Dalgleish v Fugro Survey Pty Ltd
[1996] IRCA 357
•8 Aug 1996
DECISION NO: 357/96
C A T C H W O R D S
INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - claim of UNLAWFUL TERMINATION - whether RESIGNATION by the applicant - whether TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT at the initiative of the employer - COMPENSATION.
Industrial Relations Act 1988 Ss 170DE, 170EA, 170DF.
Western Australian Surveying (Private Practice) Industry Award 1989.Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200.
Rheinberger v Huxley Marketing Pty Ltd, IRCA No. 138 of 1996, Moore J, 16 April 1996, unreported.
Kangatherin v Cybercafe Pty Ltd, IRCA No. 348 of 1996, RD Farrell JR, 2 July 1996, unreported.
Aitken v CMETSWUA - WA Branch (1995) 63 IR 1.Gemma Louise DALGLEISH -v- FUGRO SURVEY PTY LTD
WI 2048 of 1995BEFORE: R. D. FARRELL JR
PLACE: PERTH
DATE: 8 August 1996IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS )
COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
WESTERN AUSTRALIA )
DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. WI 2048 of 1995BETWEEN: Gemma Louise DALGLEISH
- ApplicantAND: FUGRO SURVEY PTY LTD
- RespondentMINUTE OF ORDERS
BEFORE: R. D. FARRELL JR
PLACE: PERTH
DATE: 8 August 1996
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $733.98 in compensation within 14 days of the date of this order.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of Orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRYWI 2048 of 1995
BETWEEN:
Gemma Louise DALGLEISH
ApplicantAND:
FUGRO SURVEY PTY LTD
RespondentREASONS FOR DECISION
8 August 1996 R. D. FARRELL JR
This is an application under Section 170EA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 for compensation arising from the alleged unlawful termination of the employment of the applicant, Gemma Louise Dalgleish (“Ms Dalgleish”), by the respondent, Fugro Survey Pty Ltd (“the Company”). Ms Dalgleish does not seek reinstatement.
Employment Background
Fugro Survey Pty Ltd is part of an international group of companies involved in offshore and onshore surveying.
At the time of the hearing, Ms Dalgleish was seventeen years of age. The Company employed her as a filing clerk in its Perth office on 13 January 1995 when aged only sixteen. It was her first job after leaving school. Her work involved assisting another employee, Ms Renae Shipp (“Ms Shipp”), to perform the filing and searching requirements of the Perth survey department.
The Company initially employed Ms Dalgleish on a three month probation period, after which her status as a permanent employee was confirmed. She had suffered illness during that period as a result of a respiratory condition, but she had fully recovered by the time her probation period had ended. By August 1995, she had taken eight days’ sick leave.
Ms Dalgleish received a pay rise when she turned seventeen in early April 1995, taking her fortnightly wage to $422.59 after taxation. When she combined her wage with the earnings of her boyfriend, who was a police cadet, they were able to move into shared accommodation. Ms Dalgleish supplemented her salary with part-time employment during the weekend with a supermarket.
Mrs Gina Bevilaqua, (“Mrs Bevilaqua”) Mr Shipp’s secretary, typed up Ms Dalgleish’s resume on 23 May 1995. Ms Dalgleish says that, when she noticed that Mrs Bevilaqua had a file of resumes for everyone else, she decided it would be good to update her own resume, which she had originally prepared at school. Ms Dalgleish and Mrs Bevilaqua were on friendly terms. I accept Ms Dalgleish’s evidence concerning her resume and place no importance on her decision to have it updated.
In early July, the applicant learnt that she was pregnant. It was an unplanned pregnancy. The applicant gave evidence that her boyfriend was initially unhappy when he learnt of the pregnancy. Ms Dalgleish says she considered her options for some time and ultimately decided to proceed with the pregnancy. She says that her boyfriend came to support that decision. The baby was due in March 1996.
The applicant privately advised Mr Colin Shipp (“Mr Shipp”), the Company’s Operations Manager, of the pregnancy; she gave him a leave application form dated 18 July 1995 requesting maternity leave from mid February 1996. Ms Dalgleish attached a note to the form in which she told Mr Shipp that she “would appreciate it if we could keep this low profile for a time being. (Minimum people as possible)”. Mr Shipp told Ms Dalgleish he would get back to her.
