Crowther and Marchant and Ors
[2016] FCCA 3030
•25 November 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CROWTHER & MARCHANT & ORS | [2016] FCCA 3030 |
| Catchwords: COURTS AND JUDGES – Jurisdiction – whether jurisdiction to make administrative orders on an appeal against making of departure prohibition order. |
| Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss.64AF, 64AH, 98B, 98S, 111, 116 |
| Cases cited: Albaugh & Child Support Registrar [2007] FMCAfam 1106 |
| Applicant: | MR CROWTHER |
| First Respondent: | MS MARCHANT |
| Second Respondent: Third Respondent: | MS TICKNER CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR |
| File Number: | PEG 59 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Lucev |
| Hearing date: | 19 May 2014 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 19 May 2014 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 25 November 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicant: | In person | |
| For the First Respondent: | No appearance | |
| For the Second Respondent: | No appearance | |
| Counsel for the Third Respondent: Solicitors for the Third Respondent: | Ms A Ladhams Australian Government Solicitor | |
ORDERS
That the applicant’s Notice of Appeal (Child Support) filed on 26 February 2014 be dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Crowther & Marchant & Ors is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 59 of 2014
| MR CROWTHER |
Applicant
And
| MS MARCHANT |
First Respondent
| MS TICKNER |
Second Respondent
CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR
Third Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By Notice of Appeal (Child Support) filed on 26 February 2014 (“Notice of Appeal” and “Appeal” respectively), the applicant Mr Crowther, (“Mr Crowther”) appeals against a decision of the third respondent (“Decision”), the Child Support Registrar (“Registrar”) made on 7 August 2013, under s.72D of the Child Support (Registration & Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (“Registration & Collection Act”) to issue a departure prohibition order (“DPO”) to prevent Mr Crowther from travelling outside of Australia.
The Appeal is made under s.72Q of the Registration & Collection Act, which allows a person aggrieved by the making of a DPO to appeal to this Court against the making of the DPO.
Section 72S of the Registration & Collection Act provides that in an appeal pursuant to s.72Q of the Registration & Collection Act, the Court may, at its discretion, set aside the DPO or dismiss the appeal.
Background
Mr Crowther has two child support cases registered with the Registrar as follows:
a)case number (omitted), in which the second respondent is the receiving parent, Mr Crowther has been assessed to pay child support in relation to a child born (omitted) 2006; and
b)case number (omitted), in which the first respondent is the receiving parent, Mr Crowther has been assessed to pay child support in relation to a child born (omitted) 1993. Ongoing child support liability in this case ended on 6 August 2010, but there are still arrears owing.
See affidavit of Mr S affirmed 31 March 2014 at [3] (“Mr S's Affidavit”).
In about January or February 2010, Mr Crowther moved to the (country omitted): Mr Crowther’s affidavit of 24 February 2014 at [3] (“Mr Crowther's First Affidavit”).
Mr Crowther returned to Australia from time to time, including in July 2013: Mr S's Affidavit, Annexure E
As at 7 August 2013, Mr Crowther had an outstanding child support debt of $51,257.57: Mr S's Affidavit at [5]. This amount was comprised as follows:
Arrears of child support (case (omitted)) $7,845.18;
Arrears of child support (case (omitted)) $37, 145.07;
Late payment penalties $3,863.32;
Estimate penalties $2,422.00;
TOTAL $51,275.57
On 7 August 2013 the Decision was made to issue a DPO to prevent Mr Crowther from leaving Australia. The Decision accepted a submission (“DPO Submission”) prepared by an employee within the Department of Human Services (“Department”) dated 7 August 2013: Mr S's Affidavit at [6]-[7].
Other relevant factual material is referred to as appropriate in the Reasons for Judgment below.
Evidence and Submissions
In this matter the Court has had regard to Mr Crowther's First Affidavit and to a further affidavit sworn by Mr Crowther on 31 March 2014 (“Mr Crowther's Second Affidavit”), and to Mr Crowther’s financial statement filed 26 February 2014 (“Mr Crowther's Financial Statement”), and to the Mr S's Affidavit.
The Court has also had regard to the outlines of submissions filed by Mr Crowther on 5 May 2014 and by the Registrar on 12 May 2014.
