Daly v Thiering - [2013] HCATrans 232

[2013] HCATrans 232

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S115 of 2013

B e t w e e n -
JOHN DALY
Appellant
and
ALEXANDER THIERING
First Respondent
ROSE MATILDA THIERING
Second Respondent
LIFETIME CARE & SUPPORT AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Third Respondent

CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 3 OCTOBER 2013, AT 10.15 AM

____________________

MR K.P. REWELL, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear for the appellant, with my learned friend, MR D.M. WILSON. (instructed by Moray & Agnew Solicitors)

MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR E.G. ROMANIUK and MS E.E. GROTTE, for the first and second respondents. (instructed by Slater & Gordon Lawyers)

MR S.B. LLOYD, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MS B.J. TRONSON, for the Authority. (instructed by Workcover Authority of NSW)

CRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Rewell.

MR REWELL: May I apologise immediately for not having provided to the Court an oral outline; that was an oversight in our camp.

CRENNAN J: We have had the procedure for quite some time, I am bound to say.

MR REWELL: I understand that, your Honour, and I can only apologise. I can give your Honours a brief overview of what I am about to say quite quickly, and I will do that now if that is convenient. First, I thought it would assist the Court to have some more background information about the Lifetime Care scheme in New South Wales because I know it is a novel scheme in some senses, and although it has been in effect in New South Wales for seven years, I think, as of yesterday, it is still in some respects little known in terms of its detail, so I will explain a bit more about that if I may because it is, of course, the legislative context with which we have to deal.

CRENNAN J: Is this common ground what you are about to go to?

MR REWELL: I hope so.

CRENNAN J: Yes, I would have thought so.

MR REWELL: Much of it was explained by the trial judge, Justice Garling, but not all of it, and then the trial judge strayed into error in respect of one part of the scheme, which is actually quite important, and that concerns how the scheme is funded.

Where I intend to start is with the purpose of the scheme about which I believe there is no issue. It was identified by the primary judge, by the trial judge. The Court of Appeal appears to have endorsed the purposes of the scheme as identified by the trial judge and I understand there is little or no issue as to its purposes here. Next, I will say a little about how the scheme is funded because that is also important…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Daly v Thiering

Details

AGLC: Daly v Thiering [2013] HCATrans 232
Case: [2013] HCATrans 232
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland in a dispute between the appellant, Mr. Daly, and the respondent, Mr. Thiering. The core of the disagreement concerned the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release entered into by the parties, which aimed to resolve a prior contractual dispute.

The central legal question before the High Court was whether the deed of settlement, which included a release of all claims, effectively precluded Mr. Daly from pursuing certain claims against Mr. Thiering that arose after the deed was executed. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope of the release and whether it extended to future, as yet unknown, causes of action.

The High Court reasoned that the language of the deed, particularly the broad terms used to describe the claims being released, indicated an intention to compromise all existing and future claims between the parties. The Court applied the principle that clear and unambiguous language in a deed of settlement will be given its ordinary meaning, and that such deeds are generally intended to provide finality to disputes. The Court found that the wording of the release was sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the claims subsequently brought by Mr. Daly, even if those specific claims were not in contemplation at the time the deed was executed.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the deed of settlement operated as a bar to Mr. Daly's subsequent claims. The Court ordered that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland be set aside and that judgment be entered for the respondent, Mr. Thiering, with costs.

Orders