DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
D. M. Wright and Associates v Murrell [2020] QDC 110
PARTIES:
D M WRIGHT & ASSOCIATES
(appellant)
v
IAN GORDON MURRELL
(respondent)
FILE NO/S: 5251/2019
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Magistrate’s Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
10 June 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
11 May and further written submissions of 15 and 22 May 2020.
JUDGES:
Reid DCJ
ORDER:
1. Appeal allowed by deleting the words “on an indemnity basis” from the order of the Magistrates Court of 29 October 2019.
2. No order as to the costs of the Appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE - APPEAL –ADJOURNMENT OF REVIEW OF COST ASSESSMENT– non-compliance with orders for filing summary of argument and list of authorities - where hearing to take longer then allotted time -where the learned Magistrate ordered the appellant pay the respondent’s cost thrown away by reason of the adjournment of the hearing on an indemnity basis – where the appellant seeks the orders be set aside – where the appellant further seeks an order that the costs of the adjournment of the review on that day be reserved – whether appellant had in fact filed a summary of argument–where allegations of bias made against cost assessor – whether the costs assessor should have been served with material– whether the appeal should be allowed
Legal Profession Act2007 (Qld) s 341
Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 – referred to
R v Watson Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 – referred to
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 – referred to
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 – referred to
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 – referred to
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 – referred to
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 96 FCR 125 – referred to
Ivory v Telstra Corporation [2002] QCA 457 – referred to
Mann v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria & Anor [2001] VSCA 51 – referred to
Fotis v Magistrates Court of Victoria [2001] VSC 301 – referred toCOUNSEL: S Hartwell for the applicant
R P Dickson for the respondent
SOLICITORS: D M Wright & Associates for the appellant
QBM Lawyers for the respondent
Introduction
This is an appeal from a decision of Magistrate Hay of 29 October 2019. I will for convenience refer to the parties by their role in this court. The appellant was the respondent below and the respondent was the applicant in that court. On that day, her Honour adjourned the review of a costs assessment and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs “thrown away by reason of the adjournment, of the hearing listed for 29 October 2019 on an indemnity basis.” The review related to the assessment of costs of three bills of the appellant on what are called the Gordon bill, Enid bill and Joyce bill. All three were estate matters in which the respondent engaged the appellant to…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read D. M. Wright and Associates v Murrell and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2020] QDC 110
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the appellant had substantially complied with the order of 23 August by filing a summary of argument and a list of authorities. The court also needed to decide whether the grounds of review and schedules of objection constituted a summary of argument, and whether the costs assessor should have been served with relevant material. Finally, the court had to determine whether the appeal should be allowed and if the order for the appellant to pay costs on an indemnity basis should be set aside.
The court found that the appellant had not complied with the order of 23 August by failing to file a summary of argument and a list of authorities. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the grounds of review and schedules of objection constituted a summary of argument, as neither document set out relevant legal principles relied on by the appellant. The court also found that the appellant had not properly disclosed any reason why the summary of argument and list of authorities were not prepared on time. In light of these findings, the court concluded that the Magistrate's order for the appellant to pay costs on an indemnity basis was justified.
ORDERS:
1. Appeal allowed by deleting the words “on an indemnity basis” from the order of the Magistrates Court of 29 October 2019.
2. No order as to the costs of the Appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed by deleting the words “on an indemnity basis” from the order of the Magistrates Court of 29 October 2019.
2. No order as to the costs of the Appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
That it was this submission which influenced the learned Magistrate to make such an order is made clear, in my assessment, because after indicating the appellant should pay costs on an indemnity basis, the learned Magistrate said at the following page (T1-29) “I had heard Mr Dickson say that part of what he would be seeking from an adjournment today was indemnity costs”. She said she had it “noted”.Consideration Her Honour very properly considered the issues raised in Ms Wright’s affidavit, including the fact that the affidavit did not properly disclose any reason why the summary of argument and list of authorities were not prepared on time. Her Honour also in my view properly addressed the issue of whether the grounds of review attached to the application and the schedules of objection attached to the affidavit of Mr Cunningham together constituted a written summary of argument. Before me the appellant submitted that they did constitute a summary of argument such that, on the filing of Mr Cunningham’s affidavit 4 October, there had been substantial compliance with the court order of 23 August. In my view consideration of the material indicates that is not to. The schedules of objections to the Gordon bill are not extensive (see pages 13 – 14 of the exhibit to the affidavit). However the schedule of objections in relation to the Enid bill and the Joyce Bill are both voluminous, comprising pages 22 – 60 and 61-85 of the exhibits to Mr Cunningham’s affidavit. The costs assessor’s reasons are themselves lengthy and had been exhibited to an earlier affidavit of Mr Cunningham filed in the court below. The objections in the Enid bill alone comprise, by my unaudited calculation, 85 separate objections to 167 items. One of those is a compendious objection to Items 414 – 471. Most however deal with an individual item or a small number of consecutive items. The phrasing of the objections is often very general. By way of example, the first objection, to Item 5, asserts a claimed error of fact by the assessor but relies also on there having been a “misapplication of the assessment criteria in s 341 of the Legal Profession Act”. That objection, namely misapplication of the assessment criteria in s 341 of that Act, is repeated for Items 6 – 10, 15 – 16, 34, 57, 58, 59, 98, 99, 117, 121, 123, 124, 131, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 148, 149, 159, 160, 165, 172, 179, 184/5, 187, 200, 204, 208, 214, 215, 221, 224, 225, 227/8, 231, 237, 243/4, 245, 271/2, 274, 277, 279, 288/9, 290, 294/5, 308, 310, 318, 320/321, 324/326, 335, 336, 339, 340, 342, 355, 356, 357/358, 363, 366, 368/369, 383, 387, 399, 490, 47, 411 and 414-471. Perusal of the material provides no insight into how or why any such misapplication arises. If the respondent’s submission that the summary of argument relied on was the schedule of objections read with the grounds for review, then the legal basis of the subject objection should be clear. It is not. Section 341 itself is in these terms: “341 Criteria for assessment (1)In conducting a costs assessment, the costs assessor must consider—(a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the legal costs relate; and(b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable way; and(c) the fairness and reasonableness of the amount of legal costs in relation to the work, except to the extent that section 340 applies to any disputed costs.(2)In considering what is a fair and reasonable amount of legal costs, the costs assessor may have regard to any or all of the following matters—(a) whether the law practice and any Australian legal practitioner or Australian-registered foreign lawyer acting on its behalf complied with this Act;(b) any disclosures made by the law practice under division 3;(c) any relevant advertisement as to—(i) the law practice’s costs; or(ii) the skills of the law practice, or of any Australian legal practitioner or Australian-registered foreign lawyer acting on its behalf;(d) the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the Australian legal practitioner or Australian-registered foreign lawyer responsible for the matter;(e) the retainer and whether the work done was within the scope of the retainer;(f) the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter;(g) the quality of the work done;(h) the place where, and circumstances in which, the legal services were provided;(i) the time within which the work was required to be done;(j) any other relevant matter.(3)In conducting an assessment of legal costs payable by a non-associated third party payer, the costs assessor must also consider whether it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances for the non-associated third party payer to be charged the amount claimed.”