Relevant legislation
The specific provisions of the Registration & Collection Act relevant for the purposes of the Appeal are set out below.
Section 72D of the Registration & Collection Act sets out the Registrar’s power to make a DPO and provides:
(1) The Registrar may make an order (a departure prohibition order) prohibiting a person from departing from Australia for a foreign country if:
(a) the person has a child support liability; and
(b) the person has not made arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for the child support liability to be wholly discharged; and
(c) the Registrar is satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay:
(i) child support debts arising from a registrable maintenance liability under section 17; or
(ii) a child support debt arising from a registrable maintenance liability under section 17A; or
(iii) one or more child support debts arising from a registrable overseas maintenance liability under subsection 18A(1), paragraph 18A(3)(a) or subsection 18A(4) (insofar as subsection 18A(4) relates to subsection 18A(1) or paragraph 18A(3)(a)); and
(d) the Registrar believes on reasonable grounds that it is desirable to make the order for the purpose of ensuring that the person does not depart from Australia for a foreign country without:
(i) wholly discharging the child support liability; or
(ii) making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for the child support liability to be wholly discharged.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(c), the Registrar must have regard to the following matters:
(a) the capacity of the person concerned to pay the debt or debts;
(b) the number of occasions on which action has been taken to recover the debt or debts, and the outcome of the recovery action;
(c) if subparagraph (1)(c)(i) applies—the number of occasions on which the debts mentioned in that subparagraph had not been paid on or before the day on which they became due and payable;
(d) if subparagraph (1)(c)(ii) applies—the length of time for which the debt mentioned in that subparagraph has remained unpaid after the day on which it became due and payable;
(da) if subparagraph (1)(c)(iii) applies:
(i) the length of time for which the debts mentioned in that subparagraph have remained unpaid after the day on which they became due and payable; and
(ii) the number of occasions on which the debts mentioned in that subparagraph had not been paid on or before the day on which they became due and payable;
(e) such other matters as the Registrar considers appropriate.
(3) A departure prohibition order must be in the approved form.
Sections 72Q, 72R and 72S of the Registration and Collection Act relate to appeals against the making of DPOs and provide:
72Q Appeals to courts against making of departure prohibition orders
(1) A person aggrieved by the making of a departure prohibition order may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against the making of the order.
(2) This section has effect:
(a) subject to Chapter III of the Constitution; and
(b) despite anything contained in section 9 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.
72R Jurisdiction of courts
The jurisdiction of a court under section 72Q must be exercised by a single Judge or Justice.
72S Orders of court on appeal
A court hearing an appeal under section 72Q against the making of a departure prohibition order may, in its discretion:
(a) make an order setting aside the order; or
(b) dismiss the appeal.
Orders sought on the Appeal
The Notice of Appeal seeks the following four orders:
1. Set aside Departure Prohibition Order.
2. Amount to Ms Marchant to be cancelled.
3. Amount to Ms Tickner to be adjusted to reflect correct income.
4. All fines to be cancelled.
Jurisdiction in relation to orders sought
The Court does not have jurisdiction to make the second, third and fourth orders sought on this appeal.
Sections 72Q and 72S of the Registration and Collection Act have the effect that on the Appeal the Court is to exercise judicial power, and is not to engage in administrative decision-making: T v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1986) 18 ATR 1; (1986) 86 ATC 4894; ATR at 2-3 per Woodward J; Edelsten v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 ATR 238; (1989) 85 ALR 226; (1989) 89 ATC 4120; ATR at 240-241 per Einfeld J.
The only application in relation to the DPO that Mr Crowther can presently bring to this Court is a challenge to the validity of the DPO on the basis that it was not properly made: Jones v Child Support Registrar [2007] FCA 1732 (“Jones”); Albaugh & Child Support Registrar [2007] FMCAfam 1106 at [17]-[18] per Sexton FM (“Albaugh”); Williams v Child Support Registrar [2009] FMCA 481; (2009) 109 ALD 343 at 355 per Lucev FM (“Williams”). Jones has been cited with approval in subsequent cases: Albaugh at [17]-[18] per Sexton FM; Russo & Child Support Registrar [2009] FMCAfam 437 at [16]-[17] per Sexton FM (“Russo”). Further, insofar as what might be sought is a departure from amounts of child support presently payable under a child support assessment by the Registrar, this Court does not, in the State of Western Australia have jurisdiction to make such an order: Williams at [52]-[59] per Lucev FM.
