Crump v The Attorney-General and Minister for Justice for Queensland

The case of Crump v The Attorney-General and Minister for Justice for Queensland involved the applicant, Crump, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and had exhausted all appeal options. Crump petitioned for a pardon to the Governor of Queensland, who referred the matter to the Attorney-General. Following advice from Crown Law, the Attorney-General decided not to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 672A of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). Crump applied for a statutory order of review, arguing that he was denied natural justice and procedural fairness by the Attorney-General's failure to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the decision not to refer the matter was not subject to review. The court had to determine whether a decision of the Attorney-General pursuant to section 672A of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) to not refer a petition for the exercise of the prerogative power of mercy was reviewable.

The court first had to determine whether the decision of the Attorney-General pursuant to section 672A of the Criminal Code was reviewable. The respondent initially argued that the application was in substance a "general application for the exercise of the prerogative" and did not specifically invoke section 672A. However, at the hearing, the respondent was content to proceed on the basis that the only relief sought was a review of the decision of the Attorney-General pursuant to section 672A. The court noted that there is a line of authority that the power to refer a petition for pardon to a Court of Appeal is unreviewable. The respondent argued that the power to refer a matter to the Court of Appeal is a power conferred upon the Attorney-General by statute, but that does not necessarily mean that the decision is reviewable. The court had to determine whether the decision was reviewable, considering the nature of the power.

The court found that the decision of the Attorney-General pursuant to section 672A of the Criminal Code was not reviewable. The court noted that there is a line of authority that certain decisions, such as whether to file an ex officio indictment, to enter a nolle prosequi or to grant a fiat, are not subject to review primarily because of the nature of the power. In Barton v The Queen, it was held that it was undesirable for the court to become too closely involved in the question as to whether a prosecution should be commenced. The court held that the power to refer a petition for pardon to a Court of Appeal is a very distinctive type of statutory power, retaining in its relationship to the process of criminal justice something of the nature of a prerogative power. As such, it is a power which does not lend itself to supervision by the courts.

The court dismissed Crump's application for a statutory order of review. The court found that the decision of the Attorney-General pursuant to section 672A of the Criminal Code was not reviewable, and Crump's application was dismissed.