CUL16 v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 1448
•7 June 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CUL16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1448 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – protection visa – whether the Authority failed to exercise jurisdiction – reasonableness of relocation – submissions on relocation provided to Authority– whether Authority considered integers of claim – claim to well-founded belief of real risk of significant harm – criminal violence – personal circumstances – disability – no case arose clearly on the facts – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5AA,36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(c), 46A(1), 473CC, 473DC Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs. 4.43, 4.43(2)(d) |
| Cases cited: CRY16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1549 |
| Applicant: | CUL16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 2635 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge McNab |
| Hearing date: | 28 September 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 28 September 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 7 June 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Gilbert |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Bardo Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Wood |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application filed 4 September 2017 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $8105.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
SYG 2635 of 2016
| CUL16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By way of a further amended application filed 4 September 2017, the Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘the Authority’) dated 1 September 2016 that affirmed a decision of the delegate of the First Respondent to refuse to grant the Applicant a Protection visa.
The grounds of review are as follows:
1.The decision of the Independent Assessment Authority was affected by jurisdictional error in that it failed to exercise its jurisdiction and/or acted unreasonably.
Particulars
(a) The Authority failed to consider the exercise of its discretion under s.473DC(3) of the Migration Act to invite the Applicant to make submissions to it on the question of his relocation within Lebanon, an issue not decided by the delegate;
(b) The Authority failed to consider the exercise of its discretion under s.473CC(2)(b) of the Migration Act to remit the matter to the delegate for the issue of relocation to be determined at first instance;
(c) The failure to exercise the discretion was unreasonable.
2. The decision of the Independent Assessment Authority was affected by jurisdictional error in that it failed to consider each of the objections which the Applicant had made to relocation.
Particulars
(a) The Authority did not deal with the Applicant’s objection to relocation being, amongst other things, that there was a rise in sectarian and criminal violence;
(b) The Authority failed to deal with the particularity of the Applicant’s objection, in the context of his personal circumstances, and in light of the current information which had been put forward.
Background
The Applicant is a Sunni Muslim from Al-Tabbeneh, Tripoli, Lebanon, which is an area that has been subject to violence between resident groups of Sunnis and Alawites. The Applicant arrived in Australia by boat on 2 May 2013. As he was classified as an “unauthorised maritime arrival” within s. 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’), he was unable to make a valid application for any visa by virtue of
s. 46A(1) of the Act. On 21 December 2015 the Applicant applied for a Protection visa.
The Applicant’s claims for protection are summarised at [5] of the Authority’s decision:
·
The Applicant claims to be a Sunni Muslim, born in
Al-Tabbeneh, Tripoli, Lebanon. His parents separated when he was young and throughout his life he has resided with other family members and also on the streets.
· He had a violent and abusive relationship with his father. His father was shot in August 2015 and subsequently died. He fears being harmed upon return to Lebanon by the same people who killed his father. He does not know the circumstances of his father’s death but knows his father was a powerful and dangerous man.
· When he applied for a passport to travel out of Lebanon to Australia, the officers at the passport office purposely delayed granting his passport as they wanted the Applicant to become an informant for them. They requested the Applicant obtain information on the security situation in Al-Tabbeneh. He declined to do this. Three and a half months later he was issued a passport. During this period there was fighting in Al-Tabbeneh so he lived with his auntie in Al Zahriya (another suburb of Tripoli) to avoid harm.
· He fears returning to Al-Tabbeneh because of the security situation and because he is a Sunni Muslim.
· One month prior to the SHEV interview, the Applicant’s grandfather was shot at. The Applicant also fears harm from the people who shot at his grandfather. He does not know who shot at him.
On 13 July 2016 the delegate refused the application and referred the matter to the Authority. The Department noted that “[t]he IAA will review the refusal decision based on the information that was before the department’s decision maker and will consider new information only in exceptional circumstances.” The Department also noted that “[i]f you feel that there are exceptional circumstances that would justify the IAA considering new information, you will need to provide the new information and evidence of the exceptional circumstances directly to the IAA”.
Helpfully, submissions prepared by counsel for the Applicant stated that the Applicant did not take issue with the Minister’s summary of the decision of the delegate and the Authority and the reasons given or those summaries. The delegate’s decision is accurately summarised in the First Respondent’s submissions at [10] as follows:
The delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant satisfied the criteria in section 36(2) of the Act, and accordingly refused to grant him a protection visa under section 65 of the Act (CB 156). In summary, the delegate’s reasons were as follows:
10.1 Militant groups in Al Tabbaneh: The delegate found that the conflict in Al Tabbaneh had subsided, and the area was now stable. “[I]n light of the improved conditions in Tripoli and the indications that these conditions will be enduring, I am not satisfied that there is a real chance of the Applicant being harmed by militants or unknown persons for reasons of his Sunni Muslim religion.” ([52])
10.2 Militant groups associated with father: The delegate considered that the Applicant’s claims regarding his father’s claimed militant affiliation were inconsistent and incongruous ([28]-[31]). The delegate was satisfied that the Applicant’s father had been killed, but was not satisfied that his father was involved with militants.
