CTO15 v Minister for Immigration

[2018] FCCA 1464

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CTO15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 1464

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for Judicial Review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision affirming decision not to grant Protection visa – dismissal of application due to non-appearance – application for reinstatement of judicial review application – whether applicant has provided a reasonable explanation for not appearing at hearing – whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable case – no arguable case demonstrated – reinstatement application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 422B, 424A

Cases cited:
MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530
SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71

Applicant: CTO15

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 3452 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis

Hearing date: 18 May 2017

Date of Last Submission: 18 May 2017

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 7 June 2018

REPRESENTATION

Applicant in person

Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Galvin of Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

1. The application in a case filed on 27 April 2017 seeking to set aside the orders made on 30 March 2017 is dismissed. 

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3452 of 2015

CTO15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. On 30 March 2017 I made an order pursuant to r.13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision made by the second respondent (Tribunal). By that decision the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).

2. I dismissed the application for judicial review because the applicant did not appear at the hearing. The applicant now applies pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules for an order that I set aside the orders I made on 30 March 2017.

Principles

1. Under r.16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules the Court has power to set aside orders made in the absence of a party. The principles that govern the Court’s exercise of that power were discussed by Ryan J in MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, where his Honour said:[1]

   In circumstances where . . . a proceeding has been dismissed in a party’s absence and reinstatement is sought, a discretion falls to be exercised by the court before which the application for reinstatement is returnable. That discretion requires the consideration of three factors, and whether, on balance, they tend for or against the reinstatement. Those factors are:

   (a)  whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out;

   (b)  the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the court is empowered to grant;

   (c)  whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application.

   [1] [2010] FCA 530 at [7]

Reason for not appearing at hearing

1. In an affidavit he filed in support of his application the applicant deposes he was terribly sick on the day of the hearing, and that he did not have credit to telephone the Court. The applicant also deposed to his being on medication. The applicant, however, does not support his claim with any medical evidence. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, I am prepared to accept the applicant was terribly sick on the day of the hearing and the applicant, therefore, has given a reasonable explanation for his non-appearance.

Merits of substantive application

1. Determining whether the applicant will have a reasonably arguable case for the relief the applicant sought in his application requires me to set out the claims for protection the applicant made before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s reasons for not accepting those claims. Before I do that, it will be useful to set out the applicant’s migration history.

Migration history

1. The applicant is a citizen of Indonesia. He arrived in Australia on 13 August 2000 as the holder of a short stay business visa. On 11 September 2000 the applicant applied for a Protection visa (First Protection Application). The First Protection Application was refused on 20 September 2000, and the applicant applied for review to the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The RRT affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa on 29 March 2001.

2. On 4 July 2001 the applicant sought Ministerial intervention pursuant to s.417 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), but that was declined on 27 September 2001. On 28 May 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal to the High Court. The matter was remitted to the Federal Court on 6 February 2003. The Federal Court dismissed the appeal on 5 May 2003. On 16 November 2010 the applicant again sought Ministerial intervention, but on 3 April 2012 the applicant was informed the Minister declined to intervene. The applicant made a further application for Ministerial intervention on 17 April 2012, but the applicant was advised that the application did not meet departmental guidelines.

3. On 10 May 2012 the applicant applied for a Medical Treatment (Long Stay) (Subclass 685) visa. That application was refused on 24 May 2012. The applicant applied for review to the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT), but the MRT found it had no jurisdiction in the matter on 21 September 2012. The applicant applied to this Court for judicial review but that application was dismissed on 14 May 2013. The applicant lodged an appeal to the Full Federal Court on 6 June 2013, but that appeal was dismissed on 21 August 2013.