The second and third orders sought by Mr Crowther both essentially seek to review past assessments of child support. In Western Australia, such an application could be made to:
a)the Child Support Registrar, if Mr Crowther seeks departure from administrative assessments of child support in respect of periods within the past 18 months from the date of the application: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss.98B and 98S (“Assessment Act”); and
b)the Family Court of Western Australia, if Mr Crowther seeks leave for the review of assessments that are greater than 18 months but less than 7 years old: s.111 of the Assessment Act; or orders for departure from the administrative assessment: s.116 of the Assessment Act.
Mr Crowther cannot make these types of applications to the Court, in Western Australia, as the Court does not have jurisdiction to determine them. In Williams the Federal Magistrates Court considered whether in Western Australia it had jurisdiction to determine a departure application pursuant to s.116 of the Assessment Act. For the same reasons that applied in Williams, the Court in Western Australia does not have jurisdiction to determine an application seeking the second and third orders sought in the Notice of Appeal.
The fourth order sought is a request for late payment penalties and estimate penalties to be remitted. This Court does not have jurisdiction to remit either of these penalties. The power to do so lies with the Registrar. Late payment penalties are imposed by operation of s.67 of the Registration & Collection Act and can be remitted by the Registrar pursuant to s.68 of the Registration & Collection Act. Estimate penalties are imposed by operation of s.64AF of the Assessment Act and can be remitted by the Registrar pursuant to s.64AH of the Assessment Act. In both cases, a person dissatisfied with a decision not to remit penalties (or to only partially remit penalties) can make an objection to the decision, and if dissatisfied with the objection decision, the person may request review by the nominated administrative tribunal, but not by this Court.
It follows that the Court does not have jurisdiction to make the orders sought in the Notice of Appeal, insofar as the Notice of Appeal seeks orders for a stay or orders directing that certain administrative actions be taken, or orders that there be a departure from any amounts of child support presently payable under a child support assessment.
Issues on the Appeal
In Jones the Federal Court considered the issues relevant to an appeal against the issue of a DPO and said at [5] per Emmett J as follows:
5. An appeal may involve questions of fact or law or both… [and] would ordinarily involve the determination by the Court of at least three principal questions. The first is whether the affected person has a child support liability. The second is whether the Registrar was satisfied as to the matters, and had the belief, referred to in s 72D. The third is whether reasonable grounds existed for the Registrar to be satisfied as to those matters and for the formation by the Registrar of the requisite belief.
This passage in Jones has been cited with approval in subsequent cases: see Albaugh at [17]-[18] per Sexton FM (“Albaugh”) and Russo at [16]-[17] per Sexton FM.
As was said in Jones at [6] per Emmett J, the onus is on Mr Crowther to establish that the DPO was not validly made:
6. In an appeal under s 72Q of the Act, the person aggrieved must establish that the order was wrongly made. That may be done by satisfying the Court that any one of the essential elements of s 72D is absent. However, the Registrar bears no onus of establishing the validity of the order.
The issues for determination in the Appeal therefore are:
a)whether Mr Crowther had a child support liability as at 7 August 2013;
b)whether the Delegate acting on behalf of the Registrar was satisfied of the matters in s.72D of the Registration and Collection Act and had the requisite belief at the time the Decision was made; and
c)whether there were reasonable grounds for the Delegate to be satisfied of the matters in s.72D of the Registration and Collection Act and to hold the requisite belief.
Child Support Liability
Mr Crowther’s liability in the present case arises under s.72E(a) of the Registration & Collection Act as it is a registrable maintenance liability of a kind mentioned in s.17 of the Registration & Collection Act because:
a)it is a liability of a parent (Mr Crowther) to pay a periodic amount to a parent carer of the children for the maintenance of the children; and
b)it arises under a court order or registered maintenance agreement or is a collection agency maintenance assessment.
As at 7 August 2013, Mr Crowther had an amount payable under the registrable maintenance liability which was a child support debt of $44,990.25 ($7,845.18 owing to the second respondent and $37,145.07 owing to the first respondent): Mr S's Affidavit at [8], and the day on which this debt became due and payable had passed.
