Crunkhorn & Reid v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines
[2001] QLC 113
•12 October 2001
LAND COURT BRISBANE
[2001] QLC 113
12 OCTOBER 2001
Re:Appeal against Annual Valuation Valuation of Land Act 1944 Property ID: 9017472
Local Government: Brisbane City-Belmont (AV2000/0399, 0400 and 0401)
Daryl L Crunkhorn and Lynne E Reid v.
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines
D E C I S I O N
Background:
By consent the matters of AV2000/0399 and AV2000/0400 were withdrawn prior to the hearing.
The remaining matter relates to land at 20 Florence Street, Carina, and described as Lot 1 on RP 73465, Parish of Bulimba. The subject land has an area of 1,945 m² and is located about 6.5 km radially east of the Brisbane GPO, and nearby to a local shopping centre at the corner of Stanley Road and Lunga Street. Access is good to Florence Street which is bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channelling. All normal utility services are available, and the subject land is zoned "Residential A" under the Town Plan of the Brisbane City Council of 13 June 1987, effective at the date of valuation of 1 October 1999. The key issue is the relativity between lots fronting a roadway and rear battleaxe lots removed from the roadway.
On 27 March 2000 the Chief Executive issued a valuation of the subject land at $150,000. Following an objection the Chief Executive amended that figure on 1 July 2000 to $140,000. The appellants have now appealed claiming the unimproved value should more properly be $117,600.
Daryl Roy Crunkhorn, an experienced real estate agent appeared and gave evidence for the appellants. Ms R Trigge, Senior Legal Officer, appeared for the respondent, calling evidence from Ross Brian Cranstoun, the departmental registered valuer responsible for determining the valuation.
The Evidence:
(1)The History of the Valuation -
This matter has been a long outstanding dispute between the parties over a period of some years. The appellants argue that longstanding evidence in the marketplace supports that rear battleaxe lots are less attractive than street-fronting parcels, and therefore reflect lower values for vacant lands. As an experienced real estate agent Mr Crunkhorn argues that relativities of the rear lots in the locality of Florence, Stanley and Lunga Street do not follow the general trend for rear battleaxe lots, and those parcels are being repeatedly treated as an isolated group in respect of inconsistent relativities between adjoining parcels.
It is agreed by both parties that there has been a paucity of sales of adjoining front and rear battleaxe lots in that locality, which might otherwise disclose whether the relationship between front and rear lots might be changing in the public's understanding.
The appellants' appeal seeks support that an inconsistent approach has been applied to the subject land, in differences of percentage changes to the valuation compared to other parcels. Mr Crunkhorn notes for example that, following discussions with the respondent on an earlier valuation for 1 October 1998, the valuation of the subject land had been reduced to $120,000. That notice of reduction had issued to the appellants on 13 March 2000, just 14 days prior to the issuing of the new valuation in the current matter on 27 March 2000.
Mr Crunkhorn concedes that it was part of his initial appeal on this matter to compare percentage increases to that revised figure of $120,000 for the preceding valuation. However, following further discussions with Mr Cranstoun, he now understands that the subject land has now been compared directly to sales of other vacant lands.
Mr Crunkhorn continues to be concerned that the new valuation at $140,000 may not reflect matters previously clarified in confidence between the parties. However he understands those were "without prejudice" discussions between the parties, the contents of which are not for consideration by this Court. However he argues any impact upon changes in relativity with adjoining parcels would be a matter to support his case. The previous objection against the 1 October 1998 valuation was not appealed to this Court.
(2) The Nature of the Land -
In their grounds of appeal the appellants argue that access to Florence Street is now impacted by increasing traffic during peak hours, when drivers seek alternative routes to avoid congestion in nearby Darcy and Creek Roads. Mr Crunkhorn also notes that traffic impacts were further accentuated at the date of valuation by the use of Florence Street by a feeder bus service between the Carindale Shopping Centre and Cannon Hill. He concedes that may now have ceased, and agrees that the nearest bus route is along Stanley Road to the south. Mr Crunkhorn also concedes that the two parcels fronting Florence Street immediately east of the subject land would provide some buffer to the noise and fumes from Florence Street.
