Da v Commission for Children and Young People
[2013] NSWADT 158
•11 July 2013
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: DA v Commission for Children and Young People [2013] NSWADT 158 Hearing dates: 17 December 2012 Decision date: 11 July 2013 Jurisdiction: Community Services Division Before: S Higgins, Deputy President Decision: The applicant's application for an order under s 33I of the Commission for Children and Young People Act 1998 is refused.
Catchwords: Declaration - prohibited person - whether applicant has discharged his onus that he poses no risk to the safety of children Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997
Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed)
Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012
Child Protection (Working with Children) Regulation 2013
Commission for Children and Young People Act 1998
Criminal Code (Queensland)
Crimes Act 1900
Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 2004Cases Cited: Commission for Children and Young People v FC [2011] NSWCA 111
Commission for Children and Young People v Y [2002] NSWSC 949
R v Flynn [2010] QCA 254Category: Principal judgment Parties: DA (Applicant)
Commission for Children and Young PeopleRepresentation: Counsel
I Bourke (Respondent)
DA (Applicant in person)
Crown Solicitor's Office (Respondent)
File Number(s): 124022 Publication restriction: S 126 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act
reasons for decision
The applicant, DA, has made an application seeking an order under s 33I of Division 2 of Part 7 of the Commission for Children and Young People Act1998 (the Commission Act) declaring that Division 2 of that Part is not to apply to him in respect of the following offences of which he was convicted:
(a) an offence of possessing child pornography contrary to s 578B of the Crimes Act 1900. DA was convicted of this offence in the Local Court of New South Wales, on 21 September 1999. DA was fined $2,000.00 and given a recognizance to be of good behaviour for 2 years; and
(b) an offence of 'without legitimate reason took an indecent photograph by means of a device that is to say a camera of a child under the age of 16 years' contrary s 210(1)(f) of the Queensland Criminal Code. DA was convicted of this offence, in the Magistrates Court of Queensland, on 15 November 1999 and was fined the sum of $1,250.00.
Division 2 of Part 7 of the Commission Act applies to persons (i.e. prohibited person) who have been convicted of a 'serious sex offence', as defined in s 33B of the Commission Act. Such persons are prohibited from applying for, or obtaining 'child-related employment' (see s33C of the Commission Act), unless the Commission, or the Tribunal, makes a declaration under ss 33H or 33I of Part 7 of the Commission Act. Subs 33J(1), provides that an order can only be made where the Commission, or Tribunal is satisfied that the person the subject of the application 'does not pose a risk to the safety of children.'
The respondent, the Commissioner for Children and Young People (the Commissioner), opposes any order being made in favour of DA under the Commission Act.
For the reasons set out below, I am not satisfied, as at the time of hearing this application, that DA does not pose a risk to the safety of children.
Jurisdiction
Since the hearing of DA's application, on 15 June 2013, Part 7 of the Commission Act was repealed by the coming into force of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012: see clause 4.2 [6] of Schedule 4 of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012. I note that Schedule 3 of that Act contained savings, transitional and other provisions. Cl 1 of that Schedule provides that the regulations may contain provisions of a savings or transitional nature consequent on the enactment of that Act or any Act that amends that Act. In this regard, I note cl 6 of Schedule 1 of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Regulation 2013 contain transitional provisions, in regard to applications made under Division 2 of Part 7 of the Commission Act, which were made prior to the coming into operation of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012. The effect of that provision is that such applications continue to be determined by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of Part 7 of the Commission Act.
Accordingly, I have proceeded to determine DA's application under Division 2 of Part 7 of the Commission Act. It is convenient to first deal with the relevant provisions of that Act.
Relevant Legislation
The objects of Part 7 of the Commission Act are set out in s 31. That section provides:
31 Object of Part
The object of this Part is to protect children:
(a) by prohibiting certain persons from being involved in child related employment, and
(b) by means of background checking administered by the Commission and other agencies.
S 32 of the Commission Act provides that 'the safety and welfare of children and, in particular, protecting them from child abuse, is the paramount consideration' in the operation of Part 7.
As I have already mentioned, section 33C of the Commission Act prohibits a 'prohibited person' from applying for, undertaking or remaining in 'child-related employment'. The term 'child-related employment', is broadly defined in section 33(1) of the Act. The word 'employment' is also broadly defined in subs 33(1) to include self-employed persons. The word 'children' is defined in s 3 of the Commission Act to mean a person under the age of 18 years. Consequently, word 'child' in Part 7 has the same meaning.
