IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B25 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
CWF16
Applicant
and
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2020, AT 9.29 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.J. KEIM, SC: May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned junior, MR D.C. FAHL, for the applicant. (instructed by Arshad and Chand Lawyers)
MR B. McGLADE: May it please the Court, I appear for the first respondent. (instructed by Minter Ellison)
NETTLE J: Yes, Mr Keim.
MR KEIM: Thank you, your Honour. It is submitted that special leave ought to be granted because the issues raised by the proposed grounds of appeal are both of general importance and specific or personal importance to the applicant, of general importance because it relates to the correct approach to be taken to the important statutory task in assessing whether complementary protection is to be extended to non‑citizen provisions that are being applied in very many applications for safe haven visas.
It is of specific importance because the consequence to the applicant is that he would be deprived of a determination of his protection visa application, we say properly according to law because the reasonableness of his being required to go to Kabul has not been considered by the Authority.
The broad issue is the correct construction and application of sections 36(2)(aa) and (2B)(a) of the Migration Act in their statutory and broader context, the construction adopted by the Immigration Assessment Authority in paragraphs 23 and 34, in the Federal Circuit Court in paragraph 26 of its reasons and endorsed by the Federal Court which said the questions of reasonableness or even relocation do not arise in the case of any place to which an applicant will return or will be returned.
GORDON J: Mr Keim, can I ask this question?
MR KEIM: Yes, your Honour.
GORDON J: Is it not the question that here on the facts your client left Kabul…..be returned to Kabul?
MR KEIM: Yes, your Honour.
GORDON J: Why, either on your approach or on the approach contended for by the Minister, is the answer not the same – that is, it is not a question of relocation, it is a question of the place to which he returned, that is, namely Kabul?
MR KEIM: Your Honour, the answer to your question is inherent in the concept of reasonable relocation.
GORDON J: It is not relocation; it is a question of return.
MR KEIM: We say that Kabul is a relocation because the place to which he would return, if it were not for the Convention “risk of harm”, is his true home which is at Ghazni. He travelled to Kabul as part of the process of fleeing. The fact that he lived…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read CWF16 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 191
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Immigration Assessment Authority, and subsequently the Federal Circuit Court and Federal Court, had erred in their construction and application of the *Migration Act*. Specifically, the applicant contended that the Authority wrongly concluded that questions of reasonableness of relocation did not arise when assessing a person's risk of harm upon return to a country. The applicant argued that the legislation required an assessment of the reasonableness of returning to a particular location, even if that location was not the applicant's original home, and that this assessment had not been undertaken.
The applicant's argument was that the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act* should be interpreted to require consideration of the reasonableness of returning to a specific place, such as Kabul, even if that place was not the applicant's original home region of Ghazni. This interpretation, it was submitted, was necessary to properly implement international law regarding complementary protection and to avoid injustice. The applicant argued that the Authority had incorrectly determined that the question of relocation was not relevant, focusing instead on the risk of harm in Kabul without considering the practicalities and reasonableness of living there, such as general violence, lack of connections, and employment prospects. The Minister, conversely, submitted that the statutory language of section 36(2)(aa) was clear and unambiguous, requiring an assessment of where the non-citizen would likely go upon return, and that the applicant's proposed interpretation would lead to anomalous results and extend protection beyond the scope of the Refugee Convention.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.