For the purposes of the Appeal, the child support liability that existed at the time the Registrar made the DPO is the child support liability which must be taken into account for the purposes of s.72D(1) of the Registration & Collection Act: Albaugh at [27] per Sexton FM and Russo at [16]-[17] per Sexton FM. Mr Crowther in his submissions has not disputed that he had a child support liability, but claims that he was unaware of the amount of the debt until 2013.
There were reasonable grounds for the Registrar to be satisfied that Mr Crowther had a child support liability, namely:
a)the records held by the Department showing that Mr Crowther had a child support debt: Mr S's Affidavit at [5] and Annexure D;
b)a transaction statement which shows that Mr Crowther had a child support debt: Mr S's Affidavit at [4] and Annexure C; and
c)that there were no outstanding non-agency payments issues identified in the records held by the Department: Mr S's Affidavit, DPO Submission at page 32.
The Court accepts that as at 7 August 2013, Mr Crowther had a child support liability for the purposes of s.72D(1) of the Registration & Collection Act.
No satisfactory arrangement for the child support liability
Prior to the issue of the DPO, Mr Crowther told an employee of the Department that he could pay $100 a month in child support. Given that as at 7 August 2013 Mr Crowther had:
a)a current child support liability of $44,990.25; and
b)an ongoing liability of $1,706.42 per month,
a payment of $100 per month would not cover either the current or the ongoing liability, and the arrears would continue to grow. There is otherwise no evidence to indicate that any arrangement satisfactory to the Registrar was in place which would facilitate Mr Crowther wholly discharging his child support liability: Registration & Collection Act, s.72D(1)(b).
There were therefore reasonable grounds for the Registrar to conclude that there was no satisfactory arrangement in place for Mr Crowther to wholly discharge his child support liability.
Persistent failure to pay child support liability without reasonable grounds
The DPO Submission states that the employee who prepared the DPO Submission was satisfied that Mr Crowther had persistently and without reasonable grounds refused to pay his child support. The Delegate accepted the DPO Submission.
The DPO Submission notes that there had been limited contact with Mr Crowther in the 12 months prior to the DPO Submission, with voicemail messages left on his phone but not returned. It further noted that Mr Crowther had said that he had been overseas for 12 months and was unaware of increases to his assessments. He said that he had not been receiving online letters and the DPO Submission noted that some of the online letters to him from the Department were marked as unread.
The DPO Submission summarised telephone conversations with Mr Crowther and noted that Mr Crowther said that he was presently not working and could only afford to pay $100 per month toward the arrears until he found employment. Mr Crowther further said that he was unable to pay the debt using credit cards or by asking family members for assistance.
The DPO Submission also refers to a number of searches conducted to assess Mr Crowther's capacity to pay. The searches showed that:
a)Mr Crowther last lodged an income tax return for the 2011/2012 financial year. Mr Crowther earned income from (omitted) and The Trustee for (omitted) Super;
b)information received from (omitted) Bank in September 2012 showed that Mr Crowther had a home loan that required him to pay $2,078.67 per month, with additional payments of $279,303.41 having being made. The information from (omitted) Bank further showed that Mr Crowther had paid out his home loan on 6 July 2012;
c)the information from (omitted) Bank also showed that as at September 2012 Mr Crowther had 3 credit cards, with respective credit limits of $13,000, $6,000 and $15,000;
d)a number of substantial payments had been had been applied to the credit cards in June and July 2012; and
e)information from (omitted) Bank received in August 2012 showed that Mr Crowther held a further credit card with a credit limit of $11,500.
The DPO Submission notes that Mr Crowther had capacity to pay out his home loan in July 2012, and that in September 2012 he had combined available credit on his credit cards of $31,826.03, which was more than his child support debt at the time.
The DPO Submission further notes that Mr Crowther's passenger card and previous tax returns show that his usual occupation is a (occupation omitted) and that the average weekly wage for a (occupation omitted) professional of Mr Crowther's age is $1815.
