CVU16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 71
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
CVU16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 71
File number(s): MLG 2125 of 2016 Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS Date of judgment: 10 February 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – refusal to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa – decision not affected by jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424A, 425 Cases cited: DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784
EAC16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1657
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123; [2018] HCA 34
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1; [2007] HCA 26
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of last submission/s: 16 December 2021 Date of hearing: 16 December 2021 Place: Melbourne The Applicant: In Person Solicitor Advocate for the First Respondent: Mr Nunez Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley ORDERS
MLG 2125 of 2016 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CVU16
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINSTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE SYMONS
DATE OF ORDER:
10 february 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.
2.The application filed on 3 October 2016 be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $6,700.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SYMONS
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
By an application filed on 3 October 2016, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (“the Tribunal”) made on 30 August 2016. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to refuse to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (“the visa”). The Minister opposes the application. The Tribunal enters a submitting appearance and has not participated in the proceeding.
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Sinhalese ethnicity who first arrived in Australia on 1 June 2012.
On 7 January 2013, the applicant made an application for the visa.
In a statutory declaration attached to his visa application (CB 63-66), the applicant claimed that:
(a)he commenced work as a fisherman in Negombo in 1999 and mainly fished in the “northern waters”.
(b)as a consequence of fishing in the northern waters, the applicant was suspected by the Sri Lankan authorities of transporting oil to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”).
(c)on three separate occasions between 2010 and 2012, the applicant was abducted, interrogated and beaten by people who suspected that he was providing assistance to the LTTE.
(d)the applicant reported the first and second incident to the police but they would not investigate.
(e)the applicant went into hiding in April 2012 (the last incident having occurred in March 2012) while arrangements were made for him to flee Sri Lanka and travel to Australia by boat.
(f)due to the trauma the applicant experienced, he has difficulty recalling specific dates, times and details of the mistreatment.
(g)the applicant fears he will be abducted, interrogated, beaten or killed if he is returned to Sri Lanka.
(h)he fears he will be harmed by Sri Lankan authorities including the police, intelligence officers and the Criminal Investigation Department (“CID”)
On 18 November 2018 the applicant attended an interview with a delegate of the Minister.
In a decision dated 20 February 2014, the delegate refused the application for the visa. The delegate did not accept that the applicant had worked as a fisherman in the northern waters of Sri Lanka between 1999 and April 2012 and did not accept, based on country information, that the applicant would have held a profile with the Sri Lankan authorities of having a suspected link to the LTTE. The delegate found, generally, that the applicant’s account of events in Sri Lanka was “incoherent and inconsistent”. The delegate accepted the applicant’s claim to have assisted to drive the vessel to Australia but was not satisfied, having regard to country information, that the Sri Lankan authorities would obtain knowledge of this conduct or impute to the applicant any adverse political opinion. The delegate also rejected the claim that the applicant would suffer relevant harm arising from his status as a failed asylum seeker or a person who had left Sri Lanka unlawfully. These findings reflected country information that was before the delegate.
On 26 March 2014, the applicant sought merits review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
On 26 June 2014, the applicant’s legal representative provided a submission to the Tribunal that contained further information concerning the applicant’s claims for protection and addressed concerns identified in the decision of the delegate. The submission included new information to the effect that on 23 June 2014, an unknown intruder had broken into the applicant’s family home and confronted the applicant’s wife.
On 18 July 2016, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments with the assistance of an interpreter in the Sinhala language. The applicant’s legal representative was also present at the hearing.
On 25 July 2016, the applicant’s legal representative provided a further submission to the Tribunal. Amongst other matters, the submission contained additional information to the effect that in 2010, the applicant’s wife had been raped when three unidentified men attended the applicant’s home. The applicant explained that trauma associated with the event had prevented him from disclosing this information at an earlier time. The submission also contained a claim that since around February 2016, the applicant’s wife had been missing from her home.
On 30 August 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant the visa.
THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
The Tribunal identified the applicant’s claim and evidence by referring to and reproducing (in its entirety) the applicant’s statutory declaration dated 16 December 2012 and by referring (although in less detail) to the written submissions dated 26 June 2014 and 25 July 2016 ([6] CB 235-237; [9]-[11] CB 238).
