CUIJPERS and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE - [2012] WASAT 87

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: VOCATIONAL REGULATION

ACT: LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 2008 (WA)

CITATION: CUIJPERS and LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE [2012] WASAT 87

MEMBER: JUSTICE J A CHANEY (PRESIDENT)

HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS

DELIVERED : 4 MAY 2012

FILE NO/S: VR 7 of 2011

BETWEEN: FREDERIK JOHAN CUIJPERS
Applicant
AND
LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
First Respondent
STEVEN BLYTH
Second Respondent

Catchwords:

Legal practitioner - Leave to extend time to seek review - Legal profession complaints committee dismissing complaint - Leave to seek review - Complaints found to be unreasonable - Whether practitioner likely to be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct

Legislation:

Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 3, s 402, s 403(1)(a), s 403(1)(b), s 404(b), s 425(a), s 435
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 20, s 27, s 60(2)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 9, r 10

Result:

Leave to extend time refused
Application dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     N/A
First Respondent          :     N/A
Second Respondent      :     N/A

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Self-represented
First Respondent          :     Law Complaints Officer
Second Respondent      :     Self-represented

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Ali v The Queen (2005) 214 ALR 1
Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196
Howle v Best [2012] WASC 62
Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 39
Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 285

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary of Tribunal's decision

The Legal Profession Complaints Committee, in November 2010, dismissed certain complaints made by the applicant, Mr Cuijpers, against a legal practitioner, Mr Blyth. In dismissing the complaints, the Committee found them to be unreasonable, and in one case vexatious. Accordingly, Mr Cuijpers required leave pursuant to s 435(2) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) to apply for a review of the decision. He did not, however, commence his application for review within the time required by the State Administrative Rules 2004 (WA), and accordingly also needed an extension of time.
In considering the application for extension of time, the Tribunal had regard to the prospects of success of the application. It analysed the various allegations made by Mr Cuijpers, and concluded that Mr Cuijpers' proposed application to review the Committee's decision did not enjoy reasonable prospects of success. On that basis, the application for extension of time was refused, and the application was dismissed.

Mr Cuijpers' applications to the Tribunal

On 17 January 2011, Mr Frederik Johan Cuijpers (applicant), lodged at the Tribunal an application under s 435(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Act2008 (WA) (LP Act) for review of a decision by the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (Committee), dated 18 November 2010, in respect of a legal practitioner, Mr Steven Blyth (second respondent).
On 8 March 2011, Mr Cuijpers, through his then lawyer, filed an amended application in which he sought leave to file this application out of time and leave under s 435(2) of the LP Act, and that the decision by the Committee dated 18 November 2010 be set aside. On the same day, the Tribunal ordered, inter alia, that the matter be adjourned to a further directions hearing on 29 March 2011 in order to consider the appropriate way to deal with the applications for extension of time and leave under s 435 of the LP Act. On 29 March 2011 it was ordered that the parties file submissions by specified dates and that the matter be determined entirely on the documents pursuant to s 60(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act2004 (WA) (SAT Act).

