CSU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 2)

CSU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 97  

File number(s): MLG 1312 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI
Date of judgment: 15 February 2023
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority affirming a decision not to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise (sub-class XE790) visa – where Authority referenced superseded country information in its reasons – where it is contended that the Authority knew or ought to have known about the updated country information - whether the Authority failed to consider relevant considerations - erred in interpreting or applying the terms “real chance” and “well-founded fear of persecution” pursuant to ss.5H, 5J and 36(2)(a) and “real risk of significant harm” pursuant to s.36(2)(aa) of the Act - and/or was unreasonable in its findings given the updated country information.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to adduce new evidence – where application to adduce evidence that existed before the hearing was made after conclusion of final hearing and judgment reserved – where parties to litigation had already suffered delay and expense on account of the interlocutory application - explanation not exceptional – interlocutory application dismissed.

Jurisdictional error not identified - application dismissed with costs.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss. 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 65, 424A, 424AA, 437DA, 437DC, 437DD, 437JA, 499

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.43(2)(a)

Public Services Act 1999 (Cth)

Ministerial Direction No. 84 – Consideration of Protection Visa Applications   

Cases cited:

APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 373 ALR 196

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62

CHP16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1818

DIJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1038

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389

ETR17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 632

F.Y.D Investments Pty Ltd v Promptair Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1097

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Home Affairs vOmar [2019] FCAFC 188

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217

SCAT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 80

Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd (2012) 46 VR 1

SZSZW v Minister for Border Protection [2015] FCA 562

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 119
Date of last submission/s: 23 August 2022
Date of hearing: 29 June and 23 August 2022
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn
Solicitor…
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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 97
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CSU17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the Applicant, CSU17, sought to challenge a decision made by the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, which had significant implications for their immigration status. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Minister and determining the validity of the Applicant's claims. Central to the dispute was whether the Minister had properly considered all relevant information and applied the correct legal standards in reaching his decision.

The legal issues that the Court had to address included whether the Minister failed to take into account a relevant consideration, whether there was an error in the interpretation or application of the law, and whether the findings of the Minister were unreasonable given the available evidence. Specifically, the Applicant argued that the Minister had not adequately considered a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report from 2017, which the Applicant believed should have influenced the outcome of their case. Additionally, the Applicant sought to introduce new evidence after the conclusion of the final hearing, which the Court had to assess under stringent criteria for exceptional circumstances.

In its reasoning, the Court emphasised the importance of the finality of litigation and the need for litigants to present all evidence at the initial hearing. The Court noted that the application to introduce new evidence, made after the conclusion of the final hearing and judgment, was unusual and should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. The Court considered various factors, including the public interest in the efficiency and finality of litigation, the significance of the new evidence, and the explanation for the delay in presenting it. Ultimately, the Court found that the explanation provided for the late introduction of the new evidence was insufficient, as it did not adequately explain why the evidence had not been presented at the trial. The Court concluded that the belated identification of material that had been in existence at the time of the hearing did not constitute an exceptional or reasonable explanation.