Mr Shipp contacted the Chamber of Commerce. He learnt that Ms Dalgleish would have qualified by February 1996 for maternity leave under the terms of the Western Australian Surveying (Private Practice) Industry Award 1989, which applied to her employment. Mr Shipp did not sign the form to indicate his acceptance of the request for maternity leave, but instead put the form to one side. He explained in evidence that the form did not need to be processed for some time. He intended to delay the processing of the application in order to keep the pregnancy “low profile”, in accordance with Ms Dalgleish’s request. I accept that explanation.
In August 1995, Ms Dalgleish suffered morning sickness and other complications related to the pregnancy. As a result, she was absent for a further five or six days over a period of three to four weeks. The company continued to pay Ms Dalgleish sick leave despite her having exhausted her entitlement, so that by 21 August 1995 her sick leave entitlement was almost seven days in arrears.
On the last occasion when Ms Dalgleish had to leave work due to illness, Mr Shipp was away. She left a note instead for Owen Temby, one of the senior surveyors. She told him in the note about her application for maternity leave. She advised him that she would need time off due to recent complications with her pregnancy, and set out the arrangements she had made while she was away. Mr Temby passed the note on to Mr Shipp, as requested by Ms Dalgleish.
Ms Dalgleish gave evidence that there was a heavy workload on the filing clerks, and that she did the best she could to keep up. At no stage has the Company alleged that her performance was unsatisfactory.
The applicant returned to work on Monday 21 August 1995, having been absent due to illness the previous Thursday and Friday. Mr Shipp says he had heard reports from a number of people in the office that Ms Dalgleish looked unwell. He says he was concerned. When he met her in the car park as she was going out to do a delivery, he asked her to see him in his office on her return. Mr Shipp says he intended to merely have a talk with Ms Dalgleish, and wanted to speak with her privately, in case the issue of her pregnancy arose.
Shortly before she left the Company, Ms Dalgleish approached Mrs Bevilaqua and asked her to prepare a letter of resignation for her, as Ms Dalgleish did not know what such a letter should include. Ms Dalgleish says that she intended to resign from her job at the supermarket. She says she told Mrs Bevilaqua that she would have to give up one of her jobs. She concedes she may not have made it clear that it was the supermarket job she intended to give up.
Mrs Bevilaqua says she typed the letter on Monday 21 August 1995. Mrs Bevilaqua’s evidence was that Ms Dalgleish initially referred to her intention to resign from Fugro Survey Pty Ltd. She says she had asked Ms Dalgleish whether she was going to another job. She says that Ms Dalgleish had told her that she was getting “stressed out” at work and that if she stayed she might lose the baby. Mrs Bevilaqua rejected the proposition that she may have mistakenly assumed that it was the company and not the supermarket from which Ms Dalgleish intended to resign.
Ms Dalgleish later told Mrs Bevilaqua not to worry about the letter. Ms Dalgleish says this was before lunch on Monday 21 August 1995. She told the Court she no longer needed the letter because she had spoken with her employer at the supermarket the day before. He had accepted her oral resignation, so that the letter was no longer necessary.
Mr Shipp did not learn of Ms Dalgleish’s request of Mrs Bevilaqua until after the application had been filed in this Court.
The Termination
Ms Dalgleish came to see Mr Shipp in his office at about lunchtime on Monday 21 August 1996. Mr Shipp says he began the conversation by inquiring about her health, telling her that he was worried about it. He said in evidence that he offered to drive her home if she was not feeling well.
Mr Shipp says that Ms Dalgleish told him that her doctor had told her that she shouldn’t be working full-time, and that if she did she might lose her baby.
Mr Shipp says he then asked her if she wanted to leave. He explained that she wouldn’t have to wait and serve out her notice if she wished to go. He says that Ms Dalgleish appeared relieved and agreed that she did wish to leave. She raised her concerns about whether she might have problems receiving social security payments.
Ms Dalgleish gives a different account of this meeting. She recalls Mr Shipp stating that “Things don’t seem to be working out”. She says Mr Shipp told her he needed her to be able to attend work consistently, whereas she was working four days one week and three days the next. Ms Dalgleish says she told him that her problems with morning sickness had been resolved, because the medication she was now receiving for it was working, but that he responded that he couldn’t rely on that and he couldn’t keep her on.
