D.I. & M.C. Settree Pty Ltd v Caltex Properties Ltd

Case

[1988] FCA 406

14 Jul 1988

No judgment structure available for this case.

I

.. b
I r: 1
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALAf.)

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY) . ...

)

DIVISION GENERAL 1
BETWEEN:  D.I. & M.C. SETTREE PTY.

LIXITED

Applicant

AND :  CALTEX PROPERTIES LIPIITED
~ _ _ _ _
Respondent

CORAM: M. L. FOSTER, J.

DATE :  14 JULY, 1988.
PLACE:  SYDNEY.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT .__
( EXTEMPORE) . __

.

directors of the Company, F t . and Mrs. Settree and thelr famlly
HIS HONOUR:  The applicant company conducts a servicc statlon
business with an assoclated restaurant buslness in Cobar, New
South Wales. The business I S called "the Golden Fleece Service
Station, Cobar". The servlce station premises, :ncludlrg the
restaurant, together vlch a r c s ~ c l o - t l a l -.ottaq~ :n h l C h the
reside are leased from the respondent under a lease agreemenc
dated 22 September, 1982, which provldes for rent31 and contalns
a large number of other provlslons. It 1s annexure C to the
Affldavit of Ian Settree of 6 [larch, 1987.
The lease expired according to its terms on 31 August,

1985.   Since that time the premises have been occupied by the

applicant, apparently under a holding-over clause. The buslness
has been carried on by the appllcant in a s ~ t u a t ~ o n where there
was a dispute as to the proper rental to be paid for the leased

premises.

The applicant brlngs these proceedings pursuant to S.
17A ( 7 ) and (9) of the Petroleum Retail rlarketlnprranchlse Act, __ - -

1980 ("the Act"). The proceedings also Include a claim under S .

9 of the Act. This claim has been abandoned. The appllcant now

seeks the followlng orders In lts applicatlon; namely:-

"(l) A declaration that the agreement entered into
between the applicant and the respondent on 22
September, 1982 1 s a Franchise Agreement w ~ t h i n
the terms of the Petroleum Retail Plarketlng and

Franchise Act, 1980;

( 2 ) An order that pursuant to S. 17A(7) of the
Petroleum Retail Marketlng Franchise Act, 1980
that the respondent be directed to renew the
Franchise Agreement with the appllcant;
( 3 ) An order that the proposed Franchlse
Agreement, undated, betveen the appllcant and the
respondent, be reneved on the terms set forth In
the Deed of Lpase 1." >nne<urr- "F" c f thF T.ffldavl?
of Tan Settree s ' : o r ? or 5 r!er-.h, 19Gi S U ~ I P C C tcl
che following 0~3e:s ard bcr~acions 2 s ;ought
herein:
(5) An order that the sald Deed of Lease be varled
by lnsertlng ;n clausn l(a) sums payable as rent
calculated or d5termlned in such a nanner as to be
reasonable, hafling r e q r r d to the market value of
any interest, goQds, or services to whlch that sum
relates; and
( 1 0 ) A n order that the respondent pay the
applicant's costs."
There is no dispute as to the first claim. I

accordingly make the declaration sought.

The respondent, however, disputes that S. 1 7 A 1s

avallable to the appllcant. It submits that the applicant can

proceed only under S. 9 . Ic subrnlcs that by virtue of the
holdlng-over clause already referred to and the operation of S.

13 of the Act, the respondent, as franchlsor, has not relevantly

proposed to renew the franchlse agreement under S. 17A. It 15

n o t necessary to set out the argument in full. The respondent

has had the benefit of it. I r e ~ e c t thls submlssion. In my
view, the case quite clearly falls within S. 1 7 A .
I am quite satlsfled that the respondent's letter of 27

July, 1985' (Annexure F to the Affidavit of Ian Settree) clearly

amounts to a proposal to review the franchise agreement. I am

further satisfied that the respondent at all relevant tlmes vas seeking to invoke the machinery of S. 174 ~n relatlon to renewal of the agreement for a further fixed term at 'I :ncreased rental. .