4. The applicant again applied for a Protection visa on 13 September 2013. He was able to do so, notwithstanding s.48A of the Act, because of the decision of the Full Federal Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.[2]

   [2] [2013] FCAFC 71

Claims for protection

1. In his application for a Protection visa the applicant claimed he feared being persecuted because he is a Chinese Christian, and that he left Indonesia because there is strong discrimination in Indonesia against the Chinese Christian minority. The applicant claimed that in Indonesia protection of his human rights was impossible, that it is a very unpredictable country to live in, that riots can occur at any time, and they are always against the Christian Chinese minority. The applicant claimed that while the Indonesian Government promises the safety of all citizens, in reality it is unable to do so. The applicant also claimed that, as a Chinese Christian, his life is always in danger, and that living in Australia has afforded him a second chance to live a good life without any risks.

2. The applicant further claimed he experienced serious harm in Indonesia, and that he left the country to avoid further physical and psychological harassment that violated his human rights. The applicant claimed he fears that he will lose his life if he returns to Indonesia because the riots are unpredictable, and the native and Muslim Indonesians hate the Chinese and Christian Indonesians. The applicant claims that native Indonesians are jealous of Christian Chinese Indonesians because they are more successful in their businesses. The applicant claims that his shop was burned down during the riots in May 1998.  

3. The applicant also claimed that native and Muslim Indonesians in the army target Chinese Christians. While the Indonesian Government says it will protect every Indonesian, the reality is different.

Tribunal hearing

1. The applicant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments in support of his application. At the hearing the applicant elaborated on his claims for protection. The applicant claimed that from Wednesday 13 1998 to Friday 15 May 1998 he saw shops being looted and burned, cars flipped upside down and burned on the street, stores stoned and ethnic Chinese beaten. In 1977, when the applicant was 12 years old, there had been similar riots in three towns simultaneously. Buildings, shops and cars were burned, and a Chinese woman was raped. The applicant, together with his father, mother, and siblings fled to a small village for one week. On their return, the applicant saw in the newspapers that many towns were damaged in the riots. The applicant realised that the 1998 riots must have been the same as those riots, and was very traumatised.

2. The applicant claimed that in Indonesia ethnic Chinese make up 10 per cent of the total population, and, for that reason, when riots occur they are the victims. The applicant also claimed that even if the fighting were between Muslims, ethnic Chinese would be the victims of that conflict, with Buddhist temples and churches being subject to vandalism. The applicant claimed that no one has been held responsible for the rioting.

3. The applicant claimed that the Indonesian government had made many announcements that it would protect minorities and all religions from violence, but up until now many Muslim people have committed vandalism, deterred people from worshipping, and forcibly closed churches; and for this reason, the applicant has not returned to Indonesia.

Tribunal’s decision

1. The Tribunal found the applicant to be a credible witness about the past, despite the applicant’s evidence differing in some aspects from the claims he made in his application for protection.[3] The Tribunal accepted the following:

   a)The applicant saw in the newspaper reports of riots in Jakarta, Bandung, and Solo in 1977.[4]

   b)The applicant opened a small shop in Jakarta selling electronic equipment around eight months before the May 1998 riots. During those riots the store was looted and the applicant was pushed. The applicant saw cars being flipped over and burned, and was traumatised by the experience.[5]

   c)After the riots the applicant returned to Bandung and saved money to come to Australia on a tourist visa. The applicant brought with him textile samples to sell, but the market was too competitive.

   d)When the applicant’s visa was about to expire, he sought the assistance of a migration agent who helped him apply for a Protection visa. The applicant did not attend the hearing because his agent advised him not to do so, and he later found out his visa had expired following a raid by the Department on the business where he worked. The applicant thought that if he returned to Indonesia he would have nothing and tried again to get a visa to work in Australia. The applicant applied for a Medical visa in 2012 for that reason, and because he has medical problems, including a heart condition.[6]

   e)The applicant’s family is Buddhist, but he went to Catholic schools. The applicant was baptised in Australia, which was not done for the purpose of seeking protection, and attends church on a weekly basis.[7]

   [3] CB211, [28]

   [4] CB211, [30]