Mr Shipp agrees he did not give her time to think about her decision. He says she gave no indication of being upset by the way the meeting had proceeded and indeed she appeared relieved. He agrees he did not canvass other possible options with her, such as leave without pay. He says it didn’t occur to him to discuss alternatives.
Mr Shipp drew up a “notification of termination” form dated 21 August 1995, which was signed by both Ms Dalgleish and Mr Shipp. The termination is described as a resignation “by mutual agreement (redundancy)”. The reason given for resignation is “redundancy”. The form indicates that no replacement is required.
Ms Dalgleish says she did not understand what “redundancy” meant. She says Mr Shipp explained it would make it easier for her to get social security. Mr Shipp agrees he described the termination as a “redundancy” in order to avoid any problems Ms Dalgleish might have with obtaining social security benefits. Ms Dalgleish says she did not feel she was in a position to alter anything on the form before she signed it.
Mr Shipp arranged to have Ms Dalgleish paid two weeks pay in lieu of notice and waived any deductions for excess leave. He offered Ms Dalgleish a memento of her employment with the Company and, being unable to find a Fugro Survey pen, settled for giving her a company T-shirt instead.
Mr Shipp asked Ms Dalgleish whether she wanted to leave immediately or whether she would rather work the day out. She chose the latter.
Mrs Bevilaqua recalls that after speaking to Mr Shipp, Ms Dalgleish told her she no longer required the letter of resignation, because she and Mr Shipp had instead “mutually agreed” that she leave. Mrs Bevilaqua says Ms Dalgleish was not upset or angry with Mr Shipp, but seemed quite relieved that the problem had been resolved.
I had some reservations about the reliability of Mrs Bevilaqua’s evidence. Though Mrs Bevilaqua did not recall discussing the matters canvassed in her evidence with Mr Shipp, there were some remarkable similarities in their evidence. Given that Mrs Bevilaqua is Mr Shipp’s long-serving secretary it would not be surprising if she had in the normal course of events become aware of his version of the events leading to the termination. I am inclined to the view that such knowledge may have affected Mrs Bevilaqua’s recollection of events. In particular, I accept Ms Dalgleish’s explanation concerning her instructions for the preparation of the letter of resignation and accept that it was intended for the supermarket job, rather than Ms Dalgleish’s employment with the Company.
Ms Dalgleish did not tell any of her fellow employees that she had been sacked. She explained she did not do so because it would have been embarrassing. Instead she told them that it was her “last day”.
At the end of the day, she presented a letter to Mr Shipp in the following terms:
“Dear Colin,
I just like to thank you and the rest of the staff at Fugro for all your help etc over the past six/seven months that I have been employed here.
I have enjoyed my time working here and have learned heaps.
I am truly sorry for inconvenience caused. Anyhow thanks for all your help and support.
Yours faithfully,
Gemma Dalgleish”
Ms Dalgleish went home after work. She told her boyfriend that she did not have to go back to work the next day. When he asked why, she told him she had been given the sack. She says she knew he would be upset. She says she had been crying all the way home. She says he gave her a hug and then they sat down to discuss it. She says he started to worry about the financial implications of her unemployment and that this led to an argument, the first of many over the next few days.
Ms Dalgleish’s relationship with her boyfriend broke down within two weeks of her leaving the Company. Because of this and because of her financial circumstances, she was forced to move back to live with her mother. Her mother is now a single woman, reliant upon social security with three other dependant children. Ms Dalgleish feels she is a burden on her mother. She has been unable to find other employment, despite her best efforts. I am satisfied she has made reasonable efforts to seek alternative employment, which task would have been made more difficult by her pregnancy.
Whether Termination at the Initiative of the Employer
The first issue to be decided is whether Ms Dalgleish’s employment came to an end in circumstances which amount to a termination at the initiative of the employer. If it is not a termination at the initiative of the employer, then the application is not competent. The applicant bears the onus of proof on this question.
I am satisfied that Mr Shipp did not call Ms Dalgleish to his office with the intention of bringing about the end of her employment. His action was more probably motivated by his concern for her health and his desire for information it.