The term 'prohibited person' is defined in s 33B of the Commission Act. So far as it is relevant, subs 33B(1)(a) provides:
33B Prohibited persons
(1) For the purposes of this Division, a prohibited person means:
(a) a person convicted of a serious sex offence, the murder of a child or a child-related personal violence offence, whether before or after the commencement of this subsection, or
(b) ...
The word 'convicted' is defined in subs 33(1) to include 'a finding that the charge for an offence is proven, or that a person is guilty of an offence, even though the court does not proceed to a conviction.'
The term 'serious sex offence' (i.e. an index offence) is defined in subs 33B(3) of the Commission Act. It relevantly provides:
(3) In this Division:
....
serious sex offence means (subject to subsections (4) and (5)):
(a) ..., or
(b) ..., or
(c) ..., or
(d) an offence under sections 91D-91G of the Crimes Act 1900 (other than if committed by a child prostitute) or a similar offence under a law other than a law of New South Wales, or
(e) an offence under section 91H, 578B or 578C (2A) of the Crimes Act 1900 or a similar offence under a law other than a law of New South Wales, or
(f) ...
(4) An offence that was a serious sex offence at the time of its commission is not a serious sex offence for the purpose of this Division if the conduct constituting the offence has ceased to be an offence in New South Wales.
...
A conviction for a serious sex offence is commonly referred to as the 'index offence' as it is the offence, which brings the person within the terms of Division 2 of Part 7 of the Commission Act.
Subs 33(2) of the Commission Act, provides that a person is not a 'prohibited person' where the person obtains an order under s 33H or s 33I of the Commission Act. The relevant provision in this application, as I have explained is s 33I. That section provides as follows:
33I IRC and ADT may make declarations concerning prohibited persons
1) On the application of a prohibited person, a relevant Tribunal may make an order declaring that this Division is not to apply to the person in respect of a specified offence.
2) A relevant tribunal is:
(a) the Industrial Relations Commission, or
(b) the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.
3) The Commission for Children and Young People is to be a party to any proceedings for an order under this section. The Commission may make submissions in opposition to or support of the making of the order.
4) An applicant must fully disclose to the relevant tribunal any matters relevant to the application.
5) If the relevant tribunal refuses to make an order under this section, the prohibited person is not entitled to make an application for an order under this section or section 33H in respect of that until after the period of five years from the date of the tribunal's refusal, unless the tribunal otherwise orders at the time of the refusal.
6) Orders under this section may be made subject to conditions.
7) The following applies to proceedings before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal under this section:
(a) the Tribunal may not award costs, and
(b) an appeal lies on a question of law to the Supreme Court of any party to the proceedings.
S 33J of the Commission Act sets out the matters that are to be considered by the Tribunal in determining an application for an order under s 33I. That section provides:
33J Matters to be considered in determining review applications
(1) The Commission or a relevant tribunal is not to make an order on a review application unless it is satisfied that the person the subject of the application does not pose a risk to the safety of children.
(2) In any proceedings for a review application, it is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children.
(3) In deciding whether or not to make an order in relation to a person, the Commission or a relevant tribunal is to take into account the following:
(a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a prohibited person,
(b) the period of time since those offences were committed,
(c) the age of the person at the time those offences were committed,
(d) the age of each victim of the offences at the time they were committed,
(e) the difference in age between the prohibited person and each such victim,
(f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child,
(g) the prohibited person's present age,
(h) the seriousness of the prohibited person's total criminal record,
(i) such other matters as the Commission or tribunal considers relevant.
The exercise of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under s 33I of the Commission Act is protective and not punitive in nature: see Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111 per Young JA at [61]. That is, the purpose of Part 7 of this Act is not to impose additional punishment on a person, but to eliminate possible risks to the safety of children. The former Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed) had a similar purpose: see R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101 at [130].
The word 'risk' in the context of prohibited persons working in child-related employment was considered by Young CJ (in Equity) in Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476, at [42]. His Honour said that in the context of subs 9(4) of the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed), 'risk' did not mean 'minimal risk', 'fanciful, or theoretical risk' to children. His Honour went on to say:
'...[what] one is looking for is whether, in all the circumstances, there is a real and appreciable risk in the sense of a risk that is greater than the risk of any adult preying on a child. One, however, must link the word "risk" with the words that follow, namely, "to the safety of children ''.
