him.[28] It seems that no charges have been made against the Applicant’s coworkers.
There is no evidence before me of what was in the chocolate syrup, and whether the police even tested the sample they collected. In my view, if the syrup merely had barbecue sauce added to it, then it would be somewhat mischaracterising the situation to call the incident “drink spiking”. If laxatives were added, as the Applicant contends, that would be a more serious incident.
The conclusion that the Applicant’s drink was tampered with is based on the Applicant’s assertion that her colleague said the syrup tasted like barbecue sauce, and based on the fact that the Applicant felt ill immediately afterwards. The Applicant provided a picture of the drink in question, showing that the milk was not past its expiry date. The Applicant claims that the day after the incident, another staff member yelled at her “chocolate chocolate chocolate”.[29]
Mr Butcher states that he conducted an investigation into the incident and found no evidence that the chocolate syrup was tampered with.
It is relevant to make reference to the Briginshaw principles regarding the assessment of fact on the balance of probabilities. As Dixon J said:
“The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty required by the law for various purposes. Fortunately, however, at common law no third standard of persuasion was definitely developed. Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences[30]
(emphasis added)
Although some people may view the incident as a prank, putting laxatives in the Applicant’s drink with the intention of making her ill is a serious matter. Intentionally doing this should, in my view, have serious consequences for an employee’s employment.
I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, based on the Applicant’s evidence, that she was in fact “drink spiked” with laxatives. The Applicant’s evidence in relation to the incident is based on assumptions. Additionally, the Applicant has provided no evidence to explain that the incident was targeted at her, or that the employer incited the incident. That said, I leave open the possibility that the Applicant’s colleagues put barbecue sauce in the chocolate syrup, but this does not amount to drink spiking.
The Applicant has concerns with the Respondent’s investigation into the milk incident. Mr Butcher provided “footnotes” saying what steps he took during the investigation:
Checked all cameras (on the right-hand monitor) in the area leading up to 10:00pm and up to 2 weeks prior to the incident.
oCamera 2
oCamera 5
oCamera 9
oCamera 13
Checked all chocolate syrup containers in the premises to determine whether they had been tampered with
Spoke to staff members working on that day to determine whether they had tampered with the object in question.
Spoke to customers who were in the hotel at that time
Spoke to the kitchen staff to see if anything had been tampered with[31]
Although these notes are brief, the Respondent appears to have taken appropriate steps.
The Applicant states that Mr Butcher asked Mr Dearden to review the footage. Mr Dearden is one of the Applicant’s colleagues who was named in the Applicant’s police report, as she suspected he was involved in the “drink spiking”.[32] The Applicant says it is inappropriate for Mr Dearden to have been involved in the investigation if he is one of the people she accused of drink spiking her.
I agree that it was inappropriate for Mr Dearden to be involved in reviewing the footage.
The Applicant then accused the Respondent of erasing CCTV footage that could have revealed who tampered with the syrup. The Applicant requested that four weeks of footage be reviewed. Mr Butcher only reviewed two weeks of footage.[33] He argued that, under s 142AH of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), “it is a requirement to erase or destroy a recording that does not show an incident 28 days after the recording is made.”[34] The incident was recorded on 18 September 2024, but the Applicant alleges that the syrup could have been tampered with a up to a month before the incident. I am not satisfied that the Respondent deleted CCTV footage with the intention of deleting evidence in a criminal investigation. The Briginshaw principle would also be applicable to this serious allegation and the Applicant’s assertions simply do not prove on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent intentionally destroyed evidence.
The Applicant claims that following the milk incident, she was brushed off and ignored by Mr Butcher.
Stress Leave
Following the milk incident, the Applicant visited her doctor, citing concerns about her mental health because of workplace bullying and harassment.[35]
The Applicant’s doctor provided her with a medical certificate from 21 October 2024 to 25 October 2024 inclusive. The Applicant returned to her doctor and was given another medical certificate covering the period from 25 October 2024 to 6 November 2024. Both medical certificates were provided to Mr Butcher and Mr Butcher was informed that it was “stress leave”.[36]
The Applicant claims that other staff members were told that the Applicant was on stress leave, in breach of her confidentiality. The Applicant claims to have heard this from “a former staff member who, was told by a current staff member”, as well as her son.[37] None of those people were called to give evidence. This assertion is disputed by the Respondent, and for reasons stated below, I have doubts about the Applicant’s credibility as a witness.