10.3 Lebanese authorities: The delegate considered the Applicant’s claim that his passport application was delayed because Mr Barakat was pressuring him to provide information about Al Tabbaneh was implausible ([32]-[33]). For example, the delegate noted that the Applicant has “not advanced any reason why the authorities would target him as a useful source of information over the many other residents of Al Tabbaneh”. And the delegate was not satisfied that, if the Applicant was being “pressured” by the government in the manner claimed, that Mr Barakat would have given him a “slip” that allowed him to obtain his passport.
On 15 July 2016, the Authority wrote to the Applicant and acknowledged that the delegate’s decision had been referred to it for review. The letter stated that “[t]he IAA will proceed to make a decision on your case on the basis of the information sent to us by the department, unless we decide to consider new information. We can only consider new information in limited circumstances, which are explained in the attached factsheet and Practice Direction.”
The Applicant did not provide any further information to the Authority, nor did he provide a submission as to why he disagreed with the delegate’s decision.
On 1 September 2016 the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision.
The Applicant made an application to this court on 28 September 2016.
Authority’s decision
The Authority placed weight on the DFAT assessment of the risk of violence faced by Sunni Muslims from Al-Tabbeneh and found that there was more than a remote chance that the Applicant would face a threat to his life or liberty or significant physical harassment and/or ill treatment, amounting to serious harm on the basis of his religion.[1] However the Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant would face harm in all areas of Lebanon.[2] At [14] the Authority noted:
Beirut Governorate has substantial Christian, Sunni and Shia populations and the city has both sectarian enclaves and mixed suburbs. Sunnis constitute approximately 27 per cent of Lebanon’s population. Most Lebanese Sunni are concentrated in west Beirut, North Governorate and South Governorate. However, there are substantial populations of Sunnis across Lebanon. DFAT have reported that the stability is constantly being tested by the conflict in neighbouring Syria, including through the large influx of Syrian refugees and the presence in Lebanon of extremist groups, such as Daesh and al-Nusra, with an intent to perpetrate violence in Lebanon and agitate the pre-existing sectarian tensions. While DFAT assesses that Daesh and al-Nusra have an increasing capacity and influence in Lebanon and that civilians face a moderate risk of violence, I also note that DFAT has provided examples where Daesh and/or al-Nusra have targeted Alawite and Shia interests. DFAT assess the potential for Daesh or al-Nusra to launch attacks in Sunni dominated areas as unlikely.
[1] Authority decision [13].
[2] Ibid [14].
In relation to the Applicant’s claim to fear harm from his father and his father’s associates, the Authority accepted that his father was killed and was not satisfied that the Applicant faced a real chance of any harm from his father on return to Lebanon.[3] The Authority accepted that the Applicant’s father was involved in a Sunni militant group operating in Al-Tabbeneh and fighting against the Alawites from Jabal Mohsen. However it was not satisfied that the Applicant would be harmed on this basis in either Tripoli or Beirut.[4] The Authority referred to the Applicant’s evidence during the SHEV interview that he had no association with his father or anything he has done. The Authority concluded that the Applicant did not face a real chance of harm upon return to Lebanon from his father or any association to his father now or in the foreseeable future.[5]
[3] Ibid [18].
[4] Ibid [24].
[5] Ibid [24].
The Authority accepted that the Applicant’s grandfather may have been caught up in localised violence in Al-Tabbeneh but did not accept that he was targeted or that the Applicant would face harm on his return due to his grandfather being shot.[6]
[6] Ibid [25].
In relation to the Applicant’s claim to fear harm from militant groups who will seek to recruit him upon his return to Lebanon, the Authority gave weight to country information which indicated that although Sunni Muslims were fighting alongside Hizballah, this had only occurred in the Bekaa Valley in southern/central Lebanon, and not in the Applicant’s home area in Beirut.[7] The Authority also referred to DFAT reports that indicated that returnees would not be targeted by Hizballah unless they were a direct threat to Hizballah’s authority.[8] The Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant would be forcibly recruited by Hizballah and/or ISIS. The Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant’s physical disability would make him more vulnerable to being recruited, or that the Applicant lacked familial support or protection in Lebanon.[9] The Applicant submitted that he had cognitive impairment and a physical disability (a limp). The Authority accepted that he had a limp but not that he was affected by cognitive impairment.[10]
[7] Ibid [27].
