DAMOND & PADROS
[2020] FCCA 1237
•7 May 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DAMOND & PADROS | [2020] FCCA 1237 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Property proceedings – interim defended hearing – orders made. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.79,79(2),79(4),80(1)(h) |
| Cases cited: Shakir & Shakir [2013] FamCA 562 |
| Applicant: | MS DAMOND |
| Respondent: | MS PADROS |
| File Number: | PAC 706 of 2019 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Newbrun |
| Hearing date: | 2 April 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 2 April 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Parramatta |
| Delivered on: | 7 May 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Mr Youseff - Edwards Family Lawyers |
| The Respondent: | Appeared legally unrepresented |
ORDERS PENDING FURTHER ORDER:
That the Respondent shall be restrained from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing or causing or allowing any third party, servant or agent of hers to do so on her behalf in respect of any interest she holds including but not limited in the following business or corporate entities or trusts:
(a)A Pty Ltd;
(b)B Pty Ltd;
(c)C Pty Ltd as trustee of the C Pty Ltd Property Trust;
(d)D No. 1 Pty Ltd;
(e)D No. 2 Pty Ltd (in liquidation); and
(f)D No. 3 Pty Ltd.
That should the Respondent wish to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any interest she may hold as referred to in the immediate preceding order, she shall provide the Applicant all the relevant information and documents of such proposed action upon not less than three weeks' notice so that the Applicant may respond to her.
That upon service of a sealed copy of these Orders on E Conveyancing, the funds currently held on trust with the said firm on behalf of the parties being the proceeds of sale of their former Suburb F Property be deposited into the trust account of Taylor & Scott Lawyers (account no.93) .
That upon transfer of the proceeds of sale from E Conveyancing to Taylor & Scott Lawyers in accordance with the preceding order herein:
(a)the Applicant shall be entitled to retain the sum of $75,000 by way of interim property provision to her; and
(b)Taylor & Scott Lawyers shall then deposit the balance remaining into a controlled monies account to be held on trust for the parties pending further order or written direction and authority from both parties.
That within seven days from the date of these Orders, the Respondent shall select one forensic accountant from the three proposed in the Applicant solicitors' letter of 26 February 2020, to be appointed a joint expert of the parties to value the Respondent’s business and trust interests including but not limited to the following entities:
(a)A Pty Ltd;
(b)B Pty Ltd;
(c)C Pty Ltd as trustee of the C Pty Ltd Property Trust;
(d)D No. 1 Pty Ltd;
(e)D No. 2 Pty Ltd (in liquidation); and
(f)D No. 3 Pty Ltd.
That within seven days from the date the Applicant provides the Respondent a draft joint letter of instructions to the joint expert, the Respondent shall sign and return the said document to the Applicant.
That should the Respondent fail, refuse or neglect to comply with either or both of the immediate preceding orders herein, the Applicant shall be at liberty of selecting and/or instructing the joint expert herself.
That the Respondent shall provide the joint expert with any and all information and/or documents to the joint expert within 14 days of being requested to do so from time-to-time.
That the reasonable costs of the joint expert shall be secured and/or paid by the Respondent at first instance as and when required by the joint expert.
That the parties shall do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to give effect to these Orders as soon as reasonably practicable unless a time provision is already provided herein to the contrary.
That the parties shall have leave to relist the matter on seven days' written notice.
These proceedings are forthwith transferred to Family Court of Australia at Parramatta.
NOTATION: As to the above transfer order, the Court refers to its interim reasons for judgment of 7 May 2020.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Damond & Padros is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
PAC 706 of 2019
| MS DAMOND |
Applicant
And
| MS PADROS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These are the Courts reasons for judgment in relation to an interim hearing held by telephone between the parties on 2 April 2020.
The property related issues to be determined were set out in the applicant’s Amended Application in a Case filed 27 February 2020 and, briefly, comprised the applicant’s proposed continuation of property related injunctions against the respondent; the provision of $75,000 to the applicant from the proceeds of sale of the parties former property at Suburb F (with the categorisation of such provision to be determined at a later date by the court); and orders sought in relation to business valuations of certain entities.
The respondent opposed the applicant’s orders sought in her Amended Application in a Case.
