Dalais v The King

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCR 2023 0001

JACQUES DALAIS	Applicant
v
THE KING	Respondent

---

JUDGES:	MACAULAY JA and J FORREST AJA
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	1 August 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	23 August 2023
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2023] VSCA 195
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	[2022] VCC 2175 (Judge Kelly)

---

CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Sentence – Home invasion – Where applicant pleaded guilty on complicity basis – Whether judge erred in finding applicant entered home deliberately – Whether judge erred in finding actual entrance aggravated offence – Leave to appeal refused.

Crimes Act 1958 ss 77A, 323(1)(a), 324.

Elsayed v The Queen [2019] VSCA 113 applied.

---

Counsel
Applicant:		Mr PJ Smallwood
Respondent:		Mr CB Boyce KC
Solicitors
Applicant:	Garde Wilson Lawyers
Respondent:	Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

MACAULAY JA
J FORREST AJA:

Introduction

On 2 December 2022, the applicant, Jacques Dalais, now aged 47 years, pleaded guilty in the County Court to one charge of home invasion.[1]
[1]Contrary to s 77A of the Crimes Act 1958.
The applicant was charged on the basis that he was an accomplice of two other males who had violently and unlawfully entered a house in Carrum Downs. Following his plea, the applicant was sentenced on 7 December 2022 by his Honour Judge Kelly on one count of home invasion (maximum 25 years) to two years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and six months.
On 3 January 2023, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against the sentence on the following ground:[2]
The sentencing judge erred by finding that the applicant deliberately entered the victims’ home with the intention to affect [sic] a home invasion by assisting his co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants.
[2]For convenience, from here on in, the proposed ground will be referred to as a ‘ground’.
On the hearing, the application focused on the judge’s analysis of the applicant’s actions and intentions at and around the time the three entered the house. We have determined that no sentencing error has occurred and the application for leave to appeal should be refused. Our reasons follow.
Circumstances of the offending
In the early hours of 18 October 2020, the applicant, together with Patrick Iaulualo and Daniel Heaven, alighted from an Uber at the home of the Betteridge family (Paul, his wife Julie and son Jake) in Carrum Downs. Each wore a hood and a mask. Iaulualo was armed with a small high power butane gas torch.
The actions of the three in endeavouring to enter the house are depicted on CCTV footage taken from a camera located on the front porch of the house.
Iaulualo, Heaven and the applicant approached the front door which Iaulualo tried to open forcefully. The family inside were asleep and were awoken by the commotion of the three miscreants. Paul armed himself with a baseball bat and went to the front door. Heaven pulled at the front screen door, then Iaulualo violently kicked at the screen door three times before it collapsed, and the front door opened. During this episode, the applicant noticed a security camera on the side of the house, away from the porch. He walked to the camera and knocked it off its brackets, rendering it inoperable.
Iaulualo first entered the house followed by Heaven. A confrontation occurred with Paul, who used his baseball bat to fend off the attack by the two intruders. While Iaulualo and Heaven were inside the house, the applicant remained in the doorway on the front porch. Paul Betteridge yelled out to the group, ‘what do you want?’. Iaulualo responded, ‘I want to fight’.
Iaulualo and Heaven retreated temporarily and exited the house.
Iaulualo then resumed a fighting stance and re-entered the house. The applicant stood in the front doorway, was pushed by Heaven from behind and took hold of the doorframe not yet crossing the threshold. After this, the applicant released his arm from the doorframe and proceeded to enter the house, followed by Heaven. In the house, Iaulualo and Heaven continued to assault Paul. Heaven used the butane torch to hit Jake on the head. As Julie approached the front door, she fell in the hallway, and sustained an injury. The applicant was not involved in the assaults.
The applicant and his co-offenders remained in the house for approximately two minutes before leaving the premises at 12:11 am.
In varying degrees, each of the members of the family was physically and emotionally injured.