[8] Ibid [27].
[9] Ibid [29].
[10] Ibid [9].
In relation to the Applicant’s claim to fear harm from passport office officials upon return to Lebanon, the Authority accepted that the Applicant’s passport was delayed during the processing of his passport renewal prior to his departure to Australia, and accepted that passport officials may have requested the Applicant to obtain information. However the Authority did not accept that the Applicant’s passport was withheld because the Applicant was an informant. The Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant will face any harm on his return due to his failure to obtain this information.[11]
[11] Ibid [33].
The Authority concluded that the Applicant did not meet the criteria in s. 36(2)(a) or s. 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
The Authority also found that the Applicant was at risk of significant harm for the purposes of the complementary protection provisions on the basis of the Applicant being a Sunni Muslim returning to
Al-Tabbeneh.[12] However the Authority found that the Applicant did not face a real risk of harm in Beirut. The authority considered that it was not unreasonable for the Applicant to relocate to Beirut on the basis of the following factors:
a)the Lebanese government does not impose limitations on the freedom of movement of its citizens;
b)DFAT information indicated that international relocation offers a degree of anonymity, and Beirut was home to mixed ethnic and religious groups;
c)DFAT information indicated that Sunnis, Shias and Alawites could easily relocate to Beirut; and
d)the Applicant had previously relocated to Beirut successfully for approximately one year, despite his physical disability and lack of educate, skills and financial resources;
e)the Applicant indicated in his SHEV interview that he funded his travel to Australia with the assistance of his uncle and had travelled to Sudan and to Belarus previously; and
f)he had previously obtained employment in Beirut.
[12] Ibid [41].
Ground One
The issue raised by the first ground is whether the Authority failed to exercise jurisdiction and/or acted unreasonably, by depriving the Applicant of the opportunity to address it on the basis for a decision which differed from the decision of the delegate.
The Applicant submitted that an invitation from the Authority to provide a written submission on the following matters:[13]
a)why you disagree with the decision of the Department; and
b)any claim or matter that you presented to the Department that was overlooked;
was not a meaningful or effective invitation as the decision of the delegate did not touch on relocation and there was nothing to respond to in that regard. that the Applicant submitted that once the Authority turned its mind to deciding the matter on a different basis (relocation) it should have provided the Applicant with an opportunity to address it on that issue or considered whether to remit the matter to the delegate to then consider the question of relocation.
[13] Court Book 179, 187 [20].
The Applicant submits that this is an instance of unreasonableness such as that found in DZU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[14] (DZU16) and CRY16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [15](CRY16). In both of those cases, the Authority failed to exercise a discretion under s. 473DC of the Act to seek information from the Applicant regarding the issue of relocation that was not discussed with the delegate. It was found that the Authority had acted unreasonably in failing exercise its discretion in both matters.
[14] [2017] FCCA 851.
[15] [2017] FCCA 1549.
This case can be distinguished from both DZU16 and CRY16. Although the issue of relocation was not dealt with by the delegate in their record of decision, the Applicant discussed this issue in the interview with the delegate. In response to this discussion, the Applicant prepared detailed written submissions regarding safety and reasonableness of relocation for consideration by the Authority. While I accept the submission of the Applicant that the delegate’s record of decision did not mention the issue of relocation, in this instance this did not result in any practical injustice before the Authority because Applicant was able to make submissions on the issue before the Authority. I do not consider the invitation to provide information on submissions to the Authority to be an empty gesture.
In relation to a claim that the Authority had failed to consider exercising its direction to remit the matter to the delegate, there is an onus on the Applicant to prove that the use of discretion was not considered.[16] There is no evidence that the Authority failed to consider whether to exercise its discretion under s. 473DC of the Act; the Applicant has failed to discharge that burden. By reason of
s. 473DC(3), the Authority does not have an obligation to consider exercising its power under that section: DVE16 v Minister for Immigration.[17]
[16] VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 [45].
[17] [2017] FCCA 2084 [32] per Judge Cameron.
Remittance to the delegate
The Applicant submitted that the Authority should have exercised its discretion to remit the matter to the delegate to make a decision on the issue of relocation.