It is agreed by both parties that the subject land is a large regular parcel 39 metres wide and 43.3 metres deep, which is accessed by a 5.3 metre access strip to Florence Street. The subject land is of medium elevation, falling gently towards the east, and with a good easterly outlook. Mr Crunkhorn notes the presence of Queensland Housing Commission (QHC) housing in the area, but agrees that QHC homes do not exist in his adjoining parcels between Stanley Road, Florence, Hendren and Lunga Streets. While he argues that generally the presence of QHC homes is seen as a detraction in the marketplace, Mr Crunkhorn provides no specific sales evidence to support that conclusion. He also agrees that any impact from overflying aircraft noise would be similar to other adjoining properties in the area.
However, Mr Crunkhorn notes that the presence of the local shopping centre at the corner of Stanley Road and Lunga Street creates excessive noise, particularly from commercial rubbish trucks accessing the site. He notes also that the shopping centre was more recently extended onto the adjoining Lot 1 on RP 75409, which is only one lot removed from the subject land. Mr Cranstoun agrees that noise would be experienced from the shopping centre, and has considered that in his valuation.
Mr Crunkhorn agrees that the two lots immediately to the east of the subject land (Lots 2 and 3 on RP 73465), are about 3 to 4 metres lower in elevation than the subject land, confirmed by the contour map supplied (Exhibit 5). It is also noted that the two adjoining parcels to the west (Lots 1 and 2 on RP 103966) are about 3 metres higher in elevation than the subject land. The subject land is serviced by a sewerage line along its southern boundary, well clear of any building areas.
(3) Relativity -
The major thrust of Mr Crunkhorn's evidence relates to comparisons of the actual relationship of unimproved values determined by the Chief Executive, for a
range of parcels in the general locality. He argues that each of the sample areas reflects lands where the street-fronting lots and the adjoining rear battleaxe lots all have similar characteristics and outlook. He contends that in those situations the relative difference between the applied unimproved values should reflect the benefit of streetscape of the front lots. For the purpose of this exercise they are referred to as front or rear lots. By using the Chief Executive's own values on those lots Mr Crunkhorn seeks to demonstrate, in his opinion, what is the normal relativity of such parcels. Mr Crunkhorn provides representatives' examples in Carina, Camp Hill and Coorparoo.
In respect of the example in Cambridge Street, Carina Heights, Mr Crunkhorn notes the front parcels have areas of 546 m² to 574 m² and are both valued at $83,000, while the rear parcel of area 1,662 m² has a value of $74,000. He argues that both rear and front parcels have some benefits and disadvantages, but both rear and front lots have values relatively similar. Mr Crunkhorn also notes that there are a further three sets of front and rear lots in Cambridge Street with similar relativities evident.
Mr Crunkhorn provides examples also in Indus Street, Camp Hill, where front lots of area 546 m² are valued at $125,000, while the adjoining rear battleaxe lots of area of 946 m² are valued at $129,000. Mr Crunkhorn notes that the rear lots in Indus Street back onto the Whites Hill Reserve, and are also higher, thus reflecting a slightly higher unimproved value. There are also examples in Booligal Street, Carina, where front lots of areas of 607 m² are valued at $90,000, while the adjoining rear lots have areas of 1,295 m² and are valued also at $90,000.
A further example in Chatsworth Road, Coorparoo, demonstrates front lots of area 759 m² ($160,000) and 911 m² ($152,500), while the adjoining rear lots are 1,955 m² ($152,000), and 1,070 m² ($132,000). Mr Crunkhorn argues that all of those samples are inconsistent with the current applied values in Florence Street, where the rear subject land is $140,000 and the adjoining front lots of area 809 m² are $96,000. Mr Crunkhorn notes that if both front and rear lots have comparable outlook and features, then the market suggests that people pay about the same price for front lots of about half the area of adjoining rear lots, in order to maximise their street frontage.
Mr Crunkhorn concedes that privacy is an issue for people, but argues that in inner suburban areas, where only 1,200 m² is available to be subdivided into two parcels, then the smaller rear parcels in those circumstances provide little added privacy compared to a front lot. He also agrees that there is no general pattern across the board, but argues that applied unimproved values in adjoining areas support that
rear lots generally are not valued considerably higher than adjoining front lots. However he concedes that when rear lots have some outstanding feature such as river frontage or outstanding views, not evident on the front lots, then a higher value for the rear lots would be appropriate.