The charge

On 3 November 2021 the applicant was committed to trial in the County Court.
The applicant was charged with one count of home invasion. The particulars of the offence contained in the indictment read as follows:
The Director of Public Prosecutions charges that JACQUES DALAIS at Carrum Downs in Victoria on the 18th day of October 2020 entered as trespasser a home situated at 3 Tasman Court with intent to commit an offence involving an assault to a person therein and at the time JACQUES DALAIS was in company with DANIEL HEAVEN and PATRICK IAULUALO, and while DANIEL HEAVEN and PATRICK IAULUALO were present in the home, PAUL BETTERIDGE, JULIE BETTERIDGE and JAKE BETTERIDGE were then present in the house.
Statement of Offence - Home Invasion contrary to s 77A of the Crimes Act 1958.
As will become clear later, the applicant’s liability under s 77A was on the basis that he was complicit in the commission of the home invasion, as provided by ss 323(1)(a) and 324 of the Crimes Act 1958 (‘the Act’):
323 Interpretation
(1)For the purposes of this Subdivision, a person is involved in the commission of an offence if the person—
(a)intentionally assists, encourages or directs the commission of the offence …
324 Person involved in commission of offence taken to have committed the offence
(1) … if an offence (whether indictable or summary) is committed, a person who is involved in the commission of the offence is taken to have committed the offence and is liable to the maximum penalty for that offence.

The plea hearing

The applicant’s plea to the charge was heard on 2 December 2022.
Before going to what transpired at the hearing of the plea it is, we think, helpful to recite a couple of uncontroversial facts. First, this whole unhappy episode took place over a period of just two minutes, during which the two co-accused, assisted by the applicant, out of the blue, unlawfully entered a family home and attacked the occupants.
Secondly, at the commencement of the hearing, the applicant was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge of home invasion. At the outset, counsel for the applicant made it clear to the trial judge that he and the prosecutor
are in agreement that the other two co‑offenders are the principal offenders, and that Mr Dalais, that’s the French version, is charged as assisting those two offenders, and the assisting commences at the property.
He went on to say:
But I just want to make it clear, your Honour, that the charge against him is not that he was a principal, that he has been charged as we used to say, aiding and abetting, but now assisting.
The prosecutor then commenced to open the case, and said as follows:
The prosecution puts the charge on the basis of complicity pursuant to ss 324 and 323(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958, which provide that a person who assists, encourages or directs another to commit an offence is also criminally responsible for that offence and is liable to the maximum penalty.
In the course of the hearing, counsel for the applicant accepted that the applicant’s assistance, which formed the basis for the complicity charge, consisted of three things, namely:
(a)remaining at the premises after the co‑offenders began the attack on the front door;
(b)the attack on the security camera; and
(c)being and remaining outside the premises after the two co‑offenders entered.
However, counsel disputed the fact that the entry by the applicant into the premises was intentional and said that this matter had to be resolved by the judge.[3] In essence, it was contended that the applicant did not intentionally enter the premises, but was pushed by his co‑offender, Heaven. This, counsel said, meant that his subsequent entry could not be used as an aggravating factor as part of the sentencing exercise.
[3]The judge made this observation: ‘Very well. As you both know, if it’s relied upon by the prosecution as a feature in aggravation, it needs to be made out beyond reasonable doubt’.
Although it was not said in terms, it is clear that on the hearing the judge was required to determine whether, as an aggravating feature of the home invasion charge, the applicant intended to enter and did in fact enter the Betteridges’ home.
The prosecutor tendered the prosecution opening, the CCTV footage and the witness statements of the Betteridges who were not cross-examined. After outlining the circumstances of the police investigation, the disposition of the charges against the co‑offenders Iaulualo and Heaven,[4] and a reading of the victim impact statement, the prosecutor sought to play the CCTV footage.
[4]They were sentenced by his Honour Judge Lacava on 6 April 2022: DPP (Vic) v Heaven [2022] VCC 473.
Its relevance was explained to the judge by counsel for the applicant:
Your Honour would have noticed there was a part of the prosecution opening that seemed to indicate that my client voluntarily and intentionally entered the premises. That’s in dispute but as to exactly what happened from the time the three arrive till the time they leave, the footage gives a pretty fair indication of that.
The applicant then gave evidence as to what was depicted on the video and the role of each of the three accused. The applicant accepted that he had gone to the premises with the other two. He said that he disabled the camera because he had panicked. However, he said that that he knew nothing of his co-offenders’ plan until an Uber was called and the three men arrived at the Betteridges’ home.[5] He maintained that he had endeavoured to persuade the others to leave the premises and that he dragged Heaven and Iaulualo out of the house after the first entry.
[5]Reasons, [24]–[26].
On the applicant’s account, after he restrained Iaulualo and removed him from the house he was then pushed into the house by Heaven. In other words, the other two entered deliberately and he went in accidentally.
In cross‑examination, it was put to the applicant that his actions as depicted on the video did not reveal any reticence or him endeavouring to restrain (either by action or words) the actions of the co‑accused. The applicant rejected this, saying that he was yelling so loudly ‘the street would have heard me’. In essence, the cross‑examination turned upon inconsistencies between what could be seen on the CCTV footage and the applicant’s account. In addition, it was put to him that none of the Betteridges in their witness statements mentioned hearing the applicant endeavouring to restrain the other two.