Toward the outset, the Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims that he had difficulty recalling dates, times and details of events where he was physically harmed due to the harm he had experienced at the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities, but found that the concerns expressed in relation to the applicant’s evidence (which were identified and elaborated upon later in the decision) related to more fundamental concerns than just specific dates, times and details of events ([14] CB 238-239).
The Tribunal gave the benefit of the doubt to the applicant and accepted (when the delegate had not) that he did fish in northern waters from approximately 1999 ([16] CB 239).
The Tribunal then dealt with and made findings concerning the applicant’s claims of harm connected with this activity.
The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims concerning events in 2009 and in particular, that the applicant’s brothers had been accused, suspected or had any involvement in smuggling fuel for the LTTE. The applicant’s evidence concerning this period of time was “confused and unclear” and in relation to the involvement of his brothers, was inconsistent ([17]-[20] CB 240-241).
The Tribunal observed in relation to the applicant’s three claims of abduction and interrogation that his evidence differed in material respects from his statutory declaration ([21] CB 240). The Tribunal, between [22] and [28] (CB 240-241) described the evidence given by the applicant to the Tribunal.
Between [30] and [34] (CB 241-242), the Tribunal identified the new claims contained in the submission dated 24 June 2014 and set out the questions to and responses provided by the applicant to the Tribunal regarding these claims.
The Tribunal, between [35] and [39] (CB 242-243), identified discrepancies in the applicant’s account of the three abductions and interrogation given in his statutory declaration, at the Tribunal hearing and in the post-hearing submission. The Tribunal found that the applicant had offered three different, distinct version of where he was taken during his three claimed abductions, without clarifying why or how he had provided these different explanations. This led the Tribunal to doubt that the events had occurred and to question the applicant’s credibility ([40] CB 243).
The Tribunal was also concerned that the applicant’s overall claim – of being suspected of smuggling oil for the LTTE and then being abducted on three occasions because of this suspicion – did not appear to be consistent with country information which was to the effect (amongst other things) that most of those suspected of support or involvement with the LTTE were identified and detained in the immediate aftermath of the war and that LTTE members and supporters were almost entirely Tamil ([42] CB 244). The Tribunal did not consider that the country information provided by the applicant in his post-hearing submission redressed this concern ([44] CB 244-245). The Tribunal found that the applicant was not ever abducted, detained, interrogated, tortured and harmed by the CID or unknown persons or anyone else on the three occasions claimed or at any other time. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not credible or a witness of truth ([46] CB 245).
The adverse view taken of the applicant’s credibility also led the Tribunal to reject the new claims that had been identified in the submission dated 26 June 2014 ([47] CB 245).
The Tribunal dealt separately with the applicant’s claim that his wife had been raped. The Tribunal rejected the claim, in part because of the Tribunal’s credibility findings, but also because it did not accept the applicant’s explanation as to why he had not disclosed the claim earlier. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had been represented throughout the process and was on notice that his claims were not believed by the delegate. The applicant had an opportunity to provide new information prior to the hearing and had done so but in respect of different matters ([49] CB 245-246). The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant’s wife had gone missing on or around February 2016 or at any other time ([50] CB 246).
The Tribunal found that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm arising from his claims of being suspected of helping or assisting the LTTE, fishing in the northern waters in Sri Lanka, his role as a fisherman, his imputed political opinion from these claims, or any other reason ([52] CB 246). The Tribunal relied on these same reasons to find that the applicant did not face a real risk of significant harm ([53] CB 246).
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant, with others, had steered the boat to Australia but it did not accept that he was paid for doing so, that he was a skipper or captain, or that he was involved in organising the trip. The Tribunal did not accept that this activity would amount to people smuggling for the purpose of Sri Lanka’s Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 (“I & E Act”). The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would face either serious or significant harm as a result ([58] CB 247-248).
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had illegally departed Australia and would be identified as a failed asylum seeker on return ([59] CB 248). However, having regard to country information that was set out at [60]-[66] (CB 248-251) and its finding that the applicant did not have the kind of profile that would be of interest to the authorities, the Tribunal found that the applicant faced no real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm as a Sri Lankan male returning as a failed asylum seeker from Australia ([73] CB 253).