The letter ltself clearly purpclrts tc be a -@t:cc in accordance

with S. 17A(1) and ( 2 ) and includes a proposal a s to a provisiop differing from that of the ~>lstlng

agreement, namely that the

rent should be increased.
Section 1 7 A contains mandatory prov~sions a s to time ~n

relation to the service of a notice. 'There 1 s no dispute that these conditions were not cornplled ~11th. In the result, ~n my

opinion, the applicant, as franchrsee, was entitled to lnvoke the
provisions of S. 1 7 A ( 7 ) seek1r.g an order from the Court dlrectlng

the franchlsee to renew the agreement.

None of the excludrng provisrons of sub-section ( 5 ) or

sub-section ( 7 ) apply. The Court consequently makes the orders
sought in paragraph 2 of the applicatlon.

The applicant is thus entitled to seek an order under

sub-section (9)(a). This provides that the Court may make:
"Orders determining any amount to be payable by the

franchisee under the franchlse agreement as to be

renewed. 'I

In the circumstances of this case, the court 1s asked

to determme the rent payable under the renewed franchlse

agreement. Although in ~ t s proposal for renewal the respondent
sought an increased rent, it now seeks only that the rent payable
at the date of expiry of the franchise agreement; namely, $67,008
per year, be fixed as the rent for the reneved agreement.
Furthermore, lt does not sec1 a v y :nq~el z s c ? l a t l ? ? o f i?? r e n t

a s had previously been provlded for.

The applrcant contends for c considerably l o w e r ~ e n t
than lt was paylng at che end of the prevlous term. ~t asserted

that the rent was renderlng the conducc of th5 buslness

unprofitable. Thls was dlsputed by the respondent vlllch

maintained that any unprofltablllty of the buslness r~sulted from
poor management on the part of the appllcant, ln partlcular from
the employment of excess staff in the restaurant, and from a
cessation of 24 hour tradlng. These matters would have asumed

far more importance had the case fallen for conslderatlon and

determination under S . 9 of the Act rather than S. 17.4. However,
insofar as these conslderatlons may have some sllght bearlng upon
the approach to be adopted ~n the flxlng of rent, I ~ndlcate that
I formed the view, on the evidence, that Fr. Settre5 was an
experlenced servlce statlon operator and that he and hls q'lfe

worked dlligently ln the buslness, and that they were genulnely

unable to achieve anything llke the level of proflt sald to be

theoretically available in accordance wlth calculatlons produced

by Mr. Lilllngton on behalf of the respondent, Exhiblts H and J.

. The Court, under S. 1 7 A ( 9 ) in the Instant case, 1s
requlred, as it were, to perform the functlon ot a valuer ln

fixing an appropriate mark of rental to be pald by the appllca~t

to the respondent for the servlce statlon premises, restaurant,
and dwelllng. Part of the land avallable has, :-, :a?c, b e ~ n u s e d
by the applicant to conduct a 3er:z Reni-a-S?..r fra~c;.lse I am
satisfied on the evldence that thls area was made available by
the respondent to the appl-1car.t wlthout charge. 1 therefore
exclude it from conslderatlon l n flxllg the rcnt.
A s might be expected, evldence f r g m e ~ p e r t valuers has
been called on both sldes and the testimony has deal; not only
with approprlate flgures for the rent but also wlth pr-lnclples to

be applied in arrlvlng at a market rental for servlce station premlses. It has been made abundantly clear ~n argument that thls litiqatlon has not been approached by elther slde, on the

basis that it constitutes a cest case ln whlch the Court 1 s belng asked to lay down approprlate prlnclples for such a valuatlon.

It has been accepted qulte clearly that the questlon 1s one of

fact, and the expert evldence serves only as a guide to the Court

in determlninq the questlon.

