FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CWY23 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1036
File number: PEG 280 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 15 October 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa – whether the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant an opportunity to discuss his claims for protection – whether the Tribunal failed to consider that the applicant would face a real chance of persecution on account of his religion – whether the applicant was denied a proper opportunity to participate in the hearing in circumstances where he claims he could not hear the interpreter – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 425, 429A, 476, 477 Cases cited: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 610; [2024] HCA 12
Mazhar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 64 ALD 395; [2000] FCA 1759
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553; [2003] FCAFC 126
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 9 October 2024 Place: Perth Applicant: The applicant appeared in person (via Microsoft Teams) Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms G Ellis Second Respondent: Submitting appearance by the second respondent, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
PEG 280 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CWY23
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
15 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $6,500.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a citizen of China who applied for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision on 8 November 2023. The applicant seeks judicial review of…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1036
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the AAT erred in not allowing the applicant to discuss his claims sufficiently or in failing to give proper consideration to his religious persecution claims. The court reviewed the AAT's decision and found that the AAT had indeed given the applicant multiple opportunities to discuss his faith and the reasons he could not return to China. The AAT questioned the applicant about his Christian beliefs, his family’s religious practices, and the implications of returning to China, among other topics. Despite these opportunities, the AAT found the applicant's responses to be vague, inconsistent, and unconvincing. The court held that the AAT's findings were supported by the evidence presented, and that the AAT's decision did not contain jurisdictional errors. The court also noted that the applicant did not provide evidence to substantiate his claim that he could not hear the interpreter, thereby failing to demonstrate that he was denied a proper opportunity to participate in the hearing.
Based on the court's findings, the application for judicial review was dismissed. The court confirmed that disagreement with the AAT's decision did not constitute a jurisdictional error, and that the AAT had properly exercised its discretion in evaluating the applicant's claims. The court's decision underscored the importance of providing clear, detailed, and consistent evidence in asylum claims, particularly regarding the risks associated with returning to the applicant's country of origin.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPLICATIONGround 1 In ground 1, the applicant asserts that the Department made errors. To the extent that the ground purports to invite judicial review of the delegate’s decision, it cannot be considered by the Court. That is because this Court does not have any jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision in this matter. The delegate’s decision is a primary decision within the meaning of s 476(4)(a) of the Migration Act and s 476(2)(a) of the Migration Act expressly provides that the Court does not have jurisdiction in relation to primary decisions. The Minister in his submissions treated the ground as an assertion of error in the Tribunal decision, noting also that the applicant did not attend his interview with the delegate so therefore the ground could not meaningfully relate to the delegate’s decision. At the hearing, I explained to the applicant that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision and that, like the Minister, I propose to treat the ground as asserting error in the Tribunal decision. The ground raised by the applicant alleges two errors, namely, that the Tribunal: (a)did not allow the applicant to discuss his faith and commitment; and (b)should have given the benefit of the doubt to asylum seekers who are generally credible but unable to substantiate all their claims. The applicant did not make any submissions that could reasonably be seen as addressing this ground. I accept the Minister’s submission that, based on the reasons given by the Tribunal in support of its decision, it appears that the Tribunal afforded the applicant many opportunities to discuss his faith and commitment at the Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal from [32] to [52] of its reasons summarised the questions that it asked the applicant at the hearing about his Christianity and the responses given by the applicant. These paragraphs suggest that the Tribunal asked the applicant questions relating to:(a)why he could not return to China;(b)what branch of Christianity he belonged to and whether he followed Catholicism or Protestantism;(c)what Christianity means to him and his beliefs in Christianity;(d)country information to the effect that Christians can practise their religion in China and about official churches in China;(e)whether the applicant had come to the attention of the authorities in China;(f)his family circumstances, including whether his parents and grandparents practised Christianity and whether they had attracted the attention of the authorities; and(g)how Jesus died. Based on the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, it appears that the applicant provided answers to each of these questions, although some of the applicant’s answers were inconsistent with the information in his written claims and the Tribunal considered some of the applicant’s answers to be vague, lacking in detail and unconvincing. I am satisfied that the Tribunal afforded the applicant a meaningful opportunity to discuss his religion and any fear of harm arising from his religion. The first part of the ground therefore fails.