Dalrance Pty Ltd v Vullers
[2003] QDC 41
•20/03/2003
Transcript of Proceedings
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DISTRICT COURT [2003] QDC 041 Date: 7 April, 2003 CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE ROBIN QCNo 5044 of 1997
DALRANCE PTY LTD (ACN 010 927 992) Plaintiff AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CESNAR TRUST and HENDRIKUS J VULLERS First Defendant and H & CT VULLERS PTY LTD Second Defendant (ACN 009 729 677) AS TRUSTEE UNDER
NOMINATION OF TRUSTEE NO.K7567720and C FREDERIKS PTY LTD Third Party (ACN 009 884 057) BRISBANE
..DATE 20/03/2003ORDER
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HIS HONOUR: Before the Court are cross-applications which 1 originally came on for hearing before his Honour Judge is for the striking out of the claim. The plaintiff's application is for leave to file amended pleadings.
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As the title of the proceedings indicates, the plaintiff is a trustee. The basis of the defendant's application is that as regards the plaintiff's claim for breach of contract tort,
which I would understand to be misrepresentation and Trade
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Practices Act type relief, the relevant causes of action belong to and ought to be pursued by the beneficiaries under the trust arrangements.
That contention was the issue before Judge McLauchlan and he
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expressed a clear view on it saying at page 13 of the
transcript that he was "inclined to think that it should be
struck out" which seems to me to involve a resort to tentative
language not consistent with the definite view that I thinkhis Honour reached.
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He said at the foot of page 14,
"The alternatives seem to me to be to strike it out or,
alternatively, grant some time to the plaintiff to see if it could put the proceedings in order in some way for the benefit of the beneficiaries. I think that as things
stand the claim should be struck out but if you wanted to
then, of course, you could commence other proceedings no 50 doubt properly formulated or, alternatively, you might be
able to do something about amending these proceedings."
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Mr Stone, who was counsel for the plaintiff, which is 1 represented today by Mr Looney, asked for a week to consider
what ought to happen. What his Honour did was adjourn the
applications to 20 December. In the end they have come on
today before me.
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Mr Lilley, who appeared before his Honour, and again today appears for the defendants, on 6th December attempted to preserve for his clients the benefit of their victory, saying at page 20:
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"Your Honour, just to save reargument can it be indicated
in the order the purpose of the adjournment because if
your Honour's not sitting on the 20th I don’t want tocome back and have to argue the strike out point again."
His Honour said,
"The adjournment and the record can show the adjournment
being granted because it appears to me that on the
pleadings as they stand the defendants have established 30 that they ought to be struck out because the plaintiff
doesn't have a cause of action and it's being adjourned
so that the plaintiff's legal representatives can
consider what they should do or may do by way of
repleading with particular reference to the beneficiaries
of the trust so it's left broadly so that they can
consider and take such action as I (sic) think is
appropriate."40
There are undoubtedly situations in which the Applications
Judge may express views, even strong ones, about the merits of
litigants' legal situations, which have no ultimate effect or,
indeed, relevance. An example may be a summary judgment
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application which fails accompanied by strong intimations from
the Judge who hears it that the plaintiff's claim is
completely hopeless. Such in intimation is not in any way
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binding on a trial Judge subsequently who may see things 1 entirely differently. Another instance that I have mentioned in argument concerns situations in which leave to appeal is granted by an appellate 10 Court, perhaps accompanied by strong intimations that the decision appealed is wrong, whereas the ultimate determination by the appellate court when the appeal itself comes on for hearing may be that the decision appealed was entirely 20 correct. In the present circumstances, as I said at the outset, I have before me exactly the same applications as Judge McLauchlan considered. No new applications have been filed. I think it 30 would bring the system into disrepute if I were to reach or even entertain reaching a contrary view to that expressed by his Honour. 40 Mr Looney says that he has come armed today with additional arguments that were not made on the 6th of December. I am willing to accept that it might be open to Judge McLauchlan, he having made no formal order, to reopen the matter. I 50 consider I am not so favourably placed and that considerations of comity and the integrity of the Court's procedures preclude my doing so.
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My firm attitude is that I ought to perfect what Judge 1 McLauchlan did by making the order sought in the defendant's strike out application, and that I ought not to revisit arguments he resolved. I have indicated, however, in light of Mr Looney's last minute application, that I adjourn the matter 10 to Judge McLauchlan; that I will withhold making any formal order so that his Honour can be approached by me or by Mr Looney's instructing solicitors to ascertain whether he is prepared to entertain it. I would not wish to create any 20 impediment to that happening. It might be noted that matters have not advanced beyond the 6th of December situation so far as the possibility of beneficiaries being brought in as substituted or new parties 30 goes. I understand one of Judge McLauchlan's concerns to have been to preserve an advantageous date of commencement of proceedings with a view to sparing the plaintiff limitations difficulties. Mr Looney is in no better a position than was 40 Mr Stone last year to apply for any particular orders about parties. The one exception to that situation is that on the other side of the record there appears to have been a misnomer of the first-named defendant in that there has been some 50 confusion of father and son. Mr Lilley has indicated to the Court that he does not wish to say anything in relation to, what, a substitution or correction of name? Was is it, Mr Lilley?
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MR LILLEY: I think it is a substitution, your Honour. 1 HIS HONOUR: Can you identify the substitution? MR LILLEY: I think instead of Hendrikus J Vullers I think it becomes Hendricus Vullers - it becomes Hendricus Vullers with a "C" in Hendricus, not a "K".
HIS HONOUR: So to the substitution of Hendricus, with a "C", 10 Vullers for the present first-named defendant, Hendrikus, with a "K" Vullers.
MR LILLEY: And a "J", initial "J" as well, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: The new one has got a "J"? MR LILLEY: No, the new one does not have a "J". The present one has a "J". 20 HIS HONOUR: Well, it doesn't in the short heading that I've got. So in lieu of Hendrikus, with a "K" and the middle initial J, we substitute "Hendricus", with a "C".
... 30 HIS HONOUR: I will order that you have the costs of your application, Mr Lilley, and make no costs order on the other one. 40 ...
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