The judge’s reasons

It is only necessary for the purpose of this application to refer to the judge’s analysis of the applicant’s role in the home invasion.
Under the heading ‘Factual dispute’, his Honour says as follows:
I was told at the start of the plea hearing that two matters relied on by the prosecution were in contention, namely the assertion that you knew what was intended to take place when you arrived at the Betteridge’s home, that is that their home was going to be invaded and, secondly, the assertion that your trespass into the home was deliberate. On your behalf, it was contended that your culpability only commenced in the seconds before Mr Iaulualo kicked in the Betteridge’s door and, secondly, that you were pushed into the home by Mr Heaven and did not enter it voluntarily.[6]
[6]Reasons, [23].
The judge set out the evidence given by the applicant and then reviewed the CCTV footage. He noted that it depicted the applicant wearing a hoodie and mask covering his face, accompanying his co-offenders to the Betteridges’ front door, and pointing out to Heaven a second CCTV camera which the applicant then disabled.[7]
[7]Reasons, [24]–[25].
The judge also considered correspondence between the Office of Public Prosecutions and the applicant’s solicitor, in which the resolution of the matter was confirmed on the basis that the applicant knew upon arrival at the Betteridges’ home that his co-offenders were there to effect a home invasion, and he had participated in it.[8]
[8]Reasons, [26].
The judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had formed the necessary intention to participate in a home invasion ‘upon alighting from the Uber or at the latest when the three of you gathered outside the Betteridge’s front door’.[9]
[9]Reasons, [27].
Turning to the second factual dispute, the judge stated that he had ‘viewed the CCTV footage a number of times to determine whether [the applicant’s] trespass was intentional or accidental’.[10]
[10]Reasons, [28].
The judge rejected the applicant’s evidence that he remonstrated with his co-offenders and implored them to stop. He found that the statements of each of the Betteridges, and the CCTV footage, were inconsistent with the applicant’s account.[11]
[11]Reasons, [28].
It is necessary to set out the following conclusionary passage from the judge’s reasons (remembering that this is within the part headed ‘Factual dispute’ and preceded by the judge’s setting out of the applicant’s evidence), upon which the applicant’s ground of appeal in this Court fastens:
The footage depicts you at one stage being pushed by Mr Heaven before you crossed the threshold of the Betteridge’s home, but you had recovered from this push by the time you entered the property and you entered it under your own steam. You then remained in the home for a number of seconds when your co-offenders further assaulted the Betteridges.
You also gave evidence that you pulled your co-offenders from the house at one stage. Whilst that is true, it occurs at a time when Paul Betteridge had armed himself with a baseball bat and was repelling your co-offenders who were forced to retreat from the house. You assisted in pulling them to safety. You then remained with them as hostilities resumed.
I do not accept that your actions in assisting your co-offenders to escape a battering by Paul Betteridge constitutes evidence in support of your claims to being a force for good and a benign presence. I note moreover that your evidence on this score comes close to traversing your plea, by which you have accepted each of the elements of home invasion. Accordingly, to the extent that it constitutes an aggravating feature of your offending, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you deliberately entered the Betteridge’s home, and you did so with the intention to effect a home invasion by assisting your co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants.[12]
[12]Reasons, [28]–[30] (emphasis added).