Mr Cuijpers' application for extension of time

Applications brought in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction must be made within 28 days of the date on which notice of the right of review is given by the original decisionmaker - State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA) (SAT Rules) r 9. Pursuant to r 10 of the SAT Rules, the Tribunal may extend the time fixed for the commencement of a proceeding.
In this case, the Committee's letter of 18 November 2010 advised, in compliance with s 20 of the SAT Act, that Mr Cuijpers had a right of review by the Tribunal subject to the requirements for leave pursuant to s 435(2) of the LP Act. It follows that Mr Cuijpers' application for review was required to be made by 16 December 2010.
An application under s 435(2) of the LP Act for leave to apply for a review of a decision of the Committee necessarily involves a review of the Committee's finding that the complaint, or complaints concerned is or are trivial, unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous. That is so, notwithstanding that, in considering the question of leave, the test to be applied is whether the substantive decision as to the liability of the practitioner to an adverse finding is wrong or is attended with sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave, and whether it is in the interests of justice that leave be granted. Accordingly, an application for leave under s 435(2) of the LP Act falls within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.
The principles to be applied in considering whether to extend time under r 10 of the SAT Rules were discussed by Simmons J in Howle v Best [2012] WASC 62. His Honour pointed out that an extension of time is not automatic, and that the discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the Tribunal to do justice between the parties. His Honour confirmed that the four major factors identified in Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196 at 198 are applicable in the context of r 10 of the SAT Rules. Those factors are:
(i)the length of the delay;
(ii)the reasons for the delay;
(iii)the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal; and
(iv)the extent of any prejudice to the respondent.
In the initial submissions filed on behalf of Mr Cuijpers, it is suggested that he had contacted the Tribunal about commencing a review and about the time within which he should do so. It is said that he followed up that enquiry with an email. Mr Cuijpers attached an email to the submission which appears to have been transmitted to the Tribunal on 13 December 2010 and contains the message:
I contacted the SAT requesting an extension of time to submit a complaint for review by SAT in regard to decisions made by the Legal Profession Complaints Committee, LPCC see ref; 133/06.
The submissions say that Mr Cuijpers was 'told not to be concerned about the timeframe', although nothing in the email supports that assertion.
The content of Mr Cuijpers' email suggests that he was aware, as of 13 December 2010, of the time limit for commencement of an application. The submission that Mr Cuijpers was told 'not to be concerned about the timeframe' is not supported by particulars of when, or by whom, that information was said to have been conveyed.
The application was eventually commenced on 17 January 2011. It was, therefore, approximately one month after the expiry for the commencement of an application for review. No satisfactory explanation is provided for that delay. The proceedings were commenced in approximately double the time prescribed by the SAT Rules.
If Mr Cuijpers were given advice that he need not be concerned with time limits for the commencement of his application, that would provide a reasonable explanation for delay in commencing proceedings. Although it would be most surprising if that advice were given to Mr Cuijpers, it is not necessary, given our conclusions in relation to his prospects of success of an application for review, that we reach any conclusion on the adequacy of his reasons for delay.
It is necessary, in the context for an application for extension of time, to consider the prospects of success in the application for review. For reasons which will follow, we do not consider an application for review of the Committee's decision has a reasonable prospect of success. For that reason alone, we would decline to extend time for commencement of the application.