The Tribunal found that the applicant would be identified as a person who had departed illegally from Sri Lanka in contravention of the I & E Act but found, having regard to country information and the applicant’s profile and circumstances, that he did not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm due to this status ([74]-[87] CB 253-255).
The Tribunal considered whether the applicant would face harm on the basis of his ethnicity and religion, as a Sinhalese man of Catholic faith but found, having regard to country information, that he would not ([88] CB 255-256).
PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT
The application for judicial review filed on 3 October 2016 contains the following (unparticularised) grounds.
1)The interest of the applicants is affected by the decision given by the second respondent on 30 August 2016.
2)That the second respondent ignored/failed to consider section 424A(1) of the Migration Act 1958.
3)The second respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or identified wrong issues, asked wrong questions, relied on irrelevant material or ignored relevant material.
4)The applicant was denied natural justice.
5)The second respondent failed to review and consider the application for protection as per the Migration Act.
The application for review was supported by an affidavit of the applicant dated 28 September 2016. The affidavit contained a number of assertions which, given that the applicant has, throughout the proceeding, been self-represented, the Court has treated as identifying additional grounds of review. These “grounds” (corresponding with paragraphs [14] and [17]-[19] of the affidavit) are:
1)I was questioned in a manner at the Tribunal with no understanding of a person in my situation would go through. After my traumatising experience I hardly remember dates and times. The Tribunal viewed this as I was not a credible witness. I have only attended 8 years of school.
2)The Tribunal did not take into account the current country situations in relation to my claims. People deported to Sri Lanka are brutally assaulted and imprisoned by the authorities for illegally fleeing the country. I fear of such treatment.
3)The Tribunal failed to identify whether I had a well-founded fear of a real chance or persecution in the foreseeable future in Sri Lanka.
4)The Tribunal also failed to consider whether it was reasonably practicable to relocate considering my situation.
On 29 March 2017, a Registrar of this Court made orders to progress this matter to final hearing. These orders included that the applicant, 28 days before the hearing, file and serve any amended application with proper particulars of the grounds of the application, any supplementary court book and written submissions. The applicant did not file any material responsive to these orders.
On 17 March 2017, the Minister filed a court book and on 12 February 2019, filed written submissions dealing with the pleaded grounds of review and the grounds as they emerged from the applicant’s affidavit. Although the Minister’s representative was able to produce evidence that both the court book and the written submissions had been served on the applicant (on 21 March 2017 and 12 February 2019, respectively), when the matter first came before me for final hearing on 30 November 2021, the applicant told the Court that he did not have either of these documents. Having regard to the time that had elapsed since the matter was commenced and the documents provided to the applicant, I adjourned the hearing of the application so as to allow sufficient time for the material to be served again on the applicant.
When the matter proceeded on 16 December 2021, the applicant confirmed (through an interpreter in the Sinhala language) that he had received both the court book and the Minister’s written submissions and he had access to both documents for the purpose of the hearing.
In accordance with the practice recommended by cases such as DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9], at the commencement of the hearing I invited the applicant to tell me what it was he would like to say, in support of his application, to the effect that the Tribunal was wrong in its decision to affirm the decision of the delegate to refuse him the visa.
The applicant told the Court that in his initial statement he had referred to a family matter that involved violence being committed against his wife. The applicant told the Court that the Tribunal had failed to take this matter into account. The applicant also told the Court that he had concerns with the questioning process adopted by the Tribunal but when asked to clarify or explain the nature of the concern, the applicant resiled from the claim, telling the Court that he was not saying that he was questioned in the wrong way.
In oral submissions, the Minister’s legal representative, Mr Nunez, first responded to the matter raised by the applicant in his oral submission to the Court and observed that the argument most closely resembled the matters raised by ground three of the application for review. The Minister submitted that the ground was lacking in merit because the Tribunal had, at [49] (CB 245), considered the applicant’s claim concerning the rape of his wife and at [50] (CB 246) had made a finding concerning the claim that the applicant’s wife had gone missing in around February 2016.
The Minister’s legal representative then addressed the extant grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5 (by reference to the Minister’s written submissions.
In relation to ground one, the Minister submitted that the statement made no allegation of jurisdictional error.