   [5] CB211, [31]

   [6] CB 211, [32]

   [7] CB 211, [33]

2. The Tribunal, however, made the following findings:

   a)No member of the applicant’s immediate family has suffered serious or significant harm in Indonesia because of their Buddhist religion or Chinese ethnicity.[8]

   b)Based on country information about Indonesia generally and the applicant’s home area of Banbung, there was not a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm to the applicant in Indonesia because of his Chinese ethnicity.[9]

   c)Based on country information and the applicant’s evidence about his family’s experience in Indonesia, there is not a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm to the applicant in Indonesia for reason of his Chinese ethnicity.[10]

   d)The applicant exaggerated the difficulties he will face on returning to Indonesia, in particular his claim of fear of harm from his not speaking Indonesian, his health, his age, having difficulty getting a job, and not being supported by his sister in Indonesia.[11]

   [8] CB 211, [39]

   [9] CB 213, [43]

   [10] CB213, [45]

   [11] CB214, [56]-[57]

3. The Tribunal therefore concluded the applicant did not satisfy s.36(2)(a) or s.36(2)(aa) of the Act, and affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.

Grounds of application

1. In his application for judicial review the applicant raised the following three grounds.

   1.The Member of the Tribunal misunderstood my case and my fear of harm in Indonesia.

   2.I was interviewed on 18 August 2015 and the decision was not made until 26 November 2015. The Tribunal ignored my submission of 11 August 2015 and ignored that I will suffer serious harm in the future for a convention reason if I return to Indonesia.

   3.The Tribunal ignored that there are substantial grounds that if removed from Australia I will suffer significant harm.

2. The applicant, who is not legally represented, also filed a document titled “Applicant’s Submissions” and, at the hearing before me, the applicant made oral submissions. The most convenient course for me will be first to identify and consider the submissions the applicant made before me, then the submissions made in the Applicant’s Submissions and, finally, the grounds stated in the application.

Submissions made at judicial review hearing

1. In his submissions before me I took the applicant to have made three submissions. The first is that the applicant does not understand why the Tribunal did not accept that his having experienced trauma was a sufficient reason for the applicant’s not being required to return to Indonesia. I take this submission to be another way of stating ground 1 of his application, namely, that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s claims. The applicant referred to his having observed first-hand the May 1998 riots in Jakarta. He said he would carry that trauma with him wherever he would go in Indonesia, including his home area of Bandung. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal misunderstood his fear.

2. Whether or not the applicant understands why the Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims, the reasons the Tribunal did not accept those claims are set out in the Tribunal’s decision record. The Tribunal identified the claims the applicant made; and it accepted the applicant’s evidence about the events he observed. The Tribunal, however, did not accept the applicant satisfied the criteria for the granting of a Protection visa provided in s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa) of the Act because it was not satisfied the applicant faced a real risk of serious or significant harm if he were to return to Indonesia; and its not being so satisfied was based largely on the Tribunal’s acceptance of country information it identified in its decision record, and the applicant’s family not having experienced any harm in the past.

3. The applicant’s submission to me appears to assume that his having experienced trauma-inducing events necessarily implied the Tribunal was compelled to conclude that the applicant satisfied the criteria provided in s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. It is not reasonably arguable that that assumption is correct. The assessment of whether an applicant will face a real risk of serious or significant harm if the applicant is to be returned to his or her country of nationality is one that must be made by reference to objective facts.

4. The second submission the applicant made to me is that, although the Tribunal put to the applicant country information, it did not identify the country information. That does not raise any arguable jurisdictional error. In its decision record the Tribunal referred to, and relied on, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Information Report on Indonesia dated 9 June 2015 (Country Report). The information contained in the Country Report, however, is information identified by s.424A(3)(a) of the Act, namely, information “that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member”. The consequence of that is that s.424A(1) of the Act did not apply to the Country Report. That, in turn, means the Tribunal was not required to give the applicant particulars of that information; and, given that the Country Report is the subject of regulation by s.424A of the Act, and that section is in a Division of the Act which s.422B(1) of the Act states is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with, there is no room for the implication of a common law duty on the Tribunal to disclose the Country Report to the applicant.