In making these remarks His Honour adopted the analysis of Haylen J in R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101, at [104]. Some care must be taken in applying the entirety of this analysis, as the provisions of the Commission Act are not in exactly the same terms as the Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed). However, the above remarks of Young CJ (Equity), have been followed by the Tribunal since the Commission Act came into force.
Finally, I reiterate the requirements of s 32 of the Commission Act, that in exercising this jurisdiction, the paramount consideration is the safety and welfare of children, in particular, protecting them from abuse.
Are the offences of which DA was convicted a 'serious sex offence'?
As I have mentioned, DA was convicted of an offence of possessing child pornography, contrary to s 578B of the Crimes Act 1900. At the time DA was charged and convicted of this offence, s 578 relevantly provided:
578B Possession of child pornography
(1) In this section:
child pornography means a film, publication or computer game classified RC, or an unclassified film, publication or computer game that would, if classified, be classified RC, on the basis that it describes or depicts, in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult, a person (whether or not engaged in sexual activity) who is a child under 16 or who looks like a child under 16.
Classification Board means the Classification Board established under the Commonwealth Act.
classified means classified under the Commonwealth Act.
Commonwealth Act means the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 of the Commonwealth.
computer game, film and publication each have the same meanings, respectively, as in the Commonwealth Act.
law enforcement agency has the same meaning as in section 13 of the Criminal Records Act 1991, and includes a person or body prescribed by the regulations for the purpose of this definition.
(2) A person who has in his or her possession any child pornography is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years (or both).
(3) Nothing in this section makes it an offence:
(a) ...
(4) Proceedings for an offence under this section:
(a) are not to be commenced later than 6 months after the date of the alleged offence, and
(b) in the case of a film, publication or computer game that is unclassified at the time of the alleged offence, are not to be commenced until the film, publication or computer game concerned has been classified, and
(c) are to be dealt with summarily before a Local Court constituted by a Magistrate sitting alone.
(4A) ...
As noted above, a conviction for an offence under 578B is a prescribed offence under para 33B(3)(e) of the Commission Act. S 578B was repealed, in 2004, by the Crimes Amendment (Child Pornography) Act 2004 (see Schedule 1 at [5]). In the same amending Act, a new offence, s 91H, of producing, disseminating and possessing 'child abuse material' was inserted into the Crimes Act 1900. For the purpose of this offence a child is defined in s 91FA to mean a person under the age of 16. 'Child abuse material' is defined in s 91FB to mean:
91FB Child abuse material-meaning
(1) In this Division:
child abuse material means material that depicts or describes, in a way that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the circumstances, offensive:
(a) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child as a victim of torture, cruelty or physical abuse, or
(b) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child engaged in or apparently engaged in a sexual pose or sexual activity (whether or not in the presence of other persons), or
(c) a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child in the presence of another person who is engaged or apparently engaged in a sexual pose or sexual activity, or
(d) the private parts of a person who is, appears to be or is implied to be, a child.
(2) The matters to be taken into account in deciding whether reasonable persons would regard particular material as being, in all the circumstances, offensive, include:
(a) the standards of morality, decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults, and
(b) the literary, artistic or educational merit (if any) of the material, and
(c) the journalistic merit (if any) of the material, being the merit of the material as a record or report of a matter of public interest, and
(d) the general character of the material (including whether it is of a medical, legal or scientific character).
(3) Material that depicts a person or the private parts of a person includes material that depicts a representation of a person or the private parts of a person (including material that has been altered or manipulated to make a person appear to be a child or to otherwise create a depiction referred to in subsection (1)).
(4) The private parts of a person are:
(a) a person's genital area or anal area, or
(b) the breasts of a female person.
The word 'material' is defined in s 91FA of the Crimes Act 1900 to include 'any film, printed matter, data or any other thing of any kind (including any computer image or other depiction).' A photograph, whether in printed or digital form) would fall within this description.
As can be seen from the terms of the s 91H offence it covers a broader scope of conduct to that contained in the repealed s 578B offence. Nevertheless, the conduct the subject of the repealed s 578B arguably also falls within s 91H. Accordingly, the repeal of s 578B did not mean that the conduct constituting this offence ceased to be an offence. In this regard I note that the s 91H offence is also a prescribed offence under the Commission Act.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the conduct of which DA was convicted, in 1999, in the Local Court of New South Wales was and remains a serious sex offence for the purpose of the Commission Act.