The applicant relied upon the documents set out in her case outline dated 26 March 2020 (page 4), and which included a tender bundle of documents (84 pages). She also relied upon a draft balance sheet (three pages).
The respondent relied upon her case outline (essentially a chronology of events), affidavit filed 30 October 2019, and her tender bundle which included affidavits of her sister and brother-in-law and other documents.
The Court has had regard to each parties filed financial statements.
Litigation funding application by applicant
The applicant’s Initiating Application filed 18 February 2019 sought final orders, inter alia, that the parties former property at Suburb F be sold with the net proceeds of sale being paid to the applicant; that the respondent “cause the debt owed by the applicant to the Australian taxation office and Centrelink to be paid within three months and that the respondent indemnify the applicant against any claims made upon her in respect of such debts”; and that each party be entitled to retain all other property currently in their name possession and/or control to the exclusion of the other.
The respondent has yet to file a Response.
Evidence
The parties’ relationship commenced in about 2008/early 2009. They separated in about early 2017.
There are three children of the parties’ same-sex relationship, X age 7 and twins, Y and Z aged five years.
It is common ground that a property at Suburb G, previously purchased by the respondent, her sister and brother-in-law, was sold in about June 2019 to a company purchaser of which the respondent’s sister and brother-in-law were the directors and shareholders. On settlement, the respondent received about $162,000. The applicant asserts that from the sale proceeds the respondent paid about $40,204 to the H trust, and then applied to repay a loan of $35,000 she had borrowed from a friend to pay the first instalment of the liquidators fees in May 2019; $80,000 was paid to her lawyers acting on her behalf in the liquidation matter; and the balance remaining was paid to the liquidator with a further $8033.
The parties are in dispute as to whether this sale transaction was at arms length. The parties are also in dispute as to whether the applicant had adequate notice of the proposed sale. The respondent asserts that she resides in the Suburb G property and makes payments that are applied towards the mortgage. The respondent asserts that she paid the stamp duty on behalf of the purchaser of the Suburb G property. The respondent asserts that her sister and brother-in-law became involved in the purchase of the property at Suburb G to assist the respondent to raise funds to assist with her proposed action to terminate the liquidation of D number two in liquidation and repayment of the tax liability to the ATO.
The respondent asserts that the Suburb G property was purchased originally for about $455,000 with a mortgage loan of about $400,000. The respondent asserts that the Suburb G property was registered 90% in the respondent’s name and 10% to the respondent sister and brother-in-law.
The applicant owned a property at Suburb J at cohabitation commencement. She received about $76,000 for this property which was sold in about 2013.
The parties purchased the Suburb F property in about 2013 in joint names. The purchase price was about $680,000. The applicant contributed to the sale proceeds from her Suburb J property. The respondent contends that the mortgage loan for the purchase of the Suburb F property was about $605,000.
It is common ground that during the parties’ relationship the respondent operated a business from which she derived income and used to support the family, whilst the applicant was, inter alia, a stay-at-home mother for the children, she being the primary carer of them.
It is common ground that the Suburb F property was sold recently and there is presently net proceeds of sale of about $416,000 presently held by the conveyancer.
The respondent asserts that in about 2008, having been a professional for many years, she started a business with Mr K who was a professional. The overall business was known as B Pty Ltd. The respondent asserts that the household income for the family was primarily received from the B Pty Ltd business throughout the relationship and was the sole source of income for the applicant and the respondent since 2012.
The respondent asserts that the business of B Pty Ltd has a structure around the business made up of a number of entities and trusts. She asserts the business trades from three premises in Sydney and is run under a licence issued to A Pty Ltd.
The respondent asserts that the business assets are held by three companies and a unit trust (see paragraph 30 of her Affidavit).
The respondent asserts that her beneficial interest in the business is held via D number one Pty Ltd (hereinafter referred to as D number one).
The respondent asserts that shares in A Pty Ltd are held equally between Mr K’s wife and D number one.
The respondent asserts that for the year ending 2018 the total income for A Pty Ltd was $432,917.
The respondent asserts that D number one is the trustee and appointer of the H trust and has never traded.
The respondent asserts that pursuant to the H trust deed the respondent’s former spouse Ms L and the respondent are the primary income beneficiaries and the applicant is also a beneficiary amongst a broad category of beneficiaries which includes D number two Pty Ltd (in liquidation) ( hereinafter referred to as D number two, in liquidation).