As recently articulated in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection the Authority’s powers of review are substantially more limited by statute compared to those of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.[18] The Authority is obliged to review the merits of the application on the materials before it and then has a discretion to either affirm the decision or remit the matter to the delegate for the decision to be made again in the event that the Authority determines that the Applicant satisfies the Authority that they are a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under
[18] [2018] HCA 16 [17] – [18].
s. 36(2)(aa) of the Act.[19] The Authority cannot replace the decision of the delegate with its own.[20] The Authority may ‘remit the decision for reconsideration in accordance with such directions or recommendations of the Authority as are permitted by regulation’.[21] Regulation 4.43[22] provides as follows:
[19] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s. 473CC; Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg. 4.43.
[20] Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16 [17] – [18].
[21] Ibid.
[22] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Permissible directions on remittal
(1) For paragraph 473CC(2)(b) of the Act, this regulation prescribes directions that the Immigration Assessment Authority is permitted to make in relation to the review of a fast track reviewable decision in respect of a protection visa application by a referred applicant.
(2) It is a permissible direction that:
(a)the referred applicant must be taken to have satisfied the criteria for the visa that are specified in the direction; or
(b)the referred applicant is a refugee within the meaning of subsection 5H(1) of the Act; or
(c)subsection 36(3) of the Act does not apply to the referred applicant; or
(d)the referred applicant satisfies each matter, specified in the direction, that relates to establishing whether the referred applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations because the criterion mentioned in paragraph 36(2)(aa) of the Act is satisfied in relation to the applicant.
(3) However, it is not a permissible direction that:
(a)subsection 5H(1) of the Act applies to the referred applicant; or
(b)subsection 5H(1) does not apply to the referred applicant because of subsection 5H(2); or
(c)the referred applicant satisfies, or does not satisfy, the criterion in subsection 36(1C) of the Act; or
(d)the referred applicant satisfies a matter that relates to establishing whether there are serious reasons for considering that:
(i)the referred applicant has committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined by an international instrument mentioned in regulation 2.03B; or
(ii)the referred applicant committed a serious non-political crime before entering Australia; or
(iii)the referred applicant has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; or
(e)the referred applicant satisfies a matter that relates to establishing whether there are reasonable grounds that:
(i)the referred applicant is a danger to Australia's security; or
(ii)the referred applicant, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, including a crime that consists of the commission of a serious Australian offence or serious foreign offence, is a danger to the Australian community.
(4)It is a permissible direction that the grant of the visa is not prevented by section 91W, 91WA or 91WB of the Act.
Regulation 4.43(2)(d) is the permitted direction in this case that enlivens the Authority’s discretion to remit the matter to the delegate; relocation is a key issue in determining whether Australia owes protection obligations to an individual for meeting the criteria under
s. 36(2)(aa) of the Act. However, the Authority in this case affirmed the decision, with the submissions on relocation before it. The Authority hears matters de novo and though it cannot substitute the decision of the delegate for its own, it may remit with permitted directions on the basis of its own factual findings.[23] In this case, the Authority could have only remitted the matter to the delegate if it that it had found the Applicant was not able to relocate safely to Beirut. This because it is only permitted under reg. 4.43(2)(d) to remit with the direction that the Applicant satisfies the criterion under s. 36(2)(aa). As the Authority found that he did not suffer a real risk of significant harm from relocating to Beirut, it was not permitted to remit the case.[24]
[23] Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16 [17].
[24] See ibid.
Unreasonable failure to exercise discretion
The Applicant’s final submission in relation to this ground was that the Authority was unreasonable in failing to exercise the discretion provided for under s. 473CC and/or s. 473DC of the Act. The unreasonableness that arose in CRY16 and DZU16 was a consequence of the Authority disabling itself from considering what was reasonable in terms of relocation. Here the Authority suffered no such disability. The Applicant provided the information that the Authority needed in order to make a reasonable decision regarding relocation, having been put on notice by the delegate that relocation was an issue in contemplation.
As the Applicant had made substantial submissions on the issue of relocation to Beirut to the Authority, it cannot be said that the Authority was unreasonable in not exercising its discretion under s. 473DC to seek further information from the Applicant on the safety and reasonableness of relocating him to Beirut. Similarly, the Authority cannot be said to be unreasonable in failing to exercise their discretion to remit the matter to the delegate under s. 473CC where there was no capacity to do so under the Act or Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).
Ground Two
The issue raised by the second ground is whether the Authority erred in failing to deal with an objection by the Applicant to relocation to Beirut, regarding an alleged rise in sectarian and criminal violence in Lebanon and Beirut.
The First Respondent submits that the Authority considered and addressed this objection while evaluating whether the Applicant faced a real risk of significant harm in Beirut. However, it is clear from the record of decision given by the Authority that their examination did not address the specific objection regarding crime.
