DAH22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

[2022] FedCFamC2G 662

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 2)

DAH22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 662

File number(s):	BRG 226 of 2021
Judgment of:	JUDGE VASTA
Date of judgment:	4 August 2022
Catchwords:	MIGRATION – Protection Visa – whether Administrative Appeal Tribunal decision affected by jurisdictional error – where no error established in Administrative Appeal Tribunal’s decision – application dismissed
Legislation:	Migration Act 1958 (Cth): s 5J, s 5H, s 91X, s 424A
Cases:	Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs:	58
Date of last submission/s:	4 August 2022
Date of hearing:	4 August 2022
Place:	Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicants:	Mr Wells
Solicitor for the Applicants:	Mackenzie Mitchell Solicitors
Counsel for the Respondents:	Ms Hoiberg
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

BRG 226 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

DAH22 (BY HIS LITIGATION GUARDIAN, DAJ22)
First Applicant

DAI22 (BY HIS LITIGATION GUARDIAN, DAJ22)
Second Applicant

DAJ22
Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

order made by:	JUDGE VASTA
DATE OF ORDER:	4 AUGUST 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r.11.10 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2)(General Federal Law) Rules 2021 DAJ22 be appointed Litigation Guardian for DAH22 and DAI22

2.The application filed on 1 June 2021 be dismissed.

3.The Litigation Guardian pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application fixed in the sum of $7,853.

4.The name of the First Respondent be amended to read “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

A.The Court will not provide a written version of the reasons for judgment delivered today, unless an appeal has been lodged or the Court has received a request in writing from either party seeking that written reasons be produced.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex Tempore)

JUDGE VASTA

1. On 27 April 2021, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT/Tribunal”) affirmed a decision not to grant the Applicants, DAH22 and DAI22, protection visas.  Through their litigation guardian, the Applicants, on 1 June 2021, asked this Court to review that decision. 

2. The background to the matter is that the Applicants are brothers.  Their parents came to Australia via boat in 2013.  Both children were born whilst their parents were under the care of Australia via either detention or bridging visas. 

3. As it is now, the children are still young, aged five and seven.  Their father has been deported to Vietnam, and the mother is still in Australia though she cannot apply for another visa.  This matter has been before the delegate, has been before the Tribunal, was taken to the Federal Court and remitted back to the Tribunal; it is now before this Court. 

4. The Applicants’ claims, via their litigation guardian, were that they were stateless and did not have the right to citizenship or the right to reside in any country and had never lived in Vietnam; were Roman Catholics and baptised in the Catholic faith; that they would be persecuted because of their religious views; and would also be persecuted because of the infamous incident at the Con Cuong Parish Church in 2012.

5. The Applicants said that their family, that is, their mother and father, had been specifically targeted; they fear that they would be prohibited from practising their religion.  The Applicants claim that their mother, having participated in a number of demonstrations against the policies and activities of the Vietnamese Government both in Vietnam and Australia, would be subject to arrest and persecution by that government if the mother returned to Vietnam.  They claim that because the parents left Vietnam illegally and travelled to Australia to seek asylum, the Applicants would then be stigmatised and treated as traitors by the Vietnamese Government, and by school authorities and society generally. 

6. They fear that they will be denied public services and essential rights such as an education.  They fear that their parents would be arrested when they return, and that they would be separated from them, and orphaned and abandoned or even imprisoned with their parents; that they will be subject to persecution wherever they lived in Vietnam. 

7. The Applicant DAI22 has an allergy, and it is claimed that medicines for the control of anaphylaxis are not available in Vietnam, and therefore his life will be in danger by living in Vietnam.

8. It is claimed that a technical error in the Federal Law search-engine function of the Commonwealth Courts Portal enabled the name of (the pseudonym of the Applicant) to be revealed and that, contrary to s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), there was an opportunity for persons to see his true name and that such information may have become known to the Vietnamese Government or other parties, exposing him to the risks that he had already claimed he would be subjected to.