The respondent asserts that during the history of the H trust D number one received income by way of fees and commissions collected by A Pty Ltd which D number one, for tax planning purposes, distributed via the H trust to the respondent, the applicant or D number two, in liquidation.
As to D number two in liquidation, the respondent asserts that she holds three of the four issued shares and her mother holds the other share. She asserts that D number two in liquidation has never traded or conducted any business other than the passive receipt of income from the H trust.
The respondent asserts that the only asset of D number two in liquidation relates to a number of Division 7A loans advanced to D number one as trustee of the H trust. She asserts that presently, the outstanding amount of the loans is in the vicinity of about $740,000. She asserts that the only creditor is the ATO.
The respondent asserts that D number two in liquidation was placed into liquidation on 3 April 2019.
The respondent asserts that upon the above winding up of D number two in liquidation, the ATO claimed that that company owed about $298,000 in tax. The respondent asserts that there was an administrative error in the calculation of the outstanding tax by virtue that D number one is the trustee of the H trust and not D number two in liquidation. The respondent asserts that once amended tax returns are lodged, the sole debt of D number two in liquidation will be about $165,000.
The applicant asserts that she has noticed that the respondent provided two Division 7A- excluded loan agreements, where the applicant’s name is listed as the witness to the respondent signature. The applicant asserts that she does not recall signing the said agreements and she was not aware of such loans. She asserts that it seems her signature has been signed by someone other than herself. The two agreements are dated 1 July 2014 and 1 July 2015.
The solvency report of the appointed liquidator dated January 2020 states, inter alia, in relation to the financial position of the company in liquidation, that the company in liquidation receives income in the form of trust distributions from H trust and interest on loans. It states that the trust distributions are not a cash distribution by H trust to the company in liquidation. It states that the distributions are recorded as a loan receivable (asset) in the accounts of the company in liquidation, and as an unpaid present entitlement (liability) in the accounts of H trust. It states the loans are interest-bearing and a new loan is established each year. It states that as at 30 June 2018, the accrued loans receivable by the company in liquidation from H trust total about $740,000. It states that these loans are the only asset of the company in liquidation. It states that the company in liquidation’s liabilities total $216,336 and consist only of the ATO income tax debt ($214,038) and superannuation payable ($2298). It states that the company in liquidation has a positive net asset position.
The report states that the loans receivable enable the company in liquidation to appear solvent, subject to the cash receipt of the trust distributions which would put the company in liquidation in funds to pay its taxation liabilities.
It states that the solvency of the company in liquidation is therefore intrinsically linked to the solvency of H trust and the ability of that trust to repay the loans receivable.
The report states that the trust conducts a financial services business and for the 2018 financial year reported a profit of $342,548. It states that the trust has historically reported substantial trading profits.
The report states that the respondent’s assertion, through her accountant, that the amended ATO liability was only about $165,000 is incorrect. The report states that the determined ATO liability of the company in liquidation is a minimum of about $247,000.
The report states that the company in liquidation requires a cash injection of about $264,000 to return to solvency. In this context, the report states that the respondent has sold (the Suburb G and Suburb F properties) to raise sufficient funds to pay the company in liquidation’s liabilities plus the costs and expenses of the winding up. It states the respondent has already advanced $70,000 to the liquidation account as a partial contribution to the sum required. The report states that it suggests that the respondent utilise personal funds available to her of about $244,000 to partially repay the loan she owes to H trust. The report states that this will put the trust in funds to pay a portion of the unpaid present entitlements owing to the company in liquidation. Those funds will then be sufficient to allow the company in liquidation to meet outstanding taxation liabilities and the costs and expenses of the winding up in full. It states that the funds should be paid to the liquidators solicitors trust account, before the termination application hearing.
On 10 March 2020 the liquidators solicitors wrote a letter to D number one as trustee for the H trust. The letter states inter alia that the liquidator has identified a loan account (in the 2018 financial statements for both the company in liquidation and the H trust) which discloses loans from the company in liquidation to the H trust in the sum of about $740,000.
The letter states that based on the uncontroverted evidence established by the financial statements for both the company in liquidation and the trust, the liquidator has formed the view that the sum of about $740,000 is due and payable by D number one as trustee for the trust to the company in liquidation.
