JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: DAKIN FARMS PTY LTD -v- ELITE GRAINS PTY LTD [2012] WADC 43
CORAM: COMMISSIONER GETHING
HEARD: 21 MARCH 2012
DELIVERED : 30 MARCH 2012
FILE NO/S: CIV 2787 of 2011
BETWEEN: DAKIN FARMS PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
BALWYN NOMINEES PTY LTD
Second PlaintiffAND
ELITE GRAINS PTY LTD
First DefendantRODNEY NORMAN CULLETTON
Second DefendantIOANNA CULLETTON
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Costs - Indemnity costs - Special costs orders - Orders removing scale limits
Legislation:
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 280
Result:
Appeal from Deputy Registrar dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
First Plaintiff : Mr C P K Russell
Second Plaintiff : Mr C P K Russell
First Defendant : Mr T Lethbridge
Second Defendant : Mr T Lethbridge
Third Defendant : Mr T Lethbridge
Solicitors:
First Plaintiff : King and Wood Mallesons
Second Plaintiff : King and Wood Mallesons
First Defendant : Kott Gunning
Second Defendant : Kott Gunning
Third Defendant : Kott Gunning
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2011] WASC 268 (S2)
Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority [2003] WASC 122 (S)
Hazart Pty Ltd v Rademaker (1993) 11 WAR 26
Heartlink Ltd v Jones As Liquidator of HL Diagnostics Pty Ltd (in liq) [2007] WASC 254 (S)
Hodgkinson v Doepel & Associates Architects Pty Ltd [2006] WASC 237 (S)
Miller v Evans [2010] WASC 127 (S)
O'Rouke v P & B Corporation Pty Ltd [2008] WASC 36 (S)
SDS Corporation v Pasdonnay Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 26 (S)
Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd [No 6] [2010] WASC 228
COMMISSIONER GETHING: By writ filed 24 August 2011, the plaintiffs claimed:
(a)the price of oats sold and delivered by the first plaintiff to the first defendant;
(b)certain payments due under an agreement by which the first plaintiff provided swathing and harvesting services to the first defendant; and
(c)damages for repudiation by the second and third defendants of lease between them and the second plaintiff.
I was advised from the bar table that the total amount of the claim is in the vicinity of $300,000.
By application dated 18 October 2011 the defendants sought a stay of the action pending the outcome of an arbitration commenced by the defendants against the plaintiffs with Grain Trade Australia (GTA) on 6 September 2011. The court made orders by consent programming the application through to a special appointment after 2 January 2012.
It is apparent from the affidavit material filed that there is a factual dispute between the parties as to whether the GTA Rules and the GTA Arbitration Rules were incorporated into the sale agreement between the first plaintiff and first defendant. The arbitration was commenced pursuant to the GTA Arbitration Rules.
In its submissions filed 20 December 2011, the defendants stated that the issue of the…
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- Case
- [2012] WADC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that there was no binding arbitration agreement between the parties. The court also held that the plaintiff's conduct was not unreasonable, and that the defendant's application for indemnity costs was not misconceived. The court noted that the hourly rates to apply in assessing costs should not be in excess of the hourly rates allowed in the Scale merely because a party's solicitor or counsel have charged at a higher rate. The court also held that there was no evidence provided by the plaintiffs as to the particular expertise or experience of Ms Pope, Mr Abbott (counsel) or any other person who may have performed work for the plaintiffs. There was also no evidence led as to why the case was of such 'unusual complexity or importance' that the case 'warrants the special expertise of the practitioner involved and warrants an increase in the hourly rate'. The court declined to make an order increasing the maximum hourly rates.
The court held that the defendant was entitled to indemnity costs and special costs orders removing the scale limits. The court held that the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable and that the defendant's application for indemnity costs was not misconceived. The court held that the plaintiff was liable to pay the defendant's costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis, and that the scale limits were removed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court should not order that the hourly rates to apply in assessing costs should be in excess of the hourly rates allowed in the Scale merely because a party's solicitor or counsel have charged at a higher rate: Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd [2011] WASC 268 (S2) [7]. The purpose of the hourly rate is to set a benchmark for use in costs determinations based on current practice in the legal profession in Western Australia. This point is made by Pullin J in Flotilla Nominees Pty Ltd v Western Australian Land Authority [2003] WASC 122 (S); 28 WAR 95 [22]:The whole point of the existing scale is that the rates are struck by reference to what is being charged within the profession. It is true that the hourly rates can only be an average or mean of the upper rates determined in the survey, and there will be some cases where the unusual complexity or importance of the case warrants the special expertise of the practitioner involved and warrants an increase in the hourly rate. In some cases not involving unusual complexity or importance, the higher rates paid will not be recoverable. A party is always entitled to the luxury of retaining the highest paid practitioners in the conduct of their case, but they cannot always expect to recover these costs from the other party. No evidence is provided by the plaintiffs as to the particular expertise or experience of Ms Pope, Mr Abbott (counsel) or any other person who may have performed work for the plaintiffs. There is also no evidence led as to why the case was of such 'unusual complexity or importance' that the case 'warrants the special expertise of the practitioner involved and warrants an increase in the hourly rate'. No evidence is provided by the plaintiffs as to the rate charged by counsel, or even that counsel's hourly rate is in excess of the hourly rate allowed under the Scale. I decline to make an order increasing the maximum hourly rates. It is possible that an order for the payment of indemnity costs may lead to an order in excess of the scale. Accordingly, it is appropriate that I consider an order for the payment of costs on an indemnity basis as a separate head. I have set out the law generally in relation to the payment of indemnity costs in par [13] above. The plaintiffs submit that the defendants' application was misconceived on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that there was a binding arbitration agreement between the parties. Their solicitors appeared to have prepared the application on the basis that it was sufficient that there be an arguable case that there was an arbitration agreement, the issue to be determined by the arbitrator. It later accepted that the District Court had to make a factual finding as to whether a valid arbitration agreement existed. The plaintiffs relied on the decision in Staley v Pivot Group Pty Ltd [No 6] [2010] WASC 228 (S), where an indemnity costs order was considered appropriate [18]. Kenneth Martin J made remarks about the plaintiff's conduct in that case being:(a)'the plaintiff's ongoing adjustments to its case' [22];(b)the case had 'hallmarks of a work in progress as it continued to evolve' [18]; and(c)'the conduct of the trial in that evolving way, in my view, was wholly unnecessary and unreasonable, reflecting inadequate preparation by way of proofing of witnesses and a failure to come to grips with some in principle deficiencies in the claim at a much earlier time' [18].