D'Lima v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

D’Lima v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1162   

File number: MLG 1514 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
Date of judgment: 18 November 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – student (subclass 500) visa – review of the decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal refusing to grant the first applicant a student visa – refusal to granting the second and third applicant visas as members of the family unit – where Tribunal found first applicant was not a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student –– whether the purported consent for the Tribunal to determine the review without a hearing was irregular – consent procured after advice was given to the applicants by their representative that the written material would be sufficient to secure a favourable outcome – where consent given was effective – whether consent was conditional – whether Tribunal should have taken any step to correct any misconception that favourable outcome was secured –  whether Tribunal’s decision affected by legal unreasonableness – application for review dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 214, 214(3)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 359A, 359C(2), 360(1), 360(2)(b), 360(2)(c), 360(3), 363A, 499

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, pt 2

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, cl 500.212

Cases cited:

Hasranv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40

Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFML [2006] FCAFC 152

Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of last submission/s: 17 July 2024
Date of hearing: 4 October 2024
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Applicants: Clothier Anderson Immigration Lawyers 
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 1514 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CIMMARON AMANDA D'LIMA

First Applicant

DENVER EUSTACE

Second Applicant

AIDEN JOSEPH EUSTACE (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GOSTENCNIK

DATE OF ORDER:

18 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to Item 10 Sch 16 of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024, the “Administrative Review Tribunal” be substituted for “Administrative Appeals Tribunal” as the second respondent.

2.The amended application for judicial review be dismissed.

3.The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1162
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants sought a judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which had upheld a delegate’s refusal to grant the first applicant a student visa and the second and third applicants’ visas as members of the family unit. The Tribunal’s decision was grounded on the finding that the first applicant was not a genuine student applicant. The applicants contended that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable because it was based on an irregular consent to determine the review without a hearing. This consent, according to the applicants, was procured after advice by their representative that the written material would secure a favourable outcome, thus misleading the applicants into believing a hearing was unnecessary.

The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal's decision to determine the review without a hearing, based on the applicants' consent, was legally unreasonable. This hinged on whether the consent was irregular, particularly if it was conditional or if the Tribunal should have taken steps to correct any misconceptions held by the applicants. Additionally, the court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision was affected by legal unreasonableness.

The court examined the statutory framework and held that the Tribunal’s power to decide a review without a hearing was contingent on the applicant’s consent. However, the court noted that if the consent was irregular or conditional, this could render the decision legally unreasonable. The court found that the applicants’ consent was indeed irregular, as it was based on a misunderstanding created by their representative that a hearing was unnecessary. Despite this, the court held that the consent was effective and not conditional. Furthermore, the court ruled that the Tribunal was not legally required to take additional steps to correct the applicants' misconception. Therefore, the court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by legal unreasonableness.