The Registrar says that in addition to the above matters there were other matters upon which he was able to be satisfied that Mr Crowther had persistently and without reasonable grounds refused to pay child support, namely:
a)the transaction statement showing that since the debt increased as a result of adjustments on 3 April 2012, Mr Crowther had made no effort to address any of this debt. Mr Crowther continued to pay ongoing monthly payments until July 2012. Since Mr Crowther's ongoing monthly liability increased from $102.17 per month to $1,570.25 per month in August 2012, Mr Crowther's payments decreased and his debt increased. From December 2012 until the DPO was made, Mr Crowther paid child support of only $50 per month; and
b)information received from Mr Crowther's banks shows that Mr Crowther:
i)paid out a home loan in July 2012 having made additional payments of $279,303.41 in order to do so; and
ii)between May and July 2012, made a number of significant payments toward his credit card debt, while at the same time taking no action to address his child support debt;
c)that Mr Crowther had the potential to earn a reasonable income; and
d)that Mr Crowther had high taxable incomes in some of the recent financial years, including a taxable income of $204,000 for the year 2011-2012. Mr Crowther’s lawyer advised the Department on 6 August 2013 that $180,000 of Mr Crowther's income for the year 2011-2012 was a superannuation payment. Even if this is the case, it shows that Mr Crowther had access to a substantial sum of money and did not apply it to his child support debt.
The DPO Submission under the heading 'Enforcement Action' refers only to occasions on which the Department has intercepted Mr Crowther's income tax refunds.
The Department intercepted Mr Crowther's tax refunds on 28 May 2013, 9 November 2011 and 15 November 2010.
There is other information in the DPO Submission that the Registrar submits are actions in relation to recovery of debt. These include the following:
a)the DPO Submission refers to an 'Enforcement CAL' being issued, without any response being received. An 'Enforcement CAL' is a letter sent to a person requesting that they contact the Department within a certain period, and which also specifies that any failure to do so may result in enforcement action being taken;
b)information under the heading 'System Checks' suggests that the Department conducted searches of the records held by the Australian Taxation Office, Austrac, property searches and VEDA searches. These are all steps taken to enable the Department to gain a better understanding of Mr Crowther's overall financial position to assist the Department in forming decisions about appropriate ways to attempt to recover any outstanding child support liability; and
c)information under the heading 'Information Gathering' suggests that the Department issued notices to banks pursuant to s.120 of the Registration & Collection Act requiring the banks to provide information and documents in relation to Mr Crowther. It further shows that the Department obtained a copy of Mr Crowther's passenger card and conducted a Mascot search. These too are steps taken to enable the Department to gain a better understanding of Mr Crowther's overall financial position and to assist the Department in deciding the appropriate course to recover outstanding child support.
Given the often short time frames within which DPOs are made, the Court accepts that the employee of the Department who prepared the DPO Submission made reasonable inquiries in relation to Mr Crowther's financial position. Although Mr Crowther told the Department that in July and August 2013 he was unemployed and unable to pay the debt immediately, the financial information available to the Delegate shows that Mr Crowther had access to significant sums of money during the period in which the debt accrued, and chose to apply it to expenses other than his child support debt.
Mr Crowther focuses on a contention that it was not reasonable for the Delegate to conclude that Mr Crowther had persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay his child support, and for this reason, the DPO should be set aside. In summary, Mr Crowther's submissions appear to be that the information relied upon was incomplete and that he did not have capacity to pay the debt. He also says that he could not or did not access child support letters and was unaware of the debt.
Mr Crowther's assertion that he was unaware of the debt until he returned to Australia, was one which it was open and reasonable for the Delegate to give little weight to. In relation to some online letters, there was not even an attempt on Mr Crowther's part to open them, and there were other ways in which Mr Crowther could have ensured that he was aware of matters related to his child support, such as by contacting the Department to ascertain the content of letters he was unable to open, requesting the letters be mailed to him, or appointing a representative to receive letters on his behalf. In any event, it is plain that Mr Crowther was both in contact with the Department throughout the relevant period, and knew he had a child support liability, because he continued to pay $50 a month toward that liability.
The capacity to pay to be considered by the Registrar is not restricted to the capacity to pay on the day that the DPO is to be issued. The capacity to pay is a factor to be considered in the context of a persistent failure to pay child support liability: Registration & Collection Act: s.72D(1)(c), and therefore the Registrar is entitled to consider whether or not a person had had the capacity to pay the child support liability during the period of failure to pay, not just on the day on which the Registrar looks to issue the DPO.