5. The third submission the applicant made to me is really a set of submissions; and these relate to matters that could only reasonably be said to relate to the merits of the applicant’s claims for protection. The applicant submitted the authorities in Indonesia do not protect ethnic Chinese. The applicant stated that although it is known who was responsible for the May 1998 riots, no person has been charged in connection with the riots. The applicant also referred to the ethnic Chinese mayor who has been charged with blasphemy. The applicant next referred to his parents having passed away, and to his having lived in Australia without breaching any laws.

6. None of these matters raise any arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal because they go no further than expressing disagreement with the Tribunal’s findings, or because they relate to matters that were not before the Tribunal, or because they raise matters that could not reasonably be regarded relevant to whether the applicant is entitled to protection.

Submissions made in Applicant’s Submissions

1. I next turn to the submissions contained in the Applicant’s Submissions. First, the applicant refers to the Tribunal’s finding that none of the applicant’s family had suffered serious or significant harm in Indonesia because of their Buddhist religion or Chinese ethnicity.[12] The applicant submits the Tribunal failed to consider he is different; that it failed to consider that the reason why the applicant came to Australia was because of the harm the applicant suffered as he explained in his letter to the Tribunal dated 8 August 2015; and it failed to consider the fact that the applicant is Christian and that he will not be able to practice his Christian faith when he returns to Indonesia; and that the Tribunal did not consider the “internet website about vandalism, church burnt on 20 July 2015”.[13]

   [12] Applicant’s Submissions, [2]

   [13] Applicant’s Submissions, [2]

2. As I have already noted, the Tribunal found that no member of the applicant’s immediate family has suffered serious or significant harm in Indonesia because of their Buddhist religion or Chinese ethnicity.[14] It is not reasonably arguable, however, that the Tribunal expressly or implicitly assumed the applicant was no different from any other member of the family. It is clear from the Tribunal’s decision record that it identified and accepted the applicant’s evidence of what he had observed. It is true that the Tribunal relied on country information and on the absence of harm to the applicant’s family in concluding that the applicant did not face a real risk or serious or significant harm; but it beyond argument that it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to do so because the applicant’s family shared with the applicant at least some of the characteristics on which the applicant relied for claiming fear of harm.

   [14] CB 211, [39]

1. It is also not reasonably arguable the Tribunal did not consider the applicant’s submission that his reason for coming to Australia was because of the harm the applicant suffered as set out in the applicant’s letter to the Tribunal dated 8 August 2015, and the other matters the applicant identified. The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s having provided to the Tribunal a “one page document in English dated 8 August 2015 and a memory stick”, noting that the applicant “wanted to explain why he does not want to go back to Indonesia”.[15] The Tribunal set out the matters the applicant set out in the letter including the “last vandalism to a church was on 20 July 2015”; and later in its decision record the Tribunal says it has “taken into account . . . the applicant’s evidence about what happened to him in the past, his evidence about the rape of Chinese women which he said was in the BBC and the information on the USB, summarised above”.[16]

   [15] CB210, [24]

   [16] CB212, [40]

2. Second, the applicant refers to paragraph 43 of the Tribunal’s decision record in which, after concluding it was not satisfied there is a real chance the applicant will suffer serious harm or a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm because of his practice of Christianity in Bandung, the Tribunal referred to Roman Catholics comprising 2.9% of the population in Indonesia.[17] The applicant submits the Tribunal ignored the applicant’s personal particulars, and it failed to ask itself whether he could practice his Roman Catholic religion in Bandung. This submission is not arguable. As I have already noted, the Tribunal understood the applicant’s evidence about his personal circumstances, and, in large part, accepted it; and in paragraph 43 of its decision record the Tribunal considered whether the applicant would be able to practice his Roman Catholic religion in Bandung. In considering that question, there can be no doubt the Tribunal considered information from the Country Report the Tribunal summarised in paragraph 41 of its decision record which was to the effect that Christians in Indonesia are generally at a low risk of official discrimination and are generally able to practice their faith.