The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

By their application filed on 16 May 2019, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 26 April 2019, affirming a decision of a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refusing to grant the first applicant a Student (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa and refusing to grant the second and third applicants’ visas as members of the first applicant’s family unit. The application filed contained five unparticularised review grounds. By their amended application filed on 20 June 2024, the applicants abandoned the five review grounds contained in the originating application. In lieu thereof, the applicants advance only one particularised ground as follows (reproduced verbatim):1. The decision of the Tribunal is affected by legal unreasonableness in that the Tribunal determined the review without a hearing in circumstances where the purported consent for the Tribunal to determine the review without a hearing was irregular.Particularsa. On 23 January 2019, the applicants through their Migration Agent lodged a submission to the Tribunal consisting, relevantly, of a covering letter and a signed Form M17.b. The covering letter contained the submission: “Trust all the above information should suffice and justify the case being remitted. Thus, advised the client that a hearing will not be necessary, but if you have any questions or you need any further information or documentation, please do not hesitate to contact me.”c. The enclosed signed Form M17 included question 2, in response to which a box was ticked indicating that the applicants “consent to the Tribunal deciding the review without a hearing.”d. The purported consent was expressed to be conditional on the Tribunal:i. accepting that the information before it would “suffice and justify the case being remitted”; andii. not having any questions or requiring any further information or documentation from the applicants.e. The Tribunal proceeded to decide the application without a hearing, and stated at [5] of its decision record that “the applicants indicated their consent” and that it was “satisfied that the necessary consent has been given under s 360(2)(b) of the Act.”f.The applicant in fact provided “consent” only on the understanding, created by the migration agent, that the applicant was certain, in a practical sense, to succeed in the review.g. In the circumstances, it was legally unreasonable of the Tribunal not to contact the applicants or their Agent to notify that the decision was not going to be favourable without a hearing.BACKGROUND On 12 December 2016, the first applicant, a citizen of India, applied for a student visa with the second and third applicants applying for visas as members of the same family unit: Court Book (CB) 1-CB19. The fourth applicant was born on 13 May 2017: CB89. The delegate refused to grant the first to third applicants visas on 23 June 2017: CB62-CB75. The delegate was not satisfied that the first applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily and found that she did not satisfy the criteria in cl 500.212 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). Consequently, the second and third applicants did not satisfy the criteria in cl 500.311: CB73-CB75.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Between 23 and 25 January 2019, the applicants’ representative provided the Tribunal with various documents including a completed ‘Request for Student Visa Information’ form signed by the first applicant, a written submission and other supporting materials: CB115-CB238; Exhibit 2R, affidavit of Elizabeth Hsu at [3] and annexure EH1. The completed ‘Request for Student Visa Information’ form indicated that the applicants consented to the Tribunal deciding the review without a hearing: CB118.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION On 29 April 2019, the Tribunal notified the applicants’ representative of its decision to affirm the delegate’s decisions: CB243 and provided the representative with a copy of the Tribunal’s Statement of Reasons and Decision (Decision) dated 26 April 2019: CB246-CB254. The Tribunal’s Decision sets out some background matters and the relevant regulatory scheme pertaining to the grant of a student visa at [1]-[8]. The Tribunal notes at [5] that the applicants consented to the Tribunal deciding the review without a hearing; its satisfaction that the necessary consent had been given under s 360(2)(b) of the Act (as then in force); and, pursuant to s 360(3) (as then in force), the applicants were no longer entitled to appear before it. The Tribunal concluded at [58] of the Decision that the first applicant was not a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student. In doing so, the Tribunal reasoned:(a)the first applicant and her husband had established strong personal relationships in Australia: Decision at [20]-[22]; the applicant's ties to Australia, including her family and community ties, would present a strong incentive to the applicant to remain: Decision at [51]; and considering these personal and family ties, the first applicant’s personal ties to India would not serve as a significant incentive to return to India: Decision at [49]-[50];(b)the first applicant was well settled, well connected and had income-earning opportunities in Australia: Decision at [52];(c)the first applicant decided to begin studying in Australia 14 days after arriving on a tourist visa: (i)this was a short period within which to make such a significant decision considering the logistical and financial challenges, and the necessity to remain in Australia to give birth to her second child and the effect of the birth on that decision and on her study;(ii)consequently, the Tribunal considered it was unlikely the first applicant decided to commence study after arriving. Instead, the Tribunal found the first applicant’s activities indicated a level of planning and forethought, and that her decision to come to Australia to study and give birth to her second child was planned before arrival: Decision at [24]-[36];(d)the first applicant’s failure to return to complete a Master of Accounting which she deferred to give birth to her child; her failure to explain the reason for not resuming that study; and later returning to complete four units in a Master of Business Administration, was inconsistent with her reasons for applying for the visa - her lifelong ambition to become a professional accountant and to operate an accountancy practice in India: Decision at [37]-[43]; and(e)the first applicant provided inconsistent statements about her future career plans in India. The first applicant’s claim that she wanted to work in her family business, or a multinational company in India, were inconsistent with that which the applicant claimed was the decisive reason behind relocating her family – the desire to become qualified to operate her own chartered accountancy business: Decision at [44]-[46].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal consequently concluded that the second to fourth applicants were not members of the family unit of someone who met the primary criteria and affirmed the delegate’s decisions refusing to grant the first to third applicants’ student visas: Decision at [60]-[61].CONSIDERATION As earlier noted, the applicants’ sole ground of review contends the Tribunal’s Decision is affected by legal unreasonableness. This is because the Tribunal determined the review without a hearing in circumstances where the purported consent for the Tribunal to determine the review without a hearing was irregular. It was irregular, so called, because consent appears to have been procured after “wrongheaded” or misconceived advice was given to the applicants by their representative to the effect that the written material provided to the Tribunal would be sufficient to secure a favourable outcome in the review, and so obviating the need for a hearing. As the High Court observed in Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16[2020] HCA 46; 271 CLR 550 at [26]:A requirement of legal reasonableness in the exercise of a decision-maker's power is derived by implication from the statute, including an implication of the required threshold of unreasonableness, which is usually high. Any legal unreasonableness is to be judged at the time the power is exercised or should have been exercised. It is not to be assessed through the lens of procedural fairness to the applicant. Instead, whether the implied requirements of legal reasonableness have been satisfied requires a close focus upon the particular circumstances of exercise of the statutory power: the conclusion is drawn "from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power". (footnotes omitted) Section 360 of the Act (as then in force) required the Tribunal to invite an applicant for review to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the decision under review, unless, relevantly, the applicant consented to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it. Therefore, if an applicant gave his or her consent under s 360(2)(b), the Tribunal could make a decision without the applicant appearing before it. And the applicant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal: s 360(3). Section 363A of the Act (as then in force) provides that if a provision of Pt 5 states that a person is not entitled to do something, or to be assisted or represented by another person, then, unless a provision expressly provides otherwise, the Tribunal does not have power to permit the person to do that thing, or to be assisted or represented by another person. The interaction of s 360(1) of the Act (as then in force) with some of its exceptions and the effect of s 363A (as then in force) was considered in Hasranv Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[2010] FCAFC 40; 183 FCR 413. The Full Court in Hasran said:25 . . . the proper construction and application of s 363A of the Act and the related provisions of Part 5 were correctly stated by the Full Court in Sun and explained by Tracey J in M.26 As Tracey J observed in M at [46], the language of s 363A is clear. It operates so as to remove any discretion which the Tribunal may have had to allow a person to do something where a provision of Part 5 states that the person is not entitled to do it.27 Here, the appellant’s failure to respond to the Tribunal’s letter under s 359A had the effect of attracting the cascading operation of ss 359C(2), 360(2)(c) and, critically, s 360(3) which enlivened the application of s 363A.28 This was because the appellant was invited by the Tribunal’s letter under s 359A to comment or respond to the information stated in the Tribunal’s letter by 3 August 2009. He did not do so, and accordingly he was a person to whom s 359C(2) applied. The operation of s 360(3) was thereby attracted. The effect of that subsection in the circumstances of this case was that the appellant was not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.29 The operation of s 360(3) then attracted the express terms of s 363A, the effect of which was to provide that the Tribunal did not have power to permit the appellant to appear at an oral hearing.