CWP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CWP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 28  

Appeal from: CWP16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1213
File number: NSD 1027 of 2017
Judges: ROBERTSON, KERR AND WHITE JJ
Date of judgment: 23 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Authority was in error in stating that the “information” that the appellant “has a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE” was “new information” – whether the delegate made a finding that the appellant had a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE – whether the Authority failed to complete its review in that respect – whether the Authority erred in failing to refer to a particular document, evidencing that the appellant and his family had been required to register their details with the authorities and therefore that the appellant was being monitored in 2009 and had come to the attention of the Sri Lankan army’s 512 Brigade prior to 2012
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD
Cases cited: BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 869
Date of hearing: 23 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Chia
Solicitor for the Appellant: Siva Logan Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1027 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CWP16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

ROBERTSON, KERR AND WHITE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

23 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal.

2.The appeal is dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. This appeal is from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 7 June 2017, dismissing the application to that Court for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) made on 9 September 2016. The Authority affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The decision of the delegate was made on 27 July 2016.

  2. The appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa on 14 November 2015.

  3. As found by the Authority, the appellant is a Tamil man originally from Jaffna in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia by boat, undocumented, in September 2012.

  4. It was common ground that the decision by the delegate to refuse the appellant’s application was a fast…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CWP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appellant who sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant, originally from Sri Lanka, had applied for a visa, which was subsequently refused by a delegate. The IAA reviewed the decision but ultimately upheld the delegate's refusal. The appellant then appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), which dismissed the appeal. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant further appealed to the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the IAA erred in its review process by not considering specific findings made by the delegate and whether the IAA failed to adequately consider a document provided by the appellant. Specifically, the appellant argued that the IAA wrongly classified certain information as "new" when it had been previously assessed by the delegate, and that the IAA did not sufficiently address a document that indicated the appellant had been monitored by Sri Lankan authorities prior to a critical incident in 2012.

In its reasoning, the court considered the scope of the IAA's review responsibilities under the relevant legislation. It noted that while the IAA was required to review the delegate's decision, this did not necessarily mean that it had to accept the delegate's findings without question. The court held that the IAA did not commit any jurisdictional error by considering the information as "new." Furthermore, regarding the document in question, the court found that even if the IAA had overlooked this document, it would not have altered the outcome of the review. The appellant's claims did not sufficiently establish that he was owed protection under the Migration Act.

As a result, the court dismissed the appeal. The appellant was granted leave to amend his notice of appeal to include the grounds he wished to argue. However, based on the arguments presented, the court concluded that the IAA's decision was sound and upheld the refusal of the visa application. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was common ground that the decision by the delegate to refuse the appellant’s application was a fast track reviewable decision and, therefore, automatically referred to the Authority for review of the delegate’s decision.The course of decision-making In light of the issues on appeal, it is necessary to review in some detail the course of decision-making. Those issues were described in the appellant’s written outline of submissions dated 9 February 2018 as, first, whether the Authority failed to conduct a “review” by failing to consider the delegate’s finding that the appellant may have transported goods for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the Sri Lankan civil war and, second, whether the Authority committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider a document entitled “Registration of Civilians Residing in ‘512’ Brigade Area - 2009” that had been provided to the Department with the appellant’s visa application. The appellant stated in a Statutory Declaration summarising his claims for protection that he believed he would be seriously harmed and killed by the Sri Lankan army as he believed he had come to the adverse attention of the authorities who believed he was an LTTE member. The appellant also stated that he believed he was at risk of being harmed as he fled Sri Lanka illegally and claimed asylum in Australia, as the Sri Lankan authorities were of the view that Tamil asylum seekers were LTTE supporters. He stated that he feared being seriously harmed by the Sri Lankan authorities for these reasons. In the same Statutory Declaration the appellant referred to a number of incidents in the period 1995 to 1997 and to a particular incident he said happened in August 2012. He said that during the period 2010 until he fled Sri Lanka in August 2012 he was working and residing in Colombo but travelled every now and then (once or twice a month) to visit his family in Jaffna. It was after an incident on 26 August 2012 that the appellant said he decided to flee Sri Lanka. The incident involved approximately ten Sri Lankan Army soldiers attached to the 512 Brigade coming to his house in search of him, taking him to the 512 Brigade army camp and telling him that he needed to confess that he was an LTTE member. One of the soldiers threatened to shoot the appellant by placing his gun inside the appellant’s mouth. The appellant was released the same day and told that he would need to report to the camp again and that he would need to confess and tell them the truth. One of the documents the appellant provided to the Department was the “Registration of Civilians Residing in ‘512’ Brigade Area - 2009” showing the “Members of the Family Presently Occupation Year 2007” apparently dated 28 March 2009. However the appellant did not refer to this document in his Statutory Declaration. The appellant was invited to attend an interview to discuss his visa application and his claims, that interview occurring on 23 March 2016.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It does not appear from the Minister’s written submissions dated 16 February 2018 that he opposes the application to amend. In these circumstances, having regard to the grounds now sought to be raised, to the consideration that the appellant does not speak English and was self-represented before the FCCA, and to the great significance of the matter to the appellant, the Court granted leave to the appellant to rely on these grounds.The parties’ submissions and consideration of those submissionsGround 1 and 2 In relation to grounds 1 and 2, the appellant submitted that the Authority was in error in stating that the “information” that the appellant “has a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE” was “new information” in circumstances where the delegate had found, at [60], that the appellant may have transported goods for the LTTE. The appellant submitted that even if the assertion in the written submissions that the appellant had “a past record of transporting goods for the LTTE” was “new information”, it did not change the fact that the delegate had already made a finding that the appellant “may have transported some goods for the LTTE”, which the Authority did not deal with in its decision. The appellant also submitted that the delegate’s finding could not have been “new information”: it cannot be that, on the one hand, the core function of the Authority is to “review” fast track reviewable decisions referred to it, whilst, on the other hand, findings forming part of those decisions are only to be considered in “exceptional circumstances”. Nor, for that matter, were the delegate’s findings “given … to the Authority” by the appellant for the purposes of s 473DD(b) as the findings of the delegate were contained in the “review material” given to the Authority by the Secretary under s 473CB. Finally on these grounds, the appellant submitted that the Authority proceeded in the present case upon the assumption that its function of review only required it to consider the appellant’s visa application afresh, without regard to the findings that had been made by the delegate. However this understanding of “review” under Pt 7AA was not accepted in BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 869. It could not be said that, had the Authority considered the issue of whether the appellant transported goods for the LTTE, it would have come to the same conclusion that he was not owed protection. The Minister submitted that the gist of the appellant’s case was that the delegate had made a finding that the appellant had transported goods for the LTTE. The Minister submitted that the delegate’s statement did not constitute a conclusive finding for the purposes of the facts in issue on the review because the delegate went on to say that in light of the conflict having been over for some time, that would not lead the appellant to have a relevant profile for the purpose of a real risk of serious harm.