The Court dismissed the application to introduce new evidence, finding that it did not meet the criteria for exceptional circumstances. Consequently, the Court proceeded to assess the merits of the three grounds of review, finding that the Minister had not erred in his decision-making process. The Court held that the Minister had appropriately considered the relevant information and applied the correct legal standards in reaching his decision. As a result, the Applicant's appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The first ground contended that this constituted a failure to take into account a relevant consideration (among two other considerations said to be relevant). The second ground contended that the Authority erred in interpreting or applying the law as demonstrated by its conclusion that the statutory criterion were not met despite the material that was available to and before it namely the 2017 DFAT Report. The third ground was plead as well as or in the alternative to Ground 2 and essentially contended that the Authority’s findings that the Applicant was not at risk of persecution or significant harm in detention or in prison on his return were unreasonable again given the material that was available to and before it. Whether to allow the late application to bring new evidence It is useful to deal first with the application in a proceeding which, if allowed, may have a bearing on the assessment of each of the three grounds of review. By this application the Applicant sought to introduce evidence of an extract of a decision of the Authority which referred to the 2017 DFAT Report and was delivered on 5 May 2017 (Decision Extract of 5 May 2017). It is not contentious that this application to introduce new evidence, made after the conclusion of the final hearing and judgment was reserved, is unusual and ought only be granted in exceptional circumstances: Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd (2012) 46 VR 1. There was no contest about the principles that the First Respondent drew to the Court’s attention as being applicable to the Court’s assessment of the interests of justice in an application of this kind, citing the decision of White J in F.Y.D Investments Pty Ltd v Promptair Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1097 at [32]:•the public interest (and the interest of the particular parties) in litigation being conducted efficiently and expeditiously; •the public interest in the finality of litigation, with the consequent expectation that litigants will present all their evidence and submissions at the one hearing; •the significance of the proposed new evidence and submissions in the context of the trial; •the explanation for the evidence not having been led at the trial; •the likely prejudice to the opposing party if the application is allowed; •the potential detriment to the applying party if the application is refused, and; •any delay by an applicant in seeking leave to reopen. The public interest in the finality of litigation and in ensuring that litigants will present all evidence and submissions at one hearing would ordinarily weigh against the grant of such application. In the present case, the matter has already suffered some delay necessitated by a further hearing, at which the parties argued the merits in the event that leave to make the application was granted. A decision now to allow this application would not delay matters further. Nonetheless, there was insufficient explanation as to why the evidence was not lead at the trial. The only reason advanced for seeking to adduce the evidence of the Decision Extract dated 5 May 2017 was that the Applicant’s Counsel had subsequently identified its existence – it was not explained how or why it was only just then discovered notwithstanding that the record itself had been in existence since some years earlier. Without more, the belated identification of material that was in existence at the time of the hearing is in my view neither an exceptional nor a reasonable explanation. For completeness, the decision of this Court in ETR17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 632 (ETR17) involved the same reviewer and the new evidence sought to be adduced arose during the course of (rather than after the conclusion of) the hearing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By this application the Applicant sought to introduce evidence of an extract of a decision of the Authority which referred to the 2017 DFAT Report and was delivered on 5 May 2017 (Decision Extract of 5 May 2017). It is not contentious that this application to introduce new evidence, made after the conclusion of the final hearing and judgment was reserved, is unusual and ought only be granted in exceptional circumstances: Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd (2012) 46 VR 1. There was no contest about the principles that the First Respondent drew to the Court’s attention as being applicable to the Court’s assessment of the interests of justice in an application of this kind, citing the decision of White J in F.Y.D Investments Pty Ltd v Promptair Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1097 at [32]:•the public interest (and the interest of the particular parties) in litigation being conducted efficiently and expeditiously; •the public interest in the finality of litigation, with the consequent expectation that litigants will present all their evidence and submissions at the one hearing; •the significance of the proposed new evidence and submissions in the context of the trial; •the explanation for the evidence not having been led at the trial; •the likely prejudice to the opposing party if the application is allowed; •the potential detriment to the applying party if the application is refused, and; •any delay by an applicant in seeking leave to reopen. The public interest in the finality of litigation and in ensuring that litigants will present all evidence and submissions at one hearing would ordinarily weigh against the grant of such application. In the present case, the matter has already suffered some delay necessitated by a further hearing, at which the parties argued the merits in the event that leave to make the application was granted. A decision now to allow this application would not delay matters further. Nonetheless, there was insufficient explanation as to why the evidence was not lead at the trial. The only reason advanced for seeking to adduce the evidence of the Decision Extract dated 5 May 2017 was that the Applicant’s Counsel had subsequently identified its existence – it was not explained how or why it was only just then discovered notwithstanding that the record itself had been in existence since some years earlier. Without more, the belated identification of material that was in existence at the time of the hearing is in my view neither an exceptional nor a reasonable explanation. For completeness, the decision of this Court in ETR17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 632 (ETR17) involved the same reviewer and the new evidence sought to be adduced arose during the course of (rather than after the conclusion of) the hearing. Further, other than the matter of costs and as will appear from the reasons that follow in relation to Ground 1 (particulars (a) to (c)), I am not persuaded that the Applicant will suffer any particular prejudice or detriment if the application is refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the time of the Authority’s Reasons, the Act (since amended) also provided that the Minister may (as distinct from must) give written directions about how to exercise a power under the Act. Relevantly, to the extent that those directions were about the performance of those functions or the exercise of those powers: s.499 of the Act (as it then was).Consideration There is considerable overlap in the three grounds relied upon by the Applicant. Each takes issue with the fact that a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country Information Report, Sri Lanka 24 January 2017 (2017 DFAT Report) was not referenced in the Authority’s Reasons. The author of the 2017 DFAT Report expressed its contents as an updated report that “replaces” the previous 2015 DFAT Report: 2017 DFAT Report at 1.5. The first ground contended that this constituted a failure to take into account a relevant consideration (among two other considerations said to be relevant). The second ground contended that the Authority erred in interpreting or applying the law as demonstrated by its conclusion that the statutory criterion were not met despite the material that was available to and before it namely the 2017 DFAT Report. The third ground was plead as well as or in the alternative to Ground 2 and essentially contended that the Authority’s findings that the Applicant was not at risk of persecution or significant harm in detention or in prison on his return were unreasonable again given the material that was available to and before it. Whether to allow the late application to bring new evidence It is useful to deal first with the application in a proceeding which, if allowed, may have a bearing on the assessment of each of the three grounds of review. By this application the Applicant sought to introduce evidence of an extract of a decision of the Authority which referred to the 2017 DFAT Report and was delivered on 5 May 2017 (Decision Extract of 5 May 2017). It is not contentious that this application to introduce new evidence, made after the conclusion of the final hearing and judgment was reserved, is unusual and ought only be granted in exceptional circumstances: Spotlight Pty Ltd v NCON Australia Ltd (2012) 46 VR 1. There was no contest about the principles that the First Respondent drew to the Court’s attention as being applicable to the Court’s assessment of the interests of justice in an application of this kind, citing the decision of White J in F.Y.D Investments Pty Ltd v Promptair Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1097 at [32]:•the public interest (and the interest of the particular parties) in litigation being conducted efficiently and expeditiously; •the public interest in the finality of litigation, with the consequent expectation that litigants will present all their evidence and submissions at the one hearing; •the significance of the proposed new evidence and submissions in the context of the trial; •the explanation for the evidence not having been led at the trial; •the likely prejudice to the opposing party if the application is allowed; •the potential detriment to the applying party if the application is refused, and; •any delay by an applicant in seeking leave to reopen.