In relation to ground two, which involved an allegation of a failure to consider s 424A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), the Minister submitted that evidence put forward by the applicant did not constitute “information” for the purpose of that provision because of the application of s 424A(3)(b). The Tribunal was also not required to put to the applicant its concerns about the credibility or plausibility of that evidence having regard to the manner in which the word “information” has been construed. The Minister referred to the decision of SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1; [2007] HCA 26 at [18] in this regard and the propositions that “information” does not encompass the Tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations nor the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence .
The Minister further submitted that the Tribunal was not required to put country information to the applicant for comment, as the country information was not specifically about the applicant and was instead information that responded to the statutory description of “information that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member” and was excluded under s 424A(3)(a) of the Act.
In relation to ground four, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal complied with its obligations as codified in Division 4, Part 7 of the Act when it invited the applicant to attend a hearing pursuant to s 425, during which the dispositive issues were raised and the applicant was given the opportunity to present arguments and provide evidence.
In relation to ground five, the Minister noted (as was the case) that the allegation of failure to review and consider the protection visa criteria was not particularised. The Minister submitted that the ground was without merit in circumstances where the Tribunal had (at [3] CB 235) provided a summary and set out in Attachment A, the relevant statutory provisions for protection, the Department policy guidelines to be considered on complementary protection, and principles on the assessment of credibility in relation to protection visa applications. It followed that the Tribunal was aware of the relevant criteria and how the criteria was to be applied to the applicant’s case.
The Minister also made submissions directed at the matters identified in the applicant’s affidavit.
In relation to the first matter, which concerned the Tribunal’s credibility findings, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims in detail before assessing both his claims and his credibility. This approach was evident from the following references:
(a)[38] (CB 243) – where the Tribunal found the details of the abductions to be inconsistent in significant ways.
(b)[40] (CB 243) – where the Tribunal considered the post hearing submissions on the abduction and found that the applicant had offered three different, distinct versions of where he was during the three claimed abductions, without clarifying or providing a sufficient explanation as to why those different explanations were provided.
(c)[40] (CB 243) – where the Tribunal accepted the applicant may have experienced stress which could impact his memory but did not accept that trouble remembering would result in different explanations or versions.
(d)[41] (CB 243) – where the Tribunal stated that it had had regard to the guidance on the assessment of credibility, and considered the applicant’s post hearing submission in which it was argued that the trauma affected the applicant’s ability to recall traumatic events.
(e)[41] (CB 243) – where the Tribunal noted that it did not rely on factors such as dates, the number of people who abducted him “or such matters” but tried to focus on concrete information such as where the applicant was interrogated or what he was interrogated about. The Tribunal noted only vague evidence was provided.
(f)[47]-[49] (CB 245-246) – where the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a credible witness and, on that basis, rejected the remainder of the applicant’s material claims for protection. It did not accept that the applicant had been arrested by authorities in Sri Lanka or the claims in post hearing submissions relating to the rape of his wife or his wife’s disappearance.
The Minister made the general submission that the Tribunal’s finding(s) on credibility was a factual determination for it, relying on the decision of Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407, 423 [67] (McHugh J).
In relation to the second matter, which concerned the approach taken by the Tribunal to ascertaining conditions in Sri Lanka, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons were replete with references to country information, including at: [42] (CB 244) where the Tribunal considered country information in relation to the applicant’s claim that he was suspected of supplying oil to the LTTE; [57] (CB 247) where the Tribunal considered country information regarding the I & E Act; [60] and [61] (CB 248-249) where the Tribunal considered the DFAT report on failed asylum seekers and country information on returnees; and [74] (CB 253) where the Tribunal considered country information on illegal departures.
The Minister observed that the weight given to country information is a factual matter for the Tribunal, citing NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11].
In relation to the third matter arising from the applicant’s affidavit, which concerned an allegation that the Tribunal had failed to identify whether the applicant had a well-founded fear or real chance of persecution, the Minister submitted that this question was considered in detail by the Tribunal, culminating in a finding that the applicant would not face harm if returned to Sri Lanka ([90]-[91] CB 256).
In relation to the fourth matter, which involved an allegation that the Tribunal failed to consider whether the applicant could relocate, the Minister submitted that this assessment was not required in circumstances where the Tribunal found that the applicant would not be subject to a real chance of harm.
