FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CZY16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1171
Appeal from: CZY16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 467 File number: NSD 359 of 2018 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 7 August 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the application to that court, with costs – that application was for judicial review of the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa – application to raise, as a sole ground of appeal, a ground not raised before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether expedient in the interests of justice to permit the ground to be raised – whether any self-evident merit in the proposed ground that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made no finding on the appellant’s claim that he feared harm in Nepal from Tarun Dal because of demands for money they had made, and would make, because of his wealth Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Date of hearing: 7 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr DH Godwin Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Galvin of Minter Ellison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 359 of 2018 BETWEEN: CZY16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant is refused leave to raise his new ground of appeal.
2.The appeal is dismissed, with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ROBERTSON J:
This appeal is from orders of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the primary judge) given on 2 March 2018 dismissing the application to that court, with costs. That application was for judicial review of the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).
As found by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) in its decision dated 26 September 2016, the appellant is a citizen of Nepal.
The grounds of review before the primary judge were as follows, as written:
1.The Tribunal accepted my evidence and the criminal groups who asked me for donations who also may have had some connection to political parties yet the Tribunal accepted that these criminal groups may ask me for donations in the future and failed to see my subjective fear of harm at their hand in the future.
2.The Tribunal erred in law by failing to accept that forced donations amount to degrading treatment or punishment.
3.The Tribunal failed to accept, based…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1171
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether it would be expedient in the interests of justice to permit CZY16 to raise a ground of appeal that he had not previously raised before the Federal Circuit Court. The court also needed to determine if there was any self-evident merit in the proposed ground of appeal, which centred on the Tribunal's omission to make a specific finding regarding the appellant's fear of Tarun Dal. The court examined the reasoning and findings of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to assess whether the issue of forced donations had been adequately addressed and whether the Tribunal had implicitly considered the appellant's claims about Tarun Dal.
The court concluded that the proposed ground of appeal lacked self-evident merit. It noted that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had indeed considered the issue of forced donations in its assessment of the appellant's fear of persecution from criminal groups, including those potentially connected to political parties like Tarun Dal. The Tribunal had explicitly found that there was no real chance of serious harm from Tarun Dal, which included the aspect of forced donations. Consequently, the court found it was not expedient in the interests of justice to allow the new argument to be raised on appeal. The court dismissed the appeal and refused CZY16 leave to raise the new ground of appeal, ordering that the appeal be dismissed with costs.
The final orders of the court were that CZY16 was refused leave to raise his new ground of appeal and that the appeal was dismissed with costs. The entry of these orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant is refused leave to raise his new ground of appeal.
2. The appeal is dismissed, with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that the Tribunal dealt with forced donations to Tarun Dal in its consideration of the well-founded fear from criminal groups at [47]-[60] of its reasons. The Minister also submitted that, when considering the complementary protection criteria, the Tribunal made findings at [73] which corresponded with the findings about Tarun Dal at [60] in relation to the claim for a well-founded fear of persecution. Consideration In my opinion, it is clear that the Tribunal made a finding on the appellant’s claim that he feared harm in Nepal from Tarun Dal because of the demands for money they had made, and would make on him, because of his wealth. The question of donations arose because of the appellant’s apparent capacity to provide them. It was his evidence that the people from Tarun Dal were approaching him for money because they were trying to get money out of him from his business. The Tribunal was well aware of this and referred to it in its reasons. In effect the Tribunal accepted, at [66] and elsewhere, that the appellant had been asked for donations from criminal groups and they may have had some connection to political parties and that those groups may ask for donations in the future. This clearly encompassed Tarun Dal. That is, despite Tarun Dal technically being a ‘political group’, the Tribunal considered it under the category of ‘criminal groups with connections to political parties’. Although in one sense it may be said that criminal groups are associated with Tarun Dal but are not identical to it, as submitted on behalf of the appellant, the issue is discerning what the Tribunal meant on a fair reading of its reasons. In conducting that exercise it is not helpful to comb the transcript for nuances of expression by the appellant. The matter is put beyond doubt by [60] of the Tribunal’s reasons, where the Tribunal stated, amongst other things, it was not satisfied that there was a real chance of serious harm from Tarun Dal, in particular, on the basis of the appellant’s inability to pay donations or for any other reason associated with the donations. In light of the Tribunal’s findings, the purported distinction between political and non-political groups is an artificial one. The Tribunal also considered whether the asking for those donations amounted to significant harm. The Tribunal held that it did not.Conclusion I find that the proposed ground lacks any self-evident merit. I take into account that the appellant represented himself before the primary judge but I do not regard that, in itself, as a basis for granting leave on the present appeal. If the application were allowed, the hearing at first instance, and the careful reasons of the primary judge, would become irrelevant. I do not regard it is expedient in the interests of the administration of justice to allow the new argument to be raised on appeal. In the circumstances the appropriate order is to refuse leave to the appellant to raise the new ground. The appeal should be dismissed, with costs.