The judgment of the Court was delivered by
GRIFFITH C.J. These are appeals from the refusal of the Registrar of Trade Marks to accept two applications for the registration of the word "Daimler" as a trade mark in respect of motor cars, aeroplanes and other machines of a like kind. The word "Daimler," which was the surname of one Gottlieb Daimler, a German, is said to come within clause (e) of the new list of registrable trade marks contained in sec. 16 (1) of the Trade Marks Act 1905 as amended in 1912, which is: Any other distinctive mark" (that is, other than those previously enumer- ated), "but a name, signature, or word or words, other than such as fall within the descriptions in the above paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) shall not, except by order of the Registrar, Law Officer, or Court, be deemed a distinctive mark."
For the purposes of these applications it is assumed, and rightly assumed, that Daimler" is to be treated as a word, not a name of anybody, and therefore not as within clause (a) and it is also assumed to be a surname, which is expressly excluded by clause (d). It was therefore necessary, in order that the applica- tion for registration should be accepted, that a declaration should be obtained that the word should be deemed to be a distinctive mark. A great deal of evidence was given before the Registrar to establish that it was in fact distinctive of the applicants' goods. He was not satisfied with it, and declined to make the declaration. He therefore refused to accept the applications, and the matter now comes before us.
Upon the evidence it appears to us that the word Daimler" has acquired in the Commonwealth of Australia a distinctive meaning, namely, that goods bearing that name are the product of the appellants' factory. It appears, however, incidentally that besides the products of the appellants' factory a few of the pro- ducts of the factories of at least two other manufacturers, namely, the Austro-Daimler Co. and the Milnes-Daimler Co., have been brought to Australia, and it is suggested that if the word "Daimler" alone were registered as a trade mark those two companies might possibly be prejudiced. That may be doubtful, but there can be no objection to precautions being taken to prevent injustice being done to them, and the Court has ample power to secure their protection under the provisions of