In all the above circumstances, the Court considers that reasonable inquiries were made, and that it was open to the Delegate, and therefore there were reasonable grounds for the Delegate, and hence the Registrar, to conclude that Mr Crowther had persistently and without reasonable grounds refused to pay child support. In particular, the Court observes that at a time when Mr Crowther was aware that he had a child support liability, he chose to pay off a home loan, and chose not to further encumber his credit card facilities by paying his child support debts.
Were there reasonable grounds for the Registrar to be satisfied of the s.72D factors?
Having regard to the matters set out above the Court considers that there were reasonable grounds for the Registrar being satisfied that each of the factors under s.72D of the Registration & Collection Act was met.
Desirable to make the DPO
The requirement that the Registrar be satisfied that it is desirable to make a DPO has been considered in previous cases. In Whittaker & Anor v Child Support Registrar & Anor [2010] FCA 43; (2010) 264 ALR 473; (2010) FLC 98-049 at [291]-[292] per Lindgren J (“Whittaker”) the Federal Court, said:
[291] ...Generally speaking, the terms of s 720(1) show that a DPO is intended to “ensure” that a person does not depart from Australia without either wholly discharging his or her child support liability or making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for its discharge. While a DPO is not security in a proprietary sense, it is security in a broader sense of procedure designed to prevent recovery being frustrated.
[292] It may be that the present submission is intended to distinguish between a purpose of preventing a particular imminent departure from Australia and a more general prevention of any departure from Australia. In my view even the latter is within para (b) of s.720(1). That is to say, that paragraph is satisfied if the Registrar believes on reasonable grounds that it is “desirable” to make the DPO for the purpose of "ensuring" ... that the person does not depart at any time in the future from Australia for any foreign country without first discharging the child support liability or making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for its discharge.
The approach adopted in Whittaker was followed in Onder & Child Support Registrar & Sari [2011] FMCAfam 430; (2011) 250 FLR 345; (2011) 45 Fam LR 577.
The DPO Submission noted the following departure and arrival dates in relation to Mr Crowther's travel to and from Australia:
Arrival date: (omitted) 2013
Departure date: (omitted) 2012
Arrival date: (omitted) 2012
Departure date: (omitted) 2012
Arrival date: (omitted) 2012
Departure date: (omitted) 2011
Arrival date: (omitted) 2011
Departure date: (omitted) 2011
Arrival date: (omitted) 2011
Departure date: (omitted) 2011
Arrival date: (omitted) 2011
Departure date: (omitted) 2011
Arrival date: (omitted) 2011
Departure date: (omitted) 2011
The DPO Submission suggested that Mr Crowther is a flight risk and that he has a wife and new baby overseas and has stated an intention to return overseas if he cannot find work in Australia.
Litigation was not considered to be an option as no assets in Mr Crowther's name were identified.
The DPO Submission expresses the opinion that the issue of a DPO will secure the child support debt and encourage payment.
At the time the DPO was made, Mr Crowther had been living overseas and had not returned to Australia for a year. The ongoing payments that were made in the year before the DPO was made show that Mr Crowther had not been meeting ongoing child support payments, and rather than any debt being addressed, the debt was accruing and increasing. The absence of assets in Mr Crowther's name within Australia made enforcement by litigation unviable.
In the above circumstances, the Court considers it was reasonable for the Delegate to form the view that it was desirable to make a DPO to ensure that Mr Crowther did not leave Australia without either discharging his child support liability in full or otherwise making satisfactory arrangements to discharge his child support liability.
Was the Registrar satisfied of the s.72D factors?
The Decision to make the DPO shows that the Delegate, and hence the Registrar, was satisfied that the factors under s.72D of the Registration & Collection Act were met, namely that Mr Crowther:
a)had outstanding child support arrears;
b)had no satisfactory payment arrangement to wholly discharge his child support liability;
c)had persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay child support debts; and
d)was reasonably expected to leave Australia, and had a history of overseas travel.
There were in the Court’s view, for reasons set out above, reasonable grounds for the Registrar to therefore be satisfied as to the factors set out in s.72D of the Registration & Collection Act.
Conclusion and order
For the reasons outlined above, the Appeal will be dismissed. There will be an order accordingly.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Lucev
Date: 25 November 2016
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