9. There was also a claim that the criminal history of the father or his status as a victim of human trafficking may expose the Applicants to those risks. 

10. The AAT looked at all of those claims.  In essence, they found that the Applicants were not stateless, and that they were citizens of Vietnam and that Vietnam is the country of nationality and the receiving country of the Applicants. 

11. The AAT found that the Applicants would not have any impediments to the practice of their religion such that those impediments would amount to persecution. The AAT found that, with regard to the mother’s political activities, her claims regarding her political activities were contrived, and that the children would not suffer any consequences from those activities because of the fact of contrivance, and that they would not have been of any interest to the Vietnamese Authorities.

12. With regard to the illegal departure from Vietnam, the Tribunal found that the Applicants would not suffer persecution because of the fact of being failed asylum seekers and returnees to Vietnam.  With regard to the food allergies of DAI22, the AAT found that there would be an ability to obtain medication such that there would be no persecution, discrimination or marshalling of social attitudes against the child.

13. The AAT found that the technical error leading to the disclosure of the name of DAH22 would not give rise to any appreciable additional risk and that the criminal history of the father would not give rise to any well-founded fear because of that.  The AAT found that, cumulatively, for all matters that have been claimed, there would not be a real chance that the Applicants would be persecuted for any reason, including race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. 

14. The AAT found that their fear of persecution is not well-founded as required by s 5J of the Act and, therefore, they were not refugees within the meaning of s 5H.

15. The AAT then considered complementary protection and, having regard to country information as well, found that the Applicants did not meet the criteria for complementary protection. 

16. Having come to those conclusions, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the Applicants protection visas.

17. The application today was argued on the basis of five distinct points which were all said to give rise to jurisdictional error. 

18. The first two grounds, realistically, are matters that can be assessed at the same time.  The point of these two grounds is a contention that the AAT considered an irrelevant matter in coming to its conclusion.  The irrelevant consideration is said to be that the mother was engaging in activities in Australia that were critical of the Vietnamese Government, but that her motivation for such engagement was to bolster any claims.

19. Now, it must be remembered that the Tribunal was looking at the claims of the children of the mother and not the mother herself.  The claim was made that the mother, having participated in a number of demonstrations against the policies and activities of the Vietnamese Government, would be subject to arrest and persecution by the government if she returned to Vietnam. If that occurred then it means that the children would be separated from their mother and, effectively, orphaned or abandoned, and that they fear they that they may even be imprisoned with the mother. 

20. The other aspect to the claim was that the children themselves would be inferred to have had the same political views as the mother, notwithstanding their very young ages, and that having had those political views, the children would be subjected to serious harm.

21. For the Tribunal to come to grips with this particular claim, it needed to understand what the political activities of the mother truly were.  The Tribunal noted the evidence from the mother was that she was involved in two protests that could be said to be against the Vietnamese Communist Party.  They were a protest on 30 March 2018 against the Communist Party in support of imprisoned members of the Brotherhood for Democracy and a candlelight vigil on 28 October 2018 at Freedom Place in Inala to pray for human rights, democracy and freedom of speech in Vietnam.

22. There were other protests in which the mother was said to have been involved.  They were protests on 10 June, 14 July, 2 September and 29 September 2018 at the Inala Civic Centre and in the Brisbane CBD against the granting of long-term leases over property in Vietnam to Chinese entities and/or the Chinese Communist Party.  She was also involved in a protest on 6 October 2019 in the Brisbane CBD against the Chinese Communist Party in relation to the invasion of Vietnam by the occupation of the Paracel and Spratly Islands and a maritime incident on 20 July 2019 said to constitute a violation of Vietnamese sovereignty.

23. At the hearing on 6 August 2020, there were two photographs, one depicting a small protest where a sign in English reads “Down with communist Vietnam” and the second photograph has a child holding a placard that reads: “Communist China stop infiltrating Australia”.