Submissions on the appeal

In the application for leave to appeal, the applicant advances one ground of appeal, that the judge erred in making the finding emphasised directly above.
In his written case, the applicant argues:
20.That finding (‘the impugned finding’) was not open. In making it, the sentencing judge:
20.1Took an irrelevant consideration into account, namely the applicant’s guilty plea;
20.2.Contravened the principles considered in R v De Simoni[13] and R v Newman & Turnbull[14] and sentenced the applicant on a basis that was not consistent with the applicant’s liability deriving from ss 323(1) and 324 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic); and
20.3.Acted on a circumstance of aggravation, namely that the applicant had the intention reflected in the finding when he entered the house, that had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
[13](1981) 147 CLR 383 (‘Di Simoni’).
[14][1997] 1 VR 146 (‘Newman’).
In the submissions on behalf of the applicant it was observed that the satisfaction of the charge did not require him to enter the house, as the prosecution’s case against him relied upon the complicity provisions of the Act, namely ss 323(1)(a) and 324. Moreover, it was said that his guilty plea did not constitute an admission to actually entering the home deliberately, with an intention to effect a home invasion by assisting his co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants.
Further, the applicant submitted that the impugned finding revealed that the judge impermissibly had regard, in aggravation of the offence of home invasion, to facts that constituted an offence of which the applicant had not been convicted:[15] being a second home invasion informed by different facts (and a different mode of liability) to the facts (and mode of liability) that satisfied the elements of the charge before the sentencing judge. He submitted that the impugned finding was not consistent with the applicant’s liability, which derived from ss 323(1)(a) and 324 of the Act.
[15]Contrary, the applicant submitted, to Di Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383, 389, 392 (Gibbs CJ) and Newman [1997] 1 VR 146, 150–2 (Winneke P). The applicant also referred to Elsayed [2019] VSCA 113, [56]–[65] (Kaye and Weinberg JJA) and Jackson v The Queen [2020] VSCA 95, [68]–[77] (Croucher AJA).
Finally, the applicant submitted that the evidence did not establish, beyond reasonable doubt, a conclusion that the applicant’s entry into the house was accompanied by an intention to effect a home invasion by assisting Heaven and Iaulualo in their assaults upon the occupants.
The Director contended that it was open to the judge to find that the applicant had deliberately entered the victim’s home with the intention to effect a home invasion by assisting his co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants.
The Director argued that in finding the applicant deliberately entered the home, the judge did not take an irrelevant consideration into account, namely the guilty plea. The Director submitted that the judge ‘clearly’ relied upon the CCTV footage rather than the guilty plea, and referred to the judge’s finding that the CCTV footage depicted the applicant entering the property ‘under his own steam’.
The Director submitted that the applicant had isolated one sentence from the judge’s reasons, and that that sentence should be read in its context, commencing from [23] of the judge’s reasons. The Director said:
The sentencing judge is referring to both issues that were in dispute on the plea. This sentence appears at the concluding paragraph of the factual findings and in no way links the plea of guilty to this specific factual finding. The reference to ‘Accordingly…’ concludes the factual findings made under the heading ‘Factual Dispute’.
The Director accepted that the offence was complete at the moment the co-accused first entered the Betteridges’ home. However, she submitted that the applicant’s entering of the home, and the co-accused’s re-entering of the home, constituted a continuation of the offence. She submitted that those subsequent events did not need to form the subject of a separate charge.
The Director submitted that the first and second entries into the house constituted a single act of criminal activity, and that it would be unfair to indict the applicant in relation to a second charge of home invasion that was connected to the first entry to the property.[16]
[16]The Director referred to Elsayed [2019] VSCA 113, [63].
The Director argued that the sentence imposed, being a term of imprisonment of two years and six months, reflected the single offence that was committed. She submitted that had the applicant been sentenced for an additional offence of home invasion as a circumstance of aggravation, it would be expected that a much higher sentence would have been imposed.

