Cumerlong Holdings Pty Ltd v Dalcross Properties Pty Ltd & Ors [2011] HCATrans 56

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[2011] HCATrans 056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S227 of 2010

B e t w e e n -

CUMERLONG HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 008 484 875

Applicant

and

DALCROSS PROPERTIES PTY LTD ACN 083 792 054

First Respondent

DALCROSS HOLDINGS PTY LTD ACN 083 791 931

Second Respondent

AUSTRALASIAN CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED ACN 000 003 930

Third Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
KIEFEL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 11 MARCH 2011, AT 11.47 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR P.J. McEWEN, SC:   May it please your Honours, I appear with my learned junior, MR S.B. NASH, for the applicant.  (instructed by Allsop Glover)

MR A.E. GALASSO, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my junior, MS G.B. NEWPORT, for the third respondent.  (instructed by Robert Napoli & Co Solicitors)

FRENCH CJ:   Thank you.  There is submitting appearances for the first and second respondents.

MR GALASSO:   Yes, your Honour, on the basis that the subject land has been sold between the decision at first instance and the Court of Appeal’s decision.

FRENCH CJ:   Yes, thank you.  Yes, Mr McEwen.

MR McEWEN:   Your Honours, the two succinct competing arguments that were in the Court of Appeal, in a nutshell, which Mr Justice Tobias and Justice Handley recognised, a question of form over substance or substance over form, arises from the manner of the drafting of LEP 194.  On one particular construction of the drafting, section 28(3) is engaged, on the other it allegedly does not and, as Justice Handley observed, that fact, that the manner of drafting has those different results, or can have, as his Honour said, it invites closes scrutiny, that is, if the LEP stated what the effect in operation would be, then section 28(3) would be engaged and the Governor’s approval would be required for it.

KIEFEL J:   Your basic position is to adopt the reasons for judgment of Justice Handley?

MR McEWEN: Correct, your Honour. Justice Tobias’ judgment, agreed with by Justice McColl, was to the effect that as LEP 194 did not specifically identify or state what was provided by way of effect, that is, that the regulatory instrument in question, here LEP 194, shall not apply, being the covenant in question, then section 28 was not engaged, although he acknowledges the practical effect of LEP 194 when combined with clause 68 of the PSO. The practical effect of reading them together was to suspend the covenant absent any words to that effect.

KIEFEL J:   Could you remind me, is the local environment plan made by the Minister?

MR McEWEN:   An LEP now is, yes, your Honour.

KIEFEL J:   At the relevant time it was?

MR McEWEN:   It was a PSO originally.  The instrument which was governing the zoning of this land was a PSO.  It was not an LEP.  It became a deemed local environmental plan under the transitional provisions when…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCATrans 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cumerlong Holdings Pty Ltd (the appellant) sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a restrictive covenant contained within a deed of transfer of land, which purported to restrict the use of the land for any purpose other than a private dwelling house. The respondents, Dalcross Properties Pty Ltd and others, were the registered proprietors of the land subject to the covenant.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the restrictive covenant, as drafted, was void for uncertainty. Specifically, the court had to determine if the phrase "any purpose other than a private dwelling house" was sufficiently clear to impose a legally enforceable restriction on the use of the land. This involved considering the principles of contractual interpretation and the requirements for certainty in restrictive covenants.

The High Court granted special leave to appeal and, in a joint judgment, found that the covenant was void for uncertainty. Their Honours reasoned that the phrase "any purpose other than a private dwelling house" was ambiguous and did not clearly define the scope of the restriction. It was not possible to ascertain with sufficient certainty what uses were prohibited beyond the use as a private dwelling house, rendering the covenant unenforceable.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal, and declared the restrictive covenant to be void and of no effect.

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