24. On 20 August 2020, the Applicants gave the Tribunal a post-hearing submission which included a statutory declaration from the mother.  In that statutory declaration she clarified that the protest, on 2 September 2018, was also against the Vietnamese Government’s cyber-security law which she said was intended to silence the voice of the Vietnamese people as well as that same protest being against the Chinese expansion into Vietnamese areas.

25. The mother also gave further photos of different protests that she had attended; one of those depicts her with or near a flag of South Vietnam, as that country then was prior to 1975.  The mother also said at paragraph 9 of her statutory declaration:

    In 2020 I have continued my political activities by writing and sharing articles through social media which oppose the Communist Government of Vietnam in unjust treatment of the people of Vietnam.

26. On 16 March 2021, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicants, pursuant to s 424A of the Act, noting that there was no evidence given to the Tribunal to support the claim that the mother had been active on social media opposing the Vietnamese Government. On 30 March 2021, the Applicants responded with copies of a number of social media posts. At paragraph 59, 60 and 61 of the Reasons, the AAT said this:

    59. I consider it relevant that all of the items included post-date the hearing, and that there is no evidence of activity between 6 October 2019 and 17 August 2020.  The items she has posted are, in each case, a simple re-posting of items composed by others; in each case but one, they are not accompanied by any commentary of her own.  The exception is a single-line comment, “Pray for Thien An Monastery,” to a reposting of a YouTube video on 17 August 2020.  One item, dated 26 October 2020, at first glance appears to contain commentary from her but on closer inspection merely copies and pastes someone else’s press release (which is reposted below her purported comment).

    60. The conclusion I have reached on the evidence presented is that [the mother’s] claimed political activity, which commenced only after the rejection of this claim by the previous Tribunal (which had made a positive finding on the mother’s own evidence, that she held no political views critical of the Vietnamese regime), was passive and temporary in nature.  She maintained the activity throughout 2018, which is well self‑documented.  At the hearing, her descriptions of her political beliefs were vague and showed little insight into the issues to which she claimed to be committed.

    61. On the evidence, [the mother] has not satisfied the Tribunal that she has engaged in her claimed political activity otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the claims.

27. Paragraph 61 is expressed in similar terms as s 5J(6) of the Act which reads as follows:

    (6)  In determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person's claim to be a refugee.

28. The Applicants contend that, in expressing itself in the manner in which the AAT did in paragraph 61, the Tribunal has, in effect, attempted to assess the claims of the children as if they were assessing the claims of the mother. If paragraph 61 were in fact a conclusion on s 5J(6) regarding the mother, this is an irrelevant consideration to the claims of the children.

29. At paragraph 63 of the Reasons, the Tribunal says:

    The post-hearing submission argues that “the Tribunal only approached the evidence of [the mother’s] political activities in relation to those activities which oppose the expansion of China into Vietnam’s special economic zone”.  The Tribunal’s questions to [the mother] were directed towards eliciting an explanation as to why these activities, conducted in Australia might expose her or the applicants to the risk of persecution, when the views articulated by these activities appear to have popular support in Vietnam.  In view of the country information that any official suppression of the public articulation of these views in Vietnam was directed at those identified with leading or participating in localised violent disorder, I cannot be satisfied that her peaceful expression of similar views in Australia gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of imputed political opinion on the part of the applicants.  For the same reason I also cannot be satisfied that there is well-founded fear of persecution of the mother by reason of her imputed political opinion that would result in persecution of, or the risk of serious harm to, the applicants.

30. The Applicants claim that this conclusion was infected by the consideration of the mother’s claims and the finding made pursuant to s 5J(6). The Applicants claim that this conclusion was made through the lens of the irrelevant consideration. The Applicants claim that this preoccupation with the consideration of the claims of the mother could not be quarantined from what it was that the AAT had to do with the application of the children.