The servlce station premlses, and I embrace 1n that

descriptlon the restaurant and dwelllnq, are sltuated in the

western outskirts of Cobar, a country town in the western
distrlct of New south Wales. It 1 s predominantly a mlnlnq t o m

in which the incomes of lts approxlmately flve thousand

.

inhabitants can fluctuate. The servlce statlon 1 s on the main
highway to and from Broken H111 and 1s che flrst servlce statlon

to be encountered by trucks approachlng Cobar from the vest along

the highway. It therefore has 3 no1 lncons~derable passlnq trade
in addltion to the t o m trade. ??ere arc- qthec sr_.r-;~lce scatlqns
ln the town. They are described, ..-lth~.~t C L S T I ) U C ~ , the
evidence. They naturally provlde competltlon but lt 1 s not, as I
understand the evidence, asserted thaE the level O F competlrion
has changed in a manner whlch should influence the rental
determlnatlon for the sub~ect prernrses.

Apart from the restaurant the business provides the

usual servlce station facilities, including sale of petrol of all
kinds, distillate, tyres, accessorles, servicrng of vehlcles,

mechanlcal repairs, and sales through a shop of ltems that

travellers buy. Accounting records of an ordinary kind have been
kept wlth the asslstance of accountants, and these have been the

sublect of examlnatlon and evldence ln the case.

It 1s clear that the servlce station, although havlnq many features in common to all small service statlons,

also has

features attributable to its locatlon rn a small country town rn

a fairly isolated area upon a maln hlghway. It appears, for instance, that the employment of labour presented difficult features for the applicants from those applicable ln the clty,

and that the cost of raw materials for use in the buslness could
be hlgher. In partlcular, from a valuation point of view, ~t was
most diff;cult to obtain comparable rentals. The service station
businesses in Cobar were not really comparable. Dubbo and
Nynqan, the closest towns, were a far larger slze, a fact which
made comparison difficult.
The evidence made ~k abundantly clEa: t h a c t h e

valuation exercise requlred partook more of art than of science.

R .

The experts differed markedly, not only in the figures arrived at

but also in respect of the appropriat? approach to be adopted.

All experts were agreed that truly comparable rentals were the

best gulde on appropriate market rental, but that these were not

available.

I n these clrcumstances two maln approaches appeared in
the evidence; valuers relled upon by the applicant used

predominantly an approach described as "return on capital". Thls

was a simple approach claimed to be approprrate to a fairly
remote country area of establlshlng a proper capltal value f o r

the premises and then establishing rent by flxing approprlate

percentage return on that capltal. The applicant called three
qualified valuers who adopted thls approach. Of the three I
found the evidence of M r . Sammervrlle the most Impressive. He
valued the service station and restaurant facllltles at $250,000

and took 15.5. per cent as an appropriate percentage to apply.

He arrived thereby at a figure of $ 3 8 , 7 5 0 as rental approprlate
to that part of the premlses. HE allowed in addltion a rent of
$4,000 per annum for the dwelling. This latter rent does not
seem to be the subject of any real dispute whereas the former is.
It IS clear that Mr. Sommervllle did not approach the

establlshment of the capital value of the buslness premises on the basis that they were mere static real estate. 3e approached on the basis that he was valulng prern~ses used a s a s~:11ce

station; that this vas thelr Sesc LISP ard t??t the 5erv1c~
station was an established and golng concern. Any doubts as to
this were completely dispelled by answers he gave vhen recalled

to the witness box in the last day of evidepce LP. th:s c a s e . For
this reason hls evidence, in my view, carries more hrelght chan
that of Mr. Poulter. He did not value the premlses orher than as
real estate.
Mr. McLennan, the other valuer called for Ehe
applicant, contributed evidence, which I regard as rnost u s e f u l ,
to the effect that the percentage return reasonably to be

expected on a service station capltal investment necessarily
increased with the distance of the statlon from the larger urban

areas in the Blue Mountarns 2nd beyond as the lnvestnent risk in

terms of capital appreciation or depreciatlon necessarily

increased with dlstance from such areas.

The valuers called for the respondent favoured an

approach referred to as the piecemeal approach. Thls consisted
of valuing rent in relation to the turnover achieved in various
aspects of the business and only using the real estate valuatlon

as some sort of a check.