After 6 November 2024, the Applicant checked the rosters and saw that she had not been rostered for the next month. On 15 November 2024, the Applicant emailed her resignation letter to Mr Butcher.
The Respondent state that the reason he did not roster the Applicant is because he wanted a return to work certificate. However, he never contacted the Applicant to ask her for one.
The Applicant claims that she was on a fixed term contract, expiring in December 2024. She claims that the Respondent wanted to get rid of her before the renewal of her contract. This claim is not made out on the evidence, but in any case, I do not see how it supports the Applicant’s argument. If the Applicant’s contract was to end in a matter of weeks, it was open for her to simply wait for the contract to expire instead of resigning.
Applicable Law
Section 386(1) of the Act relevantly provides that a person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.[38]
The Applicant’s contention is that she was dismissed within the meaning of s.386(1)(b) of the Act as she felt she had no choice but to resign.
The Full Bench in Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli outlined the relevant authorities with respect to what it means for an employee to be terminated at the initiative of the employer.[39] In short, it is not sufficient to simply demonstrate that the employee did not voluntarily leave their employment.[40]
While it may be that some action on the part of the employer is intended to bring the employment to an end, it is not necessary to show the employer held that intention.[41] It is sufficient that the employer’s conduct, would, on any reasonable view, be likely to bring the employment relationship to an end.[42]
All the circumstances – including the conduct of both the employer and employee – must be examined.[43] In other words, it must be shown that “the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment and the employment relationship is not voluntarily left by the employee. That is, had the employer not taken the action it did, the employee would have remained in the employment relationship.”[44]
The Full Bench of this Commission in ABB Engineering Construction Pty Limited v Doumit (ABB) said, in relation to determining whether the ending of an employment relationship is a voluntary or forced resignation:
“Often it will only be a narrow line that distinguishes conduct that leaves an employee no real choice but to resign employment, from conduct that cannot be held to cause a resultant resignation to be a termination at the initiative of the employer. But narrow though it be, it is important that that line be closely drawn and rigorously observed. Otherwise, the remedy against unfair termination of employment at the initiative of the employer may be too readily invoked in circumstances where it is the discretion of a resigning employee, rather than that of the employer, that gives rise to the termination.
The remedies provided in the Act are directed to the provision of remedies against unlawful termination of employment. Where it is the immediate action of the employee that causes the employment relationship to cease, it is necessary to ensure that the employer’s conduct, said to have been the principal contributing factor in the resultant termination of employment, is weighed objectively.
The employer’s conduct may be shown to be a sufficiently operative factor in the resignation for it to be tantamount to a reason for dismissal. In such circumstances, a resignation may fairly readily be conceived to be a termination at the initiative of the employer. The validity of any associated reason for the termination by resignation is tested. Where the conduct of the employer is ambiguous, and the bearing it has on the decision to resign is based largely on the perceptions and subjective response of the employee made unilaterally, considerable caution should be exercised in treating the resignation as other than voluntary.”[45]
Furthermore, in Pawel v Australian Industrial Relations Commission,[46] the Full Bench noted:
“Mere “causation” or “motivation” will not satisfy the requirement that the termination be at the initiative of the employer.”
Forced resignation has been interpreted by the Commission in the following ways:
the actual conduct of the employer forced to do so, such that there was an element of compulsion present;[47]
a ‘critical action’ or ‘critical actions’ of the employer which was intended to bring the employment relationship to an end;[48]
as a result of some action on the part of the employer intended to bring the employment to an end and perhaps action which would, on any reasonable view, probably have that effect;[49] and
the employer’s conduct (when it is not evidenced was intended to bring about the resignation directly) must be conduct that is in some way or in some manner oppressive or repugnant in the ordinary course, and/or else so impacted on the volition of the employee such that the resignation was a reasonable response to that conduct in all the circumstances.[50]
Conclusion
Constructive dismissal involves a high bar. Simply put, it would not be enough, by itself, to prove that there is a toxic workplace. There must be action by the employer, that, when viewed objectively, left the Applicant with no choice but to resign.