Consideration

It is convenient to commence by summarising the applicant’s ground of appeal as comprising three main strands of argument:
(a)First, the judge, did rely, but should not have relied, upon the applicant’s plea of guilty to make a finding that the applicant had entered the home with an intention to assist his co-offenders in assaulting the victims.
(b)Secondly, such an intention could not have been established beyond reasonable doubt, as the evidence stood.
(c)Thirdly, even if such an intention were established, it, together with the act of trespass which it accompanied, should not have been taken into account as an aggravating circumstance due to the principles enunciated in R v Di Simoni (‘Di Simoni’),[17] R v Newman (‘Newman’)[18] and Elsayed v The Queen (‘Elsayed’).[19]
[17](1981) 147 CLR 383 (‘Di Simoni’).
[18][1997] 1 VR 146 (‘Newman’).
[19][2019] VSCA 113 (‘Elsayed’).
In eight paragraphs of his reasons, under the heading ‘Factual dispute’, the judge considered the evidence of the applicant and the victims, and the CCTV footage, in order to resolve two questions, the second of which was whether the applicant entered the home deliberately.
The applicant’s argument on the judge’s affirmative finding on that question turns on the judge’s reference to the plea of guilty. The parties advance opposing readings of the following sentence:
Accordingly, to the extent that it constitutes an aggravating feature of your offending, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you deliberately entered the Betteridge’s home, and you did so with the intention to effect a home invasion by assisting your co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants.[20]
[20]Reasons, [30].
The applicant says that it amounts to the judge revealing that he had used the applicant’s guilty plea to find that the applicant had entered the Betteridges’ home with the requisite intention.
The Director rejects that analysis. It is contended that the judge was merely noting that it was not open to the applicant to advance a position that he had been actively trying to prevent the offending, because the applicant had pleaded guilty.[21]
[21]If the applicant had been actively trying to prevent the offender, that may well have rendered him not guilty of the offence charged: see eg, Crimes Act 1958 s 324(2):
It is important to appreciate that the ‘intention’ spoken of in relation to the second disputed fact was only the voluntariness of the action of crossing the threshold; not the mens rea of the substantive offence of home invasion which was never (properly) in issue. Crossing the threshold was relied upon by the Crown as the applicant continuing to assist the offending[22] which was commenced, so far as the applicant was concerned, by him encouraging and assisting his co-offenders from the porch area when they entered the house. All the while his actions were accompanied by an intention that the occupants be assaulted. By his plea, the applicant had admitted that relevant intention. The relevance of voluntarily crossing the threshold into the house only went to the content of his ‘assistance’ and it did not require any additional evidence as to his subjective intention that the occupants be assaulted.
[22]Reasons, [17].
On the applicant’s submission, in the passage extracted above, the word ‘Accordingly’ links the judge’s comment about the applicant’s guilty plea to the judge’s conclusion that the applicant entered the home with the requisite intention.
However, we think the Director is correct in her submission that the word ‘Accordingly’ does not link the plea of guilty to the judge’s factual finding that the applicant entered the house with the requisite deliberateness. Rather, as the Director submitted, it appears that the sentence beginning with ‘Accordingly’ serves as a general conclusion to [23]–[30] of the reasons.
The Director’s interpretation sits comfortably with the balance of the discussion and findings of the judge under the heading and is consistent with how this issue had been presented to him by counsel for the applicant and the prosecutor. We are satisfied that the judge’s findings were based on the evidence and did not involve consideration of the applicant’s plea of guilty.
As to the second issue (whether it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant entered the home with the intention to assist his co-offenders to assault the victims), we reiterate that the applicant’s intention to assist his co-offenders to assault the victims was not the ‘intention’ that was in dispute before the judge. It was only the deliberateness of the entry itself. The judge did not approach that factual question as if it was a component of a separate, principal-based offence. Thus, the judge was not required to redetermine the question of the applicant’s admitted intention to effect a home invasion that involved his co-offenders assaulting the occupants. The addition of the words, ‘and you did so with the intention to effect a home invasion by assisting your co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants’ merely restated the continuing intention which accompanied all of the applicant’s assistance to his co-offenders.
