Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Daley v SAS Trustee Corporation [2016] NSWCA 111 Hearing dates: 4 May 2016 Date of orders: 16 May 2016 Decision date: 16 May 2016 Before: McColl JA at [1]
Basten JA at [63]
Ward JA at [137]Decision: (1) Appeal allowed with costs.
(2) Set aside the orders made by Neilson DCJ on 28 July 2015.
(3) Remit the matter to the District Court in its residual jurisdiction for determination in accordance with the judgment of this Court as to the appropriate date in terms of s 10(1D) of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW) that payment of the additional amount of superannuation to the appellant takes effect, noting:
(a) The finding of the District Court that at all relevant times the appellant was, in terms of s 10(1A)(b), relevantly incapacitated commensurate with payment of an ‘additional amount’ of superannuation of 12.25% of the appellant’s attributed salary of office is not disturbed by these orders;
(b) These orders do not affect the entitlement of the parties to seek costs orders of the original hearing before Neilson DCJ or costs orders of any remittal hearing.Catchwords: APPEAL – statutory appeal – District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 142N – whether appellant aggrieved by award in point of law – whether primary judge determined appellant not an aggrieved person within meaning of s 21(1), Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW)
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – construing statute conferring jurisdiction on court – whether jurisdiction dependent on satisfaction of judge of court concerned – construing facultative provision
SUPERANNUATION – police superannuation – application to District Court for determination by person aggrieved by decision made by SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) – nature of jurisdiction – Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW), s 21(1)
SUPERANNUATION – police superannuation – entitlement to backdating of additional amount of annual superannuation allowance – where appellant did not seek backdating of additional amount in application for that payment – where STC determined additional amount payable from date application was received – application to District Court for determination in relation to STC’s decision as to commencement date of additional payment – Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW), s 10(1A)(b), s 10(1D)
WORDS AND PHRASES – “person aggrieved” – “decision” – “point of law” – “real merits and justice of the case” – Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW), s 21(1); District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 142J, s 142NLegislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 56
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), s 364
Compensation Court Act 2004 (NSW) , s 32
Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (NSW), Sch 7 [7]
District Court Act 1973 (NSW), ss 8, 142G, 142I, 142J, 142M, 142N; Div 8A
Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW), ss 10, 10B, 21
Small Debts Recovery Act 1912 (NSW), s 7
Superannuation Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (NSW)
Workers’ Compensation Act 1926 (NSW), s 36Cases Cited: Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172
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- Case
- [2016] NSWCA 111
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in finding that Mr Daley was not a "person aggrieved" by STC's decision for the purposes of s 21(1) of the *Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906* (NSW). This involved construing the meaning of "person aggrieved" and "decision" in that section, and considering whether the District Court's jurisdiction under s 21(1) was dependent on the judge being satisfied that the appellant was an aggrieved person. The court also considered the application of s 142N of the *District Court Act 1973* (NSW) regarding appeals on a point of law.
The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge had erred in his construction of s 21(1). The court reasoned that STC's determination of the commencement date for the additional superannuation allowance constituted a "decision" within the meaning of s 21(1), and that Mr Daley was a "person aggrieved" by that decision because it affected his entitlement to a payment. The court found that the primary judge had incorrectly applied a test that required the appellant to demonstrate that the decision was wrong on its merits, rather than simply that he was directly affected by it. The court emphasised that the jurisdiction conferred by s 21(1) was facultative and that the primary judge should have proceeded to determine the real merits and justice of the case.
The appeal was allowed with costs, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside. The matter was remitted to the District Court in its residual jurisdiction for determination of the appropriate date from which the additional superannuation payment should take effect, with the finding that Mr Daley was relevantly incapacitated for the payment of the additional amount undisturbed.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Appeal allowed with costs.
(2) Set aside the orders made by Neilson DCJ on 28 July 2015.
(3) Remit the matter to the District Court in its residual jurisdiction for determination in accordance with the judgment of this Court as to the appropriate date in terms of s 10(1D) of the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW) that payment of the additional amount of superannuation to the appellant takes effect, noting:
(a) The finding of the District Court that at all relevant times the appellant was, in terms of s 10(1A)(b), relevantly incapacitated commensurate with payment of an ‘additional amount’ of superannuation of 12.25% of the appellant’s attributed salary of office is not disturbed by these orders;
(b) These orders do not affect the entitlement of the parties to seek costs orders of the original hearing before Neilson DCJ or costs orders of any remittal hearing.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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