31. I cannot agree with this submission. If the Tribunal were truly equating the claims of the mother with the claims of the children, (such that a finding adverse to the mother on s 5J(6) was a finding against the children), then, having made the conclusion at paragraph 61, the Tribunal would have ceased any further consideration because it now was able to discount those claims. But it did not do that. It went ahead and looked at the claims of the children.

32. It must be remembered that the claim was that the mother’s political activity would affect the children because they would be perceived as having the same political outlook as the mother, and, if the mother were imprisoned because of her political outlook, the consequences for the children would be dire and devastating.  In those circumstances it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to assess the political activity of the mother.  In assessing the activity, the Tribunal needed to look at whether the activity was genuine.

33. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the activity was not genuine; nevertheless, the mother had still engaged in that activity.  The fact that the mother had engaged in the activity was an essential part of the claim of the children.  Whether that engagement was genuine or not, the Tribunal had to assess whether the children would be imputed with the same political conviction and whether the mother would suffer consequences that would have dire effects upon the children.

34. Given that the activity of the mother was not genuine, the Tribunal had to assess the children’s claim in light of that finding; this is what it did at paragraph 63 of their reasons.  The Tribunal then went further, in paragraphs 65, 66 and 67, as to with what political opinion the children would be imputed.  After detailing what the Applicants’ post-hearing submission was, the Tribunal said this at paragraph 65:

    65. In my view, this submission is misconceived.  In CAH17 v the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 119 at [19], Flick J held “the claims made by the son necessarily had to be resolved by reference to the evidence given by the mother on his “behalf”, together with such other evidence as there was available. The adverse finding made by the Tribunal as to the “credibility” of the mother’s evidence could not be divorced from such evidence as she gave on her own behalf and that given on behalf of her son”.

    66. I have taken into account the evidence that shows the applicants present at political rallies but, given their very young ages and the extremely limited amount they were able to tell the Tribunal, consider that their presence could only have been at the behest of the mother.  In light of the approach taken by the Federal Court in CAH17, I am not prepared to accept a submission that the Tribunal is bound to find that the applicants have a better claim to an imputed political opinion than that of the person who expressed the opinion. 

    67. For the reasons in paragraph 60, I am not satisfied that [the mother’s] claims of political activism are motivated for reasons other than strengthening the visa application.  I do not consider that her claimed political activity is other than contrived.  Having regard to that finding and to the DFAT country information report at chapter 5.29, that returns to Vietnam are usually done on the understanding that the individuals in question will not face charges as a result of making an application for protection, I do not consider the political activities in which she has engaged would be of any interest to the Vietnamese Authorities.  Therefore, I am not satisfied that there is a real chance of harm to her or the applicants on the grounds claimed.  Accordingly, I am not satisfied there is any evidence for a well-founded fear of persecution on the part of [the pseudonym] and [the pseudonym] on the grounds of imputed political opinion.

1. I am of the view that the conclusions that the AAT made about the genuineness or otherwise of the mother’s political activity was not an irrelevant consideration;  it was needed to be made to understand what it was that the children would necessarily be, or could potentially be, imputed with.  That would be the end of this ground.  However, even if I were incorrect and this matter of the mother’s political beliefs were an irrelevant consideration, the Applicants have not persuaded me on the balance of probabilities that it was material to the outcome. 

2. Other than to say that the irrelevant material must have made a difference or “how could it not have made a difference” is simply insufficient to prove to me on the balance of probabilities that it was material to the outcome.  The AAT has made a finding that the children would not be imputed with the supposed political opinion of the mother and that the children would not suffer from anything that would happen to the mother upon her return to Vietnam because nothing, according to the AAT, would happen to the mother.  For those reasons grounds one and two, therefore, fail.