   [17] Applicant’s Submissions, [3]

3. Third, the applicant refers to the Tribunal’s finding that no member of his immediate family has suffered serious or significant harm in Indonesia because of their Buddhist religion or Chinese ethnicity. The applicant submits his parents have now passed away, the applicant is different from his parents, the applicant has been away from Indonesia since 2000, and the Tribunal failed to ask itself whether the applicant will suffer serious harm if he were to return to Indonesia because not only of his Chinese ethnicity but also because of his Catholic religion.[18] These submissions are not reasonably arguable. The Tribunal did consider whether the applicant would suffer serious harm if he were to return to Indonesia, not only because of his Chinese ethnicity but also because of his Catholic religion. It also considered whether the applicant faced a real risk of serious or significant harm because he has been away from Indonesia since 2000 having regard to the applicant’s circumstances which, at the time of the hearing, included the applicant’s father having passed away (not his mother who passed away after the hearing). Further, although the Tribunal relied on its finding that no member of his immediate family has suffered serious or significant harm in Indonesia because of their Buddhist religion or Chinese ethnicity, it is beyond argument it was entitled to do so, and it relied on that finding together with country information and matters that were particular to the applicant.

   [18] Applicant’s Submissions, [4]

4. Fourth, the applicant, referring to paragraph 48 of the Tribunal’s decision record, submits the Tribunal failed to take into account his medical condition.[19] That is not arguable. The Tribunal recorded the applicant made claims based on his health;[20] and the Tribunal considered those claims. It referred to country information,[21] and the fact that the applicant’s father was able to be cared for, although at considerable cost; and it relied on its finding that although the applicant’s family members are not rich, it did not accept they were poor.[22]

   [19] Applicant’s Submissions, [5]

   [20] CB211-212, [36]

   [21] CB213, [48]

   [22] CB214, [51]

5. Fifth, the applicant submits the Tribunal’s thinking in paragraph 49 of its decision record is unreasonable and based on assumption.[23] In that paragraph the Tribunal refers to the applicant’s father having been cared for in hospital for three months and its not accepting that the applicant’s family used all of their resources to pay for the treatment because the applicant gave evidence that his mother continued to reside in the family home. The applicant submits he did not exaggerate the issue of health services in Indonesia, and that his mother died after the Tribunal’s hearing because of lack of medical treatment and poor resources. These submissions disclose no arguable jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. It is beyond argument it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to find that, because the applicant’s mother continued to reside in the family home after the applicant’s father had received medical treatment, not all of the applicant’s family resources had been used to pay for the cost of the applicant’s father’s treatment. The passing away of the applicant’s mother for the reasons stated by the applicant in the Applicant’s Submissions are not arguably relevant to whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error because, as accepted (at least in part) by the applicant, these are matters that were not put to the Tribunal.

   [23] Applicant’s Submissions, [6]

6. Sixth, the applicant submits the Tribunal based its decision on general country reports but failed to consider his personal circumstances, and it failed to consider whether the applicant will suffer significant harm if he were to return to Indonesia because of his age, health, the loss of his , as well as his economic hardship.[24] That is not arguable. The Tribunal stated in its decision record that it has “also considered [the applicant’s] claims about not speaking Indonesian, his health, his age, having difficulty getting a job and not being supported by his sister in Indonesia as reasons that he will suffer serious or significant harm if he returns to Indonesia”.[25] After referring to a number of matters, the Tribunal concluded the applicant “is resourceful, resilient and adaptable”, that having “lived, been educated, and worked in Indonesia for 35 years, the Tribunal finds that returning to Bandung where his mother and sister live in the family home after 15 years in Australia will not involve the hardship he claims”, and that the applicant “exaggerated the difficulties”.[26] It is beyond argument these findings were reasonably open to the Tribunal for the reasons it gave.