So much was obvious in any event from what can be observed from the CCTV footage. Particularly relevant is the fact that the applicant entered the house after the following events had unfolded:
(a)Heaven had forcefully pulled at the front door to try to open it.
(b)Iaulualo had violently kicked at the screen door three times until the security door caved in.
(c)Iaulualo had said to Paul Betteridge ‘I want to fight’.
(d)After Iaulualo and Heaven had initially been repelled from the home, Iaulualo continued to assume a fighting stance, and re-entered the home.
Immediately after these events had occurred, and being in close proximity to them, the applicant decided to enter the home. His continuing intention could not have been clearer.
The third and final issue is this: whether the applicant’s entrance into the home should have been taken into account as an aggravating circumstance.
The applicant’s argument turns upon a fine distinction between Iaulualo and Heaven’s first entrance into the house; and Iaulualo’s second entrance into the house, followed by the entrance of the applicant and Heaven. It is said that the second entrance was a ‘second home invasion informed by different facts (and a different mode of liability)’ to the first entrance.
In our view, that submission is completely without foundation and ignores the reality of this terrifying, unprovoked attack in the middle of the night.
In Elsayed, Kaye and Weinberg JJA said:
The foregoing review of the authorities indicates that the principle, that a sentencing judge should take into account all the relevant circumstances concerning the commission of the offence for which the offender has been charged, does not permit the judge to take into account, by way of aggravation, circumstances which would have warranted the conviction of the offender for a more serious offence. As Winneke P observed in Newman, it is not, generally, easy to delineate where the permissible consideration of circumstances surrounding the commission of an offence ends, and punishment for an uncharged offence commences. Ultimately, the question is one of fact, degree, and fairness. However, it is clear that the principle does not proscribe a judge taking into account, as an aggravating circumstance, conduct which may constitute some uncharged offence, but which, properly considered, formed part of or was connected with the offending, and which constituted offending that was of lesser seriousness than the offence that has been charged.[23]
[23][2019] VSCA 113, [63] (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Patently, the facts which gave rise to the first entrance were the same facts, or at least sufficiently similar facts, as those giving rise to the second entrance. Indeed, the CCTV footage shows that after the offenders were repelled from the home, they did not move from their position at the front door. Iaulualo continued to assume a fighting stance, and Heaven and the applicant continued to stand behind Iaulualo, until Iaulualo once again advanced into the house, whereupon Heaven and the applicant immediately followed. On the CCTV footage, no more than 45 seconds elapsed between the first and second entrances. The whole episode, as we have mentioned, took less than two minutes. The distinction advanced by the applicant is pedantic and without merit. Indeed, it is an invitation to the prosecution in a case such as this to charge the offenders with separate counts of home invasion which would be, in our view, artificial.
As for the applicant’s attempt to distinguish the first and second entrances on the basis that they were informed by ‘different mode[s] of liability’, that too must fail. So much is evident from the language of s 324 of the Crimes Act 1958 set out above.
Section 324 does not render the complicit offender guilty of a different offence. Rather, the secondary, or complicit, offender is ‘taken to have committed the offence’ that the principal offender commits. As we have said, the applicant’s own entry upon the premises did not mark the commencement of some new, principal-based offending, but the continuation of the assistance and encouragement which was the basis of his complicity. Accordingly, the fact that the applicant pleaded guilty on a complicity basis is not a reason to draw the distinction he contends for.
So, in our view, it was well open to the judge to find that the applicant deliberately entered the Betteridges’ home with an intention to effect a home invasion by assisting his co-offenders in their assaults upon the occupants during the entire episode. The judge was not precluded from taking this into account as an aggravating factor.
Accordingly, none of the applicant’s arguments has been made out and the only ground of appeal must fail.

Conclusion

For the reasons expressed above, orders to the following effect will be made:
(1)Leave to appeal on ground 1 is refused.
---

(2)… a person is not taken to have committed an offence if the person withdraws from the offence.

Note
The common law recognises that in certain circumstances a person may withdraw from an offence in which the person would otherwise be complicit: for example, White v Ridley [1978] HCA 38; (1978) 140 CLR 342; R v Tietie, Tulele and Bolamatu (1988) 34 A Crim R 438; R v Jensen and Ward [1980] VicRp 24; [1980] VR 194.

[2023] VSCA 195

23 August 2023