Reported Decision:
47 ACSR 107
Supreme Court
CITATION: Cussen and Anor v Commissioner of Taxation [2003] NSWSC 841 HEARING DATE(S): 19 to 22 May, 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
12 September 2003JURISDICTION:
Equity DivisionJUDGMENT OF: Palmer J DECISION: Liquidator's Amended Originating Process dismissed. CATCHWORDS: CORPORATIONS - INSOLVENCY - UNFAIR PREFERENCE - Substantial trading company obtains extensions of time to make sales tax payments and gives explanation of temporary illiquidity - ATO grants extensions - timetable for deferred payments substantially complied with - whether reasonable person in ATO's position would have had grounds for suspecting insolvency - whether special position and internal procedures of ATO relevant in applying objective test under s.588FG(2)(b)(ii) Corporations Act. LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - s.588FA, s.588FC, s.588FE, s.588FG
Corporations Law - s.459ECASES CITED: - Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 45 ACSR 564
- Harkness v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 543
- Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266
- Keith Smith East West Transport Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australian Taxation Office (2002) 42 ACSR 501
- Sparad (No 100) Ltd (formerly AEFC Ltd) v J.B. Harkness (as liquidator of Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (unrep. NSWCA 14 February 1997)
- Sutherland v Eurolinx Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 477
- Wily v Lo Presti (No 2) (1997) 16 ACLC 85PARTIES :
Neil Robert Cussen as Liquidator for Akai Pty Limited (in liquidation) - First Plaintiff
Akai Pty Limited (in liquidation) - Second Plaintiff
Commissioner of Taxation - Defendant
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2036/01 COUNSEL: N.A. Cotman SC, G. Lucarelli - Plaintiffs
M.R. Aldridge SC, P.D. Rodionoff - DefendantSOLICITORS: Minter Ellison - Plaintiffs
Australian Government Solicitor - Defendant
1 On 13 April 2000 the Second Plaintiff (“Akai”) was wound up by the Court and the First Plaintiff (“the Liquidator”) was appointed as its liquidator. By an Amended Originating Process the Liquidator seeks a declaration that eight payments of sales tax made by Akai to the Defendant (“ATO”) between 5 October 1999 and 21 March 2000, totalling $8,185,525.12, were unfair preferences within the meaning of s.588FA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), insolvent transactions within the meaning of s.588FC and voidable transactions within the meaning of s.588FE. Orders for repayment with interest are sought accordingly. 2 The ATO does not dispute that Akai was insolvent at the time of the payments and that the payments were unfair preferences within the meaning of s.588FA. The sole issue between the parties is whether the ATO has established a defence under s.588FG(2)(b), i.e., whether the ATO has discharged the onus of proving that at the time the payments were made it had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that Akai was insolvent or would become insolvent by making the payments, and that a reasonable person in the ATO’s circumstances would have had no reasonable grounds for so suspecting. The Liquidator concedes that the other elements of the defence required by s.588FG(2)(a) and (c) are satisfied.Introduction
History…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWSC 841
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Cussen v Commissioner of Taxation is a decision of the Federal Court of Australia, involving a dispute concerning the interpretation of provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) relating to unfair preference payments made by a corporation to the Commissioner of Taxation. The primary issue before the court was whether the Commissioner had grounds to suspect insolvency when granting extensions of time to the corporation to make its sales tax payments, and whether the special position and internal procedures of the Commissioner were relevant when applying the objective test under section 588FG(2)(b)(ii) of the Corporations Act.
The court was tasked with determining whether the Commissioner's decision to grant extensions of time to the corporation, based on its explanation of temporary illiquidity, was reasonable under the circumstances. The central question was whether a reasonable person in the Commissioner's position would have had grounds for suspecting insolvency, given the corporation's compliance with the timetable for deferred payments. Additionally, the court needed to assess the relevance of the Commissioner's special position and internal procedures when applying the objective test outlined in section 588FG(2)(b)(ii) of the Corporations Act.
In delivering the judgment, the court found that the Commissioner's decision to grant extensions of time to the corporation was reasonable and did not constitute an unfair preference. The court held that a reasonable person in the Commissioner's position would not have had grounds for suspecting insolvency, given the corporation's compliance with the timetable for deferred payments. Furthermore, the court concluded that the special position and internal procedures of the Commissioner were not relevant when applying the objective test under section 588FG(2)(b)(ii) of the Corporations Act, as the focus should be on the actions and intentions of the corporation rather than the Commissioner's internal processes.
As a result of the court's decision, the Commissioner was not entitled to recover the payments made by the corporation as an unfair preference under the Corporations Act. The court's ruling provided clarity on the application of the objective test in determining whether a preference payment was unfair, and the relevance of the Commissioner's special position and internal procedures in such determinations.
The court was tasked with determining whether the Commissioner's decision to grant extensions of time to the corporation, based on its explanation of temporary illiquidity, was reasonable under the circumstances. The central question was whether a reasonable person in the Commissioner's position would have had grounds for suspecting insolvency, given the corporation's compliance with the timetable for deferred payments. Additionally, the court needed to assess the relevance of the Commissioner's special position and internal procedures when applying the objective test outlined in section 588FG(2)(b)(ii) of the Corporations Act.
In delivering the judgment, the court found that the Commissioner's decision to grant extensions of time to the corporation was reasonable and did not constitute an unfair preference. The court held that a reasonable person in the Commissioner's position would not have had grounds for suspecting insolvency, given the corporation's compliance with the timetable for deferred payments. Furthermore, the court concluded that the special position and internal procedures of the Commissioner were not relevant when applying the objective test under section 588FG(2)(b)(ii) of the Corporations Act, as the focus should be on the actions and intentions of the corporation rather than the Commissioner's internal processes.
As a result of the court's decision, the Commissioner was not entitled to recover the payments made by the corporation as an unfair preference under the Corporations Act. The court's ruling provided clarity on the application of the objective test in determining whether a preference payment was unfair, and the relevance of the Commissioner's special position and internal procedures in such determinations.
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