Mr Cuijpers' application for leave to seek a review

Section 435 of the LP Act provides that:
(1)Subject to subsection (2), a person aggrieved by -
(a)a decision of the Complaints Committee to dismiss a complaint; or
(b)a decision made by the Complaints Committee under section 426,
may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision.
(2)If the Complaints Committee, in its reasons for its decision, specifically finds the complaint -
(a)to be trivial, unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous; or
(b)in the case of a complaint purporting to be made under section 410(1)(e), to be a matter in which the complainant does not have, or did not have, a direct personal interest,
the person aggrieved cannot apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision without the leave of the Tribunal.
Thus leave is required if the Committee made a specific finding of the type described in s 435(2)(a) in relation to the complaints against Mr Blyth. To ascertain whether it made such a finding, it is first necessary to identify the complaints that the Committee considered.
Mr Cuijpers first wrote to the Committee complaining about Mr Blyth in April 2006. Between then and when the Committee finally dealt with the complaints in November 2010, considerable correspondence occurred between Mr Cuijpers and the Committee. Because Mr Cuijpers referred matters related to his complaint to the police, the Committee deferred its consideration of the complaints pending completion of police investigations. Delays also occurred while various court proceedings in which Mr Cuijpers was involved were progressed.
At some point, Mr Cuijpers also complained about the lawyer acting for the other party in the litigation, Mr Jeremy Scudds. Later, in a letter dated 29 July 2009, Mr Cuijpers advised the Committee that he retracted his complaint against Mr Scudds 'with reservation'. However, in a letter to the Committee dated 9 October 2009, Mr Cuijpers advised that he 'no longer [withdrew] his complaint towards Mr Scudds'. Eventually in a letter of 29 June 2010, Mr Cuijpers again withdrew his complaint against Mr Scudds.
On 18 June 2010, the Committee wrote to Mr Cuijpers. The Committee sought confirmation that the complaint against Mr Scudds was withdrawn. It also sought to clarify the precise complaints which Mr Cuijpers was maintaining against Mr Blyth. The Committee summarised the complaints as follows:
1.that Mr Blyth engaged in professional misconduct by perverting, attempting to pervert, and or conspiring to pervert the course of justice by:
a.    permitting Mr Scudds to tender into evidence at a hearing on 4 March 2005 in matter PE 1971/04 a document which Mr Blyth knew to be a forgery;
b.    advising you [Mr Cuijpers] and your [Mr Cuijpers'] witness Ms Jenkins' that evidence was not required to support your [Mr Cuijpers'] defence of the misconduct restraining order at a hearing on 4 March 2005 in matter PE 1971/04 in circumstances where Mr Blyth knew that Ms Jenkins' evidence was necessary to support your [Mr Cuijpers'] defence of the misconduct restraining order; and
c.    requiring that [Mr Cuijpers] leave the Court whilst Mr Samut, a witness on [Mr Cuijpers'] behalf, gave evidence a the hearing on 4 March 2005 in matter PE 1971/04.
2.that Mr Blyth engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct by charging fees grossly in excess of a reasonable fee for acting for [Mr Cuijpers] in matter PE 1971/04 and/or that he charged fees in excess of a fixed fee arrangement.
Mr Cuijpers responded to that letter on 29 June 2010, but did not clearly indicate whether he accepted the Committee's description of his complaints as accurate. From his submissions to the Tribunal dated 5 December 2011 (paragraphs 55 - 57) Mr Cuijpers acknowledges that he accepted the Committee's formulation of the complaints. It is apparent that the Committee proceeded on the basis that Mr Cuijpers' complaints were as outlined in its letter of 18 June 2010.
The Committee’s minutes dated 4 November 2010 (BD 190) record that on 4 November 2010 the Committee resolved:
… in respect of Mr Blyth to dismiss the complaints of perverting the course of justice and charging grossly excessive fees contrary to a fixed fee arrangement because it was satisfied that there is no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty by the State Administrative Tribunal of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct…
… in respect of Mr Scudds [to] dismiss the complaint of perverting the course of justice under section 415(1)(b) of the Act because it is vexatious and lacking in substance.
The minutes conclude by recording the finding that:
1.the complaints of perverting the course of justice are vexatious, lacking in substance and unreasonable as the complaints were dependent upon untenable and groundless factual allegations; and
2.the complaint of charging grossly excessive fees in excess of a fixed fee arrangement was unreasonable.
The Committee's letter of 18 November 2010 setting out its decision substantially reflected the Committee's minutes of 4 November 2010, and concluded by repeating the findings of the Committee set out above.
In Mr Cuijpers' submissions dated 29 April 2011, he argued that although he had complained that Mr Blyth and Mr Scudds had conspired to pervert the course of justice, when the complaint against Mr Scudds was withdrawn, the suggestion of an intention to pervert the course of justice fell away. What remained, he submitted, was simply an allegation of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct as identified in paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c) and paragraph 2 of the Committee's summary in its letter of 18 June 2010.
Whether the conduct considered by the Committee is characterised as attempting to pervert the course of justice, or as professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct, it is apparent that the Committee's findings are addressed to the conduct, not its characterisation.
In relation to paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c), the Committee found the conduct to be vexatious and unreasonable. In relation to paragraph 2, the Committee found the conduct to be unreasonable. Leave is thus required in relation to all complaints against Mr Blyth.

The test for the grant of leave

In considering applications for leave under s 435 of the LP Act, the Tribunal applies the test for leave explained in Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 285 at 294, namely whether;
(1)it is shown that the decision in respect of which leave is sought was wrong, or at least attended with sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave; and
(2)in addition that substantial injustice would be done by leaving the decision unreversed.
- see for example Neil and Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2010] WASAT 39 at [20] - [23].

Was the Complaints Committee's decision wrong?