Mr Cranstoun does not accept that the adoption of patterns of selected unimproved values can be undertaken to represent a general trend in relativities, without specifically understanding how those valuations were undertaken. He was familiar with some of Mr Crunkhorn's examples, and after an adjournment to inspect the other examples, he was able to offer comment on the particular characteristics of all of the examples provided.
In respect of the Cambridge Street properties Mr Cranstoun argues that the rear lot is lower, and has a sewer line passing across the centre of the parcel. He also notes the presence of a multi-unit development on an adjoining lot to the rear fronting Jones Road, which, in his opinion, would be a detriment to that parcel. Mr Crunkhorn agrees that the rear parcel is lower in elevation than the front lots, but argues that as a low to medium density zoning that would make the rear parcel even more valuable. He sees the presence of the sewer line as only a matter which could limit the actual location of any building, but the larger lot has an adequate scope for various locations.
Mr Cranstoun notes that in valuing the rear parcel at Cambridge Street, the Chief Executive has ignored any higher potential for the land under s.17 of the Act. Mr Cranstoun sees the major difference between the lots at Cambridge Street and the subject land as significant, noting in particular the more regular shape of the subject land and the lack of any significant impact of a sewer line on that parcel.
Mr Cranstoun argues that some of the rear battleaxe lots in recent subdivision in inner suburbs demonstrate only slightly wider widths of the rear lots, reflecting the width of the front lot plus the narrow access strip to the rear lot. That is not so with the subject land, where a width of 39 metres reflects more than twice the width of the front lots. That is an important difference in the current matter.
While Mr Crunkhorn is unsure how the Chief Executive has valued the respective lots in his examples provided, he notes that where vacant lands occur in a new estate, then the rear battleaxe lots are clearly seen less favourably than front lots. To support that conclusion he provides further examples of older sales at Currumbin Place, Carindale (1998), Bells Place, Carindale (1998 and 2000), Pindari Street, Wishart (1998/1999) and Pioneer Crescent, Bellbowrie (1992/1995). However he
provides no details of those parcels which might clarify why those sale prices reflected certain values. On that basis I get little assistance from those older sales.
Mr Cranstoun notes also in respect of the Indus Street, Camp Hill example, that those lots have an odd irregular shape and effective usable areas, which would impact the value of those parcels. He also notes that the Chatsworth Road, Coorparoo example has a pathway alongside the rear lots, which would impact upon the privacy and safety of those rear lots. Mr Cranstoun also notes that the rear lots at Chatsworth Road have views obstructed by trees, and do not have similar views as the subject land, which could support an argument that privacy was an issue to those owners at Chatsworth Road. Mr Cranstoun also is of the opinion that the applied values at the rear lots in Chatsworth Road appear low.
Mr Cranstoun also draws relativity with the adjoining lot to the south of the subject land (Lot 3 - 2,064 m²) at $130,000, and Lots 1 and 2 to the west (976 m²) at
$119,000. Mr Crunkhorn is familiar with those parcels, particularly Lot 3 to the south, which he argues has previously been the subject of an objection, but the owner has declined to do so in the current valuation. While he agrees that past history is not relevant in the current matter, he notes that Lot 3 was valued some years previously at
$155,000, and has subsequently now been reduced after objection to $130,000.
Mr Crunkhorn also advises that the parcel adjoining the subject land to the south-west (Lot 8 on RP 75409) has an area of 1,047 m², and has subsequently been reduced to $110,000 at the next valuation. He notes that the front lot to the south of Lot 8 has a value of $105,000. Mr Cranstoun notes that the subsequent reduction of Lot 8 reflects the increased activity on the adjoining shopping centre. Mr Crunkhorn argues that the shops existed at 1 October 1999, although it appears that they were subsequently extended after 1 October 1999.
While Mr Crunkhorn may personally disagree with those unimproved values of the adjoining parcels, as Ms Trigge argues, under s.33 they are deemed to be correct unless proved to the contrary. Mr Cranstoun provides examples of those relativities (Exhibit 4), which show that relativities between all front and rear lots in the immediate area of the subject land reflect higher values for the rear lots, almost comparable to the subject land and Lots 2 and 3 to its east.