The offence of which DA was convicted in the Queensland Magistrate Court is in the following terms:
Indecent treatment of children under 16
210.(1) Any person who-
(a) ...
(f) without legitimate reason, takes any indecent photograph or records, by means of any device, any indecent visual image of a child under the age of 16 years,
is guilty of an indictable offence.
The word 'indecent' is not defined in the Queensland Criminal Code. It is accepted that the term should be given its ordinary meaning, namely - that which the community regards as indecent; 'it is what offends against currently accepted standards of decency; and indecency must always be judged in the light of time, place and circumstances' (see R v Flynn [2010] QCA 254 at [30] per Fraser JA).
At the time DA was convicted of this offence, there was no equivalent offence in the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900. S 91G, or s 578B of the Crimes Act 1900, at that time, created an offence of 'using' a child for pornographic purposes, which was defined in subs 91G(2) to mean:
(2) For the purposes of this section, a child is used by a person for pornographic purposes if:
(a) the child is engaged in activity of a sexual nature (for example, actual or simulated sexual intercourse or a striptease) for the purpose of the production of pornography by that person, or
(b) the child is in the presence of another person engaged in such an activity for that purpose
In my view, the conduct the subject of the offence in para 210(1)(f) of the Queensland Criminal Code is not similar to that contained in s 91G of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) at the relevant time. However, it is arguable that the conduct the subject of the Queensland offence, does fall within the terms of s 91H of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Hence, the question is whether, for the purpose of para (e) of the meaning of 'serious sex offence' in subs 33B(3) of the Commission Act, the conduct the subject of the Queensland offence is a 'similar offence' to s 91H of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). In my view, having regard to the express terms of subs 33B(3) and para 33B(1)(a) together with the objects of Part 7, the Queensland offence is, for the purpose of the Commission Act, a similar offence to that contained in s 91H of the Crimes Act 1900. Furthermore, it became a similar offence upon the enactment of s 91H in 2004. Even if I have incorrectly construed the meaning of 'serious offence' under the Commission Act, DA's conviction of the Queensland offence would nevertheless be a relevant matter in determining his application as it forms part of his overall criminal conduct. I can indicate that my ultimate findings would have been the same if I were to consider the Queensland offence in the context of his overall criminal conduct alone.
Evidence
DA is 54 years of age. He previously made an application, in 2002, seeking a similar declaration under the former Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed). He did not proceed with that application.
In support of this application, DA relied on the following material:
- a brief summary of his convictions and submissions
- numerous references from family and others
- certificates of appreciation
- 8 recent statements from persons who know DA and support his application for a declaration
- a number of professional photographs, taken by DA, of men and young men involved in the local surf club
The respondent tendered into evidence a report by Professor David M Greenberg, dated 14 November 2012. The respondent also tendered into evidence two arch lever folders of documents and a reference, dated 2 July 2002, from the father of DA's godchild. The documents in the arch leaver folders included the following:
- the material filed in DA's previous application for an order under the Act - this included a copy of the charge sheet, statements, transcript and decision in regard to DA's 1999 index offences and a report of Dr Christopher Lennings, a psychologist, dated 21 November 2002, and
- copies of documents produced pursuant to a number of summonses, issued by the Tribunal, at the request of the Commission.
At the hearing, DA gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. I found DA to be an open, frank and truthful witness. Occasionally, his openness and frankness was against his own interest - perhaps a reflection of him not being legally represented.
Professor Greenberg also gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. I have dealt with his evidence below.
I have considered all the material before the Tribunal. That which is relevant to the issues in this application is discussed below.
Seriousness of the index offence
The offences, of which DA was convicted, in 1999, both arise from a complaint made by the victim (a boy who was 14 years of age at the time) of the Queensland offence of which DA was convicted.
The complaint was made, to Queensland police, on 1 February 1999. As a result of that complaint, on 8 February 1999, Detective Senior Constable Firth, of the NSW Police, executed a search warrant on the home of DA. Seized from the DA's home were a black folder containing a number of video covers, 4 plastic sheaths containing 33 pages of 'thumbnail pictures', 131 video cassettes, 89 computer diskette, a box and a folder containing negatives and a computer.