The task of the Tribunal is to determine whether the Committee was wrong in concluding that 'there is no reasonable likelihood' that the second respondent would be found guilty by this Tribunal of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct within the meaning of s 425(a) of the LP Act. In doing so, the Tribunal is not confined to matters that were before the Committee and may consider new material whether or not it existed at the time the original decision was made (SAT Act, s 27). The Tribunal is, however, confined to considering only the complaints which the Committee considered, and not any new or different complaints that Mr Cuijpers may now make.
The term ‘unsatisfactory professional conduct’ includes conduct that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner (LP Act, s 3 and s 402). The term ‘professional misconduct’ includes conduct involving a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence’ and conduct which would justify a finding that that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice (LP Act, s 3 and s 403(1)(a) and (b)). Conduct that is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct includes the charging of excessive legal costs in connection with the practice of the law (LP Act, s 404(b)).
Mr Blyth acted for the Mr Cuijpers in magistrates court proceedings PE 1971 of 2004. These proceedings, which were commenced on 4 March 2005 (BD5), were brought by Ms Julie Keeler against Mr Cuijpers and were in respect of a restraining order dated 15 September 2003 (BD 10). All aspects of Mr Cuijpers' complaint against Mr Blyth arose out of Mr Blyth’s conduct in connection to those proceedings.
It is not in dispute that Mr Cuijpers and Ms Keeler were residents in the same unit complex and were formerly in a romantic relationship with each other. The agent managing the unit complex was Moncrieff Realty. Ms Sabina Moncrieff of Moncrieff Realty had retained Mr Cuijpers to look after the gardens of the unit complex and attend to small items of general maintenance.

Failure to object to tender of the letter of 16 July 2004

In the course of the proceedings, it was noted by Mr Cuijpers that a letter dated 16 July 2004 from Moncrieff Realty to Mr Cuijpers was referred to in a letter from Ms Keeler to Moncrieff Realty. Mr Cuijpers denied receipt of the letter and asserted that it was a forgery.
By letter dated 25 October 2004 to Moncrieff Realty the second respondent queried whether a letter of 16 July 2004 from Ms Moncrieff had been written, and stated to Moncrieff Realty that it is ‘a relevant consideration to the disposition of Ms Keeler’s Restraining Order Application’. By letter dated 9 November 2004, Ms Rachel Tiede of Moncrieff Realty replied attaching a copy of the 16 July 2004 letter.
The second respondent also wrote on 25 October 2004 to Ms Keeler, raising the issue of the 16 July letter, and requested details relating to that correspondence. This included a paragraph as follows:
We otherwise note that in your letter to Moncrieff Realty dated 14 September 2004, you say 'Fred totally ignored your request (letter dated 16 July 2004).' If you rely upon such letter or any relevant item of correspondence, we require details of the items of correspondence and a copy thereof within the same 14 day period.
It is clear that Mr Cuijpers told Mr Blyth that he thought the letter was a forgery and suggested that inquires be undertaken to prove that was so. By file note dated 24 November 2004, Mr Blyth noted that he had advised Mr Cuijpers that not a great deal turned on the letter of 16 July 2004, and that it was 'incidental to this whole matter …’
By letter dated 1 December 2004, Mr Scudds of Porter Scudds enclosed the ‘relevant particulars of the application’ which included at paragraph 8(g) that:
The Strata Manager was informed of the MRO and told the Respondent not to do any maintenance on the Applicant’s Unit ...
By email dated 15 February 2005 to Mr Cuijpers, Mr Blyth stated, inter alia, that:
… I will contact Sabina Moncrieff and ask if she is certain that she sent you a 16 July 2004 letter at Keeler’s request…
… I have written to Keeler’s solicitors seeking further and better particulars ... At the moment, they do not specifically allege you ignored a 16 July 2004 letter from Moncrieff. Their response will clarify if that is alleged or not….
I have phoned Moncrieff Realty who confirm Sabina no longer works for them, but I was given Sabina’s mobile phone number and I have left a message for her to call me …