It is clear that there is conflict between the Applicant and her former colleagues. The cause of that conflict is hard for me to determine, as none of these colleagues were called to give evidence. The Applicant has provided no insight into the reasons for the conflict, saying that she has never treated staff or customers inappropriately.[51] Some of the concerns appear to be around the Applicant’s colleagues not respecting her role as a manager, rather than bullying behaviours. That said, the Applicant’s colleagues seem to have engaged in unprofessional and inappropriate behaviour. Although in some instances, they may have thought they were joking around, clearly the Applicant did not find it funny.
However, I am not satisfied that the situation was such that the Respondent engaged in a course of conduct by creating or facilitating a toxic work environment which forced the Applicant to resign. The Respondent’s complaint and investigation processes are not sophisticated, but I can see no evidence that the Respondent deliberately ignored the Applicant’s concerns.
The Applicant states:
I felt like that whenever I had tried to raise any of my concerns with Jason, that he did not actually care about my health and wellbeing – there as NO duty of care, and I felt like I was instead being brushed off. I also felt like even though I had made Jason aware of me recording my shifts, that I was still being branded as a bully in the workplace – even though I can one thousand percent prove that this is in fact a head hunting mission by staff members, and I was and still am, a victim of their bullying tactics to “get me out” of Hotel Lowood, purely because my work values did not match theirs.[52]
On the evidence before me, the Applicant never made a formal complaint under the grievance policy to Mr Butcher about the bullying which she alleged was constant. Mr Butcher claims that he specifically told the Applicant to make a written complaint about bullying, but she never did. The Applicant does not recall Mr Butcher saying this. I accept the Respondent’s argument that the Applicant was aware of the Grievance and Dispute Settlement Policy, as she had completed her HR training and acknowledged that she had read the policy.[53] I find that Applicant knew it was available to her to make a written complaint, as she had been subject to disciplinary action because of written complaints.
I note that after the milk incident, Mr Butcher advised the Applicant to complete an incident report and Mr Butcher commenced an investigation. I do not see this as evidence of the Respondent ignoring the Applicant. It was not ideal that Mr Dearden was involved in reviewing the footage, but I am otherwise satisfied that the Respondent took appropriate steps to investigate the incident. Although the Respondent did not find any evidence of anyone tampering with the syrup, this does not mean that the Applicant was not listened to. The Applicant formed a view that there was a conspiracy against her, and nothing could dissuade her from that view. The steps taken in the investigation were appropriate and there is no evidence that it was a perfunctory investigation.
One of the Applicant’s concerns is that the Respondent did not reveal to her who made complaints about her behaviour, so that she could “rectify whatever the issue seemed to be.”[54] It would have been inappropriate for the Respondent to do this as it would have increased workplace tensions if the Applicant confronted people who complained about her. The Respondent is entitled to make disciplinary findings in the form of written warnings against the Applicant. The fact that the Applicant may disagree with the findings does mean that the Respondent has engaged in bullying.
It was not reasonable for the Applicant to suggest that Mr Butcher should have listened to all the covert audio recordings from 4 July 2024 to 27 August 2024.[55] Firstly, the Respondent had a concern, which was entirely justified, with the fact that employees and customers had been recorded to begin with in a breach of their privacy. Secondly, this would be a massive undertaking for Mr Butcher. The Applicant said she recorded her “entire work shifts”.[56] When working an average of 38 hours per week for approximately 8 weeks, this works out to approximately 304 hours of recordings.
Finally, I am not satisfied that the Applicant was being ignored by Mr Butcher following the milk incident. The Applicant was on medical leave related to stress from 25 October 2024 to 6 November 2024. After the medical certificate expired, the Applicant made no attempt to reach out to the Respondent regarding returning to work. The Applicant simply assumed that the fact that she had not been rostered meant she was being forced out. In fact, the Respondent was waiting for the Applicant to confirm that she was fit to return to work.
The Applicant’s evidence is prone to exaggeration. For example, she said regarding barbecue sauce being allegedly put in the chocolate syrup, “my physical health was put in jeopardy, and it was pure luck that I was not allergic to and needed to be hospitalised due to whatever had been put into my chocolate syrup bottle.”[57] I am not sure why the Applicant feels she was at risk of being hospitalised because of barbecue sauce being put in the chocolate syrup.