I accept that, in the context of their discussion about Ms Dalgleish’s health, Mr Shipp may have made some reference to the difficulties caused to the Company by her unpredictable absences from work. However, I find on balance that Mr Shipp did not end those observations with the announcement that things weren’t working out and that she would have to go, as Ms Dalgleish claimed.
I have no doubt that Ms Dalgleish was a conscientious worker. It is apparent from the terms of her note to Mr Temby explaining her final absence that she was concerned that she might be perceived to be inconveniencing the Company. Any comments made by Mr Shipp in the course of their meeting about the effect on the Company of her absences may have attained disproportionate prominence in Ms Dalgleish’s recollection of the meeting. To the extent that there are inconsistencies in the accounts of the meeting from Ms Dalgleish and Mr Shipp, I am satisfied that Mr Shipp’s recollection is more reliable.
By the time of the meeting of Monday 21 August 1995, Ms Dalgleish found herself in a very stressful situation. She was a young woman of seventeen, dealing with an unplanned pregnancy about which her boyfriend was ambivalent. Further, it had to that point been a difficult pregnancy with debilitating morning sickness and, very recently, serious complications which she had been told had almost resulted in a miscarriage. She found her job demanding, with a heavy workload. She understood her doctor to have advised her that she may miscarry if she didn’t reduce her workload. She had taken that advice seriously, and had resigned from her supermarket job.
After she had discussed some of these pressures with Mr Shipp, he asked her if she wanted to leave her job. Further, he waived any requirement for notice. Ms Dalgleish was therefore presented with a proposition that must have seemed to offer some immediate relief to the stress that she was under.
Ms Dalgleish immediately decided to accept Mr Shipp’s suggestion. Her acceptance was subject only to receiving some reassurance as to her capacity to immediately qualify for social security benefits. She was clearly conscious of the financial pressures under which she remained.
While I am satisfied that Mr Shipp’s original enquiry had been to ascertain whether Ms Dalgleish wished to resign, the documentation surrounding the termination is consistent with a dismissal, given the references to redundancy and the fact that Ms Dalgleish received two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice. This was probably to ensue Ms Dalgleish immediately received social security. In my view, the reference to “mutual agreement” does not derogate from the apparent character of the termination as a termination at the initiative of the employer, insofar as it is reflected in the formal documentation surrounding it.
By the time of the hearing, Ms Dalgleish said there was no doubt in her mind that she “got the sack”. She explained, however, that she reacted on the basis that “what the boss says goes.” She wasn’t going to argue. No harsh words were exchanged. She had enjoyed working there. They had taught her a lot, and she was not a person to hold a grudge. It is possible that Ms Dalgleish inferred that Mr Shipp was advocating the proposition that she leave, rather than merely enquiring about her intentions. I am satisfied she would have been wrong to draw that inference.
Having accepted the proposition that she leave the Company at a lunchtime meeting, Ms Dalgleish accepts that she worked the rest of the day without telling any of her fellow employees that she had been sacked. It is significant that the first person to whom she characterised her departure as a dismissal was her boyfriend, and then only in the context of his alarm at the financial implications of her leaving her employment.
Ms Dalgleish quickly came to the view that the proposition that she leave the company had not been in her interest. Without placing undue weight on it, I note that Dr Mustac, a psychiatrist who gave expert evidence, reports that:
“Ms Dalgleish explained that she had been tricked by her former employer and attributed her misfortune, including her marital situation, to the financial difficulties which flowed from that decision.”
This apparently inconsistent prior statement was not put to Ms Dalgleish, but it is an understandable attitude for Ms Dalgleish to have adopted, assuming the facts surrounding the dismissal were as I have found them to be.
In Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200 at 205, the Full Court held that the expression “termination at the initiative of the employer” refers to “a termination that is brought about by an employer and which is not agreed to by the employee”. They continued:
“In these proceedings it is unnecessary and undesirable to endeavour to formulate an exhaustive description of what is a termination at the initiative of the employer but plainly an important feature is that the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment and the employment relationship is not voluntarily left by the employee. That is, had the employer not taken the action it did, the employee would have remained in the employer relationship.”
In Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2), the employer intentionally pressured Mr Mohazab into resigning, by directing him to resign or have the police “called in”, in the context of an investigation into an allegation that Mr Mohazab had stolen from the employer. The Full Court held that what occurred was a termination at the initiative of the employer.
In Rheinberger v Huxley Marketing Pty Ltd (IRCA No 138 of 1996, Moore J, unreported, 16 April 1996), a manager of the employer initiated a meeting without the intention of procuring Ms Rheinberger’s termination. In the course of the meeting he and Ms Rheinberger argued. Then, when the manager asked what Ms Rheinberger was going to do, she indicated a willingness to resign. He immediately accepted her resignation. She confirmed her resignation two days later. Justice Moore held that there was no termination at the initiative of the employer.
In Kangatheran v Cybercafe Pty Ltd (IRCA, R.D. Farrell JR, unreported, 2 July 1996) where Mr Kangatheran agreed when asked by his employer “Do you think it's fair that we call it quits now”, I held that there was a termination at the initiative of the employer, because the employer had embarked on the discussion with the intention of procuring Mr Kangatheran’s termination.
After due deliberation, and on balance, I have concluded that the special circumstances of the present case amount to a termination at the initiative of the employer. I so find notwithstanding that I accept that:
·it was not Mr Shipp’s intention to procure Ms Dalgleish’s termination; and
·Mr Shipp was not seeking to further the interests of the Company, but was instead exploring what might be in Ms Dalgleish’s best interests.
I am conscious that Ms Dalgleish decided to accept the proposition that she leave the Company. The Court should, in my view, be slow to relieve parties of the consequences of such decisions. I am also conscious that, though Ms Dalgleish’s decision was made while she was under considerable pressure, very little if any of that pressure flowed from her employer.
However, as Counsel for the applicant put it, Ms Dalgleish was young, inexperienced and naive. She appeared to me to be a timid and suggestible person. Mr Shipp was also aware that Ms Dalgleish was in a particular stressed state at that time.
Mr Shipp acted to place Ms Dalgleish in a situation whereby she was required to make a decision whether to continue in her employment. Further, by removing any period of working notice beyond that day he ensured that that decision had immediate effect.
Mr Shipp did not suggest that she take time to consider her decision or that she consult other people about it. He did not propose any other alternatives to her, such as unpaid leave. In a usual employer relationship, it might not be reasonable to expect that an employer take such precautions. The employer would be left to consider its own interests; it would not be the employer’s responsibility to safeguard the interests of the employee. Rheinberger v Huxley Marketing Pty Ltd is perhaps an example of such a case. However, I have finally come to the view that, in the case of an employee of Ms Dalgleish’s special vulnerability, it was foreseeable that, unless Mr Shipp took appropriate precautions, the interaction with Ms Dalgleish might lead to a termination which did not reflect a properly considered decision on her part.
Mr Shipp’s act in requiring a decision from Ms Dalgleish led to the termination of the employment. I am satisfied that, had Mr Shipp not raised the proposition of her leaving, Ms Dalgleish would have remained in the employment relationship. To the extent that the employment relationship could be said to have been voluntarily left by the employee, I consider that the employee was not given the proper opportunity, given her special vulnerability, to properly assess her best interests.
Breach of the Act
The Company all but conceded that, if I found that there was a termination at the initiative of the employer, then there was no valid reason for dismissal for the purposes of Section 170DE. I find that there was no valid reason. It is not necessary for me to decide whether there was a breach of Section 170DF.
Remedy
I am satisfied that reinstatement is not practicable, given the feelings on the matter of the applicant, and given the later events at the Company, to which reference is made below.
In assessing the compensation that is appropriate, the Court will have regard to what is reasonable in the circumstances and will look at what would have been likely to occur had the Act not been contravened.
The Court heard from Mr William Richards, a director and manager of the Company, concerning events within the Company soon after Ms Dalgleish left.
The applicant had been employed as an assistant to Ms Shipp in the Perth survey department of the respondent. They worked with the Company’s developer clients, including local authorities and government departments involved in the land development process. Mr Richards says the work generated through land development has reduced dramatically over the last couple of years, with a corresponding decrease in the number of survey field teams employed by the Company to do that work.