By letter dated 28 February 2005, Mr Scudds refused to provide any further particulars on the basis that they had provided sufficient particulars.
Ultimately, a copy of the 16 July 2004 letter was tendered, through Ms Keeler, not to prove its contents but as proof of the fact that there had been a response to Ms Keeler from Moncrieff Reality in relation to her concerns about Mr Cuijpers which had been communicated to them. Mr Blyth sought to make certain of that limited tender by asking: ‘[f]or that purpose and that purpose alone?’ To which His Worship replied: ‘Absolutely. No I won’t take any notice …'
Mr Cuijpers had, prior to the hearing, clearly communicated to Mr Blyth that he considered it to be a forgery and that he did not want it to be allowed into evidence. It is not in dispute that Mr Blyth nevertheless did not challenge or cross-examine the authenticity of the 16 July 2004 letter.
In my view, the materials before the Tribunal do not support there being any likelihood that Mr Blyth might be found guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct in relation to his failure to object to the tender of the letter on the ground that it was a forgery. There are several reasons for that conclusion.
The starting point is that the complaint relates to Mr Blyth's conduct as Mr Cuijpers' counsel. The duties of counsel is summarised in Dal Pont, Lawyers Professional Responsibility (4th ed, 2010) at [17.40] as follows:
A lawyer pressed by clients to 'make every point conceivable and inconceivable without judgment or discrimination' must exercise professional judgment so as 'not to use public time in the pursuit of submissions which are really unarguable'. This does not mean refraining from pursuing points unlikely to succeed, but that the lawyer must determine those points that are reasonably arguable and jettison the rest. Mason CJ made the point as follows in Giannarelli v Wraith:
[I]t is that a barrister's duty to the court epitomizes the fact that the course of litigation depends on the exercise by counsel of an independent discretion or judgment in the conduct and management of a case in which he has an eye, not only to his client's success, but also to the speedy and efficient administration of justice. In selecting and limiting the number of witnesses to be called, in deciding what questions will be asked in cross-examination, what topics will be covered in address and what points of law will be raised, counsel exercises an independent judgment so that the time of the court is not taken up unnecessarily, notwithstanding that the client may wish to chase every rabbit down its burrow.
Gleeson CJ in Ali v The Queen (2005) 214 ALR 1 at [6] said that:
… It is not a mark of competent advocacy to pursue at trial every line of argument that can be imagined, regardless of its consistency with other arguments, and regardless of its prospects of success. On the contrary, such an approach is the hallmark of incompetence.
Mr Blyth's forensic decision not to assert that the letter was a forgery can be justified on several grounds.
First, he did not permit it to be admitted into evidence as proof of its content. In fact it does not appear that it was actually admitted as an exhibit. Rather it was marked for identification and it does not seem to ever have been formally accepted by the Court into evidence. It was the contents of the letter that could have been prejudicial to Mr Cuijpers. Crossexamining Ms Keeler with regard to it or calling Ms Moncrieff as a witness would have risked bringing the contents of the letter into evidence.
Second, Mr Blyth had no cogent evidence, beyond Mr Cuijpers' assertion, that it was a forgery. The fact that Mr Cuijpers did not receive a copy of the letters does not prove that it was a forgery, nor does it disprove that Ms Keeler received a copy of the letter.
Mr Cuijpers has since had analysis done on the signature of the letter but Mr Blyth was required to exercise judgment regarding the handling of this issue on materials available to him at the time. I note, in any event, that the handwriting analysis has proved inconclusive.
Thirdly, Mr Blyth had formed the view, which in my view was entirely reasonable, that the letter was of little significance to the case. It was reasonable and appropriate to take the view that pursuit of the issue of the genuineness of the letter was a distraction from the real issues in the case. On that basis, even if Mr Blyth failed to follow up on, or report back to Mr Cuijpers in respect of, aspects of an inquiry, for example failing to note during an inspection if the 16 July 2004 letter was not recorded in the Moncrieff Realty mail book and the file of the corporate body or failing to follow up again with Ms Moncrieff, such conduct is unlikely to be a sufficient basis for a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.