The letter states that the liquidator demands that D number one as trustee for the trust pay to the company in liquidation the sum of about $740,000 by 24 March 2020, or by that date propose a suitable payment arrangement supported by security in a form acceptable to the liquidator.
The letter states that if D number one as trustee for the trust fails to comply with this demand, it is anticipated the solicitors for the liquidator will receive instructions to commence legal proceedings “against it” (D number one as trustee for the trust) for the outstanding loan account balance, plus costs and interest, or in the alternative, to issue a creditors statutory demand for payment of debt, without further notice.
Legal Principles interim property provision
In Shakir & Shakir [2013] FamCA 562 Watts J stated, at paras 29-34:
[29] In Strahan , the Full Court said:
132. In relation to the first stage, in our view, when considering whether to exercise the power under s 79 and s 80(1)(h) of the Act to make an interim property order the “overarching consideration” is the interests of justice. It is not necessary to establish compelling circumstances. All that is required is that in the circumstances it is appropriate to exercise the power. In exercising the wide and unfettered discretion conferred by the power to make such an order, regard should be had to the fact that the usual order pursuant to s 79 is a once and for all order made after a final hearing.
...
139. We also emphasise that in order to establish an appropriate case for an interim property settlement order more is required than the mere fact that upon a final hearing the applicant would receive the property being sought (or an amount in excess of the funds being sought) from the other party.
[30] As explained by the Full Court, s 80(1)(h) FLA is a wide enabling provision for interim property decisions, and there is no reason to limit it, by requiring a finding of ‘compelling circumstances’. All that is required before the power to make an interim property order is exercised, is an assessment of whether it would be “appropriate” to make an interim order, with the “overarching consideration” being the interests of justice. There may need to be evidence of the likely cost of litigation, but only if that is the reason or part of the reason that is propounded as to why it is appropriate that the order be made.
The second step
[31] As was discussed in Harris and confirmed in Strahan , the second step in making an interim property order is to have regard to the usual matters in a s 79 order (ss 79(2) and 79(4) FLA). A detailed inquiry is not required, but there must be some assessment of s 79 FLA factors. Given it is an imprecise exercise, the interim property order has to be “conservative” so that the final outcome of property settlement will not be compromised by the interim property order. Either the remaining property needs to be sufficient to meet the legitimate expectations of both parties at the final hearing, or the order that is contemplated needs to be capable of being reversed or adjusted if it is subsequently considered necessary to do so.
[32] In Harris, the Full Court said:
As a generality, the interests of the parties and the Court are better served by there being one final hearing of sec 79 proceedings.
[33] In Strahan , the Full Court said in exercising the wide and unfettered discretion conferred by s 79 and s 80(1)(h) FLA:
Regard should be had to the fact that the usual order pursuant to s 79 is a once and for all order made after a final hearing.
[34] A corollary of these statements made by the Full Court in both Harris and in Strahan is the proposition that as a generality, the interests of the parties and the court are better served by there being as few interim property applications under s 79 as possible.
Discussion
Again, the proceeds of sale of the parties former jointly owned property at Suburb F, a sum of about $416,000, is presently held by the conveyancer.
From the material before the court, there is a significant suggestion that both parties made significant contributions, pursuant to section 79 of the FLA, towards the proceeds of sale of the property at Suburb F.
The applicant, apart from her interest in the above sum, has no assets from which she could utilise to fund these proceedings. In this context, the court refers to the applicant’s Financial Statement of which her draft balance sheet is, in part, reflective.
As to the prospective legal costs of the applicant, the court refers, inter alia, to the affidavit of Mr M filed 14 February 2020.
There is a significant suggestion, on the material before the court, that the respondent exerts significant control as to the operation of the business. There is a significant suggestion that the applicant exerts no such control.
The applicant contends that the arguably complicated manner in which the Suburb G property was sold (for example, the respondent paying the stamp duty of $24,760 on behalf of the purchasers) has led to her making the addback contentions in the draft balance sheet.
At the interim hearing, the respondent was expressly asked by the court as to what prejudice she would suffer if the court made interim property provision to the applicant of $75,000 from the jointly held proceeds of sale of the property at Suburb F in the sum of $416,000.