3. Ground three is that the comment of the Tribunal, at paragraph 59 of their Reasons, that, “I consider it relevant that all of the items included post-date the hearing, and that there is no evidence of activity between 6 October 2019 and 17 August 2020” is unreasonable.  The argument is that the mother was living in Brisbane when there was an effective lockdown because of COVID.  This meant that the mother could not leave the house and protest as she had done in the past.  The Applicants submit that I can take judicial notice of this fact and, because of that fact, the comment was unreasonable in that it was a comment that was simply not open on the evidence.

4. I have already gone through the sequence of events.  The last protest that the mother had attended before the hearing was in October of 2019.  The mother did not do anything of a political nature until after the hearing had concluded, the hearing having concluded on 6 August 2020.  This was clearly a matter that the Tribunal could find as being relevant.  The COVID lockdown did not take effect until February/March of 2020, some weeks after the declaration of emergency. 

5. Even if there had been a lockdown in late January 2020, this would mean that in the three months between 19 October 2019 and the end of January 2020, the mother of the Applicants still had not done any political activity during those months; COVID could not be blamed for that lack of activity.  The fact that the mother started social media activity after the hearing begs the question as to why such activity was not occurring in the months before the hearing. 

6. When one looks at all of those matters it is clear that the comment made by the AAT was something that it could have made on all the evidence before it; it could never be described as “unreasonable”.  This ground is without merit and it fails. 

7. Ground Four is that the Tribunal did not use the “real chance” test, but instead used the “balance of probabilities” test.  The Applicants point to occasions where the AAT outlined the submissions of the Applicants in such ways as “It was submitted to me that this would result in her being persecuted” or, “It was submitted that the persecution which was likely to be experienced” or, “It was submitted that the mother was likely to be detained”.

8. The Applicants submit that, in phrasing the submissions this way, the AAT has misunderstood that the submissions were that, “There was a real chance that the mother would be persecuted” or “There was a real chance that the mother would be detained”.

9. The Applicants submit that the culmination of this error occurs in paragraph 77 of the Tribunal’s reasons when the Tribunal was making its conclusion as to the claims relating to the mother’s illegal departure from Vietnam and status as a failed asylum seeker.  At paragraph 77 the Tribunal said:

   In the circumstances, I give more credit to the country information report than to the materials submitted by Mr Doan or the news articles.  I am not satisfied that [the mother] will be detained and fined as a failed asylum seeker on her return to Vietnam.  I am not satisfied that the applicants will be stigmatised and treated as traitors of the Vietnamese Government and school authorities because their parents are failed asylum seekers, nor that they will be denied public services and essential rights such as an education, nor that they will be orphaned, abandoned or imprisoned with their mother.  I am also not satisfied that their mother will be subjected to any treatment which would deprive them of their basic needs, or expose them to significant economic hardship, or threaten their capacity to subsist.  Therefore, I am not satisfied that the claimed well‑founded fear exists.

10. The Applicants submit that this is the gravest example of the failure to understand the proper test because the AAT continually talks of “not being satisfied”, which can only be a reference to the test on the balance of probabilities.  The Applicants submit that every plank, that the Applicants say establishes a real chance, must be viewed on whether there is a real chance that that plank occurs. 

11. By reasoning in a different manner, the Applicants submit that the AAT has committed a jurisdictional error.  The Applicants rely on what was said in the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo  (1997) 191 CLR 559, where the Chief Justice said:

    If an applicant establishes that there is a real chance of persecution, then his fear, assuming he has such a fear, is well-founded, notwithstanding that there is less than a 50 per cent change of persecution occurring.

    In the same case, McHugh J said at paragraph 19 that:

    A real chance of persecution excluded a far-fetched possibility of persecution but that as little as a 10 per cent chance of persecution may constitute a well-founded fear of persecution.

12. It seems to me that there has been a conflation of what needs to be established. It is for an applicant to satisfy a decision-maker that there is a real chance of persecution; to do so the applicant must satisfy the decision-maker that certain facts exist. 