CONSIDERATION
In order to be entitled to relief from this Court, the applicant must establish that the Tribunal has made a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal will have made a jurisdictional error if it “exceeded the limits of the decision-making authority conferred by the statute in making the decision” (MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17 at [29]).
Further, there are authorities that recognise that the failure to particularise a ground of review can be a sufficient basis for a ground of review to be dismissed (see, NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 at [37] per Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ).
In this case, although the Minister does not explicitly ask the Court to dismiss a ground on the basis that it is not particularised, the lack of particularisation has inevitable consequences, including that the focus of the Court on review is necessarily wide-ranging and directed at the ascertainment of error by reference to broadly-identified categories. Having said this, and subject to one matter that arises indirectly from the applicant’s oral submissions, I consider that the reasons of the Tribunal (which have been set out above in some detail) do not disclose jurisdictional error. This is because the Tribunal evidently understood and considered the claims that were advanced by the applicant and made dispositive findings that were informed by a credibility assessment that was rational, and country information the choice and evaluation of which was a matter for the Tribunal. I am also satisfied that the Tribunal complied with its obligations to afford the applicant procedural fairness when it invited the applicant to a hearing and questioned the applicant in a manner that communicated the areas of controversy. I accept the submission of the Minister that no obligation arose under s 424A(1) of the Act in circumstances where the Tribunal’s decision was not informed by any “information” as that term is understood in its statutory context.
As noted above at [34], the concern of the applicant when addressing the Court was directed at an alleged failure of the Tribunal to consider his claims regarding the treatment of his wife. In this regard, although I accept the submission of the Minister that the Tribunal was aware of and considered both the claim that the applicant’s wife had been raped and that she had disappeared from the family home, there is a curiosity in the Tribunal’s reasons on the second claim involving the wife’s disappearance, that requires closer evaluation. This follows from what the Tribunal recorded first at [13] (CB 238) and then at [50] (CB 246). These two passages are as follows:
[13]I accept that the applicant’s wife has gone missing 5 months prior to the hearing, but I do not accept, for the reasons below, that this is connected to his claims of past harm. I accept that the applicant is distressed by this, and by the plight of his children in Sri Lanka, but I do not accept that this distress explains any of the concerns set out below, nor the difficulties with his evidence which in most cases were concerns expressed by the delegate, prior to his wife disappearing. He said that he did not have any information about the disappearance of his wife, that his and his wife’s family had not been able to help with locating her, that his children were with a family that he had been acquainted with earlier. He said this had been reported to the police but they had not given specifics, just said they are searching for her.
[50]On the basis of my credibility findings, I do not accept that the applicant’s wife has gone missing on or around February 2016 or at any other time, nor that his children have had to stay with another family, nor that anyone has reported her missing to the police. Even if his wife has gone missing, I do not accept that it is for any reason connected with his claims, which I comprehensively reject.
As these two paragraphs disclose, the Tribunal recorded findings as to whether the applicant’s wife had disappeared which were internally inconsistent and, having regard to the written record, not possible to reconcile so that they might properly be regarded as “irrational”. However, this does not mean necessarily that the decision of the Tribunal involved jurisdictional error. To produce this consequence, the error must be material, in the sense that the error could realistically have deprived the applicant of a successful outcome: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3; at [45].
In Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123; [2018] HCA 34 at [78], Edelman J observed that the materiality of the error is to be assessed against the existing facts before the Tribunal. In EAC16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1657 at [38], Wheelahan J explained that this approach reflected the position that the primary question before the Court in considering materiality is whether the decision in issue was made outside the scope of authority to decide, and not whether the granting of the relief would be futile.
Here, I consider that had the Tribunal been consistent in its finding concerning the veracity of the applicant’s claim that his wife had disappeared, the outcome, on the Tribunal’s analysis (which I have otherwise found did not involve error) would inevitably have been the same. This is because the Tribunal considered ultimately that even if the applicant’s wife had gone missing (a “what if I was wrong”? analysis), the disappearance was dissociated from any of the applicant’s protection claims.
Dismissal
In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is not affected by jurisdictional error and the application for judicial review filed on 3 October 2016 should be dismissed with costs, fixed in the amount of $6,700.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge . Associate:
Dated: 10 February 2022
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