In response, the respondent stated, inter alia, that the liquidator of D number 2 in liquidation may well seek to recover the aforesaid sum of $740,000, the subject of the liquidator’s solicitor’s letter of demand to D number one as trustee for the H trust, from the applicant and the respondent personally and thereby seek to claim from them the said sum of $416,000. In her financial statement, the respondent had stated, “It is possible the liquidator will look through the structure (of the business operated by the respondent) and pursue individuals who ultimately used the money received via the Division 7 a loans – Ms Damond and I”.
As to this contention of the respondent, the court would make these observations. Firstly, the letter of demand by the liquidator’s solicitors does not state that the liquidator may pursue the applicant personally. The letter of demand expressly refers to the liquidator potentially giving instructions to its solicitors to commence legal proceedings against D number one as trustee for the trust.
Secondly, the aforesaid solvency report, referring to advice received by the liquidator that the respondent has available to her net cash of $611,171 as a result of sale of the Suburb G and Suburb F properties, does not take into account the applicant’s arguable interest in those proceeds of sale pursuant to these proceedings. In this context, the liquidator had stated that he had not sought from the respondent the details of her personal financial position or required the respondent to complete a statutory declaration regarding same.
Thirdly, the two division 7A excluded loan agreements of one July 14 and one July 15, refer to the lender as being D number two (now in liquidation), and the borrower being H Pty Ltd; the applicant is not named as a party to this agreement.
Fourthly, the said solvency report states that the H trust, by reference to financial statements for the financial year ended 30 June 2018 states that that trust holds trust assets totalling 1.039 million comprising, apart from a loan receivable from the respondent in the sum of $898,348, shares with a book value of $100,000, and plant and equipment (motor vehicles and computers) with a book value of $40,661.
Accordingly, on the material before the court, it is purely speculative as to whether the liquidator might seek to recover the said sum of $740,000, either in part, or in whole, from the applicant personally.
On the material presently before the court, the court can identify no significant prejudice to what the court will assume may be the respondent’s prospective significant claim for property settlement in these property proceedings, if interim property provision was made to the applicant, for litigation funding purposes, in the sum of $75,000. Such sum of $75,000 can properly be drawn from the existing proceeds of sale of the Suburb F property being $416,000.
Again, the applicant’s Initiating Application filed 18 February 2019 sought final orders, inter alia, that the parties’ former property at Suburb F be sold with the net proceeds of sale being paid to the applicant.
The Court would assess these property proceedings to be complex and it is considered reasonable that the applicant, who has not been significantly involved in the respondent’s business, wishes to continue to engage solicitors to represent her in these proceedings.
Accordingly, it will be proper to order that interim property provision be made to the applicant in the sum of $75,000 from the jointly held proceeds of sale of the Suburb F property.
Continuation of injunctions against the respondent and valuations of respondent’s interest in business
During the oral submissions of the respondent at the interim hearing, it became readily apparent that the respondent was desirous of selling the business.
The court observes that the business operated by the respondent, was established in about 2008 and operated during the course of the parties’ relationship for many years. It is significantly arguable that the applicant made a contribution towards any value that the business now possesses through her contributions, inter alia, as a homemaker and parent throughout the parties’ relationship.
In these circumstances, noting:
a)the complex corporate infrastructure of the business,
b)the complex manner in which the Suburb G property was sold by the respondent, and the applicant’s contention, disputed by the respondent, that she received inadequate notice and disclosure of the proposed sale of the Suburb G property,
c)it was common ground that the business was a significant one, it is in the interests of justice, proper and appropriate that the respondent be restrained from selling any interest she has in the business (including the six entities referred to in proposed order one of the applicant’s Amended Application in a Case filed 27 February 2020) without giving adequate notice to the applicant of any proposed sale.
Without such restraint being ordered, the court would assess, on the material before the court, that there is a significant risk that the respondent might proceed to sell her interest in the business, and then dissipate any proceeds of sale without reference to the applicant. The applicant’s proposed order 2 in her Amended Application in a Case seeks six weeks’ notice of any intended sale by the respondent. The court would assess 3 weeks’ notice as being reasonable, noting that valuation evidence will be required to be obtained by the parties, as proposed by the applicant.
