FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
D’Lima v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1162
File number: MLG 1514 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 18 November 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – student (subclass 500) visa – review of the decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal refusing to grant the first applicant a student visa – refusal to granting the second and third applicant visas as members of the family unit – where Tribunal found first applicant was not a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student –– whether the purported consent for the Tribunal to determine the review without a hearing was irregular – consent procured after advice was given to the applicants by their representative that the written material would be sufficient to secure a favourable outcome – where consent given was effective – whether consent was conditional – whether Tribunal should have taken any step to correct any misconception that favourable outcome was secured – whether Tribunal’s decision affected by legal unreasonableness – application for review dismissed Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 214, 214(3)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 359A, 359C(2), 360(1), 360(2)(b), 360(2)(c), 360(3), 363A, 499
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, pt 2
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, cl 500.212
Cases cited: Hasranv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFML [2006] FCAFC 152
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 34 Date of last submission/s: 17 July 2024 Date of hearing: 4 October 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Applicants: Clothier Anderson Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 1514 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CIMMARON AMANDA D'LIMA
First Applicant
DENVER EUSTACE
Second Applicant
AIDEN JOSEPH EUSTACE (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to Item 10 Sch 16 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024, the “Administrative Review Tribunal” be substituted for “Administrative Appeals Tribunal” as the second respondent.
2.The amended application for judicial review be dismissed.
3.The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1162
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal's decision to determine the review without a hearing, based on the applicants' consent, was legally unreasonable. This hinged on whether the consent was irregular, particularly if it was conditional or if the Tribunal should have taken steps to correct any misconceptions held by the applicants. Additionally, the court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision was affected by legal unreasonableness.
The court examined the statutory framework and held that the Tribunal’s power to decide a review without a hearing was contingent on the applicant’s consent. However, the court noted that if the consent was irregular or conditional, this could render the decision legally unreasonable. The court found that the applicants’ consent was indeed irregular, as it was based on a misunderstanding created by their representative that a hearing was unnecessary. Despite this, the court held that the consent was effective and not conditional. Furthermore, the court ruled that the Tribunal was not legally required to take additional steps to correct the applicants' misconception. Therefore, the court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by legal unreasonableness.
The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal consequently concluded that the second to fourth applicants were not members of the family unit of someone who met the primary criteria and affirmed the delegate’s decisions refusing to grant the first to third applicants’ student visas: Decision at [60]-[61].CONSIDERATION As earlier noted, the applicants’ sole ground of review contends the Tribunal’s Decision is affected by legal unreasonableness. This is because the Tribunal determined the review without a hearing in circumstances where the purported consent for the Tribunal to determine the review without a hearing was irregular. It was irregular, so called, because consent appears to have been procured after “wrongheaded” or misconceived advice was given to the applicants by their representative to the effect that the written material provided to the Tribunal would be sufficient to secure a favourable outcome in the review, and so obviating the need for a hearing. As the High Court observed in Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16[2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26]:A requirement of legal reasonableness in the exercise of a decision-maker's power is derived by implication from the statute, including an implication of the required threshold of unreasonableness, which is usually high. Any legal unreasonableness is to be judged at the time the power is exercised or should have been exercised. It is not to be assessed through the lens of procedural fairness to the applicant. Instead, whether the implied requirements of legal reasonableness have been satisfied requires a close focus upon the particular circumstances of exercise of the statutory power: the conclusion is drawn "from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power". (footnotes omitted) Section 360 of the Act (as then in force) required the Tribunal to invite an applicant for review to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the decision under review, unless, relevantly, the applicant consented to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it. Therefore, if an applicant gave his or her consent under s 360(2)(b), the Tribunal could make a decision without the applicant appearing before it. And the applicant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal: s 360(3). Section 363A of the Act (as then in force) provides that if a provision of Pt 5 states that a person is not entitled to do something, or to be assisted or represented by another person, then, unless a provision expressly provides otherwise, the Tribunal does not have power to permit the person to do that thing, or to be assisted or represented by another person. The interaction of s 360(1) of the Act (as then in force) with some of its exceptions and the effect of s 363A (as then in force) was considered in Hasranv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[2010] FCAFC 40; 183 FCR 413. The Full Court in Hasran said:25 . . . the proper construction and application of s 363A of the Act and the related provisions of Part 5 were correctly stated by the Full Court in Sun and explained by Tracey J in M.26 As Tracey J observed in M at [46], the language of s 363A is clear. It operates so as to remove any discretion which the Tribunal may have had to allow a person to do something where a provision of Part 5 states that the person is not entitled to do it.27 Here, the appellant’s failure to respond to the Tribunal’s letter under s 359A had the effect of attracting the cascading operation of ss 359C(2), 360(2)(c) and, critically, s 360(3) which enlivened the application of s 363A.28 This was because the appellant was invited by the Tribunal’s letter under s 359A to comment or respond to the information stated in the Tribunal’s letter by 3 August 2009. He did not do so, and accordingly he was a person to whom s 359C(2) applied. The operation of s 360(3) was thereby attracted. The effect of that subsection in the circumstances of this case was that the appellant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.29 The operation of s 360(3) then attracted the express terms of s 363A, the effect of which was to provide that the Tribunal did not have power to permit the appellant to appear at an oral hearing.