Failing to call Ms Jenkins

On 1 March 2005 Mr Blyth advised Mr Cuijpers that he had arranged for Ms Jenkins to attend at Court and give evidence on Mr Cuijpers' behalf at the hearing. In a copy of an affidavit dated 24 January 2008, Ms Jenkins stated, inter alia that:
My evidence was in relation to witnessing Ms Keelers conduct of purposely walking up to Mr Cuijpers in the visitors car part of the units where they reside and without fear paused briefly face to face with him near my car …
Ms Jenkins may also have given evidence that she was at Mr Cuijpers' residence constantly and had not witnessed any incidents between Mr Cuijpers and Ms Keeler and to the effect that Mr Cuijpers was not a 'lovesick puppy'. It is not in dispute that Mr Blyth did not in fact call Ms Jenkins.
Mr Blyth's response to this aspect of Mr Cuijpers' complaint was, inter alia, that his recollection was that there was no point calling Ms Jenkins because under cross-examination Ms Keeler gave no different evidence to that which Ms Jenkins was going to give. A complete copy of the transcript of proceedings PE 1971/04 was not able to be obtained by the Committee and Mr Cuijpers has only provided certain pages. There is nothing in the materials to indicate that the judgment Mr Blyth exercised in not calling Ms Jenkins might amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
Decisions of that kind fall within the responsibilities of counsel discussed above. Mr Blyth's decision not to call a witness whose evidence he considered was unnecessary was an exercise of the independent judgment he is required to exercise as an officer of the Court. The fact that his client disagreed with the decision does not mean that Mr Blyth acted in any way unprofessionally.

Requiring Mr Cuijpers to leave the Court

It is not in dispute that Mr Blyth called Mr Samut to give evidence on Mr Cuijpers' behalf but required Mr Cuijpers to leave the court room while Mr Samut gave evidence, thereby denying Mr Cuijpers the ability to hear Mr Samut’s evidence.
It is apparent that Mr Samut gave evidence before Mr Cuijpers. The reasons for that are not clear, but it can be assumed that it was done for reasons of convenience to the witness. Mr Blyth explained that he asked Mr Cuijpers to leave the courtroom 'so as not to hear how Mr Samut was cross-examined … which would have resulted in less weight being given to [the applicant's] rebuttal evidence'. The expression 'rebuttal evidence' is, in its context, clearly a reference to Mr Cuijpers' answers in crossexamination. That explanation reflects the reason why parties are usually called before any of their witnesses. It is a perfectly cogent reason. It was open to Mr Blyth to make a forensic decision to have Mr Cuijpers outside the courtroom while Mr Samut gave evidence in order to preserve the credibility of Mr Cuijpers' evidence.

Costs

By letter dated 2 November 2006, Mr Cuijpers alleged to the Committee that Mr Blyth agreed to act on his behalf in defending Ms Keeler’s restraining order application at a cost of $4,000 and then billed him $7,000. Mr Blyth says that there was no fixed fee agreement. By letter dated 21 October 2004, Mr Blyth provided Mr Cuijpers with a costs disclosure statement, a litigation retainer agreement dated 19 October 2004 and a trust authority. These annexures have not been included in the materials provided by Mr Cuijpers, but nothing in the papers indicates that there was a fixed fee arrangement.
There is no reasonable likelihood that this allegation might be made out. The Committee concluded that a cost of around $7,000 for legal services in connection with resisting an extension to a restraining order is not excessive, particularly where the client is requiring a high level of involvement in the detail of the case. There is no reason to suggest that that conclusion was wrong. The fact that Mr Blyth may have provided an estimate, and the costs ultimately charged were more than that estimate, does not render the legal fees excessive. The fact that Mr Cuijpers was unsuccessful in the proceedings is irrelevant as time is charged on the basis of hours spent working.
For these reasons the Tribunal finds that the decision of the Committee that there is no reasonable likelihood that Mr Blyth would be found guilty of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct has not been shown to be wrong or attended to with sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave.

Orders

1.The application for an extension of time to seek review of the Legal Profession Complaints Committee decision is refused.
2.The application is dismissed.

I certify that this and the preceding [56] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
JUSTICE J A CHANEY, PRESIDENT