The business valuation proposed orders sought by the applicant are reasonable and necessary so as to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant is possessed of sufficient information to assess, inter alia, whether any proposed sale by the respondent of her interest in the business is reasonable and appropriate. In the first instance the respondent should secure and/or pay the reasonable costs of the joint expert valuer (the applicant indicated the cost being some $20,000 - $25,000 with no comment by the respondent in response) as and when required by such expert. In this regard, the Court has taken into account the lack of objective material produced by the respondent in relation to her dispersal of the net sale proceeds of the Suburb G Property.
The court is not persuaded that proposed order 10 (other valuations) is a reasonable and necessary order on the material before the court.
At the interim hearing, the court raised with the parties the prospect of the proceedings being transferred to the Family Court of Australia by reason of the complexity of the property proceedings, and noting that the proceedings also contain a parenting aspect. Both parties concurred that the property proceedings are complex. In this context, the court refers to the body of material before the court at this interim hearing, including these Reasons.
In the view of the court, these property proceedings are complex and will be best heard by the Family Court of Australia at Parramatta. By reason of the addition of the parenting proceedings, there is a likelihood that these property and parenting proceedings will take in excess of four final hearing days.
It will be in the interests of justice that these parenting and property proceedings be transferred forthwith to the Family Court of Australia at Parramatta.
Accordingly, the court will make the following interim orders:
That the Respondent shall be restrained from selling, transferring or otherwise disposing or causing or allowing any third party, servant or agent of hers to do so on her behalf in respect of any interest she holds including but not limited in the following business or corporate entities or trusts:
(a)A Pty Ltd;
(b)B Pty Ltd;
(c)C Pty Ltd as trustee of the C Pty Ltd Property Trust;
(d)D No. 1 Pty Ltd;
(e)D No. 2 Pty Ltd (in liquidation); and
(f)D No. 3 Pty Ltd.
That should the Respondent wish to sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of any interest she may hold as referred to in the immediate preceding order, she shall provide the Applicant all the relevant information and documents of such proposed action upon not less than three weeks' notice so that the Applicant may respond to her.
That upon service of a sealed copy of these Orders on E Conveyancing, the funds currently held on trust with the said firm on behalf of the parties being the proceeds of sale of their former Suburb F Property be deposited into the trust account of Taylor & Scott Lawyers (account no...93) .
That upon transfer of the proceeds of sale from E Conveyancing to Taylor & Scott Lawyers in accordance with the preceding order herein:
(a)the Applicant shall be entitled to retain the sum of $75,000 by way of interim property provision to her; and
(b)Taylor & Scott Lawyers shall then deposit the balance remaining into a controlled monies account to be held on trust for the parties pending further order or written direction and authority from both parties.
That within seven days from the date of these Orders, the Respondent shall select one forensic accountant from the three proposed in the Applicant solicitors' letter of 26 February 2020, to be appointed a joint expert of the parties to value the Respondent’s business and trust interests including but not limited to the following entities:
(a)A Pty Ltd;
(b)B Pty Ltd;
(c)C Pty Ltd as trustee of the C Pty Ltd Property Trust;
(d)D No. 1 Pty Ltd;
(e)D No. 2 Pty Ltd (in liquidation); and
(f)D No. 3 Pty Ltd.
That within seven days from the date the Applicant provides the Respondent a draft joint letter of instructions to the joint expert, the Respondent shall sign and return the said document to the Applicant.
That should the Respondent fail, refuse or neglect to comply with either or both of the immediate preceding orders herein, the Applicant shall be at liberty of selecting and/or instructing the joint expert herself.
That the Respondent shall provide the joint expert with any and all information and/or documents to the joint expert within 14 days of being requested to do so from time-to-time.
That the reasonable costs of the joint expert shall be secured and/or paid by the Respondent at first instance as and when required by the joint expert.
That the parties shall do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to give effect to these Orders as soon as reasonably practicable unless a time provision is already provided herein to the contrary.
That the parties shall have leave to relist the matter on seven days' written notice.
These proceedings are forthwith transferred to Family Court of Australia at Parramatta.
NOTATION: As to the above transfer order, the Court refers to its interim reasons for judgment of 7 May 2020.
I certify that the preceding sixty nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Newbrun
Associate:
Date: 22 May 2020
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