   [24] Applicant’s Submissions, [7]

   [25] CB213, [45]

   [26] CB214, [55]

7. Seventh, the applicant submits the Tribunal failed to apply the complementary protection grounds because the applicant gave his evidence in a straightforward way and was accepted as a credible witness, yet the Tribunal ignored the applicant’s subjective fear of harm.[27] These submissions do not disclose any arguable case. They imply that the applicant’s evidence, and in particular his evidence of holding a genuine fear of harm if he were to return to Indonesia, necessarily required the Tribunal to find the applicant satisfied the criteria stated in s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. That is incorrect. Whether or not that criterion is satisfied depended on whether the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm if he were to return to Indonesia. That was a matter that was to be assessed objectively on the material that was before the Tribunal. For reasons it is beyond argument were reasonably available to it, the Tribunal concluded on the material that was before it that the applicant did not face any such real risk of significant or substantial harm if he were to return to Indonesia.

   [27] Applicant’s Submissions, [8]

8. Eighth, the applicant submits the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s circumstances based on the material before it, including the matters the applicant set out in his letter dated 8 August 2015. That is not arguable.[28] As I have already noted, the Tribunal identified and considered each of the claims the applicant made, including the matters the applicant stated in his letter dated 8 August 2015; and for reasons it is beyond argument were available to it, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant faced a real risk of serious or significant harm if he were to return to Indonesia.

   [28] Applicant’s Submissions, [9]

9. Finally, the applicant submits the Tribunal failed to interpret significant harm, and whether, on the evidence before it, that term applied to the applicant.[29] It is true the Tribunal does not set out in its decision record the meaning of “significant harm” given in s.36(2A) of the Act. It is not arguable, however, that from that omission alone the Tribunal could be taken not to have in mind the meaning of “significant harm” given in s.36(2A) of the Act or that it failed to correctly apply that meaning to the evidence the applicant gave. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s reasoning that could arguably suggest the Tribunal proceeded on an erroneous understanding of “significant harm”, as that expression is defined in s.36(2A) of the Act.

   [29] Applicant’s Submissions, [10]

Grounds stated in application

1. Having considered the submissions made at the hearing before me, and the submissions contained in the Applicant’s Submissions, I now deal with the grounds stated in the application.

2. The first ground is that the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s case and his fear of harm in Indonesia. As I have already concluded, such a claim is not arguable. The Tribunal identified the applicant’s claims and the fear the applicant claimed he held about returning to Indonesia; and there is nothing to suggest the Tribunal misunderstood the applicant’s claims.

3. The second ground claims the Tribunal ignored the applicant’s submission of 11 August 2015. That is a reference to the letter dated 8 August 2015 the applicant provided to the Tribunal to which I have already referred. The letter has a stamped date of 11 August 2015.[30] As I have already found, it is beyond argument the Tribunal did consider the contents of the letter dated 8 August 2015 and the material contained in the accompanying memory stick.

   [30] CB192

4. The third ground is “there are substantial grounds that if removed from Australia [the applicant] will suffer significant harm”. That is not arguable. As I have already concluded, it is beyond argument the Tribunal correctly identified and considered the applicant’s claims; and, for reasons that were reasonably available to it, it did not accept the applicant’s claims.

Conclusion and disposition

1. Given I have found that the applicant has not in his oral submissions before me, or in the Applicant’s Submissions, or in the application itself, raised any arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Tribunal, it follows there would be no utility in setting aside the orders I made on 30 March 2017. I propose, therefore, to order that the applicant’s application in a case seeking to set aside those orders be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-two (42) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis

Date: 12 June 2018