Curley v The State of Western Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 23 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   CURLEY -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 48

CORAM:   OWEN JA

WHEELER JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   11 FEBRUARY 2009

DELIVERED          :   27 FEBRUARY 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 97 of 2008

BETWEEN:   STANLEY RONALD CURLEY

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :JOHNSON J

File No  :INS 196 of 2007

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Sentence - Parole - Whether trial judge correct to refuse parole - Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 89(4) - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 6(2), s 89(4)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters & Ms C K O Majeks

Respondent:     Mr B Fiannaca SC

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Moody v French [2008] WASCA 67; (2008) MVR 322

Ugle v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 199

  1. OWEN JA:  I have read the reasons that Miller JA intends to publish.  I agree with those reasons and with the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed.  I wish to add a few short comments on a couple of aspects of the appeal.

  2. There was a single ground of appeal.  Originally, the appellant complained that the sentencing judge had inadvertently been led into error concerning the effect the sentence would have on outstanding parole days 'such that' her discretion miscarried.  As a matter of grammar and sentence structure the challenge is limited to consideration of the problem raised by the outstanding parole days.  During the hearing it became apparent that the appellant did not intend the ground to be so limited.  The court gave leave for the ground to be amended by removing the words 'such that' and substituting the word 'and'.  Care needs to be taken to ensure that grounds of appeal are drafted to reflect the gravamen of the challenge.

  3. Nonetheless, as Miller JA has pointed out, the challenge remained primarily based on the proposition that the sentencing judge was inadvertently led into error concerning the 'breach days' that could later be served on parole.  Although there was an error there is no indication that the sentencing judge was influenced by it or that it had an effect on the ultimate decision to decline parole eligibility.

  4. This appeal presents a stark reminder of the true nature of the appellate function.  It does not matter whether the appellate judges might have reached a decision different from that arrived at by the sentencing judge.  The question is whether the sentencing judge fell into error in exercising the discretion that is at the heart of the sentencing process.  For the reasons already expressed the 'breach days' problem does not constitute appealable error. 

  5. Nor, in my view, has the appellant demonstrated any other error encompassed by the broad terms of the amended ground of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Curley v The State of Western Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Curley v The State of Western Australia involves a dispute concerning the refusal of parole by the trial judge, a decision which the appellant, Curley, has challenged. The case was heard in the Court of Appeal, Western Australia. Curley argued that the trial judge erred in law by refusing parole, contending that the trial judge failed to properly consider the statutory requirements and the sentencing principles outlined in the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). Specifically, Curley contended that the trial judge did not sufficiently consider section 89(4) of the Act, which requires the court to weigh the risk to the community against the rehabilitation of the offender.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge correctly exercised their discretion in refusing parole, with particular attention to whether the trial judge adhered to the statutory guidelines and sentencing principles. The court was required to determine if the trial judge's decision was legally sound and whether there was any error in the application of the law to the facts of the case. The appeal hinged on the interpretation and application of section 89(4) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), which mandates that parole be granted unless the risk to the community significantly outweighs the rehabilitative prospects of the offender.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's decision to refuse parole was legally sound. The court examined the reasons provided by the trial judge and determined that they appropriately considered the statutory requirements and sentencing principles. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had correctly assessed the risk to the community and the rehabilitative prospects of the offender, and therefore, there was no legal error in the decision. The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal of parole by the trial judge was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established