The Applicant’s representative before the Authority, in written submissions dated 22 March 2016, submitted that “[i]n addition to ongoing sectarian violence the level of crime and violence (emphasis added) in Lebanon has sharply increased” and cited a passage from a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report on Lebanon[25] specifically relating to crime.[26]This passage dealt with crime in isolation, rather than ‘crime’ in the sense of it being a part of any ongoing sectarian violence. The Applicant’s submissions to the Authority then refer to sectarian violence, potential targeted violence and increased rates of crime and violence in Beirut as separate factors contributing to the serious risk of harm faced by the Applicant in being relocated to Beirut.[27] There is a clear delineation in these submissions between the types of violence that pose a risk to the Applicant. Sectarian violence, targeted violence and criminal violence are each plainly intended to be regarded as separate and distinct integers of a claim to face a real risk of harm. At [9] – [16], [24], [34], [41] and [42] of its decision, the Authority refers to religious crime and politically motivated crime, explicitly addressing both sectarian violence and targeted violence. There is no reference in the reasons to general crime risk of harm arising from it. The Authority did not deal with the issue of generalised crime.
[25] ‘Country Report; Lebanon’ (18 December 2015) [2.22].
[26] Court Book 127.
[27] Ibid.
Failure to deal with an integer of a claim
If the Authority has failed to consider an integer of a claim then it may have fallen into jurisdictional error.[28] The Authority must consider all claims raised by the Applicant, but not very piece of evidence put before it.[29] The objection to relocation put forward by the Applicant regarding crime can be classified as an integer to a claim, rather than as merely a piece of evidence, if it is a relevant consideration.
[28] Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802 [42]; NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263[20].
[29] WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & IndigenousAffairs [2003] FCAFC 18 [46].
A relevant consideration is one that would or could rationally affect the decision if accepted by the finder of fact: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd.[30] Taken on its own, even if the objection regarding crime generally occurring (rather than sectarian or targeted crime) was accepted by the Authority, it could not rationally affect the outcome of the decision. This is because the harm claimed by the Applicant arising from generalised crime affects an entire country, and not just the Applicant personally; this will not constitute a real risk of harm under s. 36(2B)(c) of the Act.
[30] [1986] HCA 40.
While the Applicant submits that the Authority should have examined this objection in light of his personal circumstances, the objection in regards to crime was not expressly raised in conjunction with his particular vulnerabilities. His representatives, in their written submissions to the Authority, made specific objections regarding criminal violence under the sub-section titled ‘factors affecting [the Applicant’s] ability to relocate to Beirut’ and raised factors such as his disabilities and previous housing conditions under a different sub-section, titled ‘[The Applicant’s] capacity to subsist’ later in their submissions regarding relocation.[31] In my view, the Applicant did not raise the claim that his disabilities, in conjunction with an increase in generalised crime, would mean he was at a real risk of significant harm.
[31] Court Book 126 - 128.
While the Authority accepted on the evidence before it that the Applicant suffered a physical disability, it could not be said to clearly arise on the materials before it that the Applicant had cause to be at a real risk of harm arising from generalised crime in Beirut due to his personal circumstances (in particular his disability).
Therefore, his claim in relation to harm must be considered as limited to an objection on the basis that generally there is a real risk of significant harm arising from an increase of crime in Lebanon. As noted above, the consideration of this claim could not have rationally affected the outcome of the determination as to whether he was at real risk of significant harm in relocating to Beirut. As advanced in the Applicant’s written submissions to the Authority, [32] the entire country of Lebanon is subject to this type of harm and therefore s. 36(2B)(c) of the Act applies. Where s. 36(2B)(c) of the Act applies, the Applicant will not satisfy the criteria for a grant of a Protection Visa under s. 36 of the Act.
[32] Ibid 126.
As explained by Judge Manousaridis in SZURJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor:[33]
[i]t may occur that the Tribunal fails to consider whether an alleged fact on which an applicant relies was an integer of the claims before it, and fails to consider whether it is satisfied the alleged fact exists. In that circumstance, it may be the Tribunal fails to discharge its statutory duties, but this failure may not result in a court intervening to set aside the decision, because the alleged fact the Tribunal failed to consider was not material to the satisfaction of the criteria for the granting of a Protection visa.[34]
[33] [2016] FCCA 1771.
[34] Ibid [22].
I find this case is one of the instances referred to above. Though the integer of the Applicant’s claim of being subject to a real risk of significant harm regarding increasing crime and violence in Lebanon and Beirut was not specifically addressed in the decision of the Authority, in this case that omission does not mean the Authority has fallen into jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, grounds one and two have not been made out and this application must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge McNab
Date: 7 June 2018
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