D v. Mills

Case [2007] QDC 270


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

D v Mills [2007] QDC 270

PARTIES:

D
(A
pplicant)

v

ANTHONY JOHN MILLS
(
Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BD 842 of 2007

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

9 November 2007

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

JUDGE:

Griffin SC DCJ

  1. This is an application pursuant to provisions of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995 for an order for compensation to be paid by the respondent in respect of alleged injuries caused to the applicant by the respondent as a result of the commission of the offence of rape.

The legislation

  1. In relation to a sexual offence, compensation is to be assessed pursuant to the provisions of the legislation and also by reference to categories of compensable injury in Sch 1 of the Act and by reference also to reg 1A of the Act.  Injury is defined[1] as follows:

“Injury is bodily injury, mental or nervous shock, pregnancy or any injury specified in the Compensation Table or prescribed under a regulation.”

[1] See s 20 of the Act

  1. Something more must be shown than mere fear, fright, unpleasant memories or anger towards an offender, or even a combination of such reactions[2].

    [2] Per Thomas JA Ferguson v Kazakoff [2000] QSC 156 at para 21

The facts

  1. The facts and indeed the resulting medical condition (to use a neutral phrase) of the applicant are largely uncontested.  The issues in this application lie elsewhere. 

  1. On or about 20 April 2005, the applicant attended a social occasion at which she met the respondent whom she knew through work circumstances.  She invited him to her home.  No sexual intention was suggested in that invitation.  The applicant had been drinking and the uncontested facts are that after the applicant had fallen into an unconscious state the respondent digitally raped her.  When the applicant awoke the next morning she realised that something of the kind had occurred, having regard to her physical condition.  The respondent subsequently admitted removing the applicant’s pants and penetrating her vagina with his fingers.  Furthermore, he admitted fondling her breasts and fondling her vagina.  The facts of the plea before me were that the respondent admitted lying naked beside her when the criminal activity took place.

  1. On 10 February 2006 the respondent pleaded guilty to one count of rape and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The Question of Compensable Injuries

  1. The applicant consulted Dr Andrew Byth, psychiatrist who was provided not only with a victim impact statement[3], but also conducted a personal interview with the applicant and was provided with other materials, including sentencing proceedings.  No issue in these proceedings concerns Dr Byth’s expertise nor, indeed, the opinion which he formed.

    [3] See affidavit of D sworn 31 May 2007, Exhibit ALD-1

  1. The issue in this application is the extent to which compensation may be awarded and whether Dr Byth’s opinion as stated goes no further than disclosing “mental or nervous shock” or whether the symptoms complained of by the applicant and the…

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D v Mills [2007] QDC 270
Case
[2007] QDC 270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the District Court of Queensland, the case of D v Mills involved an application by D, the applicant, for compensation from Anthony John Mills, the respondent, for injuries sustained due to an offence of rape committed by the respondent. The application was made under the provisions of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. The court was required to determine whether the injuries suffered by the applicant were compensable under the Act and, if so, the extent of the compensation to be awarded.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's injuries, which included mental or nervous shock, and other adverse impacts as defined in the Criminal Offence Victims Regulations 1995, were compensable. The applicant argued that the symptoms and effects she experienced went beyond mere mental or nervous shock and included additional compensable injuries under the regulations. The respondent contended that all the effects were merely aspects of mental or nervous shock and not separately compensable.

The court found that the applicant had suffered mental or nervous shock, which it assessed as mild to moderate, and awarded compensation of $13,500 for this. Additionally, the court determined that the applicant had experienced a range of adverse impacts beyond mental or nervous shock, such as reduced self-worth, social withdrawal, and difficulty sleeping, which were also compensable under the regulations. These were assessed collectively and awarded compensation of $9,000. The court rejected the respondent's argument that all effects should be considered as part of the mental or nervous shock, holding that the adverse impacts were distinct and independently compensable.

The final orders of the court were that the respondent pay the applicant the sum of $22,500 as compensation for the injuries sustained.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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