Only one of these valuers, however, actually saw the

premises and provided a figure for tent. He was Mr. Breckenridge
whose evldence I did not find particularly helpful. He appears

to have been very much Influenced, ~n "47 :.IP~', hv the r'isting
agreed rental which was under attzc'c. ? e ? d c c t c d t rp .~lecemeal
approach to the extent that he valued the rental for the fuel

selling area on the basis of turnover, hut he valued c h e rl)ther

portlons of the premises on a recurn of real estate l1as1s. He
acknowledged that there was no standard way of arrlT~:1-3 at ?
rental value of business premlses and that it was a sarter of
looking at indlvldual c~rcumstances of each service statlon.

The other two valuers: Messrs. Parlsh and Aubln dld

not see the premises although each of thPm sald thac 1t was of

signiflcance to do so in making a rental valuation. They heavlly
espoused the piecemeal approach based on turnover. Xiether of

them, however, provided a valuation to the Court although It

appears that they were aware of the exlstence of the applicant’s
financial records which evldenced turnover in all relevant areas
and they merely affirmed the superiority of a method whlch took

into account and fixed a separate rental in respect of the

turnover of particular aspects of the service station business.

The absence of their actually fixlng figures In respect of the

applicant’s business IS, ~n my view, very detrimental to the respondent‘s case. It 1s a poor substitute to proceed as was

done simply by applying the scated prlnclples as a matter o f

arithmetic to flgures extracted from the applicant‘s records and

the experts may not have proceeded in thls way, chey may have

acceded to suggestlons in cross-examinatlon xhlch vould have

altered the purely arithmetrcal sltuat~on .Then applied to the
speciflc facts of this rase. 90th valuers ~ 1 r r - r ? ~ ~ ~ s e d s ~ t h a T
other approaches vere poss:ble znd qiaS1E.

In all these clrcumstances, for the purpose of decldlng

this particular case, I feel that I should place more rellance on

and follow the principles of the capltal return eth hod a s
espoused by Mr. Sommervllle. I am fortlfled ln thls vlew by the
fact already referred to that M r . Sommervllle made it abundantly
clear that in fixlng a total sum f o r capltal value of the
business premises he bore In mlnd the factors .rihlch, ln
accordance wlth the other method, a r e made the sub~ect of
separate assessment. Indeed, 1t was recognlsed ln che evldence

of M r . Aubln that the valuatlon of the slte as a servlce station as an on-golng operatlon was an avallable method of arrlvlng at the rent in the absence of comparable rental lnformatlon.

Furthermore, the one expert, apart from M r .
Breckenrldge, who apparently had regard to the actual turnover

.

and other flgures relatlng to the buslness was M r . Sommervllle,
who expressed the vlew when called ln reply that the strlct

applicatlon of the plecemeal prlnclple could produce a rental

figure in the present case vhlch .:as conslderably 1n ?/cess of
anything regarded as accept?blc -r t h e 1 ~ ~ 5 t e 1 n ? , r e a .

li.

On the ocher hand, I do not feel obliged to accept IR

toto the rental appralsal of the Dusl~ess prerises p?cle by F r .
Sommervllle.

The evldence of Mr. ?IcLennan coupled wlth other

evidence ln the case, particularly that relatlng to an 18 per

cent risk factor In respect of a service station ln the Nyngan

area, make me believe that a 20 per cent approach would be more
appropriate here.

Accordlngly, I would adlust Mr. Sommerville’s flqure of

$ 3 8 , 7 5 0 upwards by the appllcatlon of 20 per cent to a figure of

$50,000 with the result that the flgure of annual rent that I fix

is $54,000.

I accordingly make order ( 5 ) in terms that the Deed of

Lease be varled by inserting in clause l(a) the sum of $54,000 In respect of each period thereln set out.

I order the respondent to pay che appllcant’s c o s t s of

thls application.

I certify that thls and the 11 precpdlng pages
are a true copy of the reasons l o r ludgment
hereln of his Honour, 7 r . , J U S ~ L C P !!.L. T’oster.
Dated:  3 >.uouS:, 1 9 8 8 .
Associate: -K!!&
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