D'Costa v Roe

Case [2013] WASC 99


D'COSTA -v- ROE [2013] WASC 99



SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIACitation No:[2013] WASC 99
Case No:SJA:1135/201215 MARCH 2013
Coram:HALL J22/03/13
18Judgment Part:1 of 1
Result: Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Sentence of imprisonment set aside and appellant resentenced
A
PDF Version
Parties:MARK NOEL D'COSTA
NICHOLAS GLENN ROE

Catchwords:

Criminal law
Breach of restraining order
Whether presumption of imprisonment for third offence applicable where two previous convictions occurred on the same day
Interpretation of s 61A Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)

Legislation:

Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), s 61, s 61A

Case References:

Carter v Denham [1984] WAR 123
Clark v Glover (1992) 58 SASR 571
Director of Public Prosecutions v Partridge [2009] NSWCCA 75; (2009) 74 NSWLR 62
Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286
O'Hara v Harrington [1962] Tas SR 165
Police v Nowak [2000] SASC 82; (2000) 76 SASR 551
Reid v Rowbottam [2005] NTSC 7
Ryszawa v Samuels [1969] SASR 158
Samuels v Mackenzie (1979) 23 SASR 595
Schluter v Trenerry (1997) 6 NTLR 194
T v Bolitho [2010] WASC 30
Turbitt v Pryce (Unreported, NTSC, 21 January 1998)


JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
    IN CRIMINAL
CITATION : D'COSTA -v- ROE [2013] WASC 99 CORAM : HALL J HEARD : 15 MARCH 2013 DELIVERED : 22 MARCH 2013 FILE NO/S : SJA 1135 of 2012 BETWEEN : MARK NOEL D'COSTA
    Appellant

    AND

    NICHOLAS GLENN ROE
    Respondent


ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram : MAGISTRATE B C GLUESTEIN

File No : JO 44377 of 2012


Catchwords:

Criminal law - Breach of restraining order - Whether presumption of imprisonment for third offence applicable where two previous convictions occurred on the same day - Interpretation of s 61A Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)


(Page 2)



Legislation:

Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), s 61, s 61A

Result:

Leave to appeal granted


Appeal allowed
Sentence of imprisonment set aside and appellant resentenced

Category: A


Representation:

Counsel:


    Appellant : Ms K J Farley
    Respondent : Ms R Young

Solicitors:

    Appellant : Legal Aid (WA)
    Respondent : State Solicitor for Western Australia


Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Carter v Denham [1984] WAR 123
Clark v Glover (1992) 58 SASR 571
Director of Public Prosecutions v Partridge [2009] NSWCCA 75; (2009) 74 NSWLR 62
Farrington v Thomson [1959] VR 286
O'Hara v Harrington [1962] Tas SR 165
Police v Nowak [2000] SASC 82; (2000) 76 SASR 551
Reid v Rowbottam [2005] NTSC 7
Ryszawa v Samuels [1969] SASR 158
Samuels v Mackenzie (1979) 23 SASR 595
Schluter v Trenerry (1997) 6 NTLR 194
T v Bolitho [2010] WASC 30
Turbitt v Pryce (Unreported, NTSC, 21 January 1998)


(Page 3)
    HALL J:




Introduction

1 On 9 October 2012 the appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of breaching a violence restraining order contrary to s 61(1) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (the Act). On 16 October 2012…

Continue reading D'Costa v Roe

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
D'COSTA -v- ROWE [2013] WASC 99
Case
[2013] WASC 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In D'Costa v Roe, the appellant faced charges stemming from a breach of a restraining order. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where the appellant contested the legality of the presumption of imprisonment mandated by section 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). The appellant argued that the presumption should not apply to him because the two previous convictions that triggered the mandatory imprisonment were both issued on the same day. The State sought to enforce the presumption, contending that the statutory language did not exclude situations where multiple breaches occurred simultaneously.

The court was tasked with interpreting the statutory language of section 61A, focusing on whether the plain meaning of the words indicated that the presumption of imprisonment should apply irrespective of the timing of the previous convictions. Additionally, the court had to consider the legislative intent behind the mandatory imprisonment provision and whether it aligned with the principle of proportionality in sentencing. The appellant's legal team submitted that applying the presumption in such circumstances would contravene the fundamental principles of justice and fairness.

The court found in favour of the appellant, determining that the plain language of section 61A did not explicitly include scenarios where multiple breaches occurred on the same day. The court held that the legislative intent behind the mandatory imprisonment provision was to deter repeated breaches, not to impose disproportionate penalties. By setting aside the appellant's sentence of imprisonment, the court allowed the appeal and ordered that the appellant be resentenced, ensuring that the outcome was consistent with the principles of justice and fairness.

Orders

Orders of the court

Leave to appeal granted

Appeal allowed

Sentence of imprisonment set aside and appellant resentenced

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.