On 1 September, 1995, the Company’s international parent company approved redundancies as part of a restructuring programme. The Company’s Special Projects Department and some employees of the Perth survey department, including Ms Shipp, were made redundant on 11 and 12 September 1995. The work formerly performed by the filing clerks for the surveying teams reverted back to the surveyors and project managers to perform for themselves.
I am satisfied that the prospect of impending redundancies was not known to Mr Shipp at the time Ms Dalgleish left the Company, and that, while Ms Dalgleish has not been replaced, her termination was unrelated to the planned restructuring. Mr Shipp pointed out that they had been busy at the time and Ms Dalgleish’s departure was inconvenient. He says they had been too busy to replace her.
I accept that, had Ms Dalgleish still been employed with the Company as at 12 September 1995, then she would also have been made redundant, given the nature of her work as assistant to Ms Shipp. She would have therefore been employed for only an additional three weeks. She received two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice when she left on 21 August. She would presumably had received at least as much in lieu of notice had she been made redundant on 12 September 1995. It is unlikely she would have received more, given the short duration of her employment. The remuneration lost as a result of her leaving her employment was therefore three weeks’ wages.
The applicant also claimed compensation for the mental distress she suffered as a result of the termination. In Aitken v CMETSWUA - WA Branch 63 IR 1 at 9, Lee J said:
“...it may be appropriate to include in the measure of compensation to be paid pursuant to s170EE(2) a sum sufficient to compensate an employee for mental distress or injured feelings caused by a harsh, unjust or unreasonable termination of employment...
If guidance is sought from the measure of damages applied in contract for the breach of an employment contract by wrongful dismissal, damages may be awarded for the breach of an implied term that an employer would not so breach the contract as to cause vexation, mental distress, disappointment or frustration to an employee where such an adverse consequence for an employee may be said to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the employer and the employee...
Evidence was given by two doctors concerning Ms Dalgleish’s mental state. Dr Nicholas Beech, a general practitioner with some psychiatric experience, spoke with Ms Dalgleish on three occasions. He says that the termination of Ms Dalgleish’s employment “caused great psychological harm, both directly:
· fear of how she would cope with this baby and no income,
· enormous loss of self esteem and self confidence,
· insomnia, attacks of anxiety symptoms,
and indirectly:
·the night after she was sacked, [her boyfriend] began fights and arguments. How would they be able to cope on just his income?”
I also heard from Dr Mustac, a psychiatrist, who saw Ms Dalgleish on 13 December 1995 for about two hours. He accepted that Ms Dalgleish has sleep disturbance, excessive anxiety, apprehensiveness and difficulty in sleeping. He says a psychometric evaluation conducted by him suggested a mild-moderate depressive illness. He conceded it may have been worse in the months before December. However, he concluded that it was difficult to draw a direct connection between her present mental disorder and removal from work. He believed there were a number of other factors which are equally important and distressing to her, including her unplanned pregnancy, her age, her difficult relationship with her boyfriend which ultimately led to their break up, her problematic financial situation and her lack of family support.
While I have considerable sympathy for Ms Dalgleish given the circumstances in which she finds herself, it is difficult to identify any contribution on the part of the Company to her distress other than the loss of remuneration flowing from the fact of her no longer being employed. That loss would have happened three weeks later in any event.
I do not accept that the procedure or manner in which the termination took place contributed to Ms Dalgleish’s distress. I am satisfied that Ms Dalgleish was treated by Mr Shipp with dignity throughout, and that the parting was amicable. It was only later that Ms Dalgleish realised she had acted contrary to her own best interests and perhaps mistakenly came to feel that she had been “tricked” by the company.
Accordingly, I have awarded an amount in compensation equal to three weeks’ gross wages only. I have accepted the calculation of the respondent’s representative that that amount is $733.98.
I certify that this and the preceding 16 pages
are a true copy of the reasons for decision of
Judicial Registrar R.D. Farrell.Associate:
Dated:APPEARANCES
Counsel for the applicant: Mr M George
Ms V Ponnuthurai
Solicitors for the applicant: Bannerman Ziatas & RussellRepresentative of the respondent: Ms M. Marchese
Chamber of Commercial & Industry of Western Australia (Inc)
Dates of Hearing: 15 December 1995, 18 January, 1 & 7 February, 1996
Date of Judgment: 8 August 1996
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