Mr Crunkhorn believes that Lot 3 to the south is a larger and better lot, being slightly higher in elevation and with more open views to the east than the subject land. However the contour map (Exhibit 5) shows that those two parcels are practically equal in height, and with Lot 3 being impacted by sewer lines in its north-eastern
quadrant. The matter of existence of trees on the subject land restricting views from the subject land is really a matter of priorities by the appellants. However Mr Crunkhorn concedes that access from Lot 3 to Stanley Road is more dangerous than from the subject land to Florence Street.
Mr Crunkhorn also agrees that Lots 1 and 2 to the west have views over the subject land to the east, as well as views to the west, as they are on top of a ridge line. The front lots on that side front busy Lunga Street and have values at $91,000.
In respect of the relativities at Booligal Street, Carina, Mr Cranstoun concedes that the applied values to the rear lots would appear to be less than he would have expected, considering the features of the rear lots. However, he accepts that s.33 dictates that the applied values should be able to be relied upon in this matter.
(4) Comparison of Sales -
At the heart of this matter is the apparent paucity of relatively concurrent sales of front and rear parcels, which might disclose whether patterns in the marketplace are changing from the earlier trend for relativity of front and rear lots. Mr Crunkhorn only provides the brief outline of older sales, which I have already rejected on the basis of any lack of detailed understanding of those sales, and their older age. Mr Cranstoun provides the following sales of front lots only:
· Sale 1 - (8 Princess Street, Camp Hill - Lot 209 on RP 13110). This is an 885 m² "Residential BR3" lot located about 1.7 km south-west of the subject land. The sale backs onto shops fronting Old Cleveland Road, and has a crossfall from north to south. There was an existing old dwelling which has had to be retained as a dwelling by Council direction, and which was seen as a detriment by the purchaser who preferred to commence from a vacant site. While the smaller site is near to commercial development, it is located nearer to the CBD, and is seen overall as superior to the subject land, and was Mr Cranstoun's primary sale.
The sale sold in January 1999 for $155,000, was analysed at $154,000, and applied at $152,500.
· Sale 2 - (19 Akala Street, Camp Hill - Lot 163 on RP 13179). This is a 405 m² "Residential A" site located about 1 km west of the subject land. It is located in an older area, with some QHC homes nearby, but closer to the CBD. The sale is seen as inferior to the subject land.
The sale sold in May 1999 for $115,000, was analysed at $113,000, and applied at $107,000.
· Sale 3 - (41 Hill Crescent, Carina Heights - Lot 11 on SP 123905). This is a 576 m² parcel of "Residential BR3" land of which part is covered by an easement for access along the northern boundary, giving a usable building area
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of 447 m². The sale adjoins "Residential B" land to the north which is developed for units. The sale is seen as inferior to the subject land.
The sale sold in September 1999 for $105,000, was analysed at $103,300, and applied at $93,000.
Mr Cranstoun agrees that he was unable to find a rear battleaxe lot in the immediate area of the subject land, and he used the sales of front lots as he saw location in an older area as a most important factor affecting price in that locality. Because Sale 1 is the largest sale, he sees that as his primary sale. Mr Cranstoun argues that using battleaxe lots in areas removed from Carina is potentially risky, as he believes they could represent a different market segment.
Decision:
If I look first at the nature of the land, I find that Mr Cranstoun has tended to allow for the impact of traffic and the general elevation, aspects and views from the subject land. There may be some difference between the parties in respect of the intrusion from noise from the nearby local shopping centre in Lunga Street. I see no reason for further allowance in respect of the presence of the QHC housing in the area, or the overflying of aircraft.
(i) Comparison of Sales -
In seeking comparisons with sales of vacant or lightly improved lands, Mr Cranstoun has followed guidance preferred by the Courts when determining unimproved values. (See PH Clough v. Valuer-General (1981-82) 8 QLCR 70, at 76). It is also noted that where sales of comparable lands are available, then sales evidence is generally preferred to evidence of relativity. That was followed in WM & TJ Fischer v. Valuer-General (1983) 9 QLCR 44, where the Land Appeal Court said at p.46:
"It is indeed a fundamental principle of valuation that the best basis for assessment of unimproved value is the use of sales of vacant or lightly improved parcels. Whilst maintenance of correct relativity is also of considerable importance for rating or revenue type valuations, we cannot prefer in the circumstances of this case, the use of the principle of relativity to the exclusion of the sales evidence."