The Applicant has accused the Respondent’s staff of making false and defamatory statements about her. And yet, the Applicant has no problem making serious criminal allegations against the Respondent with little evidence, including allegations of suspected money laundering and allegations that the Respondent intentionally tried to “cover up” the milk incident by deleting CCTV footage following the Applicant’s police report.[58] No evidence at all has been provided in support of the money laundering allegation. It is not clear to me whether the Applicant understands that such allegations should not be lightly made, especially in the context of proceedings in the Commission. Making such allegations without evidence negatively affects the Applicant’s credibility as a witness.
I find that the Respondent did not engage in a course of conduct, by not listening to the Applicant’s concerns, which forced her to resign. The Applicant exercised a choice to resign, as a result of interpersonal conflict in the workplace.
It is for the best for the Applicant to be away from the workplace. The Applicant was hypervigilant to the point that she covertly recorded very shift between 4 July 2024 and 20 October 2024. Setting aside the ethical issues with the Applicant recording her interactions with colleagues and customers without telling them, that behaviour demonstrates a complete lack of trust for her employer and colleagues.
I do not find the Applicant’s resignation to meet the threshold of a forced resignation per s.386(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the Applicant is not eligible to lodge an application under s.365 of the Act. The jurisdictional objection is upheld, and the Application is dismissed.
I Order accordingly.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
D Mitchell for the Applicant
J Butcher for the Respondent
Hearing details:
4 March 2025
Brisbane
Hearing via Microsoft Teams
[1] Form F8, Item 1.4
[2] Applicant Response Submissions [56].
[3] Annexure I to Respondent Submissions.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Applicant Submissions [2]-[3].
[6] Applicant Response to Respondent Witness Statement [13].
[7] Jason Butcher Witness Statement [3]
[8] Respondent Submissions [2].
[9] Applicant Submissions [3].
[10] Applicant Submissions [4].
[11] Annexure A to Applicant Submissions.
[12] Applicant Submissions [4].
[13] Ibid [6].
[14] Applicant Response to Respondent Submissions [6].
[15] Applicant Submissions [13].
[16] Applicant Submissions [1(iii)].
[17] Form F8A, Item 3.1 [18].
[18] Applicant Submissions [4].
[19] Applicant Response to Respondent Submissions [6].
[20] Applicant Submissions [8]
[21] Ibid [10].
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid [10]
[24] Ibid.
[25] Annexure K to Applicant
[26] Applicant Response to Respondent Submissions [11]
[27] Applicant Submissions [10].
[28] Respondent Form F8A, page 6.
[29] Applicant Submissions [10].
[30] (1938) 60 CLR 336 per Dixon J, at pp.362-363
[31] Annexure H to Respondent Submissions.
[32] Applicant Submissions [10].
[33] Applicant Response to Respondent Witness Statement [10(b)]
[34] Respondent Submissions [12].
[35] Applicant Submissions [12].
[36] Annexure J to Applicant Submissions.
[37] Applicant Submissions [12]; Applicant Response to Respondent Witness Statement [10(b)]
[38] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 386(1)(b).
[39] Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli[2017] FWCFB 3941.
[40] Ibid
[41] Ibid; see also Rheinberger v Huxley Marketing Pty Limited (1996) 67 IR 154, 160-161; see also O’Meara v Stanley Works Pty Ltd[2006] AIRC 496 (11 August 2006); Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200.
[42] Rheinberger v Huxley Marketing Pty Limited (1996) 67 IR 154, 160-161 cited in Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli[2017] FWCFB 3941 at [31].
[43] Whirisky v DivaT Home Care[2021] FWC 650 at [77].
[44] Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200 and Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli[2017] FWCFB 3941 at [28].
[45] (1996) PRN6999.
[46] (1999) FCA 1660 at 58.
[47] Megna v No 1 Riverside Quay (SEQ) Pty Ltd PR 973462, 11 August 2006.
[48] Boulic v Robot Building Supplies[2010] FWA 6905, [16].
[49] Bupa Aged Care Australia Pty Ltd T/A Bupa Aged Care Mosman v Shahin Tavassoli (1995) 62 IR 200, 205-206.
[50] Hastie v Impress Australia Pty Ltd [2008] AIRC 102 at [48].
[51] Applicant Response Submissions [7].
[52] Applicant Response Submissions [13(b)].
[53] Respondent Submissions [6]; Annexure A to Respondent Submissions.
[54] Applicant Response to Jason Butcher Witness Statement [5].
[55] Applicant Reply Submissions [14].
[56] Applicant Submissions [1].
[57] Applicant Submissions [13].
[58] Applicant Submissions [13].
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