13. If one goes back to paragraph 77, if the Applicants had satisfied the Tribunal that the mother would be detained upon return to Vietnam, or that the Applicants would be stigmatised and treated as traitors, or that they would be denied public services and essential rights, or that they would be abandoned or imprisoned with their mother, then the Tribunal would have to consider whether those circumstances amounted to a real chance of persecution. 

14. The Tribunal’s use of the word “satisfy” is appropriate because is exactly what the Tribunal needs to actually do; that is, be satisfied that the Applicants have met particular criteria.  Whilst the word “satisfied” is used in criminal proceedings to mean satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, or in civil proceedings as satisfied on the balance of probabilities, this does not mean that when the Tribunal uses the word “satisfied” that it necessarily must mean that the Tribunal is saying “more likely than not”. 

15. The Tribunal correctly identified the test at paragraph 7 of its Reasons when it commenced its assessment of these claims, and then when it was making its conclusion as to these claims at paragraph 95 of its Reasons, it again properly applied the correct test.  Paragraph 95 reads as follows:

    In view of the findings above, the Tribunal finds there is not a real chance that the applicants will be persecuted for any reason (including race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group). Their fear of persecution is not well-founded as required by s.5J of the Act and, therefore they are not refugees within the meaning of s.5H

16. The fact that the Tribunal used the word “satisfied” in paragraph 77 does not mean that it changed the standard of proof.  When read fairly with the preceding paragraphs, the use of the word “satisfied” in paragraph 77 can easily be equated with the real-chance test that is spoken of in paragraph 7 and applied in paragraph 95. 

17. Just as the words “irrelevant” and “relevant” often mean what we think they mean in real life, when the words “relevant” and “irrelevant” are used in judicial review proceedings they mean something totally different. When a Tribunal uses the word “satisfies”, the Tribunal is using that word for the test that needs to be met. In this case, as the Tribunal has said, it is the real-chance test. 

18. There has not been any reference at all by the Tribunal to the balance of probabilities.  The only test the Tribunal has spoken of is the real-chance test.  For this reason I do not see that a jurisdictional error has been illustrated by ground four. 

19. The final ground is that there was no evidence for the Tribunal to say that, in paragraph 67, “I do not consider the political activities in which she has engaged would be of any interest to the Vietnamese authorities.” The whole of that sentence in paragraph 67 needs to be read to put the clause into context, and I have already done that during the course of these reasons. 

20. The Applicants submits that there is simply no evidence upon which the AAT could say such a thing.  The Applicants points to the fact that the mother of the Applicants has participated in two protests against the Vietnamese Government and another protest where part of the protest was directed at the Vietnamese Government.  The mother of the Applicants has posted or, more correctly, reposted social‑media posts critical of the Vietnamese Government.  She is photographed in protests, and on one of those photographs she is pictured near the old South Vietnamese flag.

21. The Applicants contend that, given those circumstances, there is simply no evidence to say that the Vietnamese authorities would have no interest in the mother of the Applicants and her political activities if she were returned to Vietnam.  This was a finding of fact, and as long as there was some evidence to support the finding, there will be no error even if other reasonable minds may differ as to whether such a finding was warranted.

22. In this case the Tribunal had found that the mother had shown little insight into the issues which she claimed to be committed.  The Tribunal found that her descriptions of her political beliefs were vague.  The Tribunal noted that she was one of a number of people at protests.  The protests, the activity with which she has been mostly involved, have been tolerated in Vietnam itself.  Her social-media posts are really reposts without any meaningful addition. According to the Tribunal, the only inferences open from all of this evidence was that the mother’s activity was contrived.

23. Having come to that conclusion and considering the DFAT country information that persons returning to Vietnam will not face charges as a result of making an application for protection, it was open for the Tribunal to conclude that they did not consider that the political activities in which the mother had engaged would be of any interest to the Vietnamese authorities. 

24. As such a conclusion was open there can be no jurisdictional error.  As none of the five matters illustrate a jurisdictional error the application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Vasta.

Dated:       5 October 2022