However, the need for the sales to be comparable was also addressed in Brewarrana Pty Ltd v. Commissioner of Highways (SA) (1973) 32 LGRA 170 where Wells J said at pages 179 and 180:
"It is general valuation practice for sales characterised as comparable sales to be used as bases for the valuation of lands said to be similar. But allowances must always be made before such sales can be so used. No
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two parcels of land are identical in all respects: the sale price of any given piece of land is not necessarily the price at which it ought to have been sold, or the same thing as its true value. …. Adjustments must, of course, be made every time reasoning of that kind is undertaken. For example, in relation to the land itself and the circumstances appertaining to it, it may be necessary to consider such matters as topography, location, size, shape, slope view, land use (actual and potential), scope for, and differences of, development, services and amenities; …. There is no hard and fast rule by the application of which a valuer may, whatever the circumstances, draw the line that clearly separates the sales that are comparable from those that are not. …. Some adjustment is always necessary; too much adjustment will render it unsafe to use a sale, subject to such a degree of adjustment, for the purpose of the reasoning process in the comparable sales method. …. The assessment of the risks of adjustment is peculiarly within his (the expert valuer's) sphere of skill."
The problem that occurs when there are no real comparisons to draw upon was also discussed in Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources v. Radlett Enterprises Pty Ltd (1997-98) 18 QLCR 387. In that matter the Land Appeal Court noted the lack of any nearby comparable sales. Because of that lack of sales, the learned Member had rejected the approach of the Chief Executive to compare more remote and less comparable sales, on an "applied" value basis, noting that the Chief Executive had discarded certain sales which he considered "out of line". The Land Appeal Court noted the findings of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling and Co [1901] AC 373 at 391:
"It is quite true that in all valuations, judicial or other, there must be room for inferences and inclinations of opinion which being more or less conjectural, are difficult to reduce to exact reasoning or to explain to others. Everyone who has gone through the process is aware of this lack of demonstrative proof in his own mind, and knows that every expert witness called before him has had his own set of conjectures, of more or less weight according to his experience and personal sagacity."
The Land Appeal Court however noted at p.403:
"The sales as selected could hardly have been described as being of land directly comparable with the subject land. Apparently, however, the sales had been seen to afford the best evidence available relative to land which was limited by the same restrictions as the legislation placed on the subject land, for valuation purposes. It was not until after the chief executive had analysed and considered the specific sales evidence seen to be comparable, that the question of the values "applied" by him to those lands was focused upon. …. We are therefore unable to agree that the analysed values shown by those sales had, on the evidence, been disregarded by the chief executive, or that the market evidence had been discarded in favour of unsupported valuation opinion. As Mason J said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. St Helen's Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd
(1980-81) 46 CLR 336 at p.381: 'Valuation is a matter of estimation, not of precise mathematical calculation.' Valuation is intended to be an interpretation of a market, which in itself is imprecise, even when it is created by vendors and purchasers who satisfy the often quoted qualifications necessary to meet the test explained in Spencer v. The Commonwealth of Australia (1907) 5 CLR 418."
In making his comparisons with the sales provided in the current matter, Mr Cranstoun has relied upon his wide experience as a valuer, in accordance with guidance found in the recognised text Land Valuation and Compensation in Australia by Rost and Collins (3rd Edition) 1984, where it said at p.22:
"A registered or licensed valuer is regarded as the person who possesses special training. He is entitled to express opinions as to value or other matters appertaining to his vocation, but these cannot be more valid than the information and reasoning upon which they are founded. In general, opinion evidence is not admissible unless it is given by a witness called as an expert. Court judgments have emphasised that the weight of an expert's opinion concerning the value of land depends upon the foundation upon which it rests."
That was also favourable reported by the Land Appeal Court in Santos Limited v. Valuer-General (1988-89) 12 QLCR 231, at 235. The Land Appeal Court went on to conclude at p.236:
"We find that we are no better informed on the evidence than was the learned Member in the Court below. We agree with the submission of counsel for the Valuer-General that the matter rests upon the expertise of the valuer. We are of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the learned Member was inescapable on the evidence. We have no reasons to set it aside."