Detective Senior Constable Firth interviewed DA on 9 February 1999. On the same day, DA provided Detective Senior Constable Firth with six negatives of photographs he had taken of the complainant (i.e. the young man who had complained to the Queensland Police). DA was interviewed again on 23 June 1999 in regard to specific items that had been seized from his home. On this day, DA was charged with the offence of possessing child pornography under s 578B(2) of the Crimes Act 1900. The child pornography, as particularised in the charge, was: '2 video cassettes and 17 computer disks containing images of naked children in sexual acts'.
The Police Fact Sheet, prepared for the Local Court stated as follows:
'On the 8th day of February police executed a search warrant at the home of the defendant ... The defendant is full time but is a semi-professional video and still photographer. In the rooms occupied by the defendant were videos, photographs and equipment relating to photography... Police seized a large quantity of videos, computer discs, photographs, negatives and a computer hard drive. These appeared to contain child pornography. The items were further inspected at a later date and as a result 17computer 3.25" discs and two video discs were submitted to the Office of Film & Literature Classification Board. Those items were returned and issued with a Section 87 Certificate under the Classification (Publications, Films and Games) Act 1995. The items were classified RC (Refused Classification) in accordance with the National Classification Code, Films Table 1(b) as they depict "in a way that is likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult, a person who is, or who looks like, a child under 16". The defendant's computer hard drive was also examined and found to have similar images stored on it. On 23-6-99 the defendant attended [name] Police Station and consented to participating in an erisp interview in relation to the matters. In the interview he stated that the videos seized by police all belonged to him and were of a pornographic nature. He stated that he purchased the videos through a legitimate mail order service and thought they were lawful. He stated that he received email from acquaintances that he did not approve of. He stated that he downloaded the images and filed them on his computer. He stated that he had seen the images and had kept them as he was a "hoarder" and received a great deal of material over the internet. He stated that the computer 3.25" discs were his and he had loaded the images onto the discs that appeared on them. He stated he did not recall which images were on the disc. The defendant gave no reason for having possession of the items mentioned. Some of the images appear to be of pre-pubescent males and were of a very explicit nature. The defendant has co-operated with investigating police during the investigation.'
As I have explained above, the offence of which the applicant was convicted was punishable by a fine and a maximum sentence of 2 years imprisonment. On 21 September 1999, DA pleaded guilty to the offence and was convicted and fined $2,000 and given a recognizance to be of good behaviour for 2 years.
DA was charged with the Queensland offence some time in March 1999. That charge related to events that occurred on 25 January that year. The Queensland Police Fact Sheet describes the events of that day, so far as they related to DA, as follows:
'The complainant in this matter is [name of complainant] 14 years of age. On the 1st and 2nd February 1999 the compl. child provided a statement to Detectives from the Gold Coast Child Abuse Unit, outlining a number of incidents. Contained within this statement were allegations to [DA].
The compl. child stated that on the 25th January 1999 he was taken to a house, by another male person (Deft [A]), for the purpose of having photographs taken. He stated that whilst at the house a series of photographs were taken by the Deft [DA] with the assistance of another person (Deft [B]). The compl. stated that the Deft [DA] commenced taking photographs of him whilst he was wearing jeans and a t-shirt, and then down to speedos and boxer shorts.
He stated that he then posed on a bed and in the shower whilst the Deft [DA] continued to take photographs of him. During the course of the photos the deft [DA] and the other male (Deft [B]) asked the compl. child to remove his speedos, which he did, and then the deft [DA] took further photographs of the compl. child in the nude.
...
In his complaint to the Queensland Police, the complainant made additional allegations against Deft [A] and Deft [B]. As a result of those additional allegations Deft [A] and Deft [B] were charged with offences of sexually assaulting the complainant. These offences occurred subsequent to the events of 25 January 1999 and there is no evidence to suggest that DA had any involvement in these.
In sentencing DA, the Queensland Magistrate noted the co-operation DA had provided to police and went on to say:
'...[on] the evidence it would appear that there was active encouragement by you and this other gentleman named [Deft B], of the complainant. I refer in particular to paragraph 39, the last sentence of his statement in which by those words he was encouraged to act as he did. Clearly the complainant is susceptible to that sort of flattery. It was clear from his evidence, his demeanour and his age that he is and would be susceptible to that kind of comment and conduct by you and another adult and what you did was a serious, serious thing.
You took advantage of him, you were older, you were with another adult, an adult who acted upon his intentions and attraction towards the complainant of which there has been some suggestion of which you were aware. You were present when [Deft B] asked the complainant to remove his Speedos, or that is the evidence and when he did so, as Mr Bagley [DA's legal representative] says, you should have withdrawn.
...'
In the last sentence of paragraph 39 of his statement, the complainant said: 'During the photos they were telling me that I was a natural and that I was photogenic.'
The Queensland offence of which DA was convicted was punishable, on indictment, by a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. In this case, DA pleaded guilty to the offence at the conclusion of his committal hearing.
In his record of interview, on 9 February 1999, with Detective Senior Constable Firth, DA explained the circumstances, which gave rise to him taking the photographs of the complainant on 25 January 1999. He explained that prior to January 1999 he had been chatting to Deft A and Deft B on the internet. He said they did not chat regularly and that he had not chatted to Deft A for about 6 months. He explained that on the weekend in question, he, Deft A, Deft B and others he had been chatting with were all going to be in Queensland and they had decided between them to get together for a B-B-Q on the Saturday of that weekend. At the time DA did not reside in Queensland and travelled there for a 4 day weekend.
In the interview, DA explained what he did and whom he met during the days in question. He said he met Deft B for the first time. He said the complainant was present when he met up with the men he had been chatting with and that he had taken photographs at the B-B-Q. This included photographs of the complainant. He went to say that on the Monday, 25 January, when he, Deft A and Deft B, were at the home of Deft A and looking at the photos he had taken, he commented on the complainant being very photogenic. He said, that following this remark Deft A contacted the complainant and asked him if he would like to have his photos taken and it was in response to this that DA took his photos. DA went on to explain what photos he had taken. This included photos in the bedroom. DA also said he was getting a bit uneasy at that stage and that he should have stooped then.
In my view, both offences were serious. The offence of possessing child pornography was serious in that he was in possession of material, which depicted the unlawful exploitation of young males between the age of12 and 16 years and in the case of the videos, even younger. DA did not question the basis on which he was convicted for this offence. However, it seems to have been accepted that the material the subject of the charge had been sent to DA and it was not sourced or bought by him. His possession of it was nevertheless unlawful.
As pointed out by the Magistrate, his conduct in regard to the Queensland offence involved him, as an adult, taking advantage of the young complainant and failing to withdraw after Deft B asked the complainant to remove his speedos. DA did not seek to question this finding of the Magistrate. The Magistrate, I note did not make a finding that DA had taken any photographs of the complainant after he had removed his speedos. DA has at all times denied that he had done so. Nevertheless, DA was convicted on the basis of the photographs that were taken and the circumstances in which they were taken.
While I find that each index offence is a serious offence, in the scale of seriousness of child sex offences, I also find that in the scale of seriousness for such offences, they are at the lower end.
Period of Time since the index offences were committed
It is now 14 years since the commission of the index offences.
Age of DA and victim at the time etc.
At the time the index offences were committed, DA was 40 years of age. The complainant (victim of the Queensland offence) was 14 years of age. Hence there was a difference of 26 years. In regard to the possessing child pornography offences, while the children were not a victim of DA's offending conduct, they were nevertheless the subject of the material, the possession of which was the subject of DA's offending conduct. As I have indicated, these children were aged between 12 and 16 years.
In his evidence, DA acknowledged that he knew the complainant was young and in my view, on the material before the Tribunal, could reasonably have known that the complainant was under the age of 16.
As I have mentioned, DA is 54 years of age now.
DA's total criminal record
Other than the above-mentioned offences, DA has only been charged and found guilty of one further offence, in 2003.
On 24 September 2002, DA was charged, by NSW police, with an offence of having made 'a false declaration of fact stating that he was not a prohibited person under subs 7(6) of the former Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed)(the false declaration charge). In accordance with that Act, in November 2000, DA's then employer, Ambulance of New South Wales, circulated an Instructional Circular informing staff of the 'prohibited person' status of persons convicted of a serious sex offence. On 1 July 2001, DA completed a 'prohibited employment' declaration for the purpose of that Act and in doing so failed to declare his 1999 Local Court conviction. As a result of that failure, the Ambulance Service immediately commenced disciplinary action, by suspending him and charging him with disciplinary offences. On 15 October 2002, following a disciplinary hearing, the Ambulance Service, found that the disciplinary charges were proven and on that basis he was dismissed from the Service, after having served for almost 17 years.
Subsequently, on 12 February 2003, the Local Court found, without recording a conviction, that DA was guilty of the false declaration charge. He was placed on a 12-month good behaviour bond.
I note that the false declaration charge was based exclusively on his 1999 convicted of the possessing child pornography charge. This, as I have noted above, is consistent with my findings that at the time New South Wales did not have an offence equivalent to s 210(1)(e) of the Queensland Criminal Code.
DA explained that he had at no time deliberately made a false statement. DA, as I have indicated, pleaded guilty to an offence of making a statement that he knew to be false.
A copy of the declaration, the subject of the charge, was included in the folder of documents tendered by the respondent (see Ex R2 at tab 26 p 130). The declaration was a one page document where DA crossed out the word 'am' at the declaration at the bottom of the page, so that the declaration read 'I declare that I am not a person prohibited by the Act ...' While, DA was a prohibited person in that he had been convicted, in New South Wales, of an offence falling within the terms of the meaning of a 'serious sex offence' in subs 5(3) of the former Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998 (repealed), the declaration only set out one paragraph of that subs (i.e. para 5(3)(a)).
I note that during the 17 years DA was employed with the Ambulance Service, no complaints were made against him in regard to his conduct towards any child or young person.
Other matters
The other matters arising from the material before the Tribunal are:
(a) DA's evidence, including references
(b) recent medical history of DA
(c) expert evidence
DA's evidence and references - In his oral evidence, DA said that he has not been employed for a number of years and is currently his mother's carer. He said, after being dismissed from the NSW Ambulance Service, he unsuccessfully tried to establish a photographic/video business. However, he has continued to take photographs of people from the local surf club, including young males. He explained that these were never taken at his home, or in private. He said that the photographs he took were not for his personal use. He said they were taken as he had been asked to take them and they were for the person use of those who had asked. In some cases, they were used for the person's personal portfolio.
DA tendered into evidence an example of the photos he had taken of young men. Photography clearly remains one of DA's strong passions and interests. However, he has a sense of frustration in not being able to pursue this interest because of his status as a prohibited person.
I accept that DA is highly regarded amongst those who know him. This is reflected in the many references he has provided. Each referee made reference to DA's convictions, which they said were totally out of character. The statement of DA's mother and sister also indicate that DA has the support of his family. I accept that DA has found the circumstances of his convictions, dismissal from the Ambulance Service and his status as a prohibited person to be stressful.
Recent medical history - The material produced under summons identifies DA as having suffered from depression for a number of years. He received treatment for depression in 1996 and again in September 1999 after he was convicted of the possess child pornography charge. He also received treatment for depression in July 2001, August 2002 and was admitted into hospital for treatment in August 2002, November 2002, January 2006, September 2006 and October 2007. And he continues to take medication for depression.
Expert evidence - As I have mentioned, Dr Lennings, a clinical psychologist, prepared a risk assessment report for DA's 2002 application. In preparing for his report Dr Lennings met with DA for 3 hours. He was also provided with relevant material in regard to DA's criminal conduct. In making his assessment Dr Lennings applied 3 risk assessment strategies (clinical guided and actuarial approaches) to measure DA's risk of re-offending. In his report Dr Lennings concluded as follows:
34. Formulation [DA] presents as a man of average cognitive ability who reveals a severe disruption of personality function. He is a man who experiences insecurity and anguish over his looks and his sexuality. He is at best naive about his association with known pedophiles, and continues to undertake activities that place him at risk to further allegations of impropriety. It is somewhat sad he does so - it is probable that he is a good photographer and probably performs a useful service to young men seeking to advertise themselves in sport (surfing) that is very much focused on physique and sensuality. However it is unlikely that his interest is purely aesthetic.
35. Overall, all three strategies for risk assessment suggest a high to medium high risk of a future offence for [DA]. It should be noted that the kind of offence he is at risk for has no bearing on his work as an ambulance driver. It is most unlikely the kind of deviant behaviour he might commit (pornographic type photos of young men) is an activity he is unlikely to have much opportunity to do as an ambulance driver. ...