However in the current matter both parties agree that there was a lack of sales of directly comparable rear battleaxe lots in that immediate locality, which might provide guidance as to whether the market's perception of rear lots was changing. I note however that there is nothing in the evidence to refute Mr Cranstoun's comparisons of his sales applied, and the subject land could have an unimproved value between $152,500 and $107,000.
(ii) Relativity -
I turn then to Mr Crunkhorn's samples of relativity between front and rear lots. I note that Mr Crunkhorn bases his argument on both adjoining front and rear lots having comparable outlook and features, and where the advantage of street exposure is to balance the advantages of larger areas and increased privacy from the street. I note also that Mr Crunkhorn agrees that privacy is an increasingly important issue for buyers, but that where rear lots are relatively smaller, then privacy from surrounding
neighbouring lots becomes less of an attraction for rear lots. However in respect of the subject land of area of 1,945 m², the advantage of increased size lends weight to the benefits of privacy on that parcel, as also occurs to its adjoining parcel Lot 3 of area 2,064 m².
If I look at the samples provided, I would agree with Mr Cranstoun that the width of the rear lot, relative to the front lots, would be a significant feature for consideration. The subject land is large enough to provide scope for the location of major landscaping features such as a pool or tennis court, in addition to a substantial dwelling, a feature not available to the front lots in Florence Street (Lots 2 and 3). I note also that the subject land is higher and overlooks the front lots. On that basis it would be reasonable to conclude that the subject land would be more valuable.
In seeking then to conclude what impact upon such a higher value would be the lack of a wider frontage to Florence Street for the subject land, I turn to direct relativities with the surrounding rear lots. I accept that Lots 1 and 2 to the west are higher and with unimproved values of only $119,000. But those rear lots are also only 976 m² in area. I note also that Lot 8 to the south-west has an area of 1,047 m² and was valued at $120,000. However that parcel adjoins the local shopping centre and also fronts busy Stanley Road.
I believe the most useful comparison is with Lot 3 to the south, which has an unimproved value of $130,000. Lot 3 is larger than the subject land, and generally has similar topography. I accept that it is impacted by two sewer lines across its north-eastern quadrant, and that its access to Stanley Road is more dangerous than access to Florence Street. However I believe the larger size of Lot 3 allows for location of features to avoid the sewer lines, and the only real disability is its more restricted access to Stanley Road.
In placing reliance upon relativity, I note that was favourably recognised in R
& MM Barnwell v. Valuer-General (1990-91) 13 QLCR 13, where the Land Appeal Court said at p.16:
" We are conscious that it is desirable that valuations made for the purposes of the Valuation of Land Act of comparable lands should bear proper relativity, one to the other, if the valuations are soundly based. It is, however, untenable to adopt a value for one parcel on relativity with another which has no sound basis."
In the current matter it would be reasonable to conclude that Mr Cranstoun would have relied upon similar sales evidence for his value of Lot 3, which has not been discredited. I note also that precedent for seeking support for sales evidence, by
considering also relativity with surrounding parcels, was determined in Hans and Else Grahn v. Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 327, where the Land Appeal Court said at p.329:
" Bearing those propositions in mind, it is best to approach this case by considering first the position regarding sales evidence then considering the relativity of the valuations of the subject blocks with the valuations of comparable blocks of land."
In view of the lack of direct evidence of sales of rear lots in that immediate locality, I believe there remains some doubt as to whether or not some extra premium might attach to the subject land to the level proposed by Mr Cranstoun. However s.33 of the Act directs that the unimproved value of Lot 3 should be accepted at $130,000. On that basis I have only to weigh whether the additional area of Lot 3 might balance its more restricted access.
In view of directions where some doubt occurs I am directed to resolve such doubts in the appellants' favour in such matters for revenue purposes. (See Commissioner of Succession Duties (SA) v. Executor Trustee and Agency Co of SA Limited (1947) 74 CLR 358 per Dixon J at p.373.) On that basis I believe an unimproved value for the subject land at $130,000 would be appropriate.
Conclusion
Having considered the whole of the evidence I am persuaded that the appellants have proved their case. The appeal is upheld. The determination of the Chief Executive is set aside, and the unimproved value of Lot 1 on RP 73465 is determined at One Hundred and Thirty Thousand Dollars ($130,000).
NG DIVETT MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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