36. ... [the] Tribunal might wish to consider whether it is wise for [DA] to continue to seek the occasional work as a photographer of young men, given the very strong likelihood that it will continue to expose him to risk of either allegations of abuse, or further manipulation by predatory types he seems to have great difficulty in rejecting or holding accountable for their behaviour. ... [since] I believe that [DA's] behaviour is likely to place him at risk of further offences, or at least allegations of further offences, it would be greatly in his interest to avoid such situations. It is likely that [DA] would see that as highly punitive and unfairly limiting. None the less, I am persuaded to continue such behaviour places him in considerable jeopardy.'
Professor Greenberg also met with DA for the purpose of preparing his report for this application. Professor Greenberg was provided with all the relevant background material in regard to DA. In his report, Professor Greenberg, having adopted the same risk assessment strategies as Dr Lennings, concluded as follows:
'In summary therefore, I am of the opinion that [DA] has a psychiatric diagnosis of Dysthymic Disorder with episodes of Major Depressive Disorder, Socia; Phobia and Hebophillic tendencies with fetish features.
In conclusion, I am therefore of the opinion that the ultimate issue of whether [DA] will or will not re-offend cannot be stated with any scientific degree of certainty. Based on a clinically guided risk assessment approach (SVR-20) combined with the actuarial instruments such as the STATIC 99-R, [DA's] current risk for likelihood of committing a further sexual offence would be in the 'low-moderate risk' category range over a fifteen years or more period of time.
...'
Professor Greenberg went on to reiterate the limitations of the assessment instruments used. However, he remained of the view that there was a low-moderate degree of probability that DA 'is likely to commit a serious sex further offence.' That potential risk of sexual re-offending, he said 'may possibly be moderated but not eliminated by' DA receiving ongoing treatment and monitoring of his depression and compliance with that treatment, psychological counselling for his depression and a number of other issues and counselling by a therapist with expertise in sex offender treatment.
In his oral evidence, Professor Greenberg said that DA suffered from fairly sever depression. He questioned whether DA had a good support mechanism and he reiterated his concerns about DA remaining unemployed and having explored any alternative means of employment to that he has previously held.
Professor Greenberg said he did not disagree with Dr Lennings' conclusions. However, in his opinion things had changed since then. DA's age was a factor of change. He was much older now and with age there 'is a gradual reduction in risk.' He said he would be concerned if DA had been taking photos of young males. Professor Greenberg was shown the photos DA had provided to the Tribunal. He said these caused him some concern as to DA's level of insight into his offending conduct. During cross-examination, Professor Greenberg agreed that there was no evidence of DA having re-offended. However, in his opinion, DA remained at risk during states of deep depression. He also said that DA's continuation of taking photographs of young males was of concern.
Findings and Orders
In my view, having regard to the material before the Tribunal and the matters referred to in s 33J of the Commission Act, DA's application is almost border-line. As I have explained, the index offences of which he was convicted are serious, but at the lower end of the scale of seriousness. They were committed 14 years ago and DA has not committed any further offences of this nature since that time. Nor is there any evidence of any complaints having been made, or questions raised about DA's behaviour towards any child or young person.
While DA's depressive illness is of concern, there is no evidence that DA's offending conduct is triggered during periods of depression. His states of deep depression appear to have been more recent and are arguably due to the circumstances he finds himself. He clearly requires ongoing specialist treatment and counselling in this regard. Otherwise, DA is fortunate in that he has support from friends and family. With this support and ongoing counselling and treatment, hopefully DA will explore alternative means of employment.
I also share Dr Greenberg's concerns about DA continuing to take photographs of young men. At the same time, stress that the photographs, provided by DA, do not evidence any unlawful conduct. Nor was it suggested that they did so. What is of concern, however, is DA's ongoing lack of insight about his offending behaviour and hence his lack of appreciation of being able to manage the risks that an activity of this kind might involve. As explained Dr Lennings, in his 2002 report, behaviour of this kind is likely to place him at risk of further offences, or at least allegations of further offences. Professor Greenberg expressed a similar concern, when he saw the photographs of young men DA had provided.
Accordingly, due to this lack of insight, I am unable to find (i.e. be satisfied) that DA does not pose a risk to the safety of children. With ongoing specialist treatment and counselling in regard to his depression and his offending conduct this may change. However, for the purpose of determining this application, I must be satisfied, on the material before me, that DA does not pose a risk to the safety of children. As I am not so satisfied as at this time, the appropriate order is to refuse DA's application for an order under s 33I of the Commission